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In 1991, Robin Blackburn, then editor of New Left Review, argued in a long 
article with the title “Fin de Siècle: Socialism after the Crash”, that “today’s 
moribund ‘Great Power Communism’ is not a spectre stalking the globe but 
an unhappy spirit, begging to be laid to rest” (1991: 5). Although he con-
ceded that “for Marxists, to disclaim any responsibility whatever for the 
October Revolution and the state which issued from it would be wrong” 
(ibid: 9), he believed in the possibility of a new beginning for radical and 
Marxist social theory – especially if theorists not only considered the East-
ern Bloc’s lack of democratic structures, but analysed its economic prob-
lems and failures as well. About one year later, the American political 
philosopher and editor of the left-wing journal Dissent, Michael Walzer, 
seemed more sceptical: 
 
We are in a period of uncertainty and confusion. The collapse of communism ought 
to open new opportunities for the democratic left, but its immediate effect has been 
to raise questions about many leftist (not only communist) orthodoxies: about the 
‘direction’ of history, the role of state planning in the economy, the value and effec-
tiveness of the market, the future of nationalism, and so on. (1992: 466) 
 
Again three years later, American cultural sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander 
observed in the pages of New Left Review that the events of 1989 had to be 
understood as a ‘new transition’: “It is the transition from communism to 
capitalism, a phrase that seems oxymoronic even to our chastened ears. The 
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sense of world-historical transformation remains, but the straight line of 
history seems to be running in reverse” (1995: 65). Calling his article 
“Modern, Anti, Post and Neo”, Alexander described how North Atlantic 
intellectuals had come full circle, arriving again at a world of ideas quite 
similar to what he defined as the modernism of the 1950s.
1
 Towards the end 
of the decade, the British political scientist Andrew Gamble wrote an intro-
duction to a compilation of reflections on Marxism’s future role within the 
social sciences. As a title, he chose the question: “Why bother with Marx-
ism?” and explained: 
 
Nothing quite as cataclysmic however has occurred before in the history of Marxism 
as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 
1989 and 1991. Its significance for Marxism must not be underrated. Despite the 
ossification of Marxism as a doctrine in the Soviet Union, and the open repudiation 
of the Soviet system by Marxists in other parts of the world, the extent to which in 
the previous seventy years the meaning of Marxism and of socialism had become 
inextricably bound up with the fate of the Soviet Union had not been fully appreciat-
ed. (1999: 1) 
 
Gamble saw two alternatives, neither of which appeared attractive to him: 
Marxism could either continue to exist in isolation and as a former shadow 
of itself or else merge with the intellectual mainstream. He pleaded for 
keeping at least some core elements of Marxism – especially the formula-
tion of critical questions on the origins, character and developments of eco-
nomic and social relations (ibid: 4). Finally, the Swedish sociologist Göran 
Therborn diagnosed in an article “After Dialectics. Radical Social Theory 
in a Post-Communist World”, published in New Left Review in early 2007, 
that a post-1945 and – according to him – especially post-1968, Western 
Marxist triangle had been disentangled: social theory as the combination of 
historical social science, philosophy of dialectics and a working-class poli-
                                                             
1 Alexander’s version of modernism borrows from modernisation theory. This 
theory held a hegemonic position within the social sciences from the 1940s to 
the 1960s. Modernisation theorists worked under the assumption that societies 
were coherently organized systems, traditional or modern, developing through 
evolutionary processes towards individualism, secularism, capitalism, democra-
cy (cf. 1995: 67-68). 
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tics aiming at the overthrow of the existing order (cf. 2007: 69). In particu-
lar, the politically revolutionary third dimension had disappeared as a result 
of the historical defeats of Western European social democracy in the 
1970s and 1980s, the intellectual challenges of postmodernism and post-
structuralism, and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. According to Therborn, 
the European Marxist and socialist left was more seriously affected than the 
traditionally weaker, more sober and geographically farther removed Amer-
ican one (cf. ibid: 99-100). However, with regard to both, two decades after 
the events of 1989/91, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and slightly later of 
the Soviet Union is still often characterised as a last stumbling block for a 
tired and disillusioned Western Marxist left, old as well as new.
2
 
This constitutes a paradox because Western Marxism in most of its 
shades had for a long time distanced itself from really existing socialism. 
The paradox was characterised by the British political theorist Norman 
Geras as “a tendency, amongst people who have thought, insisted, for years 
that the Soviet and Eastern European regimes were not a genuine embodi-
ment or product of Marxist belief, to wonder if the entire tradition is not 
now bankrupted by their wreckage – as though the ideas and values of 
Marxism were then, after all, wrapped up in these regimes, as before they 
were said not to be.” (1990: 32) Especially in Britain, numerous studies 
have been published over the last approximately fifteen years which diag-
nose, deplore and criticise the end of Marxism as an intellectual-political 
project. They come up with a variety of explanations for what was, in their 
eyes, an improper ending. Even more surprising than the diversity of the 
reasons suggested – some of which seem contradictory – is the empirical 
                                                             
2 The distinction of old and new left is widely used in Britain and North America. 
The ‘old left’ which developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ry, stood for a more traditional version of socialism with the emancipation of the 
working class as the central goal, changes in the economic order as the means 
with which to achieve it, and socialist or working-class parties and the labour 
movements as the agents which fight for it. The new left, which emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s, aimed at liberating people from various types of structural op-
pression such as, for example, racism, sexism, or imperialism. The new left 
identifies civil rights groups, pressure groups, grassroots organisations, and non-
governmental organisations as the major agents of change – ideally united in a 
‘rainbow coalition’.  
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base on which they are founded. With the exception of Paul Newman’s 
study on Ralph Miliband
3
 (2002), they concentrate either on the journal 
New Left Review or on the individual often seen as its mastermind – Perry 
Anderson
4
 (Achcar 2000; Blackledge 2000; Blackledge 2002; Blackledge 
2004; Elliott 1998; Sprinker 1993; Thompson 2001; Thompson 2007). 
They elaborate on Anderson’s “Olympianism” (Elliott 1998), “Deutsch-
erism” (Blackledge 2004, Elliott 1998), and his and New Left Review’s 
“historical pessimism” (Blackledge 2002, Thompson 2007), the journal’s 
over-reliance on short-lived social movements, its distrust of the British 
working class and its too rosy picture of Third Worldism. Most important 
for the paradox of 1989, the pessimism resulting from the events is inter-
preted as the logical consequence of what Gregory Elliott called the 
‘Deutscherite’ perspective (1998). At its core was the perception, ascribed 
to Isaac Deutscher, of the U.S.S.R. and its allies as non-capitalist and, fur-
thermore, post-capitalist societies, despite their shortcomings (to be ex-
plained with the Soviet Union’s backward economy and hostile environ-
ment) (cf. van der Linden 2007: 139-146).
5
 Deutscher was convinced that 
eventually these deficiencies would be corrected: 
 
Stalinism has exhausted its historical function. Like every other great revolution, the 
Russian revolution has made ruthless use of force and violence to bring into being a 
new social order and to ensure its survival. An old-established regime relies for its 
continuance on the force of social custom. A revolutionary order creates new custom 
by force. Only when its material framework has been firmly set and consolidated 
can it rely on its own inherent vitality; then it frees itself from the terror that former-
ly safeguarded it. (1953: 164) 
                                                             
3 Ralph Miliband, 1924-1994, Marxist political scientist, taught at London School 
of Economics and the University of Leeds, co-founded Socialist Register with 
John Saville in 1964. 
4 Perry Anderson, born 1938, from 1962 editor of New Left Review for almost 20 
years, became editor again in 2000 and stayed on until the end of 2003; he left 
Britain in the 1980s to take up a post as professor of history and sociology at 
UCLA and is seen by many observers as the leading figure in New Left Review. 
5 For a short summary of Deutscher’s perspective, see Marcel van der Linden, 
Western Marxism and the Soviet Union. A Survey of Critical Theories and De-
bates Since 1917 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 139-146. 
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As Thompson pointed out, according to Deutscher’s perspective the princi-
pal achievement of the October Revolution, namely the abolition of private 
property, had in fact never been reversed and thus the Soviet Union stood in 
the revolutionary tradition of 1917 (cf. 2007: 33). It was at least ‘one step 
further’ than the capitalist West. Hence, change towards a version of social-
ism worth the name could be implemented from above (cf. Elliott 1998: 
30). However, there was no guarantee that it would, and the Cold-War 
climate diminished the likelihood of this to happen (cf. Thompson 2007: 
33). Still, it remained more probable than a socialist transformation in the 
West, realised through working-class struggle – especially at a time when 
the working class was declining in absolute numbers and also becoming 
ever more fragmented (cf. Anderson 1992: 279-375). According to Paul 
Blackledge, “this transposition of the extrinsic history of the class struggle 
from the point of production to the global arena of the Cold War effectively 
tied his [Perry Anderson’s; S.B.] vision of socialism to the fate of the Sovi-
et Union” (2004: 99). For those who thought like Anderson, socialist agen-
cy, or at least the possibility of movement towards socialism, rested with 
the Soviet Union, and some of them saw the Gorbachev era as a delayed 
vindication of Deutscher’s thesis. 
Important as Anderson indubitably is for the history of the Anglophone 
intellectual left in the second half of the twentieth century, the question 
arises in how far studies focusing on him suffice as analyses of the prob-
lems that 1989 caused for certain strands of Marxist and socialist thinking. 
Can the Deutscher-based explanation help us to understand the intellectual 
left’s tiredness and confusion after 1989 beyond the specific cases of An-
derson and perhaps New Left Review? Reducing – at least implicitly – the 
history of a non-aligned, heterogeneous intellectual left to a journal (even if 
it admittedly calls itself the ‘flagship of the intellectual left’) and further 
narrowing down this journal to the ideas of Perry Anderson, Robin Black-
burn
6
, and – for its earlier phase – Tom Nairn
7
, entails the danger of substi-
                                                             
6 Robin Blackburn, born 1940, member of New Left Review’s editorial board 
since 1962 and editor from 1981 to 1999, played an active role in British student 
protests in 1968, close long-term cooperation with Anderson, professor of soci-
ology at the University of Essex.  
7 Tom Nairn, born 1932, member of New Left Review’s editorial board from the 
early 1960s until the late 1980s, co-formulated the Anderson-Nairn thesis, 
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tuting accusations of individuals ‘selling out’ their former political convic-
tions for thorough analysis. Many more Marxist and leftwing intellectuals 
than those writing in the pages of New Left Review had deeply ambivalent 
feelings about the changes of 1989 though they had, with Norman Geras, 
declared again and again – at least since 1956 – that the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc did not represent their idea of socialism. 
A major methodological problem for an approach focusing less narrow-
ly on individuals and their political biographies lies in the question of who 
belongs to the ‘intellectual left’ and points to a difficulty that always arises 
once one sets out to investigate the ideas of collectives that are more amor-
phous than, say, political parties or interest groups. I try to come to grips 
with this problem through developing a comparative approach based on a 
clearly defined corpus of sources: political-academic journals. They were 
chosen because researchers of intellectuals generally agree that journals 
form important nodal points around which intellectuals assemble (cf. Bock 
1998: 41). This study embarks on a comprehensive analysis of the relevant 
material in four such publications. Two of them, New Left Review and 
Socialist Register, were British in origin while the other two, Dissent and 
Monthly Review, had U.S.-American roots, and all tried to produce social 
theory with political surplus value. With its comparative focus, thus, the 
study does not only analyse the similarities and differences between the 
journals, but also the possible variance between British and North Ameri-
can intellectuals. The analysis covers those articles in which authors tried to 
make sense of recent developments within the five years from January 1990 
to December 1994. Although these publications did not represent the Brit-
ish and American intellectual left as a whole, they played important roles 
within its debates.
8
 Moreover, although discussions did not end in 1994, the 
time frame is deliberately chosen: five years are short enough to allow for a 
                                                                                                                          
claiming that Britain’s archaic political culture had to be explained with its pro-
to-bourgeois revolution and a later alliance of aristocracy and bourgeoisie; he 
fell out with the editorial board due to different perceptions of nationalism, pro-
fessor of nationalism and cultural diversity at Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology. 
8 This selection of journals allows for a consideration of many of those thinkers 
(and their intellectual environment) whose work is discussed by Alexander and 
Therborn. 
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detailed reading and long enough to explore longer-term trends. Further, 
these five years form a period of crisis in the Gramscian sense: the old had 
died but the new could not yet be born. Arguably, the new came to life 
from the mid-1990s onwards when intellectuals embarked on critiques of 
globalisation, opposition to the incremental acceptance of war – legitimised 
through the UN – as a means of ‘solving’ geo-political conflicts and scepti-
cism over centre-left and social democratic parties’ return to governmental 
power on supposedly neo-liberal platforms.
9
 With this methodological 
design, the study complements the existing historical-biographical long-
term accounts with a comparative analysis of networks or collectives of 
intellectuals. 
There are strong arguments for choosing these publications as cases for 
a comparative study. Some are formal: the journals stand out: with birth 
years between 1949 and 1964, and uninterrupted activity since, through 
longevity and a high degree of personal continuity among editors and con-




, Perry Anderson and Ralph 
Miliband, respectively, the character and perspective of each periodical was 
shaped by one particularly influential, long-serving editor – two of them 
British and two citizens of the United States, though certainly none of the 
journals can be seen as a mere brainchild of its head editor.
12
 All stand for a 
                                                             
9 Socialist Register debated globalisation already from 1992 onwards. But as a 
topic that occupied the minds of a large number of political economists, globali-
sation critique developed from the mid-1990s. 
10 Irving Howe, 1920-1993, literary scholar and political activists, belonged to the 
‘New York Intellectuals’, disapproved of the move of many of his contemporar-
ies from Trotskyism to Neo-Conservatism and embraced a loosely defined 
‘democratic socialism’, became co-founder, with Lewis Coser, of Dissent in 
1954. 
11 Paul Sweezy, 1910-2004, Marxist economist, academic and New Deal adminis-
trator, co-founder, with Leo Huberman, of Monthly Review in 1949, became 
well-known for his work on ‘monopoly capitalism’. 
12 There are numerous discussions on editorial politics and mechanisms of deci-
sion making in New Left Review. The tenor is that Perry Anderson has played 
(and still plays) an extremely important role in its life, even at times when he 
was not the official editor, as in the early 1990s. Anderson’s role was discussed 
by Paul Blackledge (2004), Lin Chun (1996), Dennis Dworkin (1997), Gregory 
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genre of writing that integrates essayistic elements into academic articles. 
Further reasons for this selection of journals lie in their content and political 
outlook. Since they were founded during the early Cold War, most of those 
individuals setting them up belonged to a generation of leftwing intellec-
tuals born in the 1910s and 1920s and politically socialised in the interwar 
years and the Second World War. During that time, it was difficult to un-
ambiguously define one’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union – which stood 
for Stalinist violence but also for a decisive contribution to the defeat of 
Nazism. Whereas it seemed often impossible then to square the circle of 
expressing solidarity with both the U.S.S.R. and with workers’ interests on 
a global scale, after the war it became increasingly difficult to react ade-
quately to the developing block confrontation. With different approaches, 
each of the journals tried to find a democratic-socialist position, a ‘third 
way’ or ‘third space’ that was neither uncritically pro-communist nor dog-
matically anti-communist. They subscribed to a socialist and – with the 
partial exception of Dissent – Marxist ecumenism. Having started their 
political activities in the orbit of radical-left organisations, the U.S. intellec-
tuals associated with Dissent and Monthly Review had already broken with 
Moscow in the 1930s or 1940s or had always been broad-minded Marxists 
rather than ‘party soldiers’ (cf. Diggins 1992: 152). In Britain, they broke 
free from the Communist Party in 1956. The four journals saw themselves 
as critically allied primarily to the labour, peace and civil rights movements 
in their respective countries (as well as internationally) and, in some cases – 
as deliberately following popular-front traditions in coalition building – in a 
critical dialogue with the major political parties of the centre-left. Further, 
the contributors represented a specific intellectual type: they were neither 
closely associated with parties nor, although sympathetic, intimately allied 
with radical movements. They became the first generation of an academic 
left which – to a large degree – substituted ‘theoretical practice’ for in-
                                                                                                                          
Elliott (1998) and Michael Kenny (1995). None of the other journals’ internal 
lives have attracted comparable interest. Perhaps they were run more smoothly 
(Socialist Register, for example, did not work with an editorial committee before 
Ralph Miliband’s death in 1994), yet apparently New Left Review is also an ex-
ceptional case. The other publications are less frequently used as reference 
points for making statements about one’s own political position – a role that, to 
me as a foreign observer, seems quite evident in the case of New Left Review.  
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volvement in political struggles.
13
 Still, they saw themselves as ‘organic 
intellectuals’. Having preceded the student New Left of the late 1960s, all 
the journals sympathised with the student protests but also disagreed on 
certain points. Nevertheless, they provided important orientation for the 
younger new-left generation of 1968. Several student activists of the late 
1960s later joined their editorial boards or contributed articles. In the 
changing political and academic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, the jour-
nals expressed scepticism of (post-)Marxist revisionism and of neo-
Trotskyite approaches. They became severe critics of the rising neo-
liberalism and did not follow many progressives’ turn towards post-
structuralism and deconstruction. Instead, they kept their faith in historical-
materialist and political economic explanations. From their early days, the 
journals acknowledged each other, followed each others’ debates, and 
criticised each other – at times rather heavily.
14
 Finally, most writers in the 
journals shared the view that – despite all the differences they saw between 
their ideas of socialism and the version that had been realised in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union – a self-critical debate was unavoidable.  
A comparative analysis of these journals’ articles faces two difficulties: 
first, it is almost impossible to find journals that can be considered as ‘real’ 
equivalents – not only because of the specificities of the political-cultural 
settings in which the publications try to make themselves read, but also 
because it is of all things the relative uniqueness of a periodical that makes 
it successful and worth reading. The journals in question differ from each 
other in their respective versions of Marxism and socialism, in the breadth 
of political opinion that is tolerated within their pages and in many further 
                                                             
13 This distinguished the journals from others, such as Marxism Today and Inter-
national Socialism in Britain or The Nation and New Politics in the USA, which 
either moved, as a consequence of embracing Marxist revisionism, closer to cen-
tre-left parties, or, because of a different understanding of the relation of struc-
ture and agency, claimed to have a more intimate link to the radical left sections 
of labour and social movements. 
14 It should be noted that several contributors published in more than one journal – 
for example, Daniel Singer in Socialist Register and Monthly Review, Norman 
Geras in New Left Review and Socialist Register, Cornel West in Monthly Re-
view and Dissent, Ralph Miliband in New Left Review, Socialist Register and 
Monthly Review. 
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respects: different levels of theoretical abstraction and fields of empirical 
focus, varying prestige in the academic world, and wider popular versus 
narrower academic recruitment areas of contributors and implied reader-
ships. They are marked by conceptual specificities such as New Left Re-
view’s short-lived sympathies for Mao and Althusser in the 1970s, a left-
wing, critical Zionism among post-Trotskyist Dissenters, Miliband’s theory 
of the capitalist state shining through the pages of Socialist Register, or 
Sweezy’s theory of capitalist development visible in those of Monthly 
Review. Nevertheless, all of them solicit articles rather than simply inviting 
contributions and all of them try to reach a readership spectrum from the 
left wings of the respective centre-left parties in Britain and the United 
States to the many groups of the radical left. The second difficulty arises 
from the limitations of a purely contrastive comparison. It can certainly 
identify differences, similarities and analogies in the intellectual reactions 
to 1989. However, it is an insufficient tool when it comes to explaining the 
paradox described in the beginning of this introduction. Such an explana-
tion requires hypothesising and subsequent hypotheses-testing via compari-
son and contextualization. 
For left intellectuals writing in the journals, the events of 1989/91 con-
stituted a turning point. The Eastern Bloc – whether post-capitalist or not – 
had domesticated Western capitalism because it was perceived in the West 
as a systemic alternative to capitalism. This fuction was left vacant with the 
Eastern Bloc’s demise. Neither the labour movements of the West nor the 
societies and states of the South could be counted on as suitable substitutes. 
Hence, the future was likely to suffer from the imposition of a more brutal, 
‘liberated’ capitalism. In so far, the years 1989/91 constituted a turning 
point. However, the texts published in the journals reacted not only to these 
political, but to discursive shifts. At the time, Dick Flacks suggested that 
“[t]o make social theory is frequently to attempt to make history” (1991: 3). 
The intellectual left saw themselves engaged in a struggle about discursive 
power. Did they still have chances to influence political discourse on issues 
such as the reasons of the failure of state socialism, the designing of alter-





Furthermore, writers asked themselves in how far the events of 
                                                             
15 The problem of finding the adequate term for the political and economic sys-
tems of the states of the Eastern Bloc has caused considerable debate among the 
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1989 marked a caesura that required a rethinking of key components of the 
critical social theory and political analysis they had produced. Did Marxist 
and socialist concepts still prove to be useful for explaining historical de-
velopments and formulating political goals and strategies? It seems that, at 
least for most, Marxism still provided an analytical toolkit when it came to 
explaining social phenomena and developments of the past and of the pre-
sent. For the design of concrete goals and practical political strategies, 
however, many writers moved towards post-Marxism and social democra-
cy. Without systemic alternative, it became next to impossible for the 
Marxists and socialists in focus here to formulate a fundamental political 
disagreement with social democrats and post-Marxists. In this sense, 
1989/91 became an ending, which put intellectuals in a state of existential 
crisis. As a general tendency, this can be observed in all the journals inves-
tigated. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether this embrace of post-Marxist 
or social democratic positions was shared to the same extent by British and 
American texts and by the two different generations, which were represent-
ed among the contributors and editorial committees – one politically social-
ised with the experience of the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, the 
popular front, and the Second World War, the other in the context of wel-
fare capitalism, the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Shortly, what follows 
is a theoretically-informed comparison, elaborating in how far two genera-
tions of Anglo-American intellectuals’ reactions entail an adoption of social 
democratic and post-Marxist assumptions, principles, goals and strategies. 
This study looks into a large sample of articles from different angles. It 
uses a method that could be called ‘deconstructive’: it investigates lines of 
argument in regard to the question of their position on, for example, the 
deficiencies of state socialism (Part III, Chapter 2) or the core values of 
democratic socialism (Part III, Capter 4.1). Considering the narrative inten-
tion of the texts, it nevertheless reads them with questions in mind that are 
in many cases different from the questions the writers addressed in their 
articles and from the purposes their texts served. After introducing the 
Marxist-inspired democratic socialism, for which the journals claimed to 
stand as well as social democracy and post-Marxism, Section III will first 
                                                                                                                          
left in the West. I use the term ‘state socialism’ to confess agnosticism with re-
gard to these debates rather than to take a position within them. For an overview 
of the discussions see van der Linden 2007. 
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analyse articles and passages which were almost emotional – expressing 
thoughts ranging from elation to grief and sorrow over the events of 1989. 
These represent the most personal attempts at coming to terms with the 
historical break. The Section then goes on to investigate more analytical 
reflections. Writers tried to establish what had actually happened in 
1989/91 and why it had happened. Many of the contributions asked in how 
far the Western side should be held responsible for the implosion of the 
Eastern Bloc through stifling its potential to develop. Would the history of 
the state socialist systems have been different without the ‘competition’ 
from the ‘West’ and without the arms race? These articles often contained 
implicit normative comparisons. The systems of the Eastern Bloc had their 
deficiencies – but were these more serious than the shortcomings of the 
systems of the capitalist West? The following chapter discusses the future 
status of socialist theory. If Therborn’s earlier mentioned diagnosis that the 
Marxist triangle had been broken was correct, what would remain of Marx-
ism? Was Marxism simply an overrated theory, a system of thought that 
had been granted the stature of an intellectual giant which was now eventu-
ally cut to size?
16
 Which elements should be retained as kernels of a social-
ist theory and politics? What was their relationship to other social theories? 
If Blackburn’s perception, also mentioned earlier, was right that Marxism 
had to accept responsibility for developments in the Eastern Bloc – what 
would this mean for radical social theory? In how far should Marxists and 
socialists accept the allegation that a logical connection existed between the 
holistic claim of Marxist theory and the authoritarian excesses of Stalinism? 
Should socialists look for alternative ideas and strategies from within and 
beyond the socialist traditions? Which looked most promising? The follow-
ing chapter starts out from numerous writers’ agreement that one of the 
                                                             
16 To understand Marxism as a ‘system of thought’ implies granting it a privileged 
position in explanations of historical phenomena. Rather than seeing it as one 
analytical approach among many, employing Marxism as a system of thought 
rests on the assumption that its explanatory validity – and superiority to other 
theories – is self-evident or proven. Different from this approach is the use of 
Marxism as a ‘spirit of critique’, which means to evaluate historical phenomena 
from a distinctive normative position. Rather than claiming its explanatory supe-
riority, employing Marxism as a spirit of critique rests on the assumption of its 
evident ethical legitimacy. 
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most serious mistakes of Marxists had been their reluctance to engage in 
utopian thinking. What direction could such creative thinking take to start 
designing scenarios for an emancipatory politics? In this context, contribu-
tors spent much time reflecting on the concept of democratic socialism. 
Most of them admitted that a lack of democracy had constituted the biggest 
stumbling block for movement towards a socialist society in political terms. 
However, the implosion was interpreted not just as the consequence of 
political inadequacies; economic problems played an equally important role 
– most seriously the incapability of the Eastern Bloc’s economic system – 
based on centralised top-down planning – to satisfy the needs of its own 
citizens. Consequently, contributors engaged in the debates on the poten-
tially beneficial role of markets as distributive mechanisms in general, and 
of possible structures of market socialism more specifically. Thirdly, within 
this search for alternatives, really-existing models were also investigated: 
these could include socialist systems considered as working more humanely 
or more efficiently than those of the Eastern Bloc, while also extending to 
capitalist systems which had most successfully reconciled the search for 
profit with a welfarist social policy. The final chapter of Section III deals 
with the problem of how to achieve political change. Which parts of the 
world, which classes or collectives within a given society could one imag-
ine as revolutionary or transformative agents? What was the role of the 
capitalist state and its institutions such as elections, governments and par-
liaments? Would political change be organised from above, struggled for 
from below or would it require double pressure from both sides? In this 
context, the question of the necessity of a revolution could not be ignored. 
Did it still make sense to envisage a violent rupture, a revolution in the 
traditional sense, as a prerequisite and a promising starting point for the 
implementation of a socialist project? In addition, intellectuals had to think 
about their own role within an emancipatory strategy. Could they function 
as a transformative vanguard? Or was their task more low-key – did they 
have to feed the political public with critical social theory? Which were the 
groups they should try to reach: political parties, trade unions, social 
movements? Via contrastive comparison of articles and passages within 
contributions, Section III shows a near-universal agreement among radical 
intellectuals that a great deal of new thinking was necessary though there 
was a high degree of disagreement as to what direction it should take. 
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The final part (Section IV) takes the comparison a step further by ask-
ing whether these new directions in socialist thinking need to be understood 
as intellectual moves towards social democracy, post-Marxism, or both. To 
this end, the section discusses what the empirical findings in Section III 
mean for central elements of traditional Marxism and socialism: it tries, for 
example, to identify intellectuals’ positions on the logic of historical devel-
opment, on the necessity of a qualitative break with capitalism and on the 
privileged role of the working class in emancipatory struggles and it juxta-
poses these with the perspectives of social democracy and post-Marxism. 
What can be learned from this comparison is – among other things – that 
old distinctions of revolutionary socialists on the one hand and reformist 
social democrats on the other and of historical-materialist Marxists on the 
one hand and postmodern post-Marxists on the other have lost most of their 
relevance for radical intellectuals in both Britain and the United States. The 
section continues with a summary of the British-U.S. comparison and con-
cludes by reflecting on the longer-term consequences of the events of 
1989/91 for the intellectual left as a political and discursive community. 
The argument to come follows a strictly symmetrical structure: each 
topic’s treatment is analysed for each journal individually, followed by a 
short comparison. This allows the book to be read in different ways: most 
readers will probably be interested in specific topics. They can read the 
relevant chapters or subchapters in Part III in detail. Alternatively, they can 
focus on the contrastive comparison at the end of each chapter. Others 
might want to learn how the individual journals deal with and debate the 
historical conjuncture and turning point. They can use the relevant sections 
in each of the chapters and ignore the others. This structure proves useful 
for different categories of implied readers, even though it betrays the 




II. Analysing the Impact of 1989 on the 
British and the American Intellectual Left 
 
 
1. 1989/91 AND THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIALISM: 
OPTIONS FOR A THEORETICAL DEBATE OF THE 
LEFT ON STRATEGIES AND AGENCIES 
 
Socialists who wanted to remain socialists and continue to work for an 
alternative to capitalism had three major options for reacting to the collapse 
of the Eastern Bloc. For one, they could, of course, simply argue that it did 
not affect them at all. The societies of Eastern Europe had never represent-
ed Western socialists’ version of socialism or they did not even deserve to 
be called socialist at all. Their deformations were the outcomes of Stalinism 
and Stalin’s unrealistic concept of building ‘socialism in one country’. The 
states could not have been reformed from within without collapsing under 
their internal contradictions and conflicts. This position was taken by many 
on the left who were organised in, or sympathised with, the ‘Trotskyist’ 
movement – in Britain, for example, members of the Socialist Workers 
Party, or readers of and contributors to the political-academic journal In-
ternational Socialism.
1
 British intellectuals such as Tony Cliff, Alex Cal-
linicos, and Colin Barker belonged to those who argued it was business as 
usual for socialists. As the introduction has shown, those who did not be-
long to these Fourth-International circles tended to feel more affected. Two 
                                                             
1 The Socialist Workers Party, formerly known as International Socialists, is the 
strongest among Britain’s several Trotskyist parties. For details see Callaghan 
1984, 1987. 
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alternatives for reacting to the events of 1989/1991 seemed to suggest 
themselves. Reading the collapse of the East as the final declaration of 
political bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism, socialists could turn to its main 
rival: social democracy. Although social democracy historically counts as 
the origin of both Marxism-Leninism and a gradual, reformist or transform-
ative approach towards the building of socialism, such attempts at moving 
towards social democracy caused considerable unease. Traditionally, so-
cialists had regarded social democrats as traitors who had made their peace 
with capitalism and abandoned internationalism. To label someone a social 
democrat was often understood (and generally meant) as an insult. As a 
second option, socialists could also embrace post-Marxism. This seemed to 
offer a possible way forward especially for those who saw the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc as a crisis of Marxism in general. Again, such a move 
caused problems. Although post-Marxists claimed to keep what was worth 
keeping from the Marxist tradition, Marxists – and other more traditionally-
minded socialists – accused them of having given up on a whole range of 
realist, materialist, and modern paradigms of thinking about the social 
world and of having taken up too many elements of postmodern and post-
structuralist thinking. Therefore, post-Marxists were also viewed with 
hostility rather than as a collective worth joining. 
If, however, the observations made by Walzer, Alexander and Therborn 
which I quoted in the introduction were correct, socialist intellectuals had, 
as a consequence of 1989, taken over much more from social democratic 
and post-Marxist ideas than most of them would have liked to admit. For 
some, such an acknowledgement would have diminished the status of 
Marxism, which would accordingly no longer function as the sole system of 
reference for their political analyses and self-identification. For others, their 
reluctance might have been caused by intra-left dynamics of distinction and 
factionalism, separatism or even sectarianism. I will come back to these 
questions in the concluding part of this study. First however, the analysis 
needs to establish whether such an appropriation of social democratic or 
post-Marxist ideas did really occur – perhaps disguised by different termi-
nology. 
The remainder of this chapter outlines how to test this thesis and how to 
formulate answers to these questions in a differentiated way. It starts with 
general characterisations of, shortly, the basic principles of the socialist 
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intellectuals close to this study’s journals
2
 and then, a bit more in detail, 
social democracy and post-Marxism. The next chapter provides a general 
characterisation of the intellectual groups, of the historical context in which 
they developed and of the journals in focus. 
 
1.1. The Intellectuals’ Core Ideas of Democratic 
Socialism 
 
Defining even the basic principles shared by the intellectuals contributing 
to the journals constitutes a challenge. The difficulty results from multiple 
factors which include not only the differences in tasks, goals and self-
perceptions between the British and the American left, and the range of 
pluralism to which all of the journals subscribed, but also from the long 
distances and numerous roads which intellectual socialists and neo-
Marxists had travelled from traditional Marxism and socialism (cf. Ander-
son 1976; Anderson 1980; Buhle 1991; Panitch 2001). Consequently, to 
draw a sketch of prototypical socialist positions as they were widely shared 
by contributors in the late 1980s and early 1990s constitutes a risky en-
deavour. The following characteristics should hence be understood as key 
words which intellectuals used as points of reflective departure and fleshed 
out in different ways rather than as facets of a comprehensive and unani-
mously shared programme. However, what radical intellectuals indeed 
shared at the time was the conviction that precisely this orientation towards 
certain key words and principles – to a certain explanatory paradigm – 
distinguished them from other intellectuals who understood themselves as, 
for example, liberal, neo-Conservative, communitarian, social-democratic, 
or post-modern. 
Socialist intellectuals shared the notion that the organisation of econom-
ic life in capitalism depended on the existence of different classes. In turn, 
the emancipation of one of them, the working class, which was forced to 
                                                             
2  This outline is deliberately kept short. More information on the specific versions 
of socialist thought circulated and debated in the British and the American intel-
lectual left in general and in the four journals in particular over the second half 
of the twentieth century will be provided in the historical overview (Chapter 
II.3). 
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sell its labour power to reproduce itself constituted socialists’ most im-
portant goal. Ideally, the classless society of socialism should replace the 
classed society of capitalism. This substitution required a radical shift in 
power structures, which should be achieved, in traditional versions of so-
cialism, by a revolution – the overthrow of the existing economic and polit-
ical order. The necessity of revolution followed from the perception that the 
institutions of the capitalist state tended to act in the interests of capitalism. 
Although crude notions of the state as the ‘executive committee of the 
bourgeoisie’ had long been corrected by sophisticated state theories, radical 
and socialist intellectuals retained the perception that states were not neutral 
but mirrored and often reinforced power differentials in society. Radical re-
distributions of power – the concept of revolution had also been thoroughly 
debated and starkly modified – would become a realistic option only once 
the part of the population which had an objective interest in it – the working 
class – had become sufficiently large and consequently powerful. Hence 
moves towards socialism were most likely to occur, or at least seemed most 
promising, in the most advanced – namely the highly industrialised and 
wealthy – societies. A successful revolution would result in the socialisa-
tion of ownership of at least a considerable part of the industrial and service 
sectors. Proper economic development would then require planning since a 
socialist economy’s guiding principle would no longer be the extraction of 
profit, but instead the satisfaction of a society’s needs. The identification of 
such needs required democratic structures and institutions of decision mak-
ing that were not limited to familiar forms of parliamentary democracy but 
extended to the economic and the social spheres. Socialist democracy 
would thus include public works councils and mechanisms for popular 
planning at all levels and in all important areas of public life. 
At a more theoretical level, socialist intellectuals were convinced that 
their approaches to economic, social and political change amounted to more 
than just a political programme or vision that could either succeed or fail. 
They observed long-term historical trends which seemed to vindicate their 
belief that once a certain stage of capitalist development was reached, its 
substitution by something different would necessarily become possible, 
likely, or even unavoidable. This chance for superseding capitalism would 
arise when capitalism had lost the capacity to solve its inherent contradic-
tions. This approach to history was intimately linked with the principles of 
dialectics – the contradictions themselves would provoke or initiate pro-
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cesses through which to solve them. The most fundamental contradictions – 
those which directly affected people’s abilities to survive and maintain 
themselves – usually emerged in the economic sphere. According to the 
principles of materialism, economic realities prominently influenced all 
other spheres of social life. Hence without first amending the hierarchical 
and exploitative structures in the economic sphere, one would stand only a 
limited chance of exacting a lasting change on hierarchical social relations 
in, for example, the political or the cultural spheres. 
This framework calling for the interpretation of and intervention into 
historical-political developments was related to many different levels of 
social organisation – from the private and micro-sociological to the global. 
And although socialism’s goal was working-class emancipation world-
wide, national states played a prominent role for socialist intellectuals as 
they constituted the arena where most power struggles were fought and 
where social relations and the unequal access to political power were insti-
tutionalised. Nevertheless, in the twentieth century especially, this focus on 
the national state was complemented by a global perspective, which tried to 




Over the decades, numerous tendencies and schools of thought have 
emerged which have tried to refine all the elements presented in this rough 
sketch in several ways. Generally, these attempts at fine-tuning took the 
direction of replacing more apodictic and determinist conceptions with 
more circumspect and open ones. Still, even if socialist intellectuals accept-
ed ideas that, for example, the abolition of a hierarchical class system 
would not automatically end the oppression of women by men, or that, 
under conditions of parliamentary democracy, roads to socialism might ex-
ist which would differ from a narrow concept of a revolutionary overthrow 
of the existing order, they would still contend that without putting an end to 
class exploitation, equality between women and men remained impossible 
and that meaningful democracy required a much more equal distribution of 
                                                             
3  In this context, the works of a number of social scientists became widely dis-
cussed and were subsumed under labels such as dependency theory and world 
system theory. Some representatives of these theories (for example, Samir 
Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, or Immanuel Wallerstein) contributed to the journals 
discussed in this study.  
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power in society. Hence, in the second half of the twentieth century, radical 
and socialist intellectuals retained such a set of core assumptions whose 
consideration was indispensable for any fruitful reflection on democratic 
socialism. In this sense, socialism continued to be influenced by Marxism 
and continued to constitute a system of thought. 
 
1.2. Social Democracy as a Model and Social Democratic 
Parties as Agents of Change? 
 
Social democracy is a Western and specifically a North Western European 
phenomenon. Social democratic parties and governments have considerably 
influenced the political, social and economic landscapes of Germany, Brit-
ain, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavia and later, to a certain 
extent, also France. Though a real equivalent to social democracy does not 
exist in North America – a phenomenon that has occupied the reflections of 
scholars from Werner Sombart to Göran Therborn – it shares a great deal 
with strands of American liberalism in terms of ideas and practical policy. 
It even seems as if Democratic policy, from the New Deal via the uneasy 
embrace of ‘post-materialist’ issues to the Clinton-style ‘New Democratic’ 
‘third way’, has often preceded, and provided a model for social democrats. 
Social democracy’s roots lie in the labour and socialist movements 
which developed from the mid-19
th
 century onwards, to whose demands it 
intended to give a political voice: “Social democratic policy crucially links 
politics with needs and material interests. What is more, political prefer-
ences flow from interest, and interests have a collective, as well as an indi-
vidual, basis” (Krieger 1999: 17). Since the times of Eduard Bernstein, 
social democrats have accepted parliamentary democracy. They set out to 
start a transformation of the economic order. Hence, they followed a gradu-
alist logic of social change, legitimised through majority support, which 
would give moral authority to ballot-box or parliamentary socialism.
4
 Opin-
ions differed and changed over time as to whether socialism could only be 
started within capitalism or whether it could also be completed within it. In 
any case, mass support was required for, on the one hand, winning majori-
ties. On the other hand, for many social democrats mass support of a more 
                                                             
4  For the problematics of parliamentary socialism see Miliband 1962, Przeworski 
1985, Panitch & Leys 1997.  
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activist kind counted as a necessary prerequisite for moves towards social-
ism. Important as parliamentary work was, it would be more effective if 
accompanied and reinforced by extra-parliamentary pressure, especially in 
the work place. Otherwise, power differences in society – linked with the 
ownership of the means of production – were likely to disadvantage work-
ing-class interests against those with more political leverage. In Britain, 
where the Labour Party was established – and for most of its history pre-
dominantly financed – by the trade unions, it became common to speak of 
the industrial and the political wing of the labour movement. 
Social democrats’ idea of socialism was first of all pragmatic and aimed 
at improving the living conditions of the working class. For some, this was 
social democracy’s whole purpose, while others interpreted this approach 
as part of a Gramscian ‘war of position’ over hegemony in society. As 
Przeworski argued, capitalism was not necessarily irrational but offered 
chances to practice a limited functional socialism (cf. 1993: 836). However, 
for a long time, a rhetorical commitment to some tenets of Marxism was 
maintained – the West German and Austrian social democratic parties 
dropped the declared goal of the socialisation of the means of production in 
the late 1950s, the British Labour Party kept it until 1995. In this sense, 
social democracy constituted a “hybrid political tradition of socialism and 
liberalism” (Padgett & Paterson 1991: 1) and pursued a reformist or trans-
formative rather than a revolutionary strategy. As long as they propagated 
some type of socialism, they generally understood it as a socialisation of 
(parts of) the means of production. However from as early as the 1920s 
onwards, this position stood at loggerheads with the ‘politics of compro-
mise’ which social democrats actually pursued – in their own view for good 
reason: 
 
They find the courage to explain to the working class that it is better to be exploited 
than to create a situation which contains the risk of turning against them. They 
refuse to stake their fortunes on a worsening of the crisis. They offer compromise; 
they maintain and defend it. (Przeworski 1985: 46) 
 
On the national level, their first spells of government were far from impres-
sive. Shaken by sharp controversy with the Leninists in the recent past and 
also by the tragic abandonment of a commitment to internationalism on the 
eve of the First World War, when in power in the 1920s, they remained 
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fiscally orthodox and administered ‘pragmatically’ over the many crises of 
the difficult interwar years. There were, however, important and socially 
ambitious activities – such as Poplarism– on the level of the local state.
5
 At 
the national level, the turning point came with Keynesianism. It provided a 
route for leaving fiscal orthodoxy behind while leaving large parts of the 
capitalist logic and structures in place. With Keynesianism, it seemed pos-
sible to achieve more equality in society and to improve the living condi-
tions of working-class people without disturbing the supposed positive 
sides of capitalist economic dynamics. It could be embraced by those who 
accepted capitalism for the time being, but also by those who subscribed to 
the ideal of ‘collective sovereignty’, the creation of democratic procedures 
by which people could change institutions and decide over the allocation 
and distribution of resources. All this seemed easy and relatively uncontro-
versial so long as growth could be stimulated and distributive policies did 
not necessarily amount to a zero-sum game. 
The Keynes-inspired 25 years between the late 1940s and the oil crisis 
of 1973 became social democracy’s golden age. While Keynesianism and 
governmental economic planning had already been applied earlier in Swe-
den and in the United States of the New Deal years, after the end of the 
Second World War, a whole group of – comparatively wealthy – countries 
created mixed economies, in which key industries were either transferred to 
national or publicly controlled ownership. In the early period, planning 
played a prominent role though it lost importance in most countries after 
only a few years. Przeworski’s ‘functional socialism’ took the shape of 
welfare states which provided universal services of widely varying generos-
ity in order to enhance social security and material equality. The gap be-
tween the richest and the poorest sections of the population became nar-
                                                             
5  The East London borough of Poplar became famous for its early attempts at 
creating a local welfare state from below. The Labour-led council insisted on 
paying adequate levels of poor relief and refused to cut municipal workers’ 
wages in the 1920s. They demanded a fairer distribution of rate revenue within 
London, meaning a transfer of money from richer to poorer boroughs and were 
sentenced to jail for passing ‘illegal’ budgets. Eventually they succeeded in set-
ting up a new system of basic welfare support in the city. Similar struggles took 
place in Westham, Chester-le-Street and Bedwelty (cf. Lansley, Goss & Wolmar 
1989: 2). 
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rower. However, as already mentioned, Keynesian welfare capitalism de-
pended on economic growth, a constantly high demand for goods and ser-
vices, and a balanced increase in wages and productivity. Growth-
dependent welfarism became the most acceptable egalitarian doctrine for 
most West Europeans and North Americans in a world split into a ‘free 
West’ and a ‘communist East’. Even most conservative and Christian-
democratic parties subscribed to this doctrine, though controversy persisted 
over its details and its political purpose. 
At this stage, it seemed as if reformist social democracy had irrevocably 
won over transformative social democracy – a fundamental change in so-
cial relations, even if to be achieved gradually, seemed off the agenda. 
Although the leading British theorist of ‘revisionism’, Anthony Crosland, 
suggested as late as 1963 “to replace competitive social relations by fellow-
ship and class solidarity, and the motive of personal profit by a more altru-
istic and other-regarding motive”, social change was restricted to attitudinal 
issues (1963: 56). In his influential book, The Future of Socialism, Crosland 
had outlined a version of a social democratic society in an age of affluence 
which he considered to be almost completely realised in Britain: a certain 
degree of economic democracy had been achieved, a democracy of con-
sumers had emerged, and class differences had become much less visible. 
Residues of poverty and social problems remained, but could be solved by 
technocratic solutions such as via reforms in the education system. Cros-
land anticipated that post-materialist quality-of-life issues would become 
more important and eventually also lead to democratisation in the field of 
cultural life. Similar views were expressed in the new programmes of the 
German and Austrian social democratic parties (although still as goals to be 
realised rather than already attained) and also by North America based 
economists such as Joseph Schumpeter (1954) and John Kenneth Galbraith 
(1958). In sum, social democrats had made their peace with capitalism, 
embraced liberal democracy, restricted themselves to rectifying the most 
glaring anachronistic and residual injustices and inequalities. Nevertheless, 
frequency of use of the term ‘socialism’ varied in different political cultures 
and depended on the perceived pressure among social democrats to distance 
themselves from anything that could be turned into associating their parties 
with those of Eastern Bloc states. With working-class people participating 
in consumption and becoming culturally less distinguishable from members 
of the middle class, it also became less advisable to retain class-struggle 
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rhetoric for domestic-electoral reasons. Extending their appeal to the new 
and secularised middle classes, social democratic parties tended to reinvent 
themselves as what Otto Kirchheimer had called “catch-all parties” (cf. 
1990[1966]). This idea of social cohesion and class collaboration found its 
institutional expression in corporatism – concerted fine-tuning and global 
steering of economic development by government, trade unions, and feder-
ated employers’ organisations, all subscribing to scientific methods for 
technological modernisation. Padgett and Paterson argue that with these 
vaguely defined ideas, social democracy achieved a hegemonic position in 
Northern European political discourse, but this discourse, according to 
them, was ideologically empty (cf. 1991: 38). 
In several countries, Britain among them, revisionism did not go uncon-
tested. Left wingers were critical, maintaining that the goal of social equali-
ty had been translated into equal opportunities to participate in consumption 
and economic reform into rationalisation (cf. Padgett & Paterson 1991: 37-
38). While before the late 1960s or early 1970s the left within social de-
mocracy was generally weak, it then profited from two developments: on 
the one hand, the Keynesian model of accumulation ran into difficulties and 
seemed to have reached its limits. Economic growth and increases in 
productivity slowed down. As a consequence, distributive struggles reap-
peared and – as they usually did, according to Panitch – also reappeared 
within social democratic parties (cf. 1988: 357). On the other hand, with 
activists from the late-1960s New Left, a new radical, ‘post-materialist’, 
section of the middle class joined parties of the centre-left. They criticised 
the narrow ‘economic rationality’ of welfare capitalism which was suppos-
edly responsible for killing people’s creativity, exploiting third-world so-
cieties, threatening the environment, leading murderous wars, and repro-
ducing social divisions along the lines of class, ethnicity, and gender. As 
alternatives, they propagated grassroots democracy and people’s empow-
erment, throughout society and within the parties themselves. New distribu-
tive struggles and new-left ideas met in reflections and experiments like 
‘autogestion’ in France, the shop stewards movement, the Institute of 
Workers Control, and the Labour Party’s Alternative Economic Strategy in 
Britain, or the ‘Meidner plan’ (the incremental transformation of companies 
into workers cooperatives) in Sweden. Based on varieties of neo-Marxist 
analyses of monopoly capitalism, these social democrats started thinking 
about qualitative growth, market socialism, rainbow coalitions, and work-




 On the national level, these initiatives soon ran into 
difficulties – in Britain in the late 1970s, in France and Sweden in the early 
1980s. The social democratic New Left lacked a strategy for how to deal 
with the powerful resistance by financial institutions and the business 
world. On the local level they were more successful: in Britain the ‘New 
Urban Left’ and their ‘local socialism’ experimented for some time with 
grassroots democracy and at least partly and temporarily managed to unite 
different groups of the population against Thatcherite policies. Occasional-
ly, activists were able to introduce elements of grassroots democracy in the 
parties themselves at both local and national levels. 
Eventually however, the new-left momentum was lost. First, many for-
mer Keynesian revisionists made their peace with monetarism or neo-
liberalism. Padgett and Paterson see this as “a natural evolution of revision-
ist social democracy in a period of recession – the ideology of growth man-
agement became one of crisis management” (1991: 50). Secondly, parts of 
the New Left adapted to the ‘new realism’ as well. They continued to pur-
sue their projects of socio-cultural liberation and emancipation, but disen-
tangled them from a general critique of the – by now much leaner – capital-
ist welfare state. ‘New realism’ implied an acceptance of the structural 
changes which governments of the right had introduced in Britain, the 
United States, and Germany in the 1980s; it meant the turn to some vaguely 
nationalist project of modernisation in France; and it evoked moves towards 
the European Community in Sweden. No one within social democracy 
came up with comprehensive alternatives to the by now firmly established 
neo-liberal regime of accumulation. Whereas the revisionists of the 1950s 
had changed social democratic parties from class-based to catch-all organi-
sations, the new realists of the 1980s and 1990s transformed them from 
centre-left into centrist ones.
7
 Social democracy’s new programmatic open-
ness – characterised as flexibility by its supporters and as vagueness by its 
opponents – was compensated for through ‘charismatic leadership’ and 
                                                             
6  In many cases, invitations to workers to participate in decision making on eco-
nomic policy followed a double rationale of empowering them while simultane-
ously persuading them to accept wage increases which were only moderate – an 
attempt at tackling what many politicians identified as the main problem of the 
1970s: rising inflation. 
7  Scandinavia was, to a certain degree, the exception to this trend. 
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increasing reliance on political marketing strategies. Still, in many societies 
new parties and organisations emerged to occupy the space on the left 
vacated by social democracy – the perspective that it remained necessary to 
seriously reform or even transform capitalism. 
The claim that there never was socialism in America (meaning Anglo-
America and especially the United States) is, of course, incorrect. That 
socialist and social democratic parties never attained the level of mass 
support on which they could rely in large parts of Europe is another matter.
8
 
A number of explanations exist for this difference: in areas of the United 
States where socialist tendencies mustered some political strength, they 
faced massive persecution and suppression. The ‘Red Scare’ and the years 
of McCarthyism constitute only two tips of an anti-socialist iceberg. Fur-
ther, as an immigrant country with a moving frontier, expansion of territory 
for settlement acted as a safety valve against unrest due to social inequali-
ties. Moving elsewhere – as an individual – proved an attractive alternative 
to collective political pressure. Even if this chance constituted a myth rather 
than reality for poor working-class people, the idea of geographical mobili-
ty helped to maintain social tranquillity in the United Sates (cf. Howe 
1985). Still, U.S. society harnessed the idea of equality. Although this was 
first of all understood as an individual’s equal right to be ‘free’, it also had 
a collective dimension. Groups excluded from the equal right to be free, 
demanded inclusion into this category as groups.  Unlike in Europe, where 
people organized via social class lines, since the era of Jacksonian democ-
racy, in the United States these groups were very often ethnic, as immigra-
tion societies are likely to invite solidarity and collectivism along ethnic 
lines.
9
 It stands that many of the ideas, ideals, interests and demands ex-
pressed in and around social democracy in Europe, were expressed within 
the broad framework of American liberalism. Standing generally for a 
progressive political orientation, from the late 19
th
 century onwards, liberals 
                                                             
8  For detailed histories of the American left see: Aronovitz 1996, Buhle 1991, 
Diggins 1992, Weinstein 2004. 
9  Göran Therborn argued that the European route through the twentieth century 
was characterised by class conflicts fought along the lines of sophisticated ideo-
logies. The North-American path, on the other hand, consisted of conflicts about 
exclusion and demands for inclusion which very often activated ethnic identifi-
cations and solidarities (cf. 2000: 19-20). 
1989/91 AND THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIALISM | 33 
 
predominantly clustered around the Democratic Party even though for a 
long time the Republican Party also had a liberal wing. 
The overlap of socialist, social democratic and liberal values is not sur-
prising. All grew from the same roots – the Enlightenment and the bour-
geois revolutions from the late 18
th
 to the mid-19
th
 century. Both revolu-
tionary socialists and gradualist social democrats considered themselves to 
be those thinkers who took liberalism more seriously than anyone else. 
They aimed at developing the material and economic base upon which 
liberalism could prosper: social equality. American liberals differed from 
revolutionary socialists in so far as they did not consider themselves as 
revolutionaries. They saw the United States as a post-revolutionary polity 
in which politicians should rely on the institutions created through this 
revolution. Liberals did not conceive of themselves as transformers but as 
reformers, though one could argue that they changed the role of institutions 
and the scope of governmental activity at least as much as social democrats. 
Even so, these changes followed a rationale of compromise rather than 
confrontation to an even stronger degree than in the case of social demo-
crats. 
Since the last third of the 19
th
 century, liberalism in the United States 
had a social, caring dimension. With the Social Gospel Movement and with 
the liberal Republicans, activists and politicians engaged in attempts to 
resolve social hardship and create a common good. They believed in good-
faith efforts, careful and sensitive administration, and in the application of 
scientific methods (as did many social democrats – for example the British 
Fabians of the early 20
th
 century and the technocratic modernisers of the 
Wilson cabinets during the 1960s). To a certain extent, the Populist move-
ment of the late 19
th
 century also embraced social liberalism, though they 
stood for a mixture of radical, liberal, and deeply conservative ideas. Histo-
rians distinguish three major periods of U.S. social liberalism in the 20
th
 
century: the ‘progressive era’ of the early years, the New Deal of the 1930s 
and the ‘Great Society’ efforts of the 1960s. Each of these phases expanded 
the boundaries of governmental activity and weakened (though did not kill) 
anti-statist sentiment. In the first period, Theodore Roosevelt propagated a 
centrally-planned, state supervised economy, in the name of a ‘New Na-
tionalism’. Here, the power of corporations and monopolies (‘trusts’), 
which were perceived as threats to American freedoms, was curtailed. At 
the time, people disagreed about strategies. Some, like Roosevelt, believed 
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that large corporations could be effectively steered into serving the interests 
of the U.S. population. Others, like Woodrow Wilson, were more sceptical 
and suggested to disaggregate them. Both strands developed ideas for a 
corporatist, associational democratic economy. However, liberalism lost 
influence after the First World War and flourished in a modified form only 
with the beginning of the second important period in the 1930.  
This time, the problems consisted of a banking system that collapsed 
under its own irresponsibility, which resulted in a sudden explosion of 
unemployment and poverty. The consequent Great Depression required 
more comprehensive economic interventionism. During the New Deal era, 
a whole range of strategies were tested. Large-scale planning in the private 
sector was accompanied by the disentangling of trusts and the foundation of 
large public sector institutions for economic reconstruction and modernisa-
tion (the Tennessee Valley Authority is probably the best-known example). 
The New Deal increasingly relied on Keynesian approaches to fiscal policy, 
which proved to be the least controversial within the framework of a tradi-
tionally anti-statist political culture. Still, the newly created planning jobs in 
the large New Deal administration attracted many American radicals. 
Hence, during these years, social liberalism had a small left-wing minority 
of declared transformers.
10
 The turn to Keynesianism and the consequent 
identification of under-consumption as the source of economic crises, the 
cooptation of labour unions to corporatist decision making (quite a radical 
innovation in U.S. politics) and later the beginning of the Cold War all 
contributed to a consensus which was in many respects similar to the post-
war consensus in several countries of Western Europe. Expanding con-
sumption through fiscal policies seemed the most suitable strategy for 
alleviating poverty and scarcity and for guaranteeing economic growth. 
Restricting the state’s interventionist role to fiscal policy could square the 
circle of working for a fairer and more equal society while taking into ac-
count public antipathy to state intrusion, associated with the ‘totalitarian’ 
systems of government in the U.S.S.R. and Nazi-Germany. 
 
By the 1950s, this type of social liberalism had achieved – despite occa-
sional backlashes – the status of a hegemonic doctrine in the United States, 
even if the social dimension was neither legitimised via social democratic 
                                                             
10  Some of them later belonged to the early contributors to Monthly Review. 
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rhetoric nor comparable in scope to the emerging welfare states in Britain 
and Germany, let alone Scandinavia. Cheryl Greenberg characterises the 
consensus as “protection of individual rights within a capitalist framework 
of growth sustained by fiscal policies” (2001: 67). This settlement was also 
accepted by the Republican administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon, just 
as Conservatives and Christian Democrats were involved in administering 
the “golden age of social democracy” on the other side of the Atlantic. In 
much the same way that Crosland celebrated the socialism of affluence, 
writers like Lionel Trilling (The Liberal Imagination, 1950) and Louis 
Hartz (The Liberal Tradition, 1955) wrote about a post-ideological era in 
which social liberalism was triumphant. The liberals’ idea of politics as 
statecraft and economic-technocratic expertise meant that they remained – 
in the era of the early Cold War – deeply sceptical about politics as ideolog-
ical struggle, mass political action and grassroots self-empowerment. Hence 
liberals’ relationship with the Civil Rights Movement was ambivalent, and 
in the activist 1960s liberalism’s hegemony became increasingly corrosive. 
The limits of the social liberal imagination prohibited an understanding of 
issues like racism as structural deficiencies of U.S. society. The thought ran 
that such problems should be treated as incidents of individual prejudice. 
In the third period, the substitution of a more active liberalism for the 
cautious liberalism of the 1950s, following from Johnson’s Great Society 
programme, fell prey to the rising costs of the Vietnam tragedy and the 
escalating ideological battle over the Cold War. Johnson’s “war on pov-
erty” was interpreted by some liberals as the introduction of socialism by 
stealth, while others criticised the war in South East Asia as liberalism’s 
moral bankruptcy. Hence the centre-left of U.S. politics, symbolised by the 
New Deal Coalition which had given the Democrats comfortable majorities 
in Washington for a long time, disintegrated from the mid-1960s onwards. 
In the Democratic Party, a search for the soul of liberalism began, which 
first caused a move to the left – culminating in the candidacy of George 
McGovern for the 1972 Presidential elections. McGovern campaigned on a 
platform which included many new-left demands and which mirrored the 
increased influence of grassroots activists on democratic programmes. 
After their candidate lost heavily, the Democrats went through a long pro-
cess of reorientation, in the face of the U.S. economy’s being confronted 
with heavy competition from Japan and Western Europe, the oil crisis and 
inflation, a weakened currency and rising unemployment figures. Like 
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European social democrats, liberals in the United States did not know how 
to react to the failure of the Keynesian model of welfare capitalism, which 
was based on continuing economic growth and rising productivity. The 
Carter administration embodied this confusion, Ronald Reagan suggested 
that government was part of the problem rather than its solution, and when 
Bill Clinton became the first Democratic President after more than a dec-
ade, he declared the era of big government to be over, further lending cre-
dence to Reagan’s diagnosis. Thus by the early 1990s, similar to social 
democrats in Western Europe, liberal political opinion in North America 
had embraced central tenets of the neo-liberal world view and accepted its 
accumulation regime. Like social democracy, social liberalism seemed a 
spent force: the ways forward were third ways. 
Thus by the late 1980s, social democracy and social liberalism seemed 
to be in serious trouble when asked to define the core of their political 
project. Still, ideas of regulating capitalism in order to make it beneficial 
for all members of society had long been propagated. Hence the ideas of 
reformist social democracy, social liberalism and welfare capitalism had 
become deeply ingrained into the political cultures of West European and 
North American societies. A certain level of equality was still seen by 
many as a valuable political goal. The traditional social democratic project 
of a strong state, capable of creating an egalitarian society in material and 
social terms could still serve as the political vision for an intellectual left. 
 
1.3. Post-Marxism as a Re-formulation of, or a Departure 
from, Socialist Strategies for Change? 
 
While social democracy’s history began in the 19
th
 century, the term post-
Marxism appeared only recently, although some theorists argue that the 
body of thought it describes is as old as Marxism itself. Post-Marxism 
developed – under this name – as reaction to a Marxism seen as being in a 
serious crisis, both intellectually and politically. In order to understand 
post-Marxism, one must historicise it, just as it has itself done with Marx-
ism. Post-Marxism constitutes a part of a leftwing intellectual movement 
which reacted to the neo-liberal onslaught of the 1980s and focused in 
particular on its cultural and identity politics. It tried to recapture and use 
the individualism of the New Left for an innovative left project, individual-
ism which had been partly demonised and partly appropriated by Thatcher-
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ite Conservatism and by Reagan and sections of the U.S. right. Post-
Marxism starts out from the proposition that the only chance to resolve an 
allegedly fundamental crisis in Marxism consists of a root-and-branch 
renewal, one which should preserve what is worth keeping from Marxism 
and leave behind everything else. According to Stuart Sim, not even the 
core of Marxist theory is retained. Post-Marxists only rescue some elements 
– picked at random in acts of intellectual quarrying – from “the collapse of 
Marxism as a global cultural and political force in the later twentieth centu-
ry, and reorient them to take on a new meaning within a rapidly changing 
cultural climate” (2000: 1). For post-Marxists, Marxism found itself in 
crisis not only through the events of 1989, but also because it had discredit-
ed itself through lending legitimacy to the exclusive power of state bureau-




Post-Marxists dislike the control aspects of Marxism (particularly as exercised at 
party level), totalising theories in general, the deification of Marx, and subordination 
of the individual to the system that communism demands. They favour pluralism, 
difference, scepticism towards authority, political spontaneity, and the cause of the 
new social movements. (Sim 2000: 3) 
 
Assuming a link between Marxism’s totalising tendencies as a system of 
thought and the suppression of criticism in the states of the Eastern Bloc, 
post-Marxists regard it as one framework of thought among many; it does 
not have all the answers (cf. Gamble 1999: 7). 
The label ‘post-Marxism’ is used in two different ways. On the one 
hand, it serves as an umbrella term for all those who developed more and 
more doubts about the scientific validity and political usability of Marxism. 
In such a wide sense, the label might even include neo-conservatives, such 
                                                             
11  This opinion was not only shared among post-Marxists of course. Robin Black-
burn’s statement which opened the introduction to this study was in agreement 
with this perspective. Still, Blackburn would most likely not have described 
himself as a post-Marxist. New Left Review, however, was sufficiently interested 
in post-Marxism to publish a debate between the leading proponents of post-
Marxism at the time, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and the Marxist Nor-
man Geras, a member of the journal’s editorial board, in its pages (cf. Geras 
1987; Laclau & Mouffe 1987). 
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as the American Irving Kristol, who started their political odysseys as Trot-
skyists. According to Andrew Gamble, the term post-Marxism might be 
applied to a spectrum of theorists who do not know anymore whether to 
assign Marxism the status of a science, a discourse, or a critique (cf. 1999: 
5). In a narrower sense, however, the term is closely associated with the 
work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and especially their controver-
sial book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1986). The authors argue that 
there is a fundamental difference between post-Marxists who have left 
Marxism completely behind and post-Marxists who are concerned with a 
‘radical’ reformulation of the Marxist project or ‘spirit’. Their relationship 
to Marxism is similar to that of postmodernists to modernism, or of post-
structuralists to structuralism. It is a relationship of consideration but at the 
same time of moving beyond. Marxism is historicised as part of the en-
lightenment tradition whereas post-Marxism borrows heavily from post-
modern and poststructuralist theories (cf. Daly 1999: 63). 
Used in the wider, umbrella sense, post-Marxism has a long pedigree. 
Some commentators go so far as to suggest that Marx himself was the first 
post-Marxist. They point to contradictions in his work regarding the rela-
tionship of structure and agency. Wherever he emphasises agency over the 
laws of historical materialism and economic development (which he formu-
lates elsewhere), he already prepares the path for one of post-Marxism’s 
central claims: the dominance of historical contingency, of human activity 
and (political) activism, in shaping historical processes and the subordinate 
or negligible role of a teleological determinism. The discrepancies between 
the prognoses of Marx, Engels and others and actual historical develop-
ments in the twentieth century led to a considerable number of reflections 
on this topic of contingency and determinism, structure and agency. Ac-
cording to Perry Anderson (1976), the whole story of ‘Western Marxism’ in 
the first half of the twentieth century should be understood as intellectual 
attempts to come to terms with unexpected – and, for leftists, far from 
promising – developments, which undermined Marxists’ original historical 
optimism. The most important milestone in re-conceptualising the contin-
gency-versus-determinism problematic in the first half of the 20
th
 century 
was contributed by Antonio Gramsci in his reflections on hegemony. With 
the identification of ideologically hegemonic power blocs across social 
classes, he thought to have found the reason which explained capitalism’s 
failure to collapse. Later, Louis Althusser added the concepts of overdeter-
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mination and relative autonomy to shift the balance even further from de-
terminism towards contingency. Other theorists questioned further central 
tenets of traditional Marxism or, more precisely, their relevance under 
twentieth century conditions. André Gorz and Herbert Marcuse both doubt-
ed the indispensable role of the working class for revolutionary change. 
Rudolf Bahro pointed to Marxism’s blindness with regard to the natural 
limits impairing its vision of a post-capitalist society of plenty. In Britain, 
Stuart Hall and other thinkers close to the journal Marxism Today synthe-
sised many of these issues into considerations on how the left should react 
to the unexpected popularity of the Thatcherite project – also among work-
ing-class people. 
Post-Marxism in the narrow sense stemmed from these British reformu-
lations. It is closely linked, as Sim points out, not only with poststructuralist 
thinking but with second-wave feminism. Often however, post-Marxists 
emphasise their difference from the poststructuralist mainstream. To some 
extent, they distance themselves from the latter’s radical anti-foundational-
ism and anti-universalism. Instead they stick to specific emancipatory pro-
jects and to a normative dimension of political theory. They understand 
discursive operations as struggles rather than games and retain some as-
pects of cultural materialism (cf. Frankfurter Arbeitskreis für politische 
Theorie und Philosophie 2004: 17-21). Along with poststructuralism, they 
share the conviction that what counts as reality is constructed in the discur-
sive sphere and that therefore exchanges within it are of utmost importance. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s title, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, implies that 
they try to design a discursive project with which to argue for both social-
ism and what they call ‘radical democracy’: a plethora of open-ended and 
indeterminate struggles for human emancipation. 
What are the main elements of such a post-Marxist project? Unsurpris-
ingly, there is no general agreement. It seems, however, that post-Marxists 
understand their considerations on social and political issues as a critique 
rather than a holistic theory or an ideology. They emphasise their position’s 
self-reflexivity and its openness to criticism. The reluctance to take criti-
cism seriously had put traditional Marxism on the track of authoritarianism. 
Many post-Marxists still see the critique of political economy, Marx’s 
analysis of the capitalist system, as useful and some would suggest it to be 
Marxism’s most important achievement. Still, they remain unconvinced 
that all history is the history of class struggles, not even in ‘the last in-
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stance’. Instead, they observe the co-existence of numerous struggles 
fought along the lines of people’s different identifications. Neither the 
outcome of these struggles nor the emergence of new ones can be predict-
ed. Post-Marxists are less concerned about the ‘grand narrative’ of the class 
struggle per se, than poststructuralists. Rather, they direct their criticism to 
essentialist conclusions drawn from it. Unlike traditional Marxists, they 
maintain that other types of struggle are not of secondary status in compari-
son to the class struggle and that not all struggles can be referred back to 
class antagonisms. The class struggle is neither superior to other forms of 
social conflict, nor is it inevitable.  
Indeed, many attempts to explain historical change exclusively by qua-
si-automatic mechanisms – where the relations of production become an-
tagonistic to the production process and hence create social conflict – have 
been proven wrong, both frequently and in many parts of the world. Even if 
one saw the analysis of the transformation from feudalism to capitalism as 
correct, this would be of limited use for prognoses on future developments 
of capitalism. Post-Marxists concede that Marxism itself has produced 
various reflections on this issue, but, as already mentioned, the “logic of 
necessity” has very often clashed with the “logic of contingency” (cf. Daly 
1999: 64). According to Glyn Daly, these logics are incompatible but have 
produced a creative tension and thus contributed to Marxism’s intellectual 
advances over time (ibid). For post-Marxists, the tension has been resolved 
by abandoning any remnants of the ‘logic of necessity’. Consequently, they 
cannot envisage an end of history and argue against all kinds of eschatolo-
gies – to use André Gorz’s phrase – of which Marxism is one. Instead, post-
Marxists suggest that all emancipatory movements and projects need to – 
and will – seek power. Thus the future is only imaginable as an unbroken 
sequence of power struggles between emancipatory movements and coun-
ter-movements. Power struggles will be permanent. 
This position assigns a central role to politics as the political process 
must not be reduced to being a mere epiphenomenon of economic relations. 
Post-Marxists unambiguously bid farewell to the base-superstructure mod-
el, even to its refined Althusserian variety of articulations in dominance and 
the determining power of the economic in the last instance.
12
 The post-
                                                             
12  Althusser himself had argued that the moment of the last instance never came 
and should be understood as an abstraction (cf. Sim 2000: 19). 
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Marxist understanding of the political is discursive rather than economic. 
According to Daly, Laclau and Mouffe 
 
have affirmed that nothing can be identified outside the constitutive process itself 
and that all identity, order and objectivity must be considered as fully discursive: 
that is as phenomena which are wholly the result of articulatory and political (pow-
er) practices and which are ultimately prone to other articulatory practices. (1999: 
64) 
 
Post-Marxists observe an incremental return of the political from early on 
in the intellectual history of Marxism, symbolised again, above all in 
Gramsci’s introduction of the hegemony concept. However, whereas for 
Gramsci different economically defined classes allied with each other and 
fought each other over political hegemony, post-Marxists see also these 
fighting and allying groups as discursively constructed. Hence it becomes 
impossible to predict which groups might in which ways create themselves 
to act politically and it would be a futile exercise to risk prognoses about 
the political debates and fault lines of the future. For many post-Marxists, 
involvement in these fluid processes and intervention into the construction 
and negotiation of identities through formulating political values and de-
mands has become the primary task of radical intellectuals. 
Traditional Marxism worked with dialectical methods. This implied the 
existence of identifiable fixed opposites and of processes through which the 
interaction of these creates a new third. Post-Marxists disagreed with such 
assumptions for two reasons. Firstly, they followed a poststructuralist, 
Lacanian logic of the discursive construction of objects and identities. 
These acquire meaning only in relation to each other and hence cannot be 
understood as clear opposites. With this assumption, the very base for a 
dialectical dynamics ceases to exist. Secondly, post-Marxists regard the 
idea that a new ‘third’, a synthesis, would be created ‘automatically’ in a 
dialectical process as dangerous. Unlike traditional Marxists, they do not 
believe that the outcomes of political struggles would necessarily be ‘pro-
gressive’. Solutions to specific problems and controversies, strategies for 
overcoming differentials of power and wealth would not merely suggest 
themselves. Instead, such measures require planning and creative thinking. 
Thus it is important to overcome Marxists’ traditional hesitance to imagine 
a socialist society: post-Marxists consider it a necessary task to design the 
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structures, institutions and workings of a ‘new’ society and to reflect on 
strategies for how to attract people to these models.  
In terms of people, it has already been mentioned that the working class 
is not conceived of as the primary revolutionary actor. Thus attracting 
support is not synonymous with convincing the working class. Not all post-
Marxists bid an unqualified farewell to the working class but – especially in 
the political climate of Britain and the United States during the 1980s – 
they have learned to see working-class people as heterogeneous in their 
political outlook and a considerable number of them as conservative.
13
 Of 
course, this deliberate un-privileging of the working class echoes the notion 
that social relations are characterised by manifold and fluid contradictions 
and conflicts in society which cannot be traced back merely to the ‘master’ 
narrative of the conflict between exploiters and exploited. Post-Marxists 
point to a whole range of issues which have developed, marking them as 
nodal points around which political identifications are created. They also 
expect new points of identification to arise in the future: 
 
[T]he historical expansion of emancipatory discourses (especially post 1968), com-
bined with the critical Marxist identification of the increased dislocatory effects of 
capitalism, reveals a proliferation of the sites of antagonism which present new 
challenges to the social order and which go way beyond traditional questions of how 
we produce or consume. (Daly 1999: 81) 
 
In this context, post-Marxists take note of an increasing individualism 
which has replaced the old working-class collectivism. Political struggles, 
initiated first and foremost by new social movements, are much more about 
the right to be different and to be accepted as being different than about 
equality in the traditional, material sense. People demand space and respect 
for expressing themselves. The political goal of these demands consists of 
giving individuals the power over their own lives – as Gorz has expressed it 
                                                             
13  This was the core of Stuart Hall’s controversial interventions during the 1980s 
in which he characterised Thatcherism as an authoritarian-populist project which 
profited from working-class resentment and exploited working people’s unease 
with Labour’s traditional left programme – supported by many on the intellectu-
al left – and their selling of a ticket on the welfare-state past. For the debate on 
Hall’s interpretation see Hall 1988; Jessop et al. 1988. 
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(cf. Sim 2000: 8). On the one hand, such a politics represents the ‘postmod-
ern condition’ of culturally fragmented and individualised societies. On the 
other, post-Marxists interpret it as a reaction to capitalism’s penetration of 
all areas of life. 
It follows from this approach that the traditional Marxist conception of 
revolution has run its course. An obviously plural radical politics can only 
be imagined as a plethora of different emancipatory struggles. Even if these 
might lead to limited ‘revolutions’ (in the sense of qualitative leaps) in 
particular areas of social life, they need to follow certain standards of be-
haviour. The most important is to accept formal democratic procedures. 
Political actors might struggle for hegemony, but they would not be free to 
choose their strategies. Post-Marxists have made their peace with parlia-
mentary democracy and its formal rules. Laclau and Mouffe remain con-
vinced that the left is nevertheless distinguishable from the liberal political 
mainstream of the time: “The task of the Left therefore cannot be to re-
nounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and 
expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy.” (1986: 348) 
Claiming that they take concepts such as ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’ and 
‘democracy’ more seriously than their opponents, post-Marxists suggest a 
decentralisation of politics and an expansion of grassroots democracy. 
Another writer often characterised as a leading post-Marxist, Paul Hirst, 
spent much time reflecting on the workings of what he called “associative 
democracy” (cf. 1994). The radicalism of this approach lies in the idea that 
decentralisation changes power structures (and consequently power rela-
tions) in society and thus paves the way for a continuous process of democ-
ratisation. Such a process would be a ‘permanent’ democratic revolution or 
a permanent process of reform – not in a teleological, linear or dialectical 
sense but simply because each solution to a particular problem or deficien-
cy, each satisfaction of specific demands is likely to create new problems. 
Post-Marxists call these ‘dislocatory effects’. Such a dynamics of change 
should not be confused with the traditional Marxist narrative of historical 
progress since it is completely open; it is by no means sure that the left will 
succeed (though decentralisation might put it into a stronger position) and it 
will have to defend everything it has successfully introduced. 
Post-Marxists’ utopian idea is moderate. Historically, the establishment 
of socialist structures has proved difficult. The practice of setting-up au-
thoritarian regimes in order to introduce socialism has discredited itself. 
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Social democratically inspired capitalist welfare states, with their top-down 
model of service provision, have also proven incapable of responding to 
many of the more recent emancipatory demands and unable to defend 
themselves against neo-liberal onslaughts. These failures do not testify to 
the meaninglessness of the democratic state and its institutions in capital-
ism. Post-Marxists agree that parliamentary work must be accompanied and 
reinforced by extra-parliamentary pressure in order to succeed. In the long 
run, associations within civil society, decentralised decision making struc-
tures and a dense network of locally organised self-help and pressure 
groups will probably take over many parliamentary and governmental 
tasks. Post-Marxists ideal scenario consists of a snowball effect of continu-
ous democratisation and emancipation. Yet they are still aware that the 
snowball might be stopped or driven uphill (cf. Sim 2000: 26). With such a 
conception, post-Marxists move close to communitarianist models. What 
distinguishes them from communitarianists is their pronounced awareness 
of power differences and hierarchies in society. However, like communitar-
ianists, they tacitly assume that all groups will stick to certain standards, 
conventions and ethics regarding political debate and decision making 
procedures, even if doing so means having to accept unwelcome outcomes. 
Just like social democrats, post-Marxists implicitly take the nation-state 
as their most important frame of reference. Marxism’s anti-imperialist 
internationalism has been replaced by an acceptance of the capitalist world 
system which again can only be changed incrementally (cf. Petras 1998). 
Post-Marxists are aware of the debates on global governance and they seem 
to see a chance for adapting their associational model to the global sphere. 
They envisage a worldwide civil society composed of transnational social 
movements and non-governmental organisations, which become increas-
ingly involved in geopolitical confrontations and ideally transform them 
into discursive struggles over global justice and the emancipation of the 
poor and oppressed all over the world. 
By the late 1980s, post-Marxism was advertised as a possible way out 
of the political and ideological impasse traditional socialist politics seemed 
incapable of finding. It retained many elements of the emancipatory spirit 
of a libertarian Marxism – enriched by the issues raised by the social 
movements of the late 1960s and 1970s – and tried to formulate a new 
political project on this base. It took seriously the criticisms of Marxism’s 
‘grand narrative’ or ‘meta-narrative’ status and the ‘totalising tendencies’ 
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that followed from them. It constituted a radical project whose main em-
phasis was less on egalitarianism and more on self-emancipation, grassroots 
democracy and the vision of a society composed of loosely associated 




2. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH AND THE 
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LEFT AND THE 
JOURNALS ANALYSED  
 
2.1. The Many British New Lefts 
 
The British Left was formed by a very differentiated and rich political 
tradition. At its centre has always been the elaborate interrelated structure 
of the Labour Party and the trade union movement. These unions both 
preceded and helped to set the party up, thereby inscribing themselves in its 
texture and politics. Additionally, the left founded a number of organisa-
tions and other movements, such as the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(influential in a couple of trade unions), a variety of competing Trotskyist 
groups, various currents of leftwing nationalism in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, a social movement radicalism with – already in the 1950s 
– a sizeable peace movement, and several strands of radical (including 
Marxist) intellectual thought.
1
 The latter was comprised of a number of 
individuals who tried to set up a New Left as a “movement of ideas” from 
1956 onwards (New Left Review 1960: 2). For its initiators, the necessity 
of such a New Left, which borrowed its name and some of its strategies 
from the French Nouvelle Gauche, followed from the Communist Party’s 
unwillingness to critically engage with its own history of Stalinism and 
from the Gaitskellite Labour Party’s perceived adaptation to capitalism. 
The New Left formed on the one hand as a backward looking alliance, 
echoing the Left Clubs of the 1930s. However, on the other, it addressed 
issues of the time and stood in close contact with the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament. These and other actions demonstrated the group’s commit-
ment to making socialism relevant for an era characterised by  widespread 
                                                             
1  For a comprehensive history of the British left see Callaghan (1987). 
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private material prosperity, hidden inequalities, the decline of the old indus-
trial centres, the changing relationship between state and economy, the 
‘pluralisation of social identities’, and the threat of nuclear annihilation (cf. 
Kenny: 1995: 5). Its reflections extended into four different directions: 
towards socialist humanism (associated with E. P. Thompson and, later, the 
Socialist Register), culturalism (represented by Raymond Williams and, 
from 1964 onward, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies), struc-
tural Marxism (imported from 1963 onwards by New Left Review) and the 
movement for workers control (personified within the New Left by Ken 
Coates and later institutionalised with the Institute of Workers Control) (cf. 
Chun 1996: 194). 
The New Left developed from two different roots and both set up peri-
odicals – New Reasoner and University and Left Review. The former was 
launched in 1956 after a long era of self-censorship among the Communist 
Historians Group (most of whose members were based in Northern Eng-
land), which came to an end with the crushing of the revolt in Budapest.
2
 
The latter was founded after a number of Oxford and London students 
called attention to the persistence of British imperialism in the same year. 
For Gregory Elliott, these originss defined the New Left’s approach: “The 
product of the European moment of 1956, the British New Left at the outset 
had sought to bridge the mutually injurious gulf between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’, culture and politics, intellectuals and workers, socialist milieu 
and labourist organization” (1998: 7). Both wings shared a number of char-
acteristics, but also differed in many respects. Both were committed to the 
Campagin for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and “positive neutralism” (a 
strategy for British foreign policy that implied distancing Britain from 
super-power politics, creating its own foreign policy and collaborating with 
other, especially unaligned, countries) and opposed the “pathology of anti-
                                                             
2  The relationship between the Communist Historians Group and the leadership of 
the CPGB had been contentious for a long time. The historians avoided topics 
too close to recent politics and concentrated on the change from feudalism to 
capitalism in Britain. Relations became even more fraught when E. P. Thomp-
son and John Saville started publishing The Reasoner as a journal for party in-
tellectuals urging a self-critical assessment of the CPGB’s Stalinist period. For a 
detailed account on the Communist Historians Group see Dworkin 1997: 10-44 
and Woodhams 2001. 
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH AND THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LEFT | 47 
 
communism” (Samuel 1989: 49). However, they regarded the Communist 
Party as “dogmatically theoretical” and the Labour Party as “narrowly 
empirical” (ibid: 43). Thus, they emphasised the establishment of “a politi-
cal milieu that was neither Communist nor Labour, an alternative space on 
the map of the Left” (Dworkin 1997: 66). They wanted their alternative to 
constitute a “third way” between both Eastern and Western military blocs, 
and between Communism and social democracy, consistent with the ‘so-
cialist humanism’ mentioned above. At its core was a strong belief in the 
possibility of grassroots-level human – and working-class – agency (cf. 
Sedgwick 1976: 137). Beyond this optimistic central tenet, they formed a 
pluralist group. Dorothy Thompson, one of the movement’s activists, ex-
plained: 
 
The Left movement which grew up around the journals and clubs in the fifties and 
sixties was a coalition of people with varied religious and philosophical belief sys-
tems who were united around the political concept of a non-aligned European 
movement which would work out socialist policies independently of superpower 
influence and control. Not only did they not represent a single ideological position, 
they were by no means united in their definition of socialism – only perhaps by the 
negative qualities of disillusion with Soviet-style communism and West-European, 
especially British, social democracy. (1996: 94) 
 
For finding likeminded people, they looked not only to the French New 
Left, but also to the United States. Dissent provided both inspiration and 
contributions to the British journal. The American sociologist C. Wright 
Mills’s “Letter to the New Left” was printed in the first issue of New Left 
Review in 1960 and for some even hailed the American Dissent as Univer-
sities and Left Review’s  “sister publication” (Samuel 1989: 44). The British 
New Left was in its majority loosely Marxist, but more attracted by Marx’s 
early writings, more focussed on the ‘humanist’ than on the ‘determinist’ 
aspects, and more interested in ‘alienation’ (and later in ‘hegemony’) than 
in ‘exploitation’. Like others (and despite their commitment to a third 
space), they all struggled with the question of how to relate to the Labour 
Party – a problem that became increasingly urgent when one division of the 
New Left supported the tiny Fife Socialist League in the 1959 election 
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while others stayed with the Labour Party.
3
 Generally, the New Left sought 
contact with the anti-revisionist left wing of the Labour Party (cf. ibid: 50).
4
 
The most important difference between the two sections of the New 
Left was generational. While it has become common to distinguish between 
the first and the second New Left (the second consisting of those who edit-
ed New Left Review from 1963 onwards – Perry Anderson, Robin Black-
burn, Tom Nairn, etc.), the first was already trans-generational: members 
were born either shortly after the First or shortly before the Second World 
War.
5
 Though this is not much in terms of age difference, it explains the 
two groups’ divergent political perspectives in terms of fundamentally 
different experiences: depression, fascism, and army life for the older 
group; affluence, Cold War, and university life for the younger. While the 
older generation wanted to revive the British socialist traditions studied in 
the Communist Historians Group, the younger hoped to develop new ones 
that took the conditions of the post-war welfare state society into considera-
tion. According to Raphael Samuel, the younger generation wanted the 
movement to take “as its starting point the spirit of youth” (1989: 44). For a 
short time, from 1956 to 1962, the New Left indeed became a movement, 
with a well-known café in London as its base, and, at its peak, 45 clubs 
with 3,000 paying members all over the country. However, the clubs de-
clined soon afterwards, as several political manoeuvres led to tactical disa-
greements within the peace movement: the Labour Party first adopted uni-
lateralism in 1960 and renounced it only one year later. In addition, Harold 
Wilson’s succession of Hugh Gaitskell as party leader promised the per-
ceived chance of a leftward move by the Labour Party  
In 1962, another New Left group, commonly known as the ‘Second 
New Left’ formed around Perry Anderson. It accused both generations of 
the prior group of populism, empiricism, and nationalism. The conflict 
                                                             
3  Some New Leftists, like Mervyn Jones and, for a time, Raymond Williams, 
became members of the Labour Party. 
4  Also Peter Sedgwick observed a political-strategic overlap between New Left 
and Labour Left, because both tried to combine utopianism and realpolitik (cf. 
1976: 135-7) 
5  Detailed accounts of the developments, debates and conflicts between the differ-
ent generations of the New Left have been provided by Chun (1996) and Kenny 
(1995). 
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between the two groups was, according to authors such as Sassoon (1981) 
or Thompson (2001), more about style and terminology than about sub-
stance – both stood at the time for similar versions of a radical reformism.
6
 
The fight has often been presented as a showdown between E. P. Thompson 
and Perry Anderson – a perspective that ignores the amicable relationships 
and mutual respect between many of the others involved.
7
 The main differ-
ence was that the second New Left took a politically more detached posi-
tion and became occupied with ‘theoretical practice’, starting a programme 
of importing and familiarising themselves and others with continental Eu-
ropean Marxist theory. All three sections of the New Left were involved in 
initiating far-reaching and original critical approaches towards British 
politics, society, history, and culture. These were institutionalised and ex-
pressed not only in the two periodicals discussed below, but also in many 
other new foundations of the time. 
The relationship between this pre-1968 New Left and the student radi-
cals was not always easy. The activists ignored the first New Left’s May 
Day Manifesto, written by Raymond Williams, which intended to revive the 
original New Left as a response to the negative experience of the Wilson 
governments (cf. Chun 1996: 155-6). Some New Leftists, such as Ralph 
Miliband, John Saville, Stuart Hall, and many in the group around Ander-
son, supported the students, while others, like Thompson, considered the 
1968 revolt as being outside the rational revolutionary tradition (ibid: 168-
                                                             
6  Lin Chun argues that they developed into different directions – for example, on 
the question of how to define revolutionary change: whereas for the Thompsoni-
an first New Left revolutionary upheaval was the exception and piecemeal 
change the historical norm, Anderson believed that the revolution was a necessi-
ty in capitalist democracies due to their repressive tendencies. Miliband was 
convinced that revolutions were under certain conditions but not always neces-
sary – and recommended to analyse in detail the power structures within con-
crete societies and the openings they offered (cf. 1996: 227-8). 
7  Obviously, Thompson and Anderson enjoyed emphasising the bellicose charac-
ter of the disputes and their personal roles within them – see Thompson’s The 
Poverty of Theory (1978) and Anderson’s Arguments within English Marxism 
(1980). 




 In a further parallel to the United States, several of the leading student 
activists, for example the former Black Dwarf editors Tariq Ali and Sheila 
Rowbotham, later joined the editorial boards of the pre-1968 journals. The 
1970s tuned out to be a very creative, but at the same time complicated, 
decade for the British left, with the emergence of new social movements, 
self-experiments of grassroots groups, the rise of radical trade unionism, the 
development of a strong left within the Labour Party, while all these inno-
vations became overshadowed by economic crisis and decline. Further-
more, a turn from neo-Marxism to poststructuralism could be observed on 
the left of British academic life. It affected formerly Marxist publications 
such as the periodical Economy and Society, and academic disciplines, 
especially Cultural Studies. This development was prepared, welcomed and 
supported by a minority of the pre-1968 New Left. However, a debate 
about socialism continued, both in the two journals introduced below, and 
also in other publications such as Capital and Class, New Socialist (spon-
sored by the Labour Party), or the ‘Eurocommunist’ Marxism Today. By 
the end of the 1970s, the feeling of crisis came to dominate left analyses – 
as could be seen in the study Policing the Crisis, edited by members of the 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1978), and Eric Hobsbawm’s 
“The Forward March of Labour Halted?” (1978). Intellectuals disagreed on 
the merits and practicality of the Bennite Labour Left’s isolationist eco-
nomic strategy, the world view and the future of the British working class, 
the correct position towards European integration, and the sense of modern-
ising the British ancién regime as a way of changing power relations in 
society. With the consolidation of Thatcherism (or, to put it differently, 
after a series of catastrophic defeats for the British left from the isolation of 
the Labour Left via the Falklands war and failed protests against rate-
capping by leftwing local councils to the miners strike), they began to ana-
lyse its make-up and the conditions of its relative success and debated what 
these would mean for future socialist strategies (cf. Hall 1988; Jessop et al. 
1988). The New Left’s original idea of combining theory and practice was 
revived in the establishment of the short-lived Socialist Society and later the 
Chesterfield Conferences. 
                                                             
8  The Anderson team disagreed, however, on the issue of ‘red bases’ at the uni-
versities (cf. Sassoon 1981: 248). 
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The multiple British New Lefts had contributed immensely to opening 
up new ways of left theorising in Britain. Thus, for a considerable time, 
they arguably reached their goal of acting as a ‘movement of ideas’ (alt-
hough they only became a ‘real’ political movement for a short historical 
moment in the late 1950s and early 1960s and did not solve all the ques-
tions they had formulated for themselves – for example, on the relationship 
of the intellectual left to the Labour Party, or the requirements of a socialist 
strategy in an age of widespread but selective affluence). The events of 
1989, then, affected an intellectual left that had become pluralized, increas-
ingly detached from political movements and parties, and nervous about the 
unexpected persistence of Thatcherism and its radical reorganisation of 
large areas of public life. 
 
2.2. New Left Review and Socialist Register 
 
New Left Review 
The number of scholarly contributions to the history of New Left Review 
testifies to its crucial importance for the British – and as several writers 
would claim, for the international – intellectual left (cf. Blackledge 2000, 
2002, 2004, Chun 1996, Elliott 1998, Meiksins Wood 1995, Sassoon 1981, 
Thompson 2001, 2007). Its central role is also underlined by the impressive 
number of articles by ‘leading thinkers’ from around the world published in 
its pages – the journal’s website proudly mentions 32 names that include 
Giovanni Arrighi, Pierre Bourdieu, Nancy Fraser, Jürgen Habermas, Fred-
rik Jameson, Göran Therborn, and Slavoj Zizek, among others (cf. New 
Left Review 2002: 1). However, the history of the journal is not easy to tell. 
First, the New Left Review is rather reluctant to speak about its own past, 
and Robin Blackburn’s overview of its developmental stages on the website 
is correspondingly short. It also becomes difficult to balance the personal 
and the political in its internal conflicts and, moreover, to discern the 
‘voice’ of Perry Anderson, often regarded as the journal’s intellectual head, 
from those of the endeavour as a whole.
9
 Finally, the New Left Review’s 
(and Anderson’s) position has traditionally functioned as a political com-
                                                             
9  Whereas the other journals had two editors for most of the time, Anderson acted 
as New Left Review’s sole editor from 1963 to 1982, cooperating with an edito-
rial committee of varying size. 
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pass; positioning oneself in relation to New Left Review (and to Anderson), 
has always served the purpose of making a point about one’s own political 
perspective – more than would be the case with most other publications. 
Gilbert Achcar is in so far correct when calling the journal, despite its 
commitment to a plurality of positions, the “chief organ” of the New Left 
(2000: 138). 
One of the magazine’s peculiarities is its three birth years: 1956, 1960, 
and 1963. The first witnessed the foundation of its two predecessors, New 
Reasoner and Universities and Left Review. Both works were committed to 
producing a populist, activist, anti-elitist publication for the New Left 
movement. While they merged in 1960, the editors and the resulting New 
Left Review remained dedicated to these themes. Later a new group includ-
ing Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn, and Tom Nairn took charge of the 
journal, leading Dennis Dworkin to make the claim that Anderson had 
literally bought the journal through paying its debts (1997: 77). Under this 
new leadership, it changed course: “New Left Review adopted without apol-
ogy a high intellectual style and undertook a substantial and demanding 
work of theoretical renewal, the political and theoretical rationale for which 
they soon explained in cogent and solid statements of position.” (Rustin 
1985: 49).
10
 Hence, 1963 constituted a watershed both in terms of the pur-
pose which the journal was supposed to fulfil as well as in terms of the 
personnel to carry it out. Upon the arrival of the new group, the old editori-
al collective left to concentrate on other types of activity or set up Socialist 
Register as an alternative to New Left Review. Despite the overhaul, there 
are nevertheless lines of continuity with the pre-Anderson Review: most 
importantly, according to Fred Inglis, a particular neo-Gramscian human-
ism and a permanent elaboration of Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ (cf. 
1996: 91). This connection helps to explain why many activists from the 
first New Left did not stop publishing in the pages of New Left Review. 
 
At the core of New Left Review’s new direction was a programme of theory 
import which should provide an end to the perceived insularity of the Brit-
                                                             
10  Whether this renewal was a takeover, as E. P. Thompson claimed, or the rescu-
ing action for a project to be deserted by its founders, as Anderson recounted it, 
is not relevant here. For a slightly more detached and hence perhaps more relia-
ble view on the change see Williams 1979: 364-66. 
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ish left’s intellectual life. This new perspective tied in, first, with a feature 
that Peter Sedgwick called “Olympianism”, a remote, global perspective 
resulting from personal research interests (1976: 148). To this end, Elliott 
quotes a critic who claims that Anderson’s oeuvre covered historical devel-
opments from 800 BC until last week (cf. 1998: XI). The new direction also 
related to a number of additional theoretical assumptions: the baseline of 
the journal’s understanding of Marxism was that it constituted a method 
combining historical and structural analysis of economic and social change. 
Thus a Marxist approach had to employ a macro- and long-term perspec-
tive. This approach bore the danger of forcing an analysis in too unspecific 
in perspective, as was diagnosed by Duncan Thompson. He explains that 
New Left Review in the mid-1980s built, for example, its evaluation of the 
political situation in Europe on analyses of the major left parties but ig-
nored the newer, smaller anti-capitalist ones (cf. Thompson 2001: 29). A 
second characteristic feature was the Deutscherite reading of the Cold War 
as a struggle between a post-capitalist Eastern bloc and a capitalist West. 
Finally, New Left Review popularised a view of British historical develop-
ment that became known as the Anderson-Nairn thesis. Criticized by 
Thompson as over-abstract (and thus ‘anti-humanist’), the thesis claimed 
that the British left’s political achievements and theoretical perspectives 
were harmed by the consequences of a premature bourgeois revolution.
11
 
Anderson and Nairn saw utilitarianism and Fabianism as its intellectual 
corollaries and criticised the lack of a powerful revolutionary left tradition. 
Theory import became a necessary precondition for a radicalisation of the 
British labour movement, and intellectual engagement with leftwing theory 
took precedence over articles on working-class history and contemporary 
political struggles in Britain. The New Left Review collective ambitiously 
attempted to deconstruct the whole construction of Britain’s bourgeois 
                                                             
11  This premature revolution resulted, according to the thesis, in an alliance be-
tween the middle class and the aristocracy, isolated the working class (that in 
other revolutions had liaised with the bourgeoisie) and left the emerging labour 
movement with a ‘corporate’ class consciousness, making it, in the words of 
Michael Sprinker, at the same time “antagonistic but effectively deferential”, 
thus demanding their share of and stake in society rather than its transformation 
(1993: 101). For details of the debate on Anderson and Nairn’s thesis see An-
derson 1980. 




 Surprisingly, this perspective was accompanied by an 
emphasis on technicist large-scale solutions not too different from those 
recommended within the traditions criticised. With this approach, Wood 
contested that the journal was in danger of falling prey to intellectual sub-
stitutionism: 
 
If there is an epochal rupture in the evolution of the Western left since 1956, it 
occurs at the point when a section of the left intelligentsia stopped thinking of them-
selves as an ally in popular struggles, or even as a vanguard, or even as a critic from 
the philosophical sidelines, the point at which people stopped thinking of them-
selves, to use Miliband’s formula, as intellectuals of an emancipatory movement, 
and started to think of themselves as intellectuals for that movement, or, to put it 
more strongly, when they started thinking of themselves as the movement itself. 
(1995: 34-5) 
 
While New Left Review could (at least somewhat) legitimately be accused 
of this type of elitism, it has certainly never been sectarian. It followed an 
increasingly ecumenical approach to theory which allowed for contribu-
tions far beyond (its own versions of) Marxism. It remained unclear where 
this tolerance ended – that is why, for example, it proved impossible to 
transform the journal into a ‘feminist and socialist’ publication (as tried in 
the early 1980s by a group of socialist feminists who had been invited to 
the editorial committee), or why the debate on whether democratic progress 
in the Eastern Bloc would make possible a revival of revolutionary social-
ism in the West led to a collective exodus of a number of editors. In gen-
eral, however, in the 1980s New Left Review became more open to post-
modern positions than Dissent, Monthly Review, and Socialist Register, and 
more open to liberal ones than the latter two, even if Robin Blackburn, the 
editor from 1982 onwards, claimed that the journal distanced itself from the 
populism, relativism, and identity politics of the broader (post-) New Left 
(cf. New Left Review 2002: 4). According to Donald Sassoon, the price of 
                                                             
12  The most explicit example of this demolition work might be Perry Anderson’s 
all-round critique of intellectual life and theory production in Britain to be found 
in “Components of the National Culture” (Anderson 1992). 25 years later, An-
derson stuck to the essence of his critique but regretted several of its bombastic 
formulations (1992: Acknowledgements). 
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this ecumenical perspective and the coverage of topics from philosophy to 
international relations, from aesthetics to Third World issues was that the 
journal became a cultural rather than a political project; it provided food for 
thought but did not act as a political rallying point (cf. 1981: 20). On the 
positive side, this shift enabled the journal to become a location for im-
portant debates within the left – the best-known examples include the con-
troversy between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband over the capitalist 
state in the 1970s and that already mentioned between Stuart Hall and 
Kevin Bonnett and colleagues over the essentials of Thatcherism in the 
1980s (cf. Poulantzas 1969, 1976; Miliband 1970, 1973; Hall 1988; Jessop 
et al. 1988). Occasionally, coverage changed in surprising ways: whereas 
the magazine remained far aloof of British industrial militancy in the crisis-
ridden 1970s – to a degree that Geoff Hodgson called it the “lost sheep of 
the British labour movement” (quoted in Thompson 2001: 25) – they de-
veloped interest in the changing Labour Party of the early 1980s and pub-
lished contributions of some of its left-wingers, such as Tony Benn, Eric 
Heffer, and Ken Livingstone (Benn & Heffer 1986; Livingstone 1983). 
New Left Review never hesitated to take positions different from the main-
stream of the British left – for example, on the question of the importance 
of constitutional reform or European unification: since 1972, when Tom 
Nairn’s article “The European Problem” was published in New Left Review 
75, they regarded integration into Europe as an “alternative road to social-
ism”, while in the 1980s they supported the demands for constitutional 
reform by the group Charter 88 (Davidson 1999: 3). Its ecumenical eclecti-
cism extended to sporadic discussions of Third World themes, which were 
treated less systematically than in Monthly Review. 
The key to understanding New Left Review’s theoretical development 
lies in its changing approaches to reform and revolution in the West. It 
started out with a proto-Eurocommunist phase from the early 1960s until 
1968, followed by a revolutionary phase continuing until the late 1970s, at 
first Maoist and then inspired by the student protests, and later Trotskyist 
and critical of Western Marxism, finally the journal reached a ‘post-
revolutionary’ phase starting in the early 1980s in which a new interest in 
labour politics became visible. For Duncan Thompson, this “reanchorage 
was also, at least implicitly, a recognition that the Review’s search since 
1968 for an answer to the strategic questions facing a new left politics in 
the West within the canon of classical revolutionary Marxism had proved 




 It did not give up its belief – and in this respect 
sharply disagreed with Marxism Today – in a potentially anti-capitalist, 
though not necessarily revolutionary, working class as an agent of political 
transformation. When the democratic reform process began in the U.S.S.R., 
New Left Review hoped for the possibility of socialist advance in the West 
once more. Tariq Ali commented in 1988: “Many of us who remain social-
ists in the West are beginning to regard the Soviet Union once again as a 
country of hope” (quoted in Thompson 2001: 30). When viewed through a 
Deutscherite lens, and from a position still detached from domestic devel-
opments in Britain, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc seemed thus cata-
strophic. 
Many judged New Left Review in the late 1980s to be a journal of ‘intel-
lectual pessimism’, and accused it of ultra-theory accompanied by political 
eclecticism and negligence of working-class struggle.
14
 Its strengths and 
achievements, however, are undisputed. It made continental European 
Marxist theory available in Britain and arguably opened up many of the 
theoretical routes subsequently travelled by the post-1968 left and the new 
social movements, provided thorough, though selective, coverage of world 




The founding of the annual Socialist Register was a reaction to the changes 
within New Left Review in 1962/63. Ralph Miliband (who was of compara-
ble importance to Socialist Register as Perry Anderson was to New Left 
Review) had, from the beginning, expressed scepticism about the merger of 
New Reasoner (to whose editorial group he belonged) and Universities and 
Left Review. The value and importance of New Reasoner for Miliband 
consisted not only of its particular concept of non-dogmatic, originally 
dissident, Communism, but also of its climate of ‘comradely discussion’ 
which strongly appealed to him as a socialist academic who had given up 
                                                             
13  Again, it is difficult to decide, in how far this judgment is applicable to the 
contributors as a whole, to the editorial committee, or just to Perry Anderson. 
14  This allegation was made by, for example, Ellen Meiksins Wood. It was also the 
reason for her to move on to the editorship of Monthly Review (cf. Monthly Re-
view 1999: 75).  
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on the Labour Left and worked as an isolated Marxist at the London School 
of Economics. In his opinion, the split from New Left Review was provoked 
more by differences of style and journalistic philosophy than by theoretical 
substance. Unlike E. P. Thompson, whom he unsuccessfully tried to attract 
as co-editor to Socialist Register beside John Saville, Miliband did not feel 
personal animosity with the new editors of New Left Review. Instead, he 
highly appreciated several of their analyses and shared their interest in 
Marxism. However, he criticised their reluctance to test their theoretical 
hypotheses through empirical studies (cf. Newman 2002: 113-20). 
The annual publication set up by Saville and Miliband was meant to be 
a ‘survey of movements and ideas’, as its subtitle in the early years sug-
gested, and was committed to the revival of a ‘theoretical Marxism’ that 
was neither reduced to the base-superstructure simplifications of official 
dogma nor uncritical towards the structural Marxisms that would be soon to 
emerge. Miliband’s concern with political power in capitalist societies was 
central to the publication, as were the related questions of socialist agency 
and strategy (cf. Newman 2002: 350). Most authors, though not sharing a 
political line in the strict sense, saw themselves to the left of social democ-
racy, as committed to a non-sectarian socialism, and many to Marxism. 
They were convinced, with Miliband, that institutional power checks would 
still be necessary in a socialist state and remained critical of the Communist 
world, but nevertheless still unsupportive of anti-Communists. It could be 
argued that Socialist Register was less concerned with the downside of the 
Eastern Bloc than New Reasoner had been, due to the latter’s traumatic 
break with the British Communist Party. In 1960, Miliband explained his 
attitude towards the U.S.S.R. in a letter to Dorothy Thompson with the 
following words: 
 
The real point is whether the kind of society they [the U.S.S.R.; SB] are creating 
looks like approximating something we think is socialism and whether in the devel-
opment of socialism in the world they are or are not a hopeful, indeed the most 
hopeful factor. On both counts my answer is yes, with all the qualifications, hesita-
tions and this and what you will. (quoted in Kozak 2006: no pages).
15
 
                                                             
15  Obviously, his opinion has changed over the years. Directly after the collapse in 
1989 he spoke of an “awful perversion of socialism” and of “oligarchical collec-
tivist regimes” (cf. Newman 2002: 308). 
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Socialist Register intended to design and pursue a more concrete strategy 
than those arguing for a vaguely defined ‘socialist humanism’ and thus 
tried to base their work, which they regarded as an exercise in “sustained 
socialist education”, on the notion of ‘socialist democracy’ (Panitch 1995: 
12). To realise this concept, Socialist Register hoped to build counter dis-
courses and structures in both state and civil society (ibid: 14). The annual 
took pride in its internationalism (different, as Kozak suggests, from New 
Left Review’s ‘Third Worldism’ [2006]) which owed a great deal to the 
polyglot Belgian-Jewish refugee Miliband and to his close links with the 
editors of Monthly Review who facilitated contacts to writers from the 
Latin-American left. One of the publication’s most distinguishing features 
was its comprehensive coverage of developments in Britain and especially 
in the Labour Party. Socialist Register popularised what among political 
scientists and activists became known as the Miliband-Coates thesis: the 
dilemma of the left lay in the Labour Party’s centrality for working-class 
politics and the unresolved problem of how to push its leadership towards 
more radical positions (cf. Panitch 1995: 11). 
‘Critique’ served as the key word for Socialist Register’s approach and 
work. It focused on a wide variety of issues: changes in contemporary 
capitalism, Western and especially American imperialism, left wing parties 
(especially in Western Europe), Communist regimes, and Marxist theory. 
Yet coverage also extended to labour history, grassroots struggles, battles 
of the Labour Party’s left and independence movements in the Third 
World. Compared to New Left Review, the annual was characterised by a 
consistency in outlook and topics, although it took up several new issues 
over the years. For example, it paid increasing attention to the international-
isation of capital and the consequences this would have for socialist strate-
gy. The annual’s pick of contributors became more international and less 
British as well: in the 1980s, Canadian editor Leo Panitch with close British 
links first accompanied the two British editors and later replaced John 
Saville. 
The Register’s primary concern lay in political changes rather than in 
theoretical debates. Thus it developed an interest in, but remained sceptical 
about, the student unrest of 1968 and the activities of guerrilla movements, 
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both of which seemed to reveal the limits of voluntarism.
16
 Nevertheless 
writers took up several of the issues central to the New Left agenda and 
tried to give them a socialist twist. Thus, for example, they called for a 
socialist women’s movement separate from bourgeois feminism.
17
 With this 
sensitivity to political changes, it is not surprising that they were deeply 
concerned about the offensives of a changed right in the late 1970s, about 
the ‘crisis of the left’ in the 1980s and about the ‘revisionist left’s (includ-
ing many theoreticians’) attack on the Bennite Left in the Labour Party. 
The latter points were denounced as a “retreat of the intellectuals” 
(Miliband 1994a: 16). In these times of new right hegemony, the Gorba-
chev reforms were welcomed by the great majority of contributors. Michael 
Newman even assumes that the general feeling of retreat and despair led 
Miliband to overemphasise the chances of the experiments in the U.S.S.R. 
(2002: 311). 
Unlike the New Left Review’s Olympian detachment, the Register was 
committed to a down-to-earth non-sectarian political involvement. The 
perhaps most serious weakness of this philosophy was the narrow focus on 
critique which, as Miliband conceded shortly before his death, led to a 
neglect of reflections on a utopian social order for the future and on crea-
tive thought about the ways to get there: 
 
There are many people on the Left who would say that the answer should be ‘noth-
ing much can be done until the revolution, save preparing for it’; but even if this 
were to be taken as realistic, ‘preparing for it’ would still involve a series of strug-
gles over specific issues, with a clear indication of what was being struggled for, and 
without resort to incantation. (Miliband 1994a: 6). 
 
Miliband, always extremely critical of his own work as well as of the arti-
cles published in Socialist Register, listed a number of topics which the 
annual had not sufficiently considered: Northern Ireland, the Isra-
                                                             
16  Tariq Ali, one of the leading figures of the 1968 student protests, conceded ten 
years later in an article for Socialist Register that for him the most important les-
son of the events was that socialism would be achieved with the consent of the 
mass of working people or not at all (cf. Miliband 1994: 5). 
17  Marion Kozak remarks that the Register’s old-left editors were unsure how to 
relate to debates about the politics of feminism (2006: no pages). 
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el/Palestine conflict, science, mass communication, and literature and the 
arts (cf. 1994: 18). However, its focus on political core themes made it, 
according to Perry Anderson, a sympathetic observer of the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies of the more ecumenical and eclectic New Left Review (cf. 
Newman 2002: 346). Its original anti-anti-Communist outlook, however, 
meant that it was forced into reflecting very seriously about its future pur-
pose after the fall of the Eastern European Communist regimes in 1989. 
 
2.3. Two Generations of the American Intellectual Left 
 
Before the emergence of student radicalism in the 1960s, the intellectual 
left in the United States consisted of two strands which formed important 





first had their roots in the Popular Front of the 1930s and combined mem-
bers of the U.S. Communist Party (CP) with New Deal leftists and radical 
intellectuals.
20
 The great majority of intellectuals had never been members 
of the CP, but were, in the words of John P. Diggins, vague “Marxists of 
the heart” (1992: 152). Paul Buhle also emphasises that many of the intel-
lectuals were more attracted to the politically broader appeal of the Popular 
Front and the left wing of the New Deal Coalition than to the narrower CP 
                                                             
18  The predecessor to the intellectual wing of the old left was the ‘lyrical left’ of 
the first two decades of the twentieth century – which was less concerned with 
political questions in a narrow sense but experminented with new aesthetic 
forms of expression and bohemian lifestyles. In this sense, it could be interpret-
ed as a ‘proto-New Left’. 
19  Andrei S. Markovits distinguishes between an orthodox (until 1968) and a 
heterodox period (after 1968) within the history of the European and the Ameri-
can Left after 1945. The first one is characterized by a conflict between the 
Communist and the social democratic left, the second by the New Left and the 
intellectualisation of leftwing thinking (2005). It seems a bit problematic to ap-
ply this model to either the American Left (with its weak social democratic cur-
rent to whose numbers, however, the former Trotskyist New York intellectuals 
might be counted) or the British Left (where a New Left emerged as early as 
1956). 
20  In 1935, Stalin had called for a “popular front” of all liberal and progressive 
forces to contain the fascist powers (cf. Wald 1987: 129). 
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(cf. 1991: 198). The second group consisted of Trotskyists, many of whom 
had their roots in the New York intellectual scene (cf. Wald 1987). Their 
numbers were considerably smaller than those of the first group (the CP 
alone had about 80,000 members in 1945 and large groups of sympathiz-
ers), but nevertheless they had considerable shop-floor influence. While the 
immediate post-war time was one of optimism for many on the left, the 
climate changed in 1948 due to the disastrous Wallace presidential cam-
paign and the damaging dynamic of the emerging Cold War.
21
 Persecution 
intensified, and the question of how to position oneself in the conflict be-
tween the Western and the Eastern bloc became increasingly important. As 
a result of these circumstances – and due to dwindling ethnic solidarities in 
an era of sub-urbanisation – the CP became ever more isolated and lost its 
hegemonic role within the American left, a process that only intensified 
after the party’s break with the New Deal Coalition in 1950. Independent 
Marxist intellectuals, who had supported the Popular Front and the New 
Deal Coalition, started looking for ways out of this impasse. In this context, 




Like elsewhere, in the United States Trotskyism was split. However, all 
Trotskyists opposed the Popular Front and contested participation in a war 
between ‘imperialist powers’. For many of them, especially for Trotskyist 
intellectuals confronted with working-class apathy which allowed anti-
Trotskyist purges within the trade unions, vanguardist ideas changed into a 
mood of desperation and intellectual activity took the shape of a “melan-
choly critique of mass delusion” (Buhle 1991: 206). The danger of self-
annihilation had replaced the promise of self-emancipation. They rejected 
the optimistic Marxist notion that human activity mirrored the progressive 
movement of history (cf. Diggins 1992: 161). They all felt and expressed 
hostility towards the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War. They disagreed, however, 
as to how far this enmity should go. Some became uncritical supporters of 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, collaborated with Joseph 
                                                             
21  The CP was involved in setting up a third party, called Progressive Party, as 
whose candidate Henry Wallace run in the 1948 presidential election. He ended 
with only 2.4 per cent of the vote (cf. Isserman 1993: 6-7). 
22  Leo Huberman, 1903-1968, social scientist, journalist and author, taught at 
Columbia University. 
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McCarthy, wrote for Partisan Review, and participated in the anti-
Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom. A minority preferred a posi-
tion that Maurice Isserman coined the “second-and-a-half camp” in the 
Cold War – no position of equidistance between the superpowers, but nev-
ertheless one which was also critical towards the United States (cf. 1993: 
105). This stance was taken by Irving Howe, Stanley Plastrik, Manny 
Geltmann and Lewis Coser, the founders of the magazine Dissent in 1954.
23
 
Post-Trotskyists, like those close to Dissent, and Marxists, such as the 
founders of Monthly Review, did not have much in common, and Howe, for 
example, accused the editors of the latter journal to be “authoritarians of the 
left” (quoted in Wald 1987: 328).
24
 However, they shared the view that the 
times looked far from promising for radical change in the United States. 
The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement in the South in the mid-fifties 
surprised both groups. This was a new type of radicalism, which many 
observers regarded as ‘domestic American’ and that altered the world view 
of left intellectuals. Up to this time, these intellectuals had assumed that 
their role was to act for the interests of African Americans rather than to be 
taught new strategies of political activism by them. At the same time, other 
intellectual and political activities began to aggregate into something that 
Paul Buhle called a “proto-New Left” (1991: 216). Shifts in this direction 
included a revival of pacifism at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the 
protests of the “student wing” of the Civil Rights Movement (above all, the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee; SNCC) and the reflections 
of a number of writers whose background was different from both, the CP 
and the New York intellectual scene. Such authors include William Apple-
man Williams (a revisionist historian, questioning the United States’ ‘inno-
                                                             
23 Lewis Coser, 1913-2003, born in Germany, political sociologist and conflict 
theorist taught at various U.S. universities, second long-term editor of Dissent 
beside Irving Howe. 
24  Paul Sweezy was one of a total of 88 signers of an “Open Letter to American 
Liberals” in which they criticised the “American Committee For the Defense of 
Leon Trotsky” which held an inquiry into the charges formulated against Trot-
sky in the Moscow show trials in the late 1930s. Many American socialists and 
liberals declared sympathy for Stalin’s popular front strategy and feared a weak-
ening of the efforts to contain Fascism. Chaired by John Dewey, the committee 
cleared Trotsky of all allegations (cf. Wald 1987: 128-139). 
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cence’ in the emergence of the Cold War) who founded the journal Studies 
on the Left in 1959 and was also based at the University of Wisconsin; C. 
Wright Mills (a Texas-born sociologist, influenced by existentialism); 
C.L.R. James (a heterodox Trotskyist); and F. E. Matthiesen (a cultural 
critic who, through a financial gift, had made the setting-up of Monthly 
Review possible). Michael Harrington also fits the list: his studies about 
poverty in the ‘affluent’ United States (published as The Other America in 
1963) became widely read and debated. The term proto-New Left is an 
adequate characterisation of these people as they shared a number of as-
sumptions which became central for the American New Left of the 1960s: 
the need to abolish economistic Marxism, to break with the idea of the state 
as the vehicle for organising a transition to socialism, to transcend now-old 
and – as they argued – irrelevant distinctions (between idealists and materi-
alists or Communists and Trotskyists)(cf. Aronowitz 1996: 17). 
The “real” New Left, as a student movement and – despite a certain 
fashionable anti-intellectualism – as an intellectual affair, appeared with the 
Students for a Democratic Society’s (SDS) Port Huron Statement of 1963 
and the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley.
25
 The New Left, as Paul Buhle 
put it, used the experiences of the Old Left and started where the latter had 
stopped: with the ‘race’ question and with curiosity towards the political 
implications of popular culture (cf. 1991: 256). For the New Left, the “pov-
erty of abundance” had replaced the “abundance of poverty” that character-
ised the world of the Old Left (cf. Diggins 1992: 232). Diggins also empha-
sised that the New Left radicalised itself on the basis of its experiences, 
whereas the Old Left had become increasingly moderate: “The Old Left 
began with a whoop of revolution and sank into a whimper of reconciliation 
– thanks to Russia; the New Left started in a spirit of moderation and ended 
calling for nothing less than revolution – thanks to America” (ibid: 219). 
They shared the fear of human annihilation with the former Trotskyist part 
of the Old Left. They differed from them in that the New Left stressed 
America’s responsibility for preventing such destruction. In general, they 
did not know very much of the East Coast old-left traditions and internal 
conflicts as they often came from other parts of the country and often from 
middle-class Republican families. In its early stage, the New Left was not 
                                                             
25  For detailed histories of the American New Left see Katsiaficas 1987 and Gitlin 
1993. 
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in a narrow sense ‘Marxist’, but nevertheless remained hostile to U.S. anti-
Communism. Activists looked for space to manoeuvre at the margins of 
capitalism – especially in the Third World and its national liberation 
movements. Receptive to Freudian psychoanalysis, they also saw the hu-
man unconscious as a site for political intervention. Their interests in Marx-
ism extended to the “early Marx”, “cultural Marxism” (as developed by the 
British New Left), and the concept of alienation (as elaborated especially 
by Existentialism and the Frankfurt School). Their interest in liberation 
movements temporarily attracted many to Maoism. Their political goal, 
apart from the concrete demand for an end to the war in Vietnam, focussed 
on a vague demand for the replacement of “the system” by participatory 
democracy. The New Left in the United States turned out to be a rather 
short-lived movement, disintegrating into factional struggles: some em-
braced militancy while others pursued intellectual careers in the expanding 
academic sector, tried to liaise with social movements or retreated from 
activism by the early 1970s. However, some of their achievements were 
impressive: they managed to halt the draft, contributed to the withdrawal 
from Vietnam, and developed an understanding of politics that facilitated 
the emergence of the Women’s Movement and other social movements. 
Although they did not succeed in democratising the universities and could 
not convince them to cut their ties with the arms and military technology 
industries, these reformers radically modified the academic disciplines and 
curricula in higher education. Their influence became most visible in histo-
ry departments in the 1970s and in English departments in the 1980s. Inter-
estingly, despite the New Left’s critique of the Old Left for sticking to 
anachronistic and economistic problematics or for siding with the United 
States in the Cold War and Vietnam, in the 1970s a number of the New 
Leftists became contributors to, and editorial board members of those Old 
Left Magazines that had not moved towards the emerging New Right. This 
integration allowed for a combination of old-left concerns about how to 
achieve socialism with new concerns about gender equality, environmental 
issues, and grassroots movements and thus initiated a more open debate on 
possible agencies and strategies for radical social change. 
In the 1970s, a new division appeared between different sections of the 
intellectual left in the United States: while some started drawing heavily on 
Foucauldian and post-structuralist critical theory imported from Europe 
(especially from France), others remained in the tradition of socialist or 
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materialist analysis. The first tendency in particular became widespread in 
the academic world and provoked New Right assaults on “cultural and 
moral relativism”, “epistemological irrationalism” and “political correct-
ness”. Leftist thinkers who did not follow this trend found themselves in an 
odd situation. They agreed with the New Right on some of its criticisms, 
but were still labelled by the Right as part of the same broad left – especial-
ly because they shared a concern about “minority issues” with the post-
modern left. Left thinking in the 1970s became very much a university 
affair; extra-university activity reached its nadir in 1979/80. In the 1980s, a 
renewed interest in old American radical traditions emerged (cf: Ostendorf 
& Levine 1992) – a concern supported by several thinkers associated with 
the journal Dissent, such as Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer and Irving 
Howe, for example (cf. Rorty 1982, Walzer 1983, Howe 1986). The rupture 
of 1989 thus affected an intellectual left that either claimed to retain the 
basics of materialist historiography and political economy, or instead 
claimed to reinvent a new radical perspective from old domestic traditions. 
 
2.4. Dissent and Monthly Review 
 
Dissent 
For Irving Howe, the leading figure behind Dissent, the publication of a 
journal became an escape route out of what he regarded as sectarian politics 
(cf. Isserman 1993: 88-9). For the New York intellectuals, magazines had 
always been the most important medium of political debate and disagree-
ment. With Partisan Review’s move to the right, a vacuum emerged that 
was first filled by the journal Politics (founded in 1944) whose contributing 
editors included several future Dissenters. The actual founding of Dissent 
in 1954 resulted from a feeling of political helplessness (as Howe later 
explained, whenever left intellectuals do not know what to do, they set up 
magazines), but also from dissatisfaction with the shape of the left in the 
United States and the climate of McCarthyism (cf. Plastrik 1979: 3). Dis-
sent developed under the “shadow of the two Josephs” – Stalin and McCar-
thy (Cohen 2004: 4). This explains its originally planned name “No!”. The 
journal wanted to be a forum for open debate – albeit within certain limits. 
It called itself “democratic socialist” and stood for a critical support of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Cold War. It disagreed with those who saw the 
U.S.S.R.’s nationalisation of the economy as a progressive step and thus 
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took a staunch anti-Deutscherite position. Yet on the other hand, it did not 
participate in the “Leninophobia” of other (former) Trotskyists (cf. Wald 
1987: 324). The peculiar spirit and perspective of this “Quarterly of Social-
ist Opinion” might best be explained through a few quotations. For Irving 
Howe, Dissent’s theoretical reflections were a process of self-cleaning: 
“Year by year we shook off remnants of ideology, till we seemed to have 
nothing, at times, but the motivating ethic of socialism; yet we wanted 
thereby to hold fast to the socialist vision, to give it new strength and val-
ue.” (1979: 6). A commitment to democracy remained absolutely central:  
 
We provided a platform for Herbert Marcuse when he engaged in principled debates 
with Erich Fromm on psychoanalysis and politics; we parted company with him 
when he suggested that civil liberties should be reserved for the virtuous, with the 
voice of the sinful to be stilled. We printed some of C. Wright Mills’s most signifi-
cant essays, but we turned against him when he listened with admiration to the 
appeals of Castro. (Coser 1974: 4) 
 
An external perspective on the magazine’s version of socialism was provid-
ed by the liberal Joseph Epstein, writing in the twentieth anniversary issue: 
“Dissent’s editors themselves, while insisting on their socialism, have tend-
ed to wear it lightly. Their approach to socialism, they have always 
claimed, is not to a fixed piety and their concentration has been on ‘prob-
lematics’ of the subject” (1974: 161). The journal was, according to an 
observation by second-generation editor Mitchell Cohen, opposed to de-
terminism but not to utopianism. Over the years, this position has remained 
remarkably constant, though, in the 1980s, Dissent described itself as 
“democratic left” rather than socialist and in 2004 Cohen offered his read-
ers a wide variety of self-identifications of Dissenters – “democratic social-
ists”, “liberal socialists”, “social democrats”, “social liberals”, and “liberal 
left” (cf. Cohen 2004: 4). Another defining feature, distinguishing Dissent 
from the other journals in this study, is its suspicion against ‘grand theory’, 
including supposedly over-abstract versions of historical materialism and 
political economy. 
These misgivings influenced the choice of topics: the journal consist-
ently focussed on actually existing political movements, on social demo-
cratic parties in other countries (with particular sympathies at times for the 
British Labour Party and the various Scandinavian Social Democrats), on 
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the reflections of disillusioned European intellectual leftists – “refugees 
from the International” (Isserman 1993: 92) – as well as on those of Eastern 
European dissidents. In the 1950s, Dissent’s mood was not so much one of 
despair as of anger (cf. Walzer 2004: 11). Contributors controversially 
discussed the ‘mass-culture thesis’ and celebrated the uprising in Hungary 
and the emergence of the African American Civil Rights Movement. The 
latter provided hope for the emergence of further radical movements in the 
United States, hence Dissenters’ pessimism about the possibilities of politi-
cal change mellowed slightly. Its greatest success story was perhaps the 
extensive coverage of Michael Harrington’s work on poverty that culminat-
ed in his important study The Other America (1963), many of whose find-
ings were published in advance by Dissent. 
The journal welcomed the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s, 
having anticipated several themes that became associated with the students’ 
movement: the insistence on human emancipation, democratisation, and 
decentralisation of power. Nevertheless, their relationship was complicated 
by a number of differences. They disagreed over Vietnam – whereas Howe 
and others argued for negotiations (at least before the Tet offensive), the 
New Left demanded the immediate withdrawal of American troops. Dissent 
remained anti-Communist, whereas the New Left, though not pro-
Communist, still rejected anti-Communist sentiments. They also clashed on 
more theoretical issues; whereas Dissenters had mostly abandoned Marx-
ism, the New Left was increasingly attracted to the “early Marx”, and 
whereas Dissent abhorred politically motivated violence, the New Left 
sympathised with Maoism for a time. Finally, there were cultural differ-
ences. Dissent retained the New York intellectuals’ admiration for modern-
ist high culture and was deeply suspicious of popular culture, while the 
New Left stood for a cultural anti-elitism. Despite the efforts by individu-
als, such as Michael Walzer, who acted as intellectual interlopers between 
the New Left and the magazine, “a sense of disappointment, of hurt pride, 
and toward the end, of ironic resignation flavoured Dissent’s attitude to-
ward the New Left” (Isserman 1993: 122). Nevertheless, in the 1970s, a 
number of important figures from the former New Left began to contribute 
articles to the magazine. This change brought the generations of the 1930s 
and the 1950s closer to each other (cf. Cohen 2004: 4) and prompted Howe 
and other Dissenters to revise their view of new social movements, espe-
cially feminism (cf. Wald 1987: 333). 
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During the 1970s, the journal held its political course in general. How-
ever, since others raced to the right or turned to postmodernism it created 
an impression of moving to the left. Despite its mentioned scepticism about 
‘grand theory’, the journal took a hostile position towards poststructuralist 
anti-foundationalism and political eclecticism. This stance made it ambiva-
lent to the issue of identity politics and deeply suspicious of ‘political cor-
rectness’ and its associated ‘cultural relativism’ (cf. Cohen 2004: 5). In 
many of the contributions of the time, one could find “regret for a gone era 
of reform” (Bromwich 2004: 110). The journal suffered, like the American 
left as a whole, under the experience of Reaganism, which it regarded as 
the worst onslaught on liberal-left achievements and thinking since the 
1950s. However, it tried to avoid futile laments about being confronted 
with an over-powerful enemy (cf. Phillips 2004: 170). Additionally, it faced 
problems with recruiting younger contributors: due to the ever increasing 
specialisation among university intellectuals, only few were willing and 
able to submit articles with the generalist perspectives the journal preferred. 
When the Eastern Bloc collapsed in 1989, Dissenters felt more ambivalent 
about the events than might be expected from an originally anti-Communist 
collective. While they welcomed the disappearance of dictatorships and 
state violence, at the end of the neo-liberal 1980s, they were at the same 
time deeply concerned about future developments within Eastern European 
societies. 
For Alan Wald, Dissent suffered for most of its history from an anti-
theoretical perspective that prevented it from seeing the structural deficien-
cies of capitalist societies (cf. 1987: 334). Similarly, Maurice Isserman 
diagnosed that, for example, U.S. foreign policy was analysed almost ex-
clusively on the basis of case studies rather than systematically or systemi-
cally. The journal was not willing or able to realise that the United States’ 
role in the world was not decided by competent or incompetent specialists 
and politicians, but resulted instead from the context of a geo-political 
system of power (cf. 1993: 106-107). For the whole Cold War period, Dis-
sent was, to a certain degree, a Janus-faced journal: it defended the merits 
of liberal democracy against radical leftists and criticized its shortcomings 
in discussions with liberals. 
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Monthly Review 
Like Dissent’s, the foundation of Monthly Review in 1949 was a reaction to 
the obvious left retreat in the United States in the late 1940s. For the found-
ers and the early contributors, the New Deal liberal-left coalition had been 
replaced by a Cold War liberal-conservative coalition (cf. Phelps 1999: 8). 
The idea was to set up an “independent socialist magazine” (this was its 
subtitle) in order to sustain and further open debate among the non-
orthodox Marxist left in the United States. This group basically consisted of 
an alliance of people who had united behind the Wallace presidential cam-
paign in 1948 and were no longer willing to accept the leading role of the 
Communist Party which had reacted to a hostile public climate with in-
creased authoritarianism (cf. Buhle 1991: 197). The founders, Paul Sweezy 
and Leo Huberman, “believed roughly in [the] extension of the New Deal 
into state socialism, with heightened democratic participation and interna-
tional détente” (ibid: 198). Although the New Deal Coalition had already 
started disintegrating, the journal’s founders remained convinced that it was 
necessary to develop a Marxist theory more closely related to American 
society and less axiomatically founded on Leninism. However, as Sweezy 
and Huberman explained in the 1953 article “A Challenge to the Book 
Burners”, they were in no way anti-Communist. Instead, they described 
their position as “socialist, Marxist, non-Communist, but willing to cooper-
ate with anyone, including Communists, on agreed aims and by agreed 
methods” (1953: 159). 
This claim to cooperate with anyone was taken very seriously and es-
tablished Monthly Review as a journal that tried to reach beyond academic 
contributors and intellectual readers. In the early years, the theoretical 
heads behind it were Sweezy and his friend and collaborator Paul Baran. As 
a former assistant of Joseph Schumpeter at Harvard, Sweezy was sentenced 
to three years in prison in a McCarthyite trial for his involvement in the 
Wallace campaign – a verdict that later was overturned by the Supreme 
Court. At the time, Baran was the only Marxist tenured professor at a U.S. 
economics department. Both formulated individually and jointly a theory of 
capitalist development that, by the mid-1950s, had become known as the 
‘Monthly-Review School’. They worked to support their major premises 
through numerous articles in the journal, most written from a historically 
informed materialist perspective (cf. Hopfmann 1999: 398). According to 
their basic assumption, crises were inherent to capitalist development and 
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thus unavoidable and, therefore, fine-tuning strategies such as Keynesian-
ism were doomed to fail. Furthermore, large and strong national economies 
were able to externalise these crises, a process that made imperialism a 
structure of domination intimately linked with capitalism. The task of the 
left, and particularly of left intellectuals, then was not to devise more so-
phisticated strategies of social and economic engineering, but to oppose 
capitalism in all its economic, cultural, political, ideological and social 
dimensions. Monthly Review’s notion of socialism, consequently, was the 
overthrow of capitalism in all these aspects, but most importantly, the trans-
formation of property relations, the abolition of private profit as guiding 
principle for economic decision making, and the creation of a society in 
which the producers would control the conditions and results of economic 
activity. This position differed radically from a social democratic perspec-
tive, though many contributors’ personal histories in New Deal agencies 
resulted in a gradualist approach towards achieving these goals. Monthly 
Review’s particular strength lay in its coverage of the mechanisms and 
intricacies of ‘externalising’ capitalist crises. They analysed developments 
in the Third World in great detail and became early popularisers of depend-
ency and world system theory.
26
 André Gunder Frank, Immanuel Waller-
stein, and especially Samir Amin all became frequent contributors. Later, 
the editors concerned themselves with another form of externalisation: the 
problem of environmental devastation. In this context, the magazine 
searched for alternatives to the growth principle underlying neo-liberal, 
social democratic, but also many socialist strategies. 
Despite viewing capitalism and especially finance capital as a system 
acting globally, Monthly Review insisted on the national arena as being 
central for anti-capitalist politics. Thus they were interested in, and support-
ive of, local labour and popular struggles in the United States and every-
where else. Like other leftists in North America, they reflected on working-
class conservatism in the climate of the 1950s, but did not show much 
interest in the mass-culture thesis. While the magazine’s particular strength 
lay in its editors’ expertise in political economy, beyond this they published 
                                                             
26  According to Ellen Meiksins Wood, also the British journal New Left Review 
was at certain stages in its history very interested in developments in the Third 
World. Unlike Monthly Review, however, they focused more on vanguard 
movements and parties than on popular struggles (1995: 30). 
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contributions by numerous innovative left thinkers of the time and, in sev-
eral cases, articles by the same persons who wrote for Dissent – among 
them C. Wright Mills, William Appleman Williams, Todd Gitlin, and the 
British New Left authors Raymond Williams and Ralph Miliband. In the 
words of Christopher Phelps, the journal became an “arc of continuity” 
between the Old Left and the emerging New Left in the 1960s and profited 
from the rise of the latter through fresh debates and rising circulation num-
bers (1999: 18). Despite these cross-generational tendencies, the journal 
still belonged more to the Old Left than to the New: 
 
[I]t seems fair to say that Monthly Review was a journal of the old left that extended 
its sympathies to the new, that from the beginning it held certain beliefs identical to 
the new left’s central tenets, and that it was further shaped over time by interaction 
with the movements and events of the 1960s, serving as one place of fusion for 
overlapping generations of the left. (ibid) 
 
Obviously, the relationship between Monthly Review and the New Left was 
less contentious than between the latter and Dissent. This cordiality was 
facilitated by more common theoretical ground and also by generally simi-
lar positions both against the war in Vietnam (Monthly Review had criti-
cised American involvement in Indochina as early as 1954) and on U.S. 
foreign policy (which according to the journal’s definition of capitalism 
was imperialist by necessity). However, the magazine did not accept the 
early New Left’s anti-Marxism; it still insisted on the centrality of class 
struggle in any strategy for radical change and saw all forms of oppression 
as linked to the class hierarchy within capitalism. Furthermore, Monthly 
Review shared the New Left’s enthusiasm for liberation movements in the 
Third World and was initially intrigued by Maoism, but moved towards 
more sober analyses of post-revolutionary societies after the failure of the 
Cultural Revolution became obvious. Again, the Reagan and Bush years 
were conceived of as a time of left retreat, though the editors (the econo-
mist Harry Magdoff had accompanied Paul Sweezy since Huberman’s 
death in 1969) had expressed less enthusiasm about the 1960s as an era of 
reform.
27
 Like Dissent, the journal stuck to its original course and reacted 
                                                             
27  Harry Magdoff, 1913-2006, became co-editor of Monthly Review after Leo 
Huberman’s death in 1969. As an auto-didactically trained economist, he had 
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sceptically towards the academic integration and post-modernisation of the 
American left, and especially to its substitution of psychoanalysis and dis-
course theory for historical-materialist political economy as explanatory 
tools of social phenomena. As a result of the unsupportive political and 
theoretical climate, its influence on the academic left declined in the 1980s. 
Another problem for Monthly Review was its relationship with and 
views of the states of the Eastern Bloc. Contributors criticised the regimes’ 
authoritarianism, but at the same time partly excused it, attributing its cause 
to the introduction of socialism in such ‘backward’ countries, the failure of 
revolutions in Central Europe after the end of the First World War, and 
U.S. pressure and aggression in the Cold War. On the one hand, they con-
demned the Soviet army’s crushing of revolts in Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia and the suppression of Solidarnosc in Poland. On the other hand, they 
accepted the nationalisation strategy in the U.S.S.R. as a horrendous – but 
nevertheless to a certain degree successful – step towards modernisation. 
They saw the states of the Eastern Bloc as ‘transitional’, as no longer capi-
talist but not yet socialist, and hence always in danger of sliding back into 
capitalism.
28
 For a short time in the mid-1980s, they hoped for a democra-
tised socialism as the successful result of the Gorbachev reforms, but be-
came very critical of their content (and implementation) after the restructur-
ing failed and the feared backslide to capitalism actually occurred. 
Monthly Review was, to a certain degree, a pan-American journal. Its 
eyes were never directed exclusively towards developments in North Amer-
ica and Europe; it also closely followed political struggles in Latin Ameri-
ca, as in the 1970s and 1980s, when the journal took an interest in liberation 
theology. The philosophy tied in nicely with the Review’s emphasis on the 
ethical dimension of Marxism, which had already been responsible for its 
openness to the New Left, the Women’s Movement and environmental 
concerns. For most of its history, the journal focused on political economy 
(and in this context was occasionally criticised for its adventurous use of 
statistical material to prove its central theses [cf. Hopfmann 1999: 398]). Its 
                                                                                                                          
held jobs in the New Deal administration and later wrote on the nexus of capital-
ism and imperialism. 
28  For a summary of Paul Sweezy’s view on the U.S.S.R., the Eastern Bloc and 
Yugoslavia as transitional societies which moved back to capitalism see van der 
Linden 2007: 209-210. 
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focus broadened with regard to historical, sociological and environmental 
questions when Ellen Meiksins Wood (for a couple of years) and John 
Bellamy Foster accompanied and later replaced the old editors. Monthly 
Review’s most distinctive features – its global perspective, its environmen-
talism and its effort to reach beyond academia – influenced its reactions to 
the changes of 1989. 
 
2.5. Similarities and Differences among the American and 
the British Intellectual Lefts 
 
The journals introduced were all set up by leftwing intellectuals at a partic-
ular historical conjuncture characterised by the first Cold War, a conserva-
tive hegemony – moderate in terms of welfarism but radical in its anti-
Communism – in the leading countries of the West and a break (at times 
hesitant and reluctant) with a dogmatic Marxism which subordinated work-
ing-class emancipation beyond the Soviet sphere of influence to the inter-
ests of the Moscow leaderships. Against this background and alarmed by 
the possibility of an East-West confrontation which could lead to a nuclear 
war and human self-annihilation, the intellectuals surrounding the journals 
started discussing questions that developed into the agenda of a proto- or 
pre-1968 New Left. The British thinkers looked to intellectuals in the Unit-
ed States like C. Wright Mills for inspiration, but also to the two American 
journals which had been founded several years earlier (cf. Chun 1996: 207). 
The intellectuals’ older generation in both countries was heavily influenced 
by the experiences of the 1930s, whether or not they supported the Popular 
Front and backed the Allies in the Second World War. The journals can, to 
a certain extent, be regarded as the brainchildren of single intellectual fa-
thers (Irving Howe, Paul Sweezy, E. P. Thompson, Perry Anderson, and 
Ralph Miliband) who stood for particular versions of historical materialist 
analysis and who (apart from Thompson) retained their influence over the 
respective publication well into the 1990s, or in the case of Anderson until 
today. Despite important differences listed below, they were united by the 
act of producing historically informed analyses of political and economic 
power relations, struggles and developments. Although working on differ-
ent levels of abstraction, this enabled contributors to submit articles to one 
of the other journals – which in fact happened frequently. Each journal 
searched for potential historical agents of change – labour organisations, 
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left-of-centre parties, and social movements. All of them viewed the events 
of 1968 with a sceptical sympathy for the revolting students, struggled with 
their new forms and themes of political activism, integrated some of these 
issues into their own agendas, and provided shelter for several of the former 
activists once the revolts had died down. All became deeply concerned 
about the ideological radicalisation and rising self-confidence of the Right 
from the mid-1970s onwards and perhaps even more by the start of what is 
called the Second Cold War, at the end of the decade. With feelings of 
losing out in the 1980s, they placed high hopes in the attempts at reforms in 
the Soviet Union from 1985 – hopes they had soon to abandon. 
The differences between the journals often mirrored specific features of 
and developments within American and British society. In Britain, the 
labour movement, the Labour Party, and class conflict played a central role. 
In the United States, with its more fragmented and ethnically divided socie-
ty, where, the Civil Rights Movement, one of the strongest ever popular 
movements, emerged around ethnic identification during the formative 
years of the two journals. In Britain, the spectrum of the political main-
stream extended slightly more to the left than in the United States, where 
even the revisionist British Labour Party appeared progressive. It also 
stands that some of Dissent’s positions which in Britain could have been 
found in publications close to the Labour Party were ‘far left’ in the Ameri-
can context. In the United States, the break with the New Deal and World 
War II climate was fundamental and gave way to Cold War anti-
Communism, whereas in Britain, the war ushered in the era of the welfare 
state. The two American journals strongly disagreed with each other on 
many substantial political questions. The two British publications’ differ-
ences were, first of all, generational and slightly less about questions of 
politics – although behind their controversies over epistemology lay prob-
lems of the possibilities and limits of historical agency and thus also ques-
tions of political strategy. 
Each of the magazines has always had its own project, identity, and pri-
orities, reflecting their editors’ and contributors’ political and personal 
backgrounds and perspectives. Dissent put great effort into defining demo-
cratic socialism practically and for this purpose analysed concrete policies 
instead of discussing ‘grand theory’. Most Dissenters did not see them-
selves as equally distant from the United States and the Soviet Union, but 
closer to the former. Many of them shared a left Zionism. Their experiences 
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as Jewish Americans or former Jewish Europeans played an important role 
for their political perspectives. Monthly Review focused strongly on politi-
cal economy due to its conviction that capitalist crises (and their externali-
sation) explained the dynamics of domestic and international politics. This 
notion of inevitable crisis explained its concern with international power 
structures, environmentalism, and its opposition to reformism. New Left 
Review was the most theoretically inclined of the publications. Thus it 
focused on political philosophy and, additionally, on world history. It was 
deeply involved in following (and shaping) the vogues of post-1968 left 
intellectualism. It published a wide variety of critical theory, far transcend-
ing the boundaries of Marxism and socialism. Hence it was more open to 
(although often critical of) poststructuralism, but, at the same time, perhaps 
the least consistent of the journals in terms of political perspective. Like 
Dissent and unlike the two other publications, New Left Review took a 
consistently supportive position towards European unification since the 
early 1970s. Socialist Register was most thoroughly concerned with struc-
tures and mechanisms of power, both internationally and within the (Brit-
ish) state. On questions of international political economy, it was close to 
Monthly Review but more systematic in the analysis of domestic power 
relations and struggles. More than the others, it stressed the importance of 
designing democratic institutions suitable for a socialist state, although it 
had problems with translating this into concrete scenarios. 
All journals, with the exception of Dissent due to its Trotskyist origin, 
had problems in defining their relationships towards the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc. They oscillated between foregrounding the progressive 
content of the U.S.S.R.’s and the East European states’ nationalisation 
programmes – which made them post- or non-capitalist – and criticising 
their violations of their own populations, especially their working classes – 
which made them authoritarian. This fluctuation put the journals in a vul-
nerable position once the states of the Eastern Blocs had collapsed. Despite 
their differences and inconsistencies concerning these questions, all were 
aware that the discursive nexus between the term socialism and the forms 
of governance associated with the Eastern Bloc – a nexus whose formula-
tion was, as they all, including Dissent, agreed, a central ideological device 
of the capitalist West in the Cold War – would still cause profound inhibi-







III. Crisis and Re-orientation: Evidence 
from the Journals 
 
 
1. THE MOMENT OF 1989: EMOTIONAL RESPONSES 
TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN BLOC 
 
This chapter sheds light on the mood in which analyses among the intellec-
tual left were formulated in the years after 1989. By focusing on the per-
sonal, emotional, immediate aspects of intellectuals’ reactions, it sketches 
out an important part of the framework within which to understand the 
more academically detached and more sober reflections discussed in later 
chapters. The emotional link to the Eastern Bloc, whether one of sympathy, 
anger, discomfort, or protectiveness, overshadowed and influenced what 
contributors thought and wrote about its disintegration. Obviously unex-
pected by most of them at the time, the collapse provoked ‘spontaneous’ 
reactions in all the four journals. Such statements peaked in the years 1990 
and 1991 and became less frequent from 1992 onwards. At their core were 
questions about what the altered conditions meant for radical intellectuals 
individually, for their generations of the left as a whole, socialised in times 
of the Popular Front or the Cold War, and for the chances of left political 
projects in Britain and North America. 
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New Left Review 
Feelings in New Left Review oscillated between relief, mourning, and un-
ease. Relief was founded on the hope that with overdue changes in the 
societies of the crumbling Eastern Bloc, new socialist beginnings would 
become possible – not only there but also elsewhere. This view, formulated, 
for example, by Robin Blackburn in the introduction’s first quote, which 
termed great-power communism an “unhappy spirit begging to be laid to 
rest” and to be replaced by something new, was obviously strongest in the 
early months and years after 1989 (1991: 173). However, such sentiments 
soon disappeared behind more ambivalent feelings. While socialist and 
radical intellectuals welcomed the revolutionary agency of Eastern Europe-
an people who had brought down those state socialist regimes which had 
denied them certain basic rights, the character of these revolutions was not 
unproblematic. It was defined, as Jürgen Habermas stated, by a “total lack 
of ideas that [were] either innovative or oriented towards the future” (1990: 
5). As a consequence, intellectuals became increasingly uneasy about the 
directions which political developments took in the former Eastern Bloc. 
Lucio Magri, a leading member of the Italian Rifondazione Comunista 
described the mood change over the months after the autumn of 1989: 
 
When the Berlin Wall came down the judgement of many people was one of eupho-
ria. They saw the coming of a new historical period marked by world cooperation, 
disarmament, and democratic advance which would provide a clear opportunity for 
democratic socialism with a human face. Now we can see that the reality is different 
and much harsher. (1991: 5) 
 
The reality turned out to be a situation in which capitalism stood triumphant 
and where people in Eastern Europe embraced it whole-heartedly even if 
ill-informed. In this context, the hope for a human socialism appeared illu-
sory. Over the following years, it became increasingly clear that the aboli-
tion of state socialism meant the introduction of an even more radical, 
liberated capitalism – especially since it was paralleled by the collapse of 
the Western labour movements and by the fizzling out of Third World 
radicalism (cf. Ahmad 1994: 96). 
However, grief was not limited to the loss of the revolutionary moment 
of 1989 which had been appropriated by those interested in the restoration 
of capitalism. At least some contributors felt obliged – despite all their 
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previous criticism – to express their mourning over the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. G. A. Cohen, philosopher and analytical Marxist, made no 
secret of his deep feelings of regret: 
 
It is true that I was heavily critical of the Soviet Union, but the angry little boy who 
pummels his father’s chest will not be glad if the old man collapses. As long as the 
Soviet Union seemed safe, it felt safe for me to be anti-Soviet. Now that it begins, 
disobligingly, to crumble, I feel impotently protective toward it. (1991: 9-10) 
 
While this position appeared paradoxical, Cohen explained why it was not: 
 
[A]lthough I have long since sustained little hope that things in the Soviet Union 
might get substantially better, in a socialist sense, there is, in certain domains, and 
people are prone to overlook this, a vast difference between nourishing little hope 
and giving up all hope. The small hope that I kept was, as it were, an immense thing, 
since so much was at stake. And now that residual hope has to be forsworn. So a 
feeling of loss is not surprising. (ibid: 9) 
 
Furthermore, the feeling of loss was likely to have serious psychological 
consequences. For those who, like Cohen, had been socialised into a social-
ist culture as children and had continued to understand themselves as part 
of it as adults, the collapse marked the end of a relationship that was far 
from harmonious but nonetheless extremely important. The tradition’s 
sudden end transformed it into traumatic experience: 
 
What is more, depression about the failure of the Soviet Union, as it supervenes in 
those of us who reluctantly rejected its claims decades ago, perforce has a complex 
structure, one element in which is self-reproach, since what is lost is a long since 
denied (yet also fiercely clung to) love. (ibid: 13) 
 
Critics of the Soviet Union, feelings disappointed over its inglorious per-
formance, had not necessarily stopped projecting their dreams into it – even 
if it had not been socialist, it was the part of the world that could and should 
have. 
However, despair among contributors to New Left Review was not lim-
ited to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Rather, it became an additional 
blow in a long series of political defeats that had to be accepted at least for 
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most of the 1980s. The experience of powerlessness against the Thatcherite 
dismantling of many progressive gains for which the labour movement and 
other social movements had struggled turned out to be particularly hard to 
bear for the generation politically socialised around 1968. They had started 
out with some optimism that critical intellectuals could make a difference 
and install elements of a libertarian socialism. This generational project, as 
Lynne Segal explained, was in shambles: 
 
Today, depression, cynicism or political turnabouts are hard to avoid, even knowing 
we are not the first – and will not be the last – to face the defeat and disorderly 
retreat of the ideals, activities and lifestyles that transformed and gave meaning to 
our lives. Depression hits hardest when the withering of former struggles and aspira-
tions begins to feel like personal defeat; often ending the friendships, the shared 
activities, and the opening up of public spaces, so necessary for the survival of any 
sense of optimism in the future. (1991: 81) 
 
The biographical consequences for this generation were grave as she point-
ed out later: “Ten years of defeat for almost all egalitarian and collectivist 
endeavours has caused many of us on the Left to fall into chronic mutual 
abuse, to fall upon our own swords or to fall – some never to raise again – 
onto the analytic couch” (ibid: 82). She argued that all socialist ideals and 
aspirations were threatened by illegitimacy in the aftermath of 1989. She 
deplored the “gloom of witnessing the erasure of the history of such strug-
gles: an erasure which stems not only from the mainstream media, but from 
sections of the Left as well, busy exchanging new ideas for old, or else 
recoiling memoryless from the corpse of Soviet socialism” (1991: 82). For 
others it seemed to constitute a problem which of the socialist ideals of the 
recent past could be retained and retrieved – even if Western socialists had 
not hesitated to distance themselves from the Eastern Bloc. Jürgen Haber-
mas questioned the sustainability of socialist commitments in a post-
communist world when he discussed what the changes meant for German 
society: “It [the West-German non-Communist left; SB] does not need to 
let guilt by association be foisted on it for the bankruptcy of a state social-
ism that it has always criticized. But it must ask itself how long an idea can 
hold out against reality” (1990: 10).  
Faced with this situation, the majority of authors encouraged each other 
not to surrender and recommended a certain level of stubborn perseverance. 
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It remained an important task to stick to the principles of socialist critique 
in order to avoid both the stagnation of social theory and the spread of 
political agony – especially since the triumph of capitalism was likely to be 
less stable than anticipated by many: 
 
As the light of socialist hopes and aspirations fades, and the need for clear vision 
and historical perspective grows imperative, we might look to the owl of Minerva, 
trusting she will neither be dazzled by the fires of capitalist celebration (or crisis?) 
nor succumb to the absolute darkness of despair. (Therborn 1992: 17) 
 
Critical intellectual work on capitalism and the limits of capitalist democra-
cy remained important, as contributors frequently reminded each other, 
especially if they agreed with Göran Therborn’s diagnosis that “as the 
twenty-first century approaches, no labour movement, no anti-imperialist 
movement, no surviving socialist regime, is offering a convincing vision of 
a socialist future” (1992: 21). Since the need for political change was more 
important than ever, intellectuals should keep up their nerves – as many 
contributors urged though most of them not as elegantly as Jacques Derri-
da: 
 
For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in 
the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the 
ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus 
economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the Earth and 
of humanity. (1994: 53) 
 
According to Immanuel Wallerstein, future developments could be hardly 
anticipated at the moment. He expected the horizon to stay open for a long 
time of up to fifty years – this amounted to a “bleak period” during which a 
new world system would emerge in a slow and complicated process, a 
system either more or less democratic and egalitarian than the previous one 
(1994: 4). From left intellectuals, this prospect required open-mindedness 
but also a certain sense of programmatic direction and, above all, stamina: 
 
You may think that the programme I have outlined for judicious social and political 
action over the next twenty-five to fifty years is far too vague. But it is as concrete 
as one can be in the midst of a whirlpool. First, make sure to which shore you wish 
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to swim. And second, make sure that your immediate efforts seem to be moving in 
that direction. If you want greater precision than that, you will not find it, and you 
will drown while you are looking for it. (ibid: 17) 
 
Socialist Register 
The reactions in Socialist Register in many respects resembled those in 
New Left Review. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, contributors be-
lieved, the chances for the realisation of a socialist society had declined 
everywhere. Joel Kovel, still shocked by witnessing what for most of his 
life he had considered as hardly thinkable – the victory of anti-Communism 
– was convinced that the demise of the state-socialist regimes reinforced a 
neo-liberal onslaught on Western labour movements and would make the 
life of what was left of the latter extremely difficult – particularly in the 
Unitred States (cf. 1992: 254): 
 
The dream of the [U.S.; SB] bourgeoisie had come true: the proletariat had withered 
away; anti-communism had helped secure class struggle on the most favourable 
possible terms to business, leaving in its wake a largely oppositionless society char-
acterised by the accommodation of labour to capital, the functional identity of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties, and the most threadbare left-wing politics of 
any nation in modern history. (ibid: 263) 
 
The problem remained that however one judged the states of the Eastern 
Bloc, they had been the only alternative to capitalism ever realised, as the 
editors Leo Panitch and Ralph Miliband stressed in their editorial to the 
1992 Register, which focused on the question of a new ‘world order’ (cf. 
1992: 1). Both of them had expressed severe criticisms of the Eastern 
Bloc’s lack of democracy. The disappearance of these negative characteris-
tics was still to be saluted. Nevertheless Panitch and Miliband emphasised: 
 
What is a matter for bitter regret, on the other hand, is something else altogether: the 
disappearance of the hope that existed at the beginning of perestroika in the Soviet 
Union that this might in due course produce something that would begin to resemble 
socialist democracy, on the basis of a loosened but predominant public sector. This 
hope turned out to be an illusion. (ibid: 4) 
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Richard Levins was convinced that socialists everywhere had to 
acknowledge a defeat of immense proportions and that this defeat was only 
the final result of a process of several decades of decline in Eastern Europe 
and of defeats in the capitalist parts of the world (cf. 1990: 328). Like Co-
hen in New Left Review, he commented on the personal dimension this had: 
“Half a century ago, my grandmother could assure me that my grandchil-
dren would live in a socialist republic. It now seems unlikely” (ibid). Once 
more, it is obvious that although contributors held deep reservations about 
the political realities in the Eastern Bloc, they had regarded it as indispen-
sable for, and as the most likely area of, moves towards socialism. For 
Levins, the present situation constituted a nadir, but he seemed to remain 
convinced of a dialectical movement of history: “We are living in a difficult 
time, a low point between periods of upsurge, when revolutionary optimism 
looks like a cruel joke.” (ibid: 345) Again, this constituted a call on intel-
lectuals to stick to their convictions and not to give up on the principles 
they believed in. Joel Kovel however feared that this would become in-
creasingly difficult because the commensurability of these principles, of 
understanding history through the category of class struggle, might be lost. 
He seemed to be less certain about the reliability of reassuring dialectical 
moments in the future, or he seemed to suspect that they would be misread. 
If transformative criticism was regarded as quixotic in the future, any at-
tempts at political change worth its name could be easily suppressed (cf. 
1992: 264). These proposed developments were to have most dramatic 
consequences: 
 
A profound weariness and cynicism occupies the place where critical/dialectical 
thinking used to occur. Since the underlying structure which makes society intelligi-
ble is erased, society becomes a mystery, its various phenomena merely strung 
together like the words of a game of Scrabble, and as easily forgotten. Thus even 
factual understanding of the world is lost. (ibid) 
 
Arthur MacEwan expressed a feeling of insecurity – perhaps socialist intel-
lectuals had themselves lost understanding of the world? More wholeheart-
edly than others he conceded that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc posed 
serious questions concerning the feasibility of socialism. Even if, as he 
agreed, a socialist society had never been constructed in the U.S.S.R., at 
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least one difficult question remained: “[W]hy is it that our efforts will lead 
to something better?” (1990: 312). 
Socialists, and the intellectuals among them, were in the defensive. 
Still, they remained important. For instance, they should support attempts 
to prevent further damage and protect the bad against the worse – a domes-
ticated capitalism against a liberated one. To this purpose, they should act 
not as a vanguard anymore but as a rearguard, “defending the gains of 150 
years of struggle, acknowledging the reality of the defeat and evaluating the 
reasons for it, regrouping and preparing for the second wave of revolution-
ary upsurge. It is an agenda of years and decades” (Levins 1990: 329). 
 
Dissent 
Dissent’s reaction to the events of autumn 1989 was more positive. Initial-
ly, at least, the main thrust of comments emphasized the positive effects, 
not just for the people in Eastern Europe but also for the Western left – they 
had been freed of the burden to continuously explain that they did not sym-
pathise with what the Eastern Bloc declared to be socialism: “Intellectually, 
Stalinism evoked keener discomforts than did Nazism, since here the ene-
my seemed to have come out of ‘our own’ milieu, that of the left. Stalinism 
used words and symbols representing our hopes” (Howe 1991: 63). Given 
the journal’s Trotskyist roots and anti-Soviet perspective, these reactions 
did not come as a surprise. More amazing, perhaps was how soon the eu-
phoria of 1989 was left behind. Irving Howe stated already in the summer 
of 1990 that his main feelings were scepticism and uneasiness by now (cf. 
1990: 301). The roots of this change of mood lay in the directions devel-
opments in Eastern Europe took and perhaps also in Howe’s later realisa-
tion that the era of revolutions had come to an end (cf. 1992: 144).  
Still, also for Dissenters, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the sub-
sequent rapid introduction of capitalism came as a surprise, even if they had 
close contacts with opposition circles in Eastern Europe. Norberto Bobbio, 
for example, the Italian liberal socialist who repeatedly wrote for Dissent, 
described the events breathlessly as “total overturn of a utopia, of the great-
est political utopia in history […], an overturn into its exact opposite” 
(1990: 340). This seemed to imply an interpretation similar to Habermas’s 
in New Left Review – the revolutions of 1989 were characterised predomi-
nantly by negative motivations. They had to be understood as protests 
against the state-socialist regimes rather than as the attempts at creating 
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something new. The revolutions initiated the introduction or restoration not 
just of capitalism but of a variety which, for Dissenters, was the worst 
option: Anglo-American, neo-liberal capitalism. While already Stalin had 
turned socialist utopia into dystopia, the abandoning of any idea of social-
ism could now introduce a free-capitalist dystopia. 
For the intellectual left in the United States, the conjuncture of 1989/91 
could cause serious biographical problems. Ann Snitow, for example, ex-
pected difficulty for the two generations of Dissenters to come to terms 
with the altered global context: “As a cultural group, we U.S. leftists (Old 
and New now shovelled together by recent events) may not recover spiritu-
ally from 1989. Our utopianism took root in other soil. Children of the cold 
war, we are not likely to be elected to the future.” (1994: 14). Dennis Wong 
agreed and argued that the events of 1989 had to be interpreted as the 
“death knell of socialism as a credible and attractive political goal” (Rule & 
Wong 1990: 481) and that, among left traditions, only reformist social 
democracy could profit from its demise (ibid.). Whether this would allow 
socialist intellectuals to adopt new functions seemed to be not entirely 
clear. Two Hungarian dissident leftists resident in the United States argued 
that, if they intended to play a role in the future, democratic socialists had 
to accept new tasks which they had for a long time avoided: 
 
This perplexity of (noncommunist) socialism is a highly revealing feeling, convey-
ing the message that noncommunist socialism has not faced seriously the complex 
issue of the historic achievements and internal limitations of its own theory and 
politics. The critique of communism seemed to have spared socialism this unpleas-
ant task, which can no longer be postponed. (Fehèr & Heller 1991: 105) 
 
As a consequence, writers expressed deep insecurity about how to proceed 
in this “moment of political and intellectual confusion” (Howe 1992: 143). 
Obviously, most of them retained a feeling that there still was a difference 
between ‘radicalism’ (or democratic socialism) and liberalism (or social 
democracy), but found it difficult to exactly define distinctive features. The 
following words stem from the opening paragraph of a Dissent symposium 
in 1994: “Are we now advocates only of an American version of social 
democratic reformism, reduced to piecemeal opponents of the liberal status 
quo, urging only that things be made a little more democratic? Can we still 
project some radical hope?” (Editors of Dissent 1994: 7). In their responses, 
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many tried. Yet in this symposium other voices proved more afraid of fail-
ing to make a radical break with the past than of giving up on radical 
change: “[I]f we keep trying to project radical hope by sticking more or less 
to our main arguments from the past, will our efforts be credible?” (Berman 
1994: 9). 
In principle, radical intellectuals were still needed: the collapse of 
Communism had not put an end to the ‘social question’ within capitalism. 
In no way had capitalist democracies solved all the problems, which were 
linked to social inequalities, exploitation and oppression – characteristic 
features of capitalism. Socialism had tried to address these issues and had 
not found adequate solutions. However, the need to find solutions remained 
and intellectuals could play a role in finding them – ideally before a new 
period of political unrest began. Bobbio, at least, did not doubt that future 
social struggles lay ahead and, differing from Howe in this respect, he did 
not even preclude the possibility of revolutionary change: 
 
In a world of frightful injustices to which the poor are condemned, crushed by un-
reachable and apparently unchangeable great economic powers, including those that 
are formally democratic – to think at this juncture that the hope for revolution has 
been extinguished only because the communist utopia has failed is tantamount to 
closing one’s eyes in order not to see. (1990: 341) 
 
Monthly Review 
In the pages of Monthly Review, writers expressed a feeling absent in the 
other journals: anger. It was a reaction to, for example, self-congratulatory 
statements by conservatives, but also by liberals like Robert Heilbroner 
(who occasionally wrote for Dissent), claiming that capitalism had won the 
contest with socialism. These statements were viewed as pure propaganda. 
Carl Marzani, who wrote an extended article “On Interring Communism 
and Exalting Capitalism” which appeared as Monthly Review’s first piece in 
January 1990, asked: “Which contest? If the 70-year-old contest was mili-
tary, then neither side had won; if it was economic, the conclusion was 
premature; if cultural, it was debatable” (1990: 2). The author went on to 
explain that the United States and other Western states had proven impotent 
in terms of preventing moves towards socialism in many places: “What we 
are witnessing in our day is the grand failure, not of communism, but of the 
capitalist attempt to prevent or destroy any socialist state, whether the Sovi-
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et Union, Cuba or Nicaragua” (ibid: 3). Nevertheless, for leftists associated 
with Monthly Review, the future of socialism was insecure after 1989 and it 
depended to a great extent on what would happen to the Soviet Union, a 
point that the editors emphasised in spring 1990: 
 
Socialists all over the world have not only an interest but a personal and political 
stake in what happens in the Soviet Union in this coming and decisive phase of the 
process that began with Gorbachev’s accession to office in 1985. We can only hope 
that the outcome will be positive and that it will set the stage for a following phase 
of economic recovery. (Monthly Review 1990: 17) 
 
As soon as this hope had to be abandoned, the mood changed: Miliband, 
who had close ties with the editors of Monthly Review made the claim that 
“[n]o socialist could mourn the passing of oppressive regimes; but the 
sequel to that passing has, from a socialist perspective, been profoundly 
disheartening” (1991: 18). 
Some authors, however, tried to reassure each other that even if the So-
viet Union followed the rest of the Eastern Bloc and disintegrated, this 
would not disqualify socialism as a political goal. Paul Sweezy provided 
solace by analogy and with a certain trust in the longue durée, when ex-
plaining that in the late Middle Ages the first attempts at installing capital-
ism had also failed but developments had soon made its rise inevitable (cf. 
1993: 6). A restoration of capitalism in the Eastern Bloc would also be just 
a temporary phenomenon. Like Marzani, Michel Löwy argued that the 
West had not defeated and killed socialism – but he argued his case rather 
differently: “One cannot die before being born. Communism is not dead, it 
is not yet born. The same applies to socialism.” (1991: 33) Following this 
line of argument, the journal published optimistic statements from authors 
such as Howard J. Sherman. He advocated grassroots models of socialism 
and expressed his hope that the Eastern European revolutions would pro-
vide a “wonderful opportunity to begin the construction of a democratic 
socialist society” (1990: 22). He enthused that “[w]e are thus witnessing an 
end to statism and the possible – still fragile – beginnings of the worldwide 
triumph of socialism” (ibid). Again, this symbolised the hope that the dis-
appearance of the state-socialist regimes would free socialists from elabora-
tions that they intended to build socialist societies radically different from 
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those that ‘really existed’ and that democratic experiments would be grant-
ed space and time in Eastern Europe. 
Generally, contributors to Monthly Review claimed that there was no 
reason to be perplexed by the events of 1989/91 because they had been 
predictable – and Samir Amin claimed that in fact he had predicted them 
for thirty years (cf. 1992: 43). Like the other journals, if writers in Monthly 
Review expected tremendous problems for the Western left and their intel-
lectuals after 1989, they explained these problems as the results not just of 
the “collapse of neo-Stalinism” but also of the political “bankruptcy” of 
social democracy and of left defeats in the Western world over the preced-
ing years (Singer 1994: 87). The problem for Monthly Review was that 
developments elsewhere were not encouraging either: in 1993, the left was 
forced to digest not only the recent end of the Soviet Union but also the 
defeat of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, new problems for an isolated Cuba, 
and the demise of Marxism-Leninism in Africa (cf. Meisenhelder 1993: 
40). 
Also in Monthly Review writers saw important tasks for intellectuals 
and repeated that they should not submit themselves to the dismal situation 
at hand because otherwise they would become part of an “unholy alliance, 
between capitalist triumphalism and socialist pessimism” (Wood 1994: 9). 
Contributors agreed that a portion of socialist optimism, based on sober and 
critical analysis continued to be of utmost importance. John Bellamy Foster 
quoted Cornel West who had emphasised precisely this point. West related 
his admonition not only to the end of the Eastern Bloc but also to the intel-
lectual and political zeitgeist in the West and demanded that “social theory 
wedded in a nuanced manner to concrete historical analysis must be de-
fended in our present moment of epistemic scepticism, explanatory agnosti-
cism, political impotence (among progressives), and historical cynicism” 
(1993: 14). 
 
Coming to Terms with the Crash 
Between the journals but also between British and American intellectuals 
the similarities in spontaneous, emotional reactions to the events of 1989/91 
outnumbered the differences. All agreed (though Monthly Review took 
longer than the other three journals to come to this conclusion) on the defi-
nite demise of the Eastern European variant of state socialism. Common to 
them also was the emphasis that the regimes they witnessed crumbling did 
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not represent their models and visions of socialism. Nevertheless, they 
expected the collapse would have consequences for their reflections in the 
future. They expressed doubts that the world was on the route to socialism 
(as Richard Levins’s grandmother had been convinced) and some were 
even unsure that socialism could still serve as a guideline for an emancipa-
tory politics. They were convinced that the Eastern and the Western bloc 
would be affected by the changes in Eastern Europe, either positively, as a 
minority of optimists believed (through freeing socialism from the associa-
tion with the state-socialist regimes), or negatively, as a growing majority 
of pessimists was convinced (with the freeing of capitalism from the neces-
sity to make concessions to its critics). This ‘liberation’ of capitalism was 
the consequence not only of the collapse of its systemic alternative, but also 
of the weakness of Western labour movements, and the fossilisation of 
Third World left nationalism. 
Interestingly, emotional feelings were more strongly expressed in the 
pages of Dissent and New Left Review than in the other two journals. This 
is surprising, given Dissent’s post-Trotskyist origin and New Left Review’s 
broad-church approach. However, the generational difference between the 
writers in the journals is important here: Monthly Review and Socialist 
Register were still more dominated by an older generation of leftists who 
had had to survive similar ruptures before, for example, in 1956. They 
seemed to have more trust in the emergence of new movements and strug-
gles. In the other two magazines the ‘1968’ generation had a stronger pres-
ence, a generation that had always distanced itself from the Eastern Euro-
pean states and originally shared very optimistic and voluntarist perceptions 
of social change. This optimism became increasingly qualified by the expe-
riences of the economic and political crises of the 1970s and the beginning 
of the dismantling of welfare capitalism in the 1980s. Paradoxically, 1989 
came as a further blow in a long series of defeats. The pieces by Cohen, 
Segal, and Snitow – all born in the 1940s – can serve as examples. 
The two British journals seemed more inclined to feelings of mourning 
and regret over the collapse of the Soviet Union or the failure of its at-
tempts at reform than the American ones. In the case of Dissent, the early 
reaction consisted of relief and elation, later more and more replaced by 
unease. In Monthly Review, a mixture of anger and unease seemed to domi-
nate. Most likely, this can be explained geographically – for the British and 
the West European intellectual left, Europe, including Eastern Europe, 
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served as a frame of reference in a way it did not for American intellectuals 
who were at the same time more inward looking – focusing on the United 
States – and more internationalist through taking into account parts of the 
world beyond Europe. When Monthly Review expressed pessimism, it 
reflected developments in Latin America as much as in Eastern Europe. 
Dissenters were the only group of writers who demanded a radical re-
direction of intellectual work. The task amounted to defining new versions 
of democratic socialism which should not shy away from borrowing from 
and communicating with social democratic varieties. Contributors to the 
other journals were more concerned with continuity. They should not aban-
don their former positions and follow their colleagues on the roads to polit-
ical reformism and – to use Cornel West’s formulation – epistemological 
relativism even if it would take a long time to gain clarity about the exact 
shape of future struggles for socialism. 
 
 
2. ASSESSMENTS OF STATE SOCIALISM 
 
Finding the adequate words for, and the right relationship to, developments, 
deformations and debates in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc had 
always been complicated issues for the Western radical left. Evidence in the 
journals suggests that matters did not become any easier after the end of the 
Cold War. Even though most socialists and Neo-Marxists had seen the 
Eastern European countries as spent forces by the 1960s and 1970s and had 
subsequently turned to seemingly more promising developments elsewhere 
(for example, to China), interest in the Soviet Union again intensified with 
the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s. Unfortunately, hopes were disappoint-
ed soon, as these experiments began to crumble. This chapter looks into the 
analytical attempts at summarising the achievements and failures of the 
Eastern Bloc in the four journals. Intellectuals wanted to know what went 
wrong, why it went wrong and what lessons could be learned from the 
large-scale but eventually failed attempts at implementing socialism in a 
considerable part of the world. The overall explanations and interpretations 
that were formulated would influence the directions in which theorists 
looked in order to design the details of a new socialist project. Contributors 
generally commented on four different issues: (1) the economic develop-
ment of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, (2) their power structures 
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and apparatuses of government and governance, and (3) the consequences 
of the Cold War for their economic and political realities. From these three 
dimensions, reasons for the collapse (4) could be deduced. The journals’ 
common aim was to find adequate, differentiated judgments on the 
achievements and failures of the state socialist experiment that differed 
from the Western triumphalism that was perceived to be dominant at the 
time. 
 
New Left Review 
On the topics listed above, most serious disagreement existed and contro-
versial debate took place in the journal’s pages. The deliberations over the 
Cold War proved especially heated; though the long-term debate on ‘ex-
terminism’ still continued, it became marked by an even more fundamental 
struggle. Positions were divided, ranging between those (the minority) who 
saw the Soviet experiment as an unmitigated disaster and as those (the 
majority) who were convinced that this judgement needed qualification. 
Such differences resulted in normative evaluations not only of the Soviet 
Union, but also of the United States and its allies and of their treatment of 
countries which questioned their hegemonic position in global politics – 




Several authors emphasised that economic development in the Eastern Bloc 
had been a success, if measured against pre-revolutionary levels of wealth. 
Fred Halliday and Göran Therborn remarked that its people lived relatively 
well when viewed from a global perspective and thus industrial modernisa-
tion could not be interpreted as unconditional failure (cf. Halliday 1990: 15; 
Therborn 1992: 28). Additionally, Therborn elsewhere hinted at statistical 
evidence that the Eastern Bloc’s economic performance was not seen as an 
“unmitigated disaster” even by its own population (1993: 187-8). Moreo-
ver, contributors remarked that other parts of the world, which had re-
mained under capitalist domination, did far worse: 
 
Indeed there can be no doubt that the loss of human life, and the extent of physical 
suffering in the capitalist third world in the 1980s greatly exceeded that experienced 
in the countries ruled by Communist bureaucracies – a dismal comparison which 
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does nothing to justify the stifling tyranny exercised by the latter but does put it in 
perspective. (Blackburn 1991: 174) 
 
Through achieving industrialisation, whose immense human costs the au-
thors did not ignore, the Eastern Bloc managed to narrow the gap to the 
advanced capitalist nations of the West. (cf. Therborn 1992: 26-7). Authors 
reiterated the well-known fact that, during the 1960s and still in the 1970s 
especially, there was widespread fear in Western countries that they might 
be overtaken in economic terms by the Eastern Bloc, especially as long as 
De-Stalinisation seemed to signal the parallel transition to a more humane 
and possibly also to a more productive social and economic order (cf. 
Blackburn 1991: 211-2). Though Halliday conceded that this had been an 
exaggeration of economic advance in the Eastern Bloc, he pointed out that 
it formed part of the rationale of the Cold War (cf. 1990: 15) and Therborn 
underlined that “impressive growth” had continued until recently (1992: 
20). 
These analyses of course generated the question of how economic 
shortcomings were to be explained. Here one could find statements by 
sceptical voices such as that of Nicos Mouzelis who criticised Therborn’s 
“overly positive” account of the Soviet economy. He pointed out that indus-
trialisation had already started in tsarist Russia and would have continued 
without revolution (1993: 182). Hence he contradicted the widespread 
Marxist narrative of the Herculean task of transforming pre-industrial Rus-
sia into the industrialised Soviet Union (cf. ibid). Hence, unlike Therborn, 
Mouzelis did not trace back the collapse of the Eastern Bloc to a conjunc-
tural crisis of its economy, but to fundamental structural deficiencies (cf. 
ibid: 183). Other writers were less sure and described the undeniable failure 
that followed the transformation to an industrial economy, which they still 
considered as an economic success, as a relative one. In their view, the 
failure could be traced back to two causes: firstly, the Eastern Bloc never 
succeeded in delinking from the capitalist world economy but took a subal-
tern place in it (cf. Halliday 1990: 19). Delinking would have required the 
modelling and creation of a system alternative to capitalism. Instead, they 
remained in the state of a “socio-economic hybrid” (Blackburn 1991: 193). 
In recent times, they had become, partly against their will, increasingly 
integrated into the global economy, but, as hybrids, were in no way 
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equipped to deal with its uncertainties and rapid changes (cf. Hobsbawm 
1992: 60). 
As the second mistake, writers diagnosed the particular mode of eco-
nomic planning, which Blackburn described as the crudity of the link be-
tween micro-decisions and macro-decisions in the production process (cf. 
1991: 213). This led not only to the dissuasion of innovation and creative 
development (which would also have needed some form of socialist democ-
racy) but also to an extended system of fixing, the trading of favours and 
thus the persistence of a complex web of mutual obligations (ibid: 214). 
This had not only economic consequences, but ideological ones as well – a 
point Blackburn wanted Marxists to accept: 
 
Socialists are, not without reason, suspicious of the ideological forces generated by 
the capitalist market […]. But it should also be acknowledged that the pattern of 
nationalized property in the Communist states also produces unlovely ideologies – 
notably an intolerant nationalism and an excessively tolerant attitude towards tradi-
tional patriarchy. (ibid: 235) 
 
Others added that inhuman aspects were not restricted to the ideological 
level but manifested themselves in forced labour and super-exploitation – 
something which Karl Kautsky had already criticised when he observed the 
agrarian collectivisation process (cf. Wollen 1993: 87). These characteris-
tics could not be explained without the Cold War, as Mary Kaldor pointed 
out. The Eastern Bloc’s economy, especially under Stalin, remained a war 
economy, organised primarily for the purpose of countering Western threats 
– from Marshall aid to nuclear weapons. Later, some piecemeal corrections 
were implemented in order to move towards a more differentiated econom-
ic strategy, but these were overshadowed from the 1970s onward by the 
need for austerity policies, which arose from trade deficits with the West. 
Their consequences of social displacement, Kaldor argued, eventually 
destroyed the remaining legitimacy of the Eastern European governments 
(cf. 1990: 29-30). While Mike Rustin was convinced that the main reason 
for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc experiments was economic failure 
rather than a lack of democracy (cf. 1992: 100), there were also other voic-
es: “The defeat of Communism has thus been the defeat of a type of social 
formation which gave too little scope for popular initiative and pluralism, 
or self-recognition and self-activity (whether collective or individual), 
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either in economic life, politics, or culture” (Blackburn 1991: 236). It was 
this critique of over-regulation that led some contributors to agree with 
Fukuyama’s thesis that Communism was not able to satisfy humans’ long-
ing for ‘thymos’, for the chance to develop as individuals and to receive 
appreciation for their activity, creativity, work, and achievement.
1
 Joseph 
McCarney expressed this dissatisfaction as a trespass against “freedom”: 
 
It is surely not at all fanciful to see these people in a Hegelian perspective as having 
grasped the central truth of the modern world, that freedom belongs to their nature as 
human beings, and as having grasped also the contradiction between that nature and 
their actual conditions of life. (1991: 22) 
 
Many contributors qualified their critical perspective by a belief in the 
Soviet Union’s and later the Eastern Bloc’s beneficial impact on parts of 
the world beyond their direct sphere of influence. The following considera-
tions by Blackburn were echoed by several authors: 
 
While the peoples of the Soviet Union have good cause to rue the horrendous cost of 
Stalinism, the survival of the Soviet Union has had huge, and often positive implica-
tions for those outside Soviet borders – most obviously the immense and irreplacea-
ble Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazism but also the real, though less quanti-
fiable, Soviet contribution to persuading Western ruling classes to cede ground to 
anti-colonial liberation movements and to make concessions to their own domestic 
labour movements. […] The Bolshevik victory of 1917-20 or the Soviet role in the 
victory of 1945 did not put socialism on the agenda, even in Russia, but, in conjunc-
tion with antagonisms internal to the leading capitalist nations and empires, they did 
                                                             
1  Francis Fukuyama’s well-known book The End of History and the last Man 
(1992) claimed the triumph of ‘liberal democracy’ and denied the possibility of 
further systemic changes. Fukuyama based his thesis on the assumption that lib-
eral democracy was best able to satisfy the universal konging for both economic 
efficiency and individual recognition by society. While writing his book, how-
ever, the author seems to have developed his own doubts whether liberal capital-
ism would really be the ‘end of history’. In some passages, he obviously feared 
deterioration into an authoritarian capitalism. 
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help to bring about a new global order, both limiting and prevailing forms of capital-
ist and imperialist power. (1991: 192-193) 
 
Along similar lines, Lucio Magri conceded that it had been fundamentally 
wrong for socialists not to criticise Stalinism, and the bureaucratic authori-
tarianism that followed it. Nevertheless, he suggested to not ignore their 
constructive role in international politics: 
 
But for decades another side also continued to operate: the side of national inde-
pendence; the spread of literacy, modernization and social protection across whole 
continents; the resistance to fascism and victory over it as a general tendency of 
capitalism; support for and actual involvement in the liberation of three-quarters of 
humanity from colonialism; containment of the power of the mightiest imperial 
state. (1991: 7) 
 
This anti-imperialist dimension was celebrated as the most unambiguously 
positive one. Halliday, for example, declared that “[i]t is for Brezhnev, as 
much as anyone else outside South Africa itself, that credit for cracking the 
racist bloc should go” (1990: 15). Writers unanimously contended that 
despite internal political inadequacies, the Eastern Bloc was a force for 
good in the rest of the world – making not only the defeat of Nazism possi-
ble (the reluctance with which Stalin took up this task was not mentioned), 
but allowing for decolonisation and posing as enough of a threat for capital 
to make it concede to the institutional arrangements that became associated 
with the golden age of social democracy. Magri summed up the conse-
quences of the Eastern Bloc’s disappearance in the following way: 
 
For the oppressed, it means the passing away not so much of a model [...] as of an 
ally and support. And with it is going a legacy of cultural autonomy which the 
common sense of Marxism, in its most diverse forms, deposited in the world much 
more widely and deeply than in the Communist parties alone. (1991: 7) 
 
Concerning political achievements, not much in the pages of New Left 
Review could be read as a defence of the Eastern Bloc’s record. Only Paul 
Auerbach pointed to the credit that should be given “for advancing broad-
based literacy and culture, in spite of the debilitating effects of totalitarian-
ism and isolation from the rest of the world” (1992: 23-24). These conces-
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sions, however, were undermined by the political system itself: “The inabil-
ity to use this human potential in even a moderately effective way is a 
weighty indication of the failure of the command-administrative system of 
government” (ibid). Nevertheless, the systems were not totalitarian in the 
sense that there was no chance of reforming them. Therborn hinted at the 
examples of Hungary, Slovenia, and the Soviet Union itself to prove that 
‘change from above’ was possible (cf. 1993: 187). And Halliday added 
bitterly: “The historical irony is that communism has lost its appeal just at 
the moment when it has demonstrated a new political potential, an ability to 
change that theorists of totalitarianism and many within the Soviet system 
had doubted” (1990: 14).
2
 
The most problematic issue for socialists was certainly the lack of de-
mocracy in the Eastern Bloc. Comments were numerous and dealt with the 
problem of introducing socialism in one, or as had often been claimed, in a 
‘backward’ country. Giovanni Arrighi explained ways in which Marxist 
principles were violated in this process. The revolutionaries developed 
interests different from those of the world proletariat and sought to catch 
and keep up with the wealth and power of leading capitalist states. Accord-
ing to Arrighi, realities in Russia required to take sides with that section of 
the proletariat suffering mass misery and thus to develop a coercive form of 
rule in which the party controlled the state which in turn controlled civil 
society. Arrighi defined this as a double substitution with the vanguard first 
standing in for a mass organisation (Leninism) and then also for the ruling 
functions of the bourgeois state (Stalinism). Since the Russian revolutionar-
ies were successful in this effort, up to the surprising point where the Soviet 
Union gained super power status, they also successfully transformed Marx-
ism into an ideology of coercion and industrialisation. At the same time, 
they still claimed to represent the interests of the world proletariat as a 
whole and accused those sections that formulated interests at variance with 
their own, especially the increasingly strong social democratic wing of the 
labour movement, as traitors. By splitting the world labour movement, they 
“provided the world bourgeoisie with a valuable ideological weapon in the 
                                                             
2  Halliday saw this potential however just as a hypothetical one. He argued that 
‘socialism with a human face’, as, for example, behind the Prague spring risings, 
had never been possible under Cold War conditions because of the Western 
multi-party alternative (cf. 1990: 20). 
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struggle to reconstitute its tottering rule” (1990: 59). Arrighi nevertheless 
claimed that the strategies chosen by the Russian revolutionaries did not 
constitute a ‘betrayal’ of Marxism: 
 
Rather, [...] it describes Marxism for what it is, a historical formation that conforms 
to the actual unfolding of the Marxian legacy under circumstances unforeseen by 
that legacy. Or to rephrase, Marxism was made by bona fide followers of Marx but 
under historical circumstances that were neither prefigured for them nor of their own 
making. (ibid: 57) 
 
Blackburn drew a similar sketch of developments in the Soviet Union. 
However, he also contended that it was, at least from a traditional Marxist 
point of view, delusory to try building Marxism in one backward country 
(cf. 1991: 176). Revolutionaries could not help but fall prey to political 
voluntarism (ibid: 189). He described and gave reasons for the processes 
which guided the revolutions of the 20
th
 century into increasingly authori-
tarian directions: 
 
The would-be socialist revolutions of the twentieth century have all taken place 
against a background of war-devastation and capitalist failure and each has had to 
struggle with a heavy weight of economic backwardness as well as military encir-
clement. In each revolutionary process there have been primitive elements of de-
mocracy, as hitherto excluded and suppressed layers of the population asserted their 
elementary interests, but in each case a centralizing political and military apparatus, 
while giving stability and direction to the revolution, has also foreclosed democratic 
development. (ibid: 176-177) 
 
Several other voices came forward with characterisations of state social-
ism’s defects, such as the disastrous skipping of historical stages (cf. Mou-
zelis 1993: 185), attempts at accelerating history (cf. Wollen 1993: 93), 
economism, statism, Jacobinism (as another term for vanguardism), Euro-
centrism (cf. Magri 1991: 12), or the attempt at achieving radical change 
through ruthless leadership (cf. Miliband 1994: 12). 
These deficiencies resulted in an authoritarian top-down structure which 
made political democracy as impossible as economic democracy and popu-
lar planning. Hence the political and the economic problems were clearly 
linked. Eric Olin Wright claimed that this was precisely the critique Neo-
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Marxists expressed with regard to the Eastern Bloc – without democracy, 
socialist institutions could not be sustained and would degenerate into 
intractable power centres and networks, serving their own interests (cf. 
1993: 22). All this could be summarised, in Kautsky’s words, as a “barbaric 
road to socialism” (quoted in Wollen 1993: 86). Or perhaps not to socialism 
but to something else – for example, to “authoritarian collectivism” which 
was the exact opposite of the “socialized individualism” that Miliband saw 
as the goal of socialism (cf. 1994: 4). Critique was meticulously histori-
cized and carefully balanced and contributors maintained that the possibil-
ity of political change had existed in the Eastern Bloc for most of the time. 
To this end, Kaldor identified 1968 as the turning point which convinced 
the population of the futility of further strivings for socialism (cf. 1990: 30). 
Therborn disagreed and claimed that until 1980 all uprisings in the East had 
been socialist in character (cf. 1992: 20). Only Mouzelis condemned the 
entire time span and disagreed with the others, claiming that comments by 
contributors (in this case, Therborn’s) were “based less on sober analysis 
than on a reluctance to accept that the Soviet experience was from begin-
ning to end an unmitigated disaster” (1993: 182). He countered that once 
human costs were taken into account, the situation could not be taken as a 
success story in any way (cf. ibid). The issue, however, was not the degree 
of success of the endeavour, but rather the problem was whether it was 
legitimate to use categories of relative or absolute failure when describing 
the lack of fundamental democratic principles. Another question was 
whether explanations for the deficiencies were to be found in the Eastern 
Bloc’s internal structures only. The evidence above has shown that for most 
authors such an explanation was too narrow. Rather, the historical frame-
work of system competition and geo-politics also needed to be taken into 
account. 
 
The Impact of the Cold War 
The Cold War was central to these additional considerations. Debates over 
how to interpret the Cold War had reached a peak in the early 1980s when 
Edward P. Thompson popularised his notion of ‘exterminism’.
3
 This con-
                                                             
3  Thompson interpreted the second Cold War – which had started in the late 
1970s – not as an element of the ‘competition’ between a capitalist West with an 
expansionist tendency and the state socialist East reacting to this aggression (and 
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cept was criticised by many intellectuals associated with New Left Review. 
Unlike Thompson, they interpreted the Cold War as one between capitalism 
and state socialism – and as one in which capitalism acted as the main 
aggressor. Halliday reiterated this position after 1989. He maintained that 
the end of the Cold War signalled the end of an era in which the Western 
states had been predominantly concerned with containment of the Soviet 
Union – an era stretching back to the Versailles treaty (cf 1990: 10). The 
“global, ultimately irreconcilable, conflict between two different kinds of 
society and political system” had come to an end (Halliday 1990a: 149). It 
had done so not because the capitalist West had lost its opponent – as 
Thompson seemed to indicate – but because the Western countries had 
succeeded in subjugating it (cf. ibid: 148; Ahmad 1994: 96). Despite the 
general disagreement, the journal also provided a forum for dissenting 
voices which restated the ‘exterminist’ argument, as was done by Thomp-
son and Mary Kaldor. Though both ‘exterminists’, their positions differed 
slightly from one another. For Kaldor, Atlanticism and Post-Stalinism were 
compatible, part of one system (cf. 1990: 33). It had been one of Western 
Marxists’ major mistakes to ignore this: 
 
Even though the Western Left was, for the most part, sharply critical of Stalinism, it 
still characterized the Cold War as a conflict between capitalism and socialism. It 
described the West as ‘capitalist’ and the East as ‘socialist’, and explained the con-
flict in terms of the expansionary nature of capital and the unwillingness of capital-
ism to tolerate any alternative. (ibid: 25) 
 
Thompson in contrast underlined that he interpreted the Cold War as an 
inter-systemic conflict which had, however, developed a self-reproducing 
dynamic and a logic of its own (cf. Thompson 1990: 140). Immanuel Wal-
lerstein argued along similar lines. He identified a Cold-War system that 
                                                                                                                          
neither the other way round). He regarded the Cold War as following the self-
governing logic of ‘exterminism’ in which both sides amassed ever larger sup-
plies of weapons and became dependent on economic and political agents inter-
ested in maintaining them. Both the ‘West’ and the Eastern Bloc had become 
tied as symmetrical components to this dynamics. Peace movements in East and 
West scandalised this situation and tried to make people aware of its immense 
dangers (cf. New Left Review 1982).  
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left a part of the world for the Soviet Union where anti-systemic forces that 
had come to power after 1945, were co-opted to the capitalist world econ-
omy, and created their own inequalities and power centres. The same Cold-
War system created a hegemonic bloc from North America via Western 
Europe to Japan, backed ‘moderate’ decolonisation in the Third World and 
a certain degree of redistribution in the states of the capitalist core. But the 
regime contained repressive elements – from the gulags in the East via one-
party states in the Third World to McCarthyism and anti-Communism in 
the West. This system, for Wallerstein, constituted the logic of the Cold 
War – and the risings of 1968 were directed against the many faces of this 
system in East and West (cf. 1994: 9-11). 
Why was this debate still important after the Cold War had ended? Kal-
dor was convinced that the Western left had been seriously weakened by 
lending critical support to the Eastern Bloc or by its anti-anti-Communism 
– but still, some chances remained for a renewed socialism (cf. 1990: 36). 
Thompson shared this view, especially since he did not interpret the end of 
the Cold War as an unconditional victory for the West: 
 
In a logic of reciprocal interaction, if one side withdraws it may have profound 
effects upon the other, just as the wrestler who suddenly loses an antagonist may fall 
to the ground. [...] If the Cold War is no longer ‘self-reproducing’ we can expect 
other (more traditional, less mystifying and less ideological) pressures to reassert 
themselves. But let us wait a few months before we can decide that it is ‘capitalism’ 
which has triumphed tout court. (1990: 141) 
 
In other words, for Kaldor and Thompson, new possibilities emerged with 
the end of the confrontation between East and West which, to a certain 
degree, had been achieved by progressive forces on both sides.
4
 Most con-
tributors to New Left Review seemed less optimistic. If the West had won 
the Cold War, popular movements had nothing to do with its end and, even 
                                                             
4  Jürgen Habermas was more cautious in his judgment. Although he agreed that 
changes in people’s political opinion obviously had consequences, it was hard to 
determine how important the peace movements had been for the end of the Cold 
War (cf. 1990: 21). He was also convinced that developments had moved be-
yond Jürgen Kuczynski’s idea of a self-purifying reform process on the road to 
socialism (ibid: 6). 
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worse, the victory signalled the disappearance of the only systemic alterna-
tive that had existed to capitalism. While for Thompson this view amounted 
to a perverted version of Western triumphalism, Halliday insisted that the 
process of disarmament from 1987 onwards was already a sign of the East-
ern Bloc’s defeat and any attempts of the former state socialist countries to 
develop a third way were “swept aside by the combined pressures of their 
own populations and Western state and financial interventions” (1990a: 
149-150).
5
 Therborn supported this position, linked socialism to the epoch 
of modernity and questioned whether it still represented a realistic alterna-
tive (cf. 1992: 21). At least for the moment, the end of state socialism 
seemed to suggest the end of the socialist project as a whole. 
 
Reasons for the Collapse 
The question remained as to what exactly had caused the collapse. Contrib-
utors suggested two reasons: Halliday described the first one as the Eastern 
Bloc’s internal entropy. Even if economic failure was only a relative one, it 
was decisive. It was the West, the core of the capitalist world, against 
which the economic performance of the Eastern Bloc was measured (cf. 
1990: 17-19). The catching-up or overtaking of the Eastern Bloc, feared by 
many Western politicians, did not happen. Instead, increasing economic 
problems, ecological devastation, falling birth rates, declining life expec-
tancy and growing crime caused a diminishing legitimacy of the ruling 
elites in the eyes of the public of the Eastern Bloc. The governments were 
neither able to develop a post-industrial strategy (that was needed from the 
1970s onwards) nor to muster new sources of political legitimacy: 
 
By the 1980s the industrial and military capacities of Communism were waning 
assets. The previous achievements of industrialism bequeathed new tasks, beyond 
the scope of industrial modernity. The Second World War generation was ageing 
and thinning out biographically, and their expertise of little value to a Cold War 
stabilisation of the continent, symbolised by the Helsinki agreement. Radical struc-
tural changes were needed. We know now that this led to the end of Communist 
                                                             
5  Halliday also agreed that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was the result of 
public mass action. But he disentangled the events of autumn 1989 from the end 
of the Cold War (cf. 1990: 5). 
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socialism, or socialist claims, and to an attempted restoration of capitalism. (Ther-
born 1993: 186) 
 
However, Therborn again maintained that there were some successful 
moves towards modernisation, led by Communist leaderships, for example, 
in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, in Hungary and Slovenia in the 1980s. How-
ever, they obviously came too late. In general, the public upheaval seemed 
to be as much a consequence of entropy as an activity that caused the col-
lapse. Yet it also contributed to it – the state socialist apparatuses became 
ground between internal forces such as Charter 77 and Solidarnosc and the 
pressures of capitalism (cf. Blackburn 1991: 236). Secondly, the Eastern 
Bloc, not least due to economic weakness, lost the Cold War (cf. Ahmad 
1994: 96). The confrontation not only prevented a healthier economic de-
velopment in the Eastern countries, it also made the export of socialism to 
the West impossible. Hence, socialism as a political system had to be de-
veloped in a limited geographic area, in one country or in a small number 
of countries. Such constraints were likely to cause difficulties (and to vindi-
cate Marx’s thesis of the necessity of revolution on the international level). 
For Therborn however, it was not all elements of socialism that had col-
lapsed, rather, after a peak of socialist influence in about 1980, decline had 
set in. Nevertheless, socialist measures such as planning and redistribution 
were still widely used. Hence, “the current crisis of socialism in the west 
did not follow an accumulative series of failures but, rather, constitutes a 
changed perception of the prospects for socialism from that of a very recent 
historical peak of impact and influence” (1992: 26). Others, such as Eric 
Hobsbawm and Wallerstein, interpreted the collapse of the Eastern Bloc as 
just one expression of a more general crisis which was not restricted to one 
particular political, economic or ideological system: “For, at least in the 
zone of Western civilization and economic development, neither past expe-
rience nor the ideologies and theories inherited from the pre-industrial past 
or developed since the eighteenth century, seem to fit the situation of the 
last quarter of this century.” (Hobsbawm 1992: 58) What the Eastern Bloc 
proved unable to cope with was not a ‘healthy’ capitalism but capitalism in 
crisis. This crisis would continue (cf. ibid: 59). State socialism, however, 
had died due to its lack of democracy and its defeat in the Cold War. 
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Socialist Register 
Although the issues discussed in Socialist Register were mostly the same as 
those in New Left Review, the emphasis was slightly different. Whereas, for 
example, the debate on the adequate conceptualisation of the Cold War 
played only a minor role in Socialist Register, the authors showed a strong-
er interest in comparing the failures of state socialism with the deficiencies 
of capitalism. Different opinions became clearly visible on a number of 
questions, for instance, on the quality of the Gorbachev reforms or on the 
degree to which the Eastern Bloc formed part of one world system. 
 
Assessments 
Like in New Left Review, a number of voices emphasised the economic and 
social achievements of the Eastern Bloc, also in comparison to the capitalist 
West. Some authors set out to question both the normative standards and 
the empirical bases of judgment prevalent in the West. One example was 
Ellen Meiksins Wood’s article on “The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society” 
from 1990. She took issue with social conditions in the United States and 
hinted at horrendous infant mortality rates in Washington D.C., extreme 
discrepancies between wealth and poverty in New York City and Los An-
geles as well as a deficient education system and widespread drug abuse 
throughout the United States (cf. 1990: 80-81). She listed similar problems 
in Britain and went on to ask: 
 
If these are the successes of capitalism, what standards should we then use in com-
paring its failures to those of the communist world? Would it be an exaggeration to 
say that more people live in abject poverty and degradation within the ambit of 
capitalism than in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? (ibid: 81) 
 
Similarly eager to diffuse capitalism’s rosy image, Robert W. Cox echoed 
Therborn’s defensive statements in New Left Review that socialism’s eco-
nomic planning was not without successes and had created an educated 
population, health provision, and an equitable distribution of life necessities 
(cf. 1991: 177). Although he admitted that this had been achieved at great 
cost such as police terror, war casualties and the victims of collectivisation, 
he – like Wood – posed the question: “But was the cost more terrible than 
the suffering caused by the impersonal market forces of capitalist industri-
alization? There is little basis to conclude that it was, though the socialist 
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experience was compressed into a shorter space of time” (ibid). Miliband 
also pointed to the high levels of inequality in capitalist countries and criti-
cised that decisions by large and transnational corporations had conse-
quences for ordinary people who could not control these decisions. He 
concluded that the assumption on which a beneficial capitalism was built, 
the good invisible hand of the market, was “belied by the whole experience 
of capitalism” (1991: 379). And also Joel Kovel expressed the problem of 
how to measure the value of individual freedoms usually associated with 
capitalism against the safety of a social infrastructure that the state socialist 
countries had provided: 
 
How to justify the fact that those released from the bondage of Communism would 
have to give up guaranteed rights to housing, employment and education, and their 
factories with recreation clubs and day care centres, for structural unemployment, 
inflation, gross differences in wealth and widespread banditry? (1992: 258) 
 
In short, contributors agreed that the “first attempt to build socialism” 
(Richard Levins’ term) had achieved a great deal in terms of social and 
cultural improvements (1990: 330) as well as unprecedented levels of 
equality and security. However, they also accepted that these – according to 
them impressive – stories of extensive development, based on rapid and 
reckless industrialisation, had to be qualified by taking note of the horren-
dous human costs. (cf. Miliband 1991: 377; Panitch & Miliband 1991: 3). 
Furthermore, serious economic deficiencies made it difficult or impos-
sible to maintain the flattering social achievements over time. The Eastern 
Bloc never succeeded in organising a highly centralised and sustainable 
economy that could do without markets as regulating mechanisms (cf. 
MacEwan 1990: 312). In the end, with Perestroika, they deliberately and 
officially re-introduced markets (Immanuel Wallerstein described the gov-
erning groups of the Eastern Bloc even as the last true believers in market 
liberalism [cf. 1992: 104]). The question remained as to why did economic 
and organisational difficulties turn out to be so insurmountable? Just like in 
New Left Review, it was argued that the Eastern Bloc failed to set up an 
alternative world system. Instead, the Soviet Union (and later the Eastern 
Bloc) tried to develop ‘socialism in one country’ and became, as such, 
integrated into the capitalist world economy (cf. ibid: 102). Under these 
circumstances, it was impossible to design an economy that was superior 
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to, or at least qualitatively different from, the capitalist one (cf. Lebowitz 
1991: 365). Even as early as the 1930s, the Bolsheviks organised produc-
tion along the lines of capitalist management structures. This affected the 
re-emergence of quasi-class hierarchies in society with not only a manage-
rial class but also a primary and a secondary labour force (cf. Cox 1991: 
174, 180). Thus, planning could not be pursued on the base of economic or 
social rationality, rather it became a bargaining process between interest 
groups. This led to power struggles and alienation just like in capitalism (cf. 
ibid: 180-181). 
Some writers listed a number of political achievements and expressed 
sympathy for, or solidarity with, the political leadership groups. Again, 
there was a tendency to compare the East and the West – for example, 
when Arthur MacEwan argued that the states of the former had been creat-
ed by committed Marxists, whereas the Western leaders with their human 
rights rhetoric were simply cynics (cf. 1990: 312). Nor were the Eastern 
Bloc’s governments staffed by “mere scoundrels and stooges”, as Miliband 
assured the readers (1991: 377). Rather, they acted under immensely diffi-
cult circumstances (cf. Cox 1991: 170). Several contributors hence ques-
tioned which was the correct approach towards criticism. Cox, for example, 
explained that many assessments of the failure of ‘real socialism’ were 
inconsistent with a socialist theory of history – a perspective that consid-
ered real society to be the product of struggle rather than the ideal result of 
a project led by intellectuals on the basis of a Marxist blueprint (ibid: 169-
170). He was convinced that certain developments towards a higher level of 
democracy could be detected in the Soviet Union’s history. He observed, 
for instance, the emergence of a rudimentary civil society during the 
Brezhnev era and explained that the party acted as a link between it and the 
state institutions (cf. 1991: 178-179). Finally, like in New Left Review, 
contributors emphasised the positive effects the Eastern Bloc had caused 
beyond its own borders, notably in the Third World – less as a model than 
as a provider of material support: 
 
This aid was hardly costless in terms of the political, ideological and economic 
courses into which such regimes and movements were often channelled, but at the 
same time it was often a critical lifeline. The prospect of not standing alone against 
the massive military, political, economic and ideological power of a hostile capitalist 
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world was an important condition of struggle against oppressions and exploitation in 
the ‘third world’. (Panitch & Miliband 1991: 5) 
 
Despite all qualifications, writers published detailed criticisms of political 
failure. Above all, they hinted at the lack of democracy (stemming from 
either the beginning of the socialist experiment or else resulting from intro-
ducing democratic structures but then allowing them to swiftly lose all real 
content [cf. Levins 1990: 338]) and the inability to create a socialist con-
sciousness among the populations. MacEwan’s argument that meaningful 
and sensible planning was impossible without a democratic social and 
political environment pointed to the link between economic and political 
failures. He argued that the abolition of markets and market relations might 
have been a step towards the creation of democratic political structures, but 
alone it proved insufficient (cf. 1990: 312). For him one of the most serious 
weaknesses of Marxism was not having taken the problem of democracy, of 
establishing democratic structures, seriously enough (ibid: 314). Miliband 
described the consequences such failings  had for revolutionary leaders and 
those coming after them: 
 
Their tragedy and that of their successors was that the system they built or accepted 
was based on unchecked power, and demonstrated to perfection how deeply corrupt-
ing such power is, and how wasteful and ultimately inefficient is economic man-
agement under its auspices. (1991: 377) 
 
This meant, as Panitch and Miliband explained, that centralist economic 
and political systems and the concept of the vanguard party were, in the 
end, ultimately discredited (cf. 1991: 18). Moreover, critics could no longer 
maintain the notion that a state under workers’ control was in and of itself a 
progressive achievement (although there was difference of opinion whether 
workers control had ever existed in the Soviet Union [cf. MacEwan 1990: 
315]). MacEwan raised the topic of pre-revolutionary Russian ‘backward-
ness’ and of the alleged imperialist threat – the classical argument for justi-
fying the lack of democracy in the Soviet Union. He contested the argu-
ment’s validity and, obviously not believing in the chance of world-scale 
revolution, explained that there would always be a threat of imperialism 
(ibid: 314-315). Socialism would have to learn to live with this threat or it 
would not live at all. The problem, furthermore, had not so much been 
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backwardness but the belief in productionism – the plan of accumulating 
wealth in the present, in order to provide a suitable socio-economic envi-
ronment for a more democratic socialism in the future (cf. ibid: 316): “Thus 
the valid idea that the full development of socialist democracy and ‘social-
ist man’ requires a material base became the justification for a single-
minded pursuit of economic growth and callous disregard for the self-
determination of the people in the present” (Levins 1990: 331). This pro-
ductionism had not only been substituted for human emancipation (and on 
the way neglected issues such as equality, the liberation of women, humane 
working conditions), it also had reduced the socialist experiment to an 
economic competition with the capitalist West. Levins concluded that this 
meant that socialism had not moved far enough from capitalism (cf. ibid: 
340). A similar idea was forwarded by Wallerstein: the one-country version 
of socialism meant that Leninism developed aspects of a ‘liberal Socialism’ 
which made it compatible with the liberal world order and its breakdown a 
symptom of the liberal order’s demise (cf. 1992: 102-104). Authors were 
convinced that a more radical break would have been necessary to provide 
space where socialist ideas could develop and take shape. Ideally, economic 
change and political change should have occurred side by side. Only then 
would social consumption, the absence of unemployment and economic 
crises be valued sufficiently by the population (cf. Levins 1990: 330). Mi-
chael Lebowitz stated that the economic strategy failed to produce or to 
educate human beings for whom the requirements of socialist production 
were self-evident. Nowhere, he claimed, had a civil society with a socialist 
common sense emerged (cf. 1991: 365-367). Instead, as Panitch and 
Miliband noted, with their productionist success stories – impressive as 
long as one focused on economic development only – they had destroyed 
people’s creativity (cf. 1991: 3). The most strongly worded political cri-
tique came from Daniel Singer; he accused Stalinism of being a curious 
mixture of oppression and an almost religious belief in a particular doctrine 
and, hence, quite the opposite of a self-organised, democratic system, able 
to energise and use the creativity of the people (cf. 1993: 251). All intellec-
tuals seemed to agree that the Soviet Union’s and the Eastern Bloc’s reli-
ance on state-centred, top-down mechanisms of decision making had even-
tually undermined their political and moral authority. Nevertheless, some 
theorists remained circumspect in their judgment and hinted at the problems 
always present in attempted reforms: “As Macchiavelli long ago warned, 
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the necessity of reforms can never be acted upon without danger, the dan-
ger being that the state may be destroyed before having perfected its consti-
tution.” (Cox 1991: 171) This seemed to be even truer when this internal 
risk was accompanied by an external threat – such as the Cold War. 
 
The Impact of the Cold War 
Socialist Register’s interpretation of the Cold War differed in some respect 
from the versions discussed in New Left Review. They were less interested 
in conflicting interpretations like exterminism versus capitalist aggression 
and socialist self-defence. Their obvious main point was that, during the 
Cold War, the capitalist threat was experienced as reality in the Eastern 
Bloc, whether this concern was justified or not: 
 
External opposition to established socialist regimes, whether or not intended, wheth-
er or not justified, provoked responses from the socialist leaderships in the realms of 
foreign policy, production, and the form of state that have nothing intrinsically to do 
with the socialist idea per se. (ibid: 172) 
 
This perception remained important even if revisionist historiography had 
challenged the view that the alleged threat was as real as the socialist coun-
tries’ leaders claimed. From war communism and New Economic Policy 
onwards, it influenced the states’ structures and activities (cf. ibid: 172-
174). On the Western side, the Cold War had left its marks too – for exam-
ple, with the central role for the arms industry which was a key element of 
capitalist growth and depended on the maintenance of arms production (cf. 
Singer 1993: 255). The discursive and ideological consequences were 
equally important. Kovel even suggested naming the Cold war the “Forty 
Years War” after the Thirty Years War – in order to highlight that also the 
former in his view had quasi-religious, ideological dimensions. In the end, 
the West had succeeded in tying up terms like ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ 
with their own political systems (1992: 254). Kovel additionally hinted at 
the scars the Cold War left in the West. Speaking in particular about the 
United States, and describing the reconstitution of the country as a “nation-
al security state” that managed its “empire” through terror and cooptation, 
he claimed that the U.S. population became anti-Communist (ibid). This 
construction made international solidarity among working-class people 
impossible, weakened the labour movement at home, and stabilised the 
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political system of the United States: “[A] nation welded together against 
Communism sees itself as identical with its state and ruling class” (ibid: 
256-7). Avishai Ehrlich further added that these ideological struggles had 
world-systemic effects. The most serious was a domestication or bringing-
into-line of all states who tried to break free from the bipolar confrontation 
and to follow alternative political logics (cf. 1992: passim). The authors 
were unanimously convinced that the Western powers’ goal of containment 
was reached in so far as the Cold War contributed to the marginalisation of 
socialist struggle in the West, further complicated democratic-socialist 
innovation in the East, and effectively blocked ‘third ways’ in other parts of 
the world. 
 
Reasons for the Collapse 
The overview of economic and political failures listed in the pages of So-
cialist Register, as well as the comments on the Cold War, suggest various 
reasons for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. One of the major causes was 
Stalinism – “in either its bloody form or its more common authoritarian and 
bureaucratic form” – which was “not the necessary outcome of Marxism” 
but nonetheless tragic (MacEwan 1990: 317). Perhaps the failures of Stalin-
ism could have been corrected if the socialist states had been granted more 
time to do so. The problem, at least according to Levins, was that capital-
ism was still the ‘natural’ system of the 20
th
 century. He argued that really 
new societal norms and arrangements needed long periods of time in order 
to develop, and he compared the formation process of the Soviet Union to 
the slow rise of democracy in the United States: 
 
Seventy years after the Bolshevik revolution, we see nationalist rioting in the Soviet 
Union; 70 years after the American Revolution the massacre of Native Americans 
was still in full swing and opposition to slavery was still a fringe movement. A 
hundred years after the revolution, Jim Crow laws were being imposed throughout 
the South. Seventy years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the formal but hollow 
structures of socialist democracy are just being revitalized; 70 years after the Ameri-
can Revolution we were still only halfway toward women’s suffrage and more than 
a century from Black enfranchisement. 70 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
labour movement struggles for more direct workers’ control and strikes threaten to 
bring down Communist-led governments; 70 years after the American Revolution 
110 | INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM AFTER 1989 
 
union organizing was still the criminal offence of ‘conspiracy to increase wages’; 
and now, two centuries later, unions are in decline. (1990: 333) 
 
Later in the same article, the author referred to an argument that was shared 
by Wallerstein and Hobsbawm in both Socialist Register and New Left 
Review: the terminal crisis of the Eastern Bloc could not – at least not for 
long – hide the structural problems that had taken hold of the liberal capi-
talist West (ibid: 345). The collapse was just one consequence of structural 
problems in the world system as a whole. 
It has already been noted that several writers regarded reforms as dan-
gerous as they destabilised the structural and institutional set-up of a socie-
ty. The risk proved even greater if they came late and were introduced in an 
inconclusive way. Miliband emphasised the incoherence and inconsistency 
of Gorbachev’s reforms and Levins pointed out that in the second half of 
the 1980s a rhetorical Marxism had been substituted by a naïve liberalism 
in the U.S.S.R. (ibid: 341). However, this only explained why the belated 
attempts at rescuing the state socialist systems did not succeed. More deci-
sive had been the long-term inability to firmly anchor the socialist experi-
ment in the hearts and minds of the population, the only agent who in the 
long run could defend and sustain it. Lebowitz referred to Brecht’s tailor of 
Ulm (who wanted to fly without proper wings) and related his fate to that of 
societies supposed to become socialist while being insufficiently equipped 
with knowledge and experience of the value of the socialist experiment but 
instead attracted by promises to materially overtake people living under 
capitalism. Participants in the struggle for socialism thus had been poorly 
equipped and ill-prepared for their tasks. Lebowitz concluded that “[n]o 




Unsurprisingly, Dissent evaluated state socialism more negatively on the 
whole. This clear position resulted in a briefer treatment of the issue. There 
were no direct attempts to balance the shortcomings of capitalism with 
those of state socialism. Furthermore, the journal expressed an alternative 
opinion on the Cold War, which identified the Soviet Union as the major 
aggressor, though this view was not shared by all contributors. However, 
like in the others, in this journal one could find traces of traditional Marxist 
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arguments on the difficulties of developing socialism in a ‘backward’ coun-
try as well as indirect comparisons of state capitalism and socialism which 
warned against too complacent a view about the current historical situation. 
 
Assessments 
Exemplary evidence of the former type of argument could be found in 
editor Mitchell Cohen’s article, “Theories of Stalinism. Revisiting a Histor-
ical Problem” (1992).
6
 Here Cohen restated the original economic success 
of the Stalin era’s modernisation programme, but contrasted it with a later 
stage in which economic organisation and state bureaucracy became in-
creasingly anachronistic, a situation that was alleviated for some time 
through the emergence of a civil society from the ranks of the techno-
scientific and intellectual strata of the population (ibid: 189). More im-
portantly, the journal worked to counter the exaggeration of capitalism’s 
successes. Unlike the qualifying remarks found in Socialist Register, no one 
attempted to question the ethical scales of failures (for example, by compar-
ing, state socialism’s beneficial impact on Third World countries with 
capitalism’s exploitation of the peripheries). However, Dissent did feature 
warnings against triumphalism that echoed those in the other journals. The 
Canadian Bob Rae described capitalism as a remarkably tenacious system 
of power and values, but hinted at its serious limitations and contradictions 
– to produce opulence and squalor simultaneously; to make technological 
achievements possible, but at the price of ecological disasters; to allow for 
individual triumphs for a few and hardship for many (cf. 1991: 42). Further, 
he explained: 
 
Capitalism’s ability to ‘deliver the goods’ economically has been much exaggerated. 
As a political system, it fails miserably to address the ordinary needs and demands 
of its citizens. As a moral system, it utterly fails to enlist people’s will to a shared 
freedom, to justice, to equality, to community, or to love. (ibid: 45) 
 
                                                             
6  Mitchell Cohen, born 1952, served as co-editor of Dissent from 1991 to 2008, 
works as political theorist at Baruch College and City University of New York 
Graduate Center. His work focuses on social democratic theory, political culture 
and cosmopolitanism. 
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Though Dissenters saw no need to regret the end of state socialism and did 
not have much to say about its economic achievements, they nevertheless 
feared that the domesticating effect it had had on the Western bloc would 
disappear and make capitalism even less considerate. 
That the Soviet Union’s and the Eastern Bloc’s economic performance 
constituted a disaster (initial modernisation notwithstanding) – this view 
was almost universally shared in contributions to Dissent. For its explana-
tion, many authors referred to Marxist arguments. Shlomo Avineri, for 
example, repeated the issue of the problematic skipping of historical stages 
and hinted at Lenin’s New Economic Policy as an attempt to bridge the gap 
from pre-capitalism to socialism that ended in failure and produced an 
economic system that could by no means be called socialism (cf. 1992: 8). 
Dissenters were not overly concerned with the question of what label the 
economy deserved instead, though Howe referred to the observations of his 
once-ally Max Shachtman, who subscribed to the characterisation of the 
system as one of ‘bureaucratic collectivism’.
7
 For Howe, this was a label 
more negative than those of ‘state capitalism’ or ‘degenerated workers 
states’ because it implied the development of a new exploitative social 
structure where the bureaucracy had become almost a fully-fledged ruling 
class. Yet this was an isolated statement; instead an altogether telling si-
lence testified to the view that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc did not 
deserve much attention, except for the question in what directions its coun-
tries would move now (cf. 1991: 69).
8
 
The journal’s initial optimism about the direction which changes could 
take in Eastern Europe was dependent on the notion that certain social 
achievements of its former systems could not be abandoned without caus-
ing collective outrage. They had provided levels of social security and 
social consumption that had become important for their populations. For 
this reason, Dennis Wong argued that people in Eastern Europe did not 
                                                             
7  Max Shachtman, 1904-72, was expelled from the CPUSA in 1927 and moved 
via Trotskyism to social democracy. He became a source of inspiration for U.S. 
neo-Conservatives 
8  The developments in Eastern Europe were observed with an increasing pessi-
mism by Dissenters who initially had believed in a spread of European-style so-
cial democracy but then had to observe that, to the contrary, a liberated capital-
ism was gaining strength (see Chapter III 1.3.). 
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want capitalism per se, but the fruits of capitalism (cf. Rule & Wong 1990: 
482). It remained to be seen what they would turn to once they realised that 
the latter depended on the former. In addition, like in the other journals, 
authors argued that the Eastern Bloc had achieved its most substantial ef-
fects elsewhere; as without its domesticating effects, capitalism would have 
collapsed. Only one author, who did not belong to the inner circle of the 
journal, Eric Foner, pointed in an exchange with Eugene Genovese (who 
surprisingly un-self-critical criticised the left’s lack of self-criticism) to the 
‘great achievements’ of the Soviet Union as they were mentioned in Social-
ist Register and New Left Review: 
 
Genovese generates a great deal of passion, but never gets around to explaining 
precisely why anyone on the left who supported even part of the USSR’s ‘political 
line’ (which at various times included anti-Fascism, promotion of colonial inde-
pendence, and opposition to the war in Vietnam) bears moral responsibility for the 
crimes of Stalinism. (1994: 379) 
 
Yet on the whole, Dissent defended fewer aspects of the Eastern Bloc’s 
political, social and economic realities than the other journals, though this 
did not signal a wholehearted embracing of capitalism on the part of its 
writers. As Genovese stressed, “I do believe that socialism is finished but 
am no more enamored of capitalism than I ever was.” (1994: 388) 
 
While the list of achievements was short, that of political failures was long. 
The most fundamental disappointment was that the overthrow of capitalism 
did not translate itself into a reign of freedom, a movement which was 
instead suppressed or postponed after the revolution: 
 
Indisputable, however, even more than the failure of the communist regimes is the 
failure of the revolution inspired by communist ideology – that is, the ideology of 
the radical transformation of a society considered oppressive and unjust into a com-
pletely different, free, and just society. (Bobbio 1990: 339) 
 
Wong argued that the whole concept of a sudden and comprehensive shift 
from one stage to another was a mistake, as it was based on a simplistic 
understanding of political change: “Today the very concept of socialism 
seems to me too evocative of totalistic solutions, as in the phrase, still wide-
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ly used by thoroughly principled democrats, ‘the transition to socialism’, 
which implies a once-and-for-all passage across a demarcated dividing 
line” (Rule & Wong 1990: 483). Once this premise was given up, it became 
indefensible to monopolise power through measures such as the disbanding 
of the constituent assembly, as in revolutionary Russia, and replace it with 
centralised planning of all social and economic developments. Mitchell 
Cohen expressed a very negative view of what happened in the transitional 
process: 
 
In short, self-declared Marxists came to power in Russia lacking all preconditions 
for socialist goals, and had to accomplish what capitalism did in the West – thereby 
converting Marxism into a program for modernization and industrialization rather 
than emancipation – while eliminating those segments of the citizenry most ‘ad-
vanced’ in know-how and political culture. (1992: 188) 
 
These shifts had serious repercussions for the post-revolutionary society 
that developed; the producers did not become the ruling class, but rather a 
proletariat dominated by strata of bureaucrats. Discussing the study The 
Gorbachev Phenomenon by Moshe Lewin, Cohen described what this 
meant for the character of the modernisation process the Soviet Union 
embarked on: 
 
The social bases for the Stalinist state were, therefore, badly collectivised peasants 
‘flanked by millions’ of poorly urbanized peasants governed by ill-prepared bureau-
cratic strata of rural and semi-rural origin. In the meantime the party was trans-
formed from supervisor of change into ‘an adjunct of the economic bureaucracy’. 
The party became étatized, lost its political nature, and the Stalinist system became a 
party-state-economy ‘bureaucratic matrix’. (ibid) 
 
This configuration of political power had serious consequences for the 
social structure of the Soviet Union. Several contributors mentioned the 
persistence of class relations. In fact, the bureaucracy had become the new 
ruling class (though some questioned whether it really constituted a class) 
and ruled over an oppressed and alienated proletariat. Far from being a 
homogenous post-revolutionary subject, this proletariat was split along 
ethnic and community lines. Maintaining this hierarchical and conflictual 
order required authoritarian power. Some authors stressed that the Eastern 
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Bloc should be regarded as authoritarian rather than totalitarian, but never-
theless conceded that its ruling mechanisms contained a large amount of 
terror and violence. Cohen depicted the difference between the Leninist and 
the Stalinist phase of terror: while under Lenin the apparatus of violence 
was used against imagined or real enemies, under Stalin it was directed 
against the Communist Party itself – a move which killed what might have 
been left from a revolutionary socialist ethos. He continues, “[u]nder Lenin, 
the USSR was a one-party state; under Stalin it was an unparty state, with 
(surviving) card holders functioning less as members of a political party 
than as clergy under an infallible pope” (ibid: 184). Despite liberalisations 
after the Stalin era, the Soviet system was not able to integrate the creative 
potential that lay in the emergence of an intellectual class and elements of a 
civil society (ibid: 189). This view seemed consensual, but authors disa-
greed on the roots of these developments in the U.S.S.R.. Some, such as 
Howe, accused Soviet leaders of “violating Marxist prescriptions and ex-
pectations” (1991: 70). This perception was shared by many who, for ex-
ample, blamed a blend of different elements of political culture – such as 
the application of Marxism in the form of a positivist Leninism which owed 
a lot to nineteenth-century scientific thought in general (more than to 
Marx’s method of critique) and to a traditional Russian positivism (cf. 
Cohen 1992: 184-186).
9
 Others contradicted and claimed violence to be not 
the consequence of the perversions of Marxist ideology, but instead of the 
ideology itself. Eugene Genovese even went a step further by not limiting 
this judgment to Marxism, but extending it to all radical egalitarian move-
ments – whose victories were always followed by despotism and cruelty – 
though he was convinced that the Soviet Union broke all records for mass 
slaughter (cf. 1994: 375). Genovese’s position, however, did not represent 
the majority opinion in Dissent and his  intervention met with a great 
amount of criticism. In particular, Cohen blamed him for drawing the 
wrong conclusions from the disastrous Soviet experience: 
                                                             
9  Cohen explains that this positivist-scientific approach was widely shared, for 
example, by Mensheviks like Plekhanov who stated that Marxism should be un-
derstood as Darwinism applied to social science (cf. 1992: 186). Beyond Russia, 
schools of thought such as British Fabianism would qualify for a similar catego-
ry. For a critical discussion of left perceptions of history, determinism, positiv-
ism and agency see Morgan 2003. 
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If there is something to learn from the willingness to see millions die in the short run 
for utopia in the long run it is that the form and content of politics shape one anoth-
er. Many ex-communists – especially those who became neoconservatives – try to 
expunge the content without questioning the form. (1994: 378) 
 
This idea of a procedural approach to socialism, one which would take the 
form of politics seriously enough, became the guiding principles of the 
journal’s work in the next few years and explained its high interest in issues 
such a market socialism, associative democracy and communitarianism. 
 
The Impact of the Cold War 
Dissent’s peculiar opinion on the Cold War, called the second-and-a-half-
camp position by Isserman, has already been mentioned. Nevertheless, 
comments resembled those in the other periodicals. For Irving Howe, writ-
ing under the impression of recent events in 1990, the conflict ended with a 
“decisive victory for the West (in part for democratic capitalism, in part for 
social democratic welfare states, with the relative weight of these two still 
to be determined)” (1990a: 87). In another contribution, the end was inter-
preted as a compromise: the capitalist states had integrated so many social-
ist features that it was incorrect to claim that with the collapse of the East-
ern Bloc all elements of socialism had been abandoned. Still, Howe repeat-
ed that fear of Communism in the 1950s had been justified and restated his 
conviction that the revisionist historians had been wrong (cf. Howe 1991: 
64). Paul Berman supported this view with his argument that large sections 
of the American left had tainted the United States with many more crimes 
than the country had actually committed (cf. 1993: 100). This position 
(though not shared by everyone on the editorial committee) distinguished 
the journal from other left and post-left positions – from the ‘hard left’ to 
the neoconservatives – who were, however, not completely banned from its 
pages as Genovese’s intervention as well as the responses by Eric Foner 
and others proved. 
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Reasons for the Collapse 
The reasons for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc were seen as closely linked 
to its internal development. Even if the West won the Cold War, its ability 
to win had to do with its opponent’s internal weakness. Daniel Bell listed 
three main reasons as the immediate causes of the implosion: the failure of 
the economic model, the failure of ideology and the crumbling of the ‘em-
pire’ that the Eastern Bloc constituted (cf. 1990: 172). These were, of 
course, related to each other and to the authoritarian nature of the state 
socialist system (cf. Howe 1990: 87). Under particular historical conditions, 
authoritarianism became vulnerable because, as Howe explained, masses 
could act on their own, without leadership and without a vanguard (cf. ibid: 
89). Elsewhere he sketched out the framework in which this was likely to 
occur: “The events in the Soviet Union show that, as in Germany and Italy 
a few decades ago, all the socio-political forces, good and bad, suppressed 
by the total state have a way of reappearing once a bit of freedom is al-
lowed.” (Howe 1991: 71) While authoritarianism led to insurrectionism, 
economic inefficiency led to the restoration of private property relations. 
However, if not socialism in all its aspects had been abandoned, and if not a 
pure capitalism had won, but one that had been forced to make numerous 
concession to the working classes, then an epoch of supposedly clear alter-
natives between two systems had come to an end for all, rather than only 
for those living in Eastern Europe.  
 
Monthly Review 
There are important differences between Monthly Review and the other 
publications with regard to the discussion of state socialism. On the one 
hand, in the early 1990s, contributors to Monthly Review still retained some 
hope that the eventual rescue of a renewed Soviet Union was possible. This 
perspective was shattered beyond repair with the unsuccessful attempt at 
ousting Gorbachev in the summer of 1991, which led to the final break-up 
of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, several important journal contributors 
expressed their divergent views on the nature of the Soviet state. Despite 
differences, most seemed to agree that it had been neither socialist nor 
state-capitalist. Whereas before interest in power relations and mechanisms 
of decision-making in the Soviet Union had been only limited, this now 




. Writers also discussed the values and weaknesses of the Gorba-
chev reform project in relation to these considerations. For obvious reasons, 
the Soviet case was treated as important for socialists all over the world. Its 
importance, once more, seemed to stem less from its internal political and 
economic contradictions, problems and weaknesses, than from its role in a 
global class struggle in which it was just one actor, although a major one, in 
the anti-capitalist camp. The Cold War, it seemed, had not yet ended – even 




Carl Marzani remained the only author who argued for labelling the Soviet 
Union as “socialist”. On the surface, he disagreed for pragmatic reasons 
with those who insisted on finding other ascriptions – he saw no sense in 
ignoring a term that was so widely used. Yet at the same time he licensed a 
reading of the U.S.S.R. as, at least in some sense, socialist: 
 
My chief objection [against calling the USSR ‘post-revolutionary’; S.B.], however, 
is one of political tactics: the current appellation is so deeply ingrained that attempts 
to change it would be sterile. It is simpler and more effective to use Isaac 
Deutscher’s epigram, ‘Socialism in a backward country is backward socialism’. 
(1990: 24) 
 
The other contributors backed Sweezy’s interpretation of the Soviet Union 
as ‘post-revolutionary’. Alberto Prago criticized Marzani heavily for paying 
insufficient attention to the U.S.S.R.’s violent and authoritarian aspects 
(1990). He suggested that critics speak of the “Soviet system” or follow 
Paul Sweezy’s proposal because socialist or communist societies required 
political and economic democracy (ibid: 53-54). Sweezy himself explained 
that the lack of democracy resulted in an authoritarian class society with 
state ownership and central planning (cf. 1990a: 7). Elsewhere he formulat-
ed a similar diagnosis about Cuba, which he described as pursuing a partic-
                                                             
10  Marcel van der Linden speaks of Paul Sweezy’s “agnostic theory about classes” 
in the Soviet Union: Sweezy simply observed the existence of “a ruling class 
[…] of a new type” without further elaborating on the mechanisms and relations 
of domination (2007: 210). 
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ular form of “Caudillismo” – a term that stands for power concentrated in a 
‘chief’ – characterised by a mixture of bureaucratic patronage systems and 
political repression (1990b: 19). Unsurprisingly, in Monthly Review 
Miliband also emphasised that the U.S.S.R., in general, and Stalinism, in 
particular, fundamentally contradicted central tenets of socialism (cf. 1991: 
18). Perhaps more astonishingly, others questioned whether the Eastern 
Bloc could really be seen as non-capitalist or even post-capitalist. While 
Michel Löwy in his “Twelve Theses on ‘Really Existing Socialism’” 
thought it could at best be described as non-capitalist (cf. 1991: 33), Istvan 
Mészáros was even more careful. He introduced a distinction between 
capitalist systems and those dominated by capital and categorised the Sovi-
et Union as an example of the latter (cf. Monthly Review 1993: 13). It was 
easier to destroy capitalism than the power of capital which reproduced 
particular socio-economic relationships and priorities and thus inhibited the 
emergence of a radically different form of societal organisation. The East-
ern Bloc had developed divisions of labour, a hierarchical structure of 
economic command and it retained the priority of capital accumulation in 
economic considerations (ibid). 
Listings of the Soviet Union’s economic achievements however were 
few in Monthly Review and they included a comparative dimension, con-
trasting its industrialisation process with that of the United States. Carl 
Marzani pointed out that the Soviet Union built its industries without using 
child labour whereas in the United States in the early twentieth century coal 
mines were still staffed with children not older than eleven years (cf. 1990: 
25). Others added that, unlike the United States, it modernised without 
slavery. Several authors deplored the discrepancy between the system’s 
considerable economic and social achievements and its lack of democracy 
(cf. Monthly Review 1991: 20). Generally, primitive accumulation worked 
well in the Soviet Union, economic problems began after this expansive 
phase (cf. Singer 1990: 76-77). However, even if this early stage was suc-
cessful in economic terms, it should be considered as state-led growth 
rather than as a move towards socialism (cf. ibid: 77). Contributors stressed 
the similarities and the links between the post-revolutionary and the capital-
ist countries. Samir Amin suggested that common ground lay in the pre-
dominant role of economism: technological modernization and industriali-
sation as priorities and as precondition for social progress (cf. 1992: 46). 
Amin criticised that the collective identities and political solidarities that 
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had existed had been sacrificed for such purposes – when, for example, 
collectivisations, carried out in the name of efficiency and technological 
progress, had destroyed the class alliance between peasants and workers. At 
the same time, this allowed for the development of a Soviet bourgeoisie 
(ibid). Because of their shared developmental priorities, the Western and 
the Eastern Bloc remained parts of the same economic system. Victor Wal-
lis explained the ecological problems of the non-capitalist countries as 
consequence of the capitalist climate in which they had to survive. When 
the Soviet state took over and then continued with habits inherited from 
capitalism (such as the satisfaction of private ambition), the practice proved 
to have detrimental effects on the internal level and also externally, propa-
gated by the fear of falling behind the West economically (cf. 1992: 2). 
Forced into competition with the capitalist West, the Eastern Bloc eventual-
ly lost. 
Yet the Eastern Bloc did not lose without having its own successes, 
some of which were political. The fact that communism became a move-
ment with considerable backing owed a great deal to the irrationalities of 
capitalism, under which many people suffered and from which it promised 
an escape route via rational planning. Like in the other journals, several 
writers suggested that among the Eastern Bloc’s political accomplishments 
was the domestication of capitalism in many parts of the world. Demon-
strating by their sheer existence that alternatives to Western-style capital-
ism were possible, they destabilised its reign. Tom Mayer, who reviewed 
the 1991 issue of Socialist Register (Communist Regimes: the Aftermath), 
was convinced that this threat would continue to function even if the re-
gimes themselves had – with exceptions such as Cuba – disappeared (cf. 
1992: 60). With this positive effect, it becomes understandable that the 
revolution of 1917, despite its substitutionism and all its problematic out-
comes, was not judged as a mistake – even by severe critics of the U.S.S.R. 
like Amin (cf. 1992: 45). The same author observed occasional attempts at 
correcting the problems which had resulted from substitutionist revolutions 
in agrarian countries, for example, in China’s cultural revolution, which he 
described as strategies for strengthening “popular classes” (workers and 
peasants) against the bureaucracy (ibid: 46-47). The other great historical 
achievement of the Soviet Union was once again the defeat of Nazism – 
with this victory, Marzani suggested, the Soviet Union and socialism had 
proven their raison d’être (cf. 1990: 3). This triumph bestowed both legiti-
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macy and prestige on the regime (cf. Monthly Review 1990: 7). Closer to 
the present, Marzani hinted at another achievement which backed his 
Deutscherite interpretation – the Soviet Union was able to produce a Gor-
bachev, to reform itself ‘from above’ through its ruling class, and to attract 
people in many parts of the world to socialism once more. Again in a com-
parative view, he pointed out: “People may well catch on to history’s gar-
gantuan jest: the ‘sick’ system produced Mikhail Gorbachev, the ‘healthy’ 
one Ronald Reagan” (1990: 15). Marzani’s article appeared in early 1990. 
Later, contributors were more likely to mention Gorbachev’s initiatives as 
one of the failed attempts at reforming the Soviet system and perhaps even 
as the most disastrous one. 
As in the other journals, a great deal of attention was reserved for a cri-
tique of the Soviet Union’s political mistakes and deficiencies. One of the 
most outspoken critics, Alberto Prago, insisted that the country’s success in 
defeating Nazism did not say anything about its internal qualities. He ac-
cused others like Marzani to be apologetic about the countless state-
sponsored crimes, the resulting terror, its victims, and the system’s bureau-
cracy. If Gorbachev was seen as one of the system’s achievements, these 
darker aspects needed acknowledgement too (cf. 1990: 54). Although other 
contributors’ assessments were often milder in tone and blamed the hostile 
climate for driving the Soviet Union into authoritarian postures of self-
defence, in principle they also criticised the same crimes and bureaucracy. 
Sweezy explained that all the numerous socialist revolutions of the 20
th
 
century struggled with the form of a post-revolutionary state’s institutional 
set-up and its distribution of power (cf. 1990a: 6): 
 
The new revolutionary regimes were able to overthrow and expropriate the old 
rulers, and to this extent they succeeded in laying the foundation for a socialist 
society. But the life-and-death struggle to develop and protect the embryonic new 
society gave rise – whether inevitably or not remains a matter for debate – to a 
military-style cleavage between the leaders and the people which in time, and 
against the will and intentions of the original revolutionaries, hardened into a new 
self-reproducing system of antagonistic classes. This was obviously not the restora-
tion of capitalism: that would have been the result of a victory of the counter-
revolution, not of a development clearly internal to the revolutionary regime itself. 
(ibid: 7) 
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Löwy agreed that the leading class in fact excluded the workers and the 
majority of the population from political power. Ideologically, the upper 
stratum of post-revolutionary societies discredited individual political and 
human rights as bourgeois while in reality they were fruits of victorious 
working-class struggles (cf. 1991: 33). Sweezy and Magdoff emphasised 
that not only the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc suffered from this 
problem, but also other socialist countries such as China (cf. Monthly Re-
view 1991: 1). And addressing the situation in Cuba Sweezy explained: 
 
From a socialist point of view, there is much to criticize in Cuban society, most 
importantly that it is not democratic and after 30 years shows no sign of evolving 
toward democracy – using the term in its authentic Marxist sense of a society in 
which the associated producers are in charge of their own lives and destiny. (1990b: 
19) 
 
Others hinted at the direct contradiction between post-revolutionary prac-
tice and the democratic principles Marx had laid down in his essay on the 
Paris Commune (cf. Wallis 1991: 6-7) and argued that this practice had 
contributed, just like the counter-revolutionary threat and fascism, to the 
destruction of the original revolutionary Marxist tradition (cf. Löwy 1991: 
39). These discrepancies harmed not only the workers, or to use Amin’s 
terminology, the popular classes, but also the rulers; originally most of 
them had not been careerists, but in many cases had suffered greatly for 
their convictions before they came to power. They had to be seen as victims 
too – who fell prey to power’s corrupting tendencies. For Miliband, the 
only chance to avoid the traps of power lay in the implementation of a 
system of checks and balances which facilitated critical debate and safe-
guarded accountability. Socialism, in other words, could only be democrat-
ic socialism and needed a formal democratic context (cf. 1991: 20). With-
out such a framework, the Soviet Union and the states of the Eastern Bloc 
had developed a class antagonism with the nomenklatura as a quasi-
bourgeois class – or a ruling elite (cf. Meisenhelder 1993: 40) – that even 
tried to behave like the one in the West and was consequently regarded by 
the working classes as their enemy (cf. Amin 1992: 44). 
This was the tenor of Monthly Review’s description of the material real-
ities of power. In parallel, there was an ideological dimension with, accord-
ing to voices in the journal, two main features: voluntarism and super-
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humanism. Miliband explained that for many revolutionaries and for many 
leaders in the post-revolutionary societies, a belief in socialism was under-
stood as a quasi-religious commitment. While it could sustain people, it 
could just as well invite a type of voluntarism that tried to install a com-
pletely different order too quickly and with insufficient consideration of 
those who did not share the religious commitment (cf. 1991: 19-20). This 
arrogance became even more dangerous since it was accompanied by what 
Kovel described as a quasi-Nietzschean super-humanism that would with-
out hesitation sacrifice the individual human being for the benefit of the 
human species – a perspective that most Bolshevists shared and that found 
its ultimate expression in attempts at ‘radicalising’ Marx and introducing 
communism immediately. The author hinted at Pol Pot’s Kampuchea as a 
case in point (cf. 1994: 40-41). These mistaken interpretations of socialism 
had harmed its chances all over the world: “An exorbitant price is still 
being paid for this confusion of the Stalinist nightmare with the socialist 
dream” (Singer 1990: 74). Since the left elsewhere in the world had re-
mained too hesitant in condemning the failures of the post-revolutionary 
states, it was suffering the consequences too. As Singer concluded in a later 
article, this timidity explained, at least to a certain extent, why all genuine 
popular movements had developed outside, or even against, the traditional 
left over the previous twenty-five years (cf. 1994: 97). 
 
The Impact of the Cold War 
Several writers seemed convinced that the political leaderships of the East-
ern Bloc were not alone to be blamed for the deformations their experi-
ments in socialism had produced. Defence against Cold War pressures 
played an important role in justifications of authoritarian measures. Hence, 
interpretations of the Cold War were given considerable space in the jour-
nal’s pages. Contributors unanimously argued that the capitalist West ought 
to be seen as the main aggressor in the confrontation. For the Soviet Union, 
the problems of rapid industrialisation under conditions first of war and 
then of the Cold War era became almost insurmountable (cf. Monthly Re-
view 1990). The idea that the West had won was accepted only relatively 
late. In early 1990, Marzani, commenting on Western triumphalism, still 
doubted that this was the case (cf. 1990: 2). In terms of economic and mili-
tary strength, the United States and the U.S.S.R. (as well as their systems of 
allies) were almost equal. That the United States tried to outperform its 
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opponents generated negative consequences for both – the United States 
suffered from a trade deficit, as well as a run-down, under-financed infra-
structure and was overtaken economically by Germany and Japan (ibid: 11-
12). The author even interpreted Reagan’s sudden shift from hostility to 
cooperation with Gorbachev’s U.S.S.R. as a sign that the United States 
were unable to keep up with the arms race (ibid: 14). For both sides the 
question of whether they could win the Cold War was one of survival, but, 
perhaps, for capitalism even more than for socialism. Sweezy explained 
that the West had to prevent the Eastern Bloc to prove its historical superi-
ority over capitalism: 
 
Centrally crucial was the question of whether the socialist leaders of the revolutions 
would be able to steer a course toward the creation of new societies increasingly 
capable of realizing the aspirations and ideals of the socialist faith. If so, it would be 
only a matter of time for the struggle to be decided in favor of socialism. (1993: 2-3) 
 
For this reason, the Western, and especially the U.S. ruling classes put a 
great deal of effort in obstructing all moves towards socialism. Internally, 
the U.S.S.R. mutated from ally to enemy and internationally, its security 
interests were demonised as imperialist (ibid: 3-4). Since the West had 
reached a higher level of economic development, it profited more from the 
arms race and could more easily integrate the weapons industry into its 
patterns of production (ibid: 5). In the 1970s, at a time of serious crisis 
when capitalism’s future seemed at risk once more, the West intensified its 
ideological onslaught on the Eastern Bloc and argued that all radical chang-
es would lead to totalitarianism: “In the mid-1970s, when a deep capitalist 
economic crisis followed student protests, the system felt threatened. The 
gulag campaign – the discovery of latter-day Christopher Columbuses, the 
nouveau philosophes, of Soviet concentration camps – came to the rescue” 
(Singer 1990: 88-89). The combination of economic, military and ideologi-
cal pressure finally decided the Cold War – by 1993, Monthly Review writ-
ers accepted the ‘defeat’ of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union: “So 
capitalism won the Cold War and in the process snuffed out whatever 
chance there may have been that the revolutions of the twentieth century 
could or would provide successfully working models of socialism” 
(Sweezy 1993: 3-4). In another piece, Sweezy repeated these arguments 
and described the Western aggression as a counter-revolutionary attack 
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with an inevitable outcome, given the global distribution of economic pow-
er (cf. 1994: 4-5). Nevertheless, he clarified that the collapse of the Soviet 
system should not be reduced to external factors: “Its defeat in the great 
showdown of the second half of the twentieth century owed as much to its 
own internal divisions and weaknesses as to the strength of its opponent” 
(ibid: 7). The disastrous consequences of the Cold War, however, extended 
to the Western left as well. It was never able to effectively counter the 
argument that socialism manifested itself in the realities of the Eastern 
Bloc, especially since those who made the claim could not agree on a defi-
nition of ‘true socialism’ (cf. Vilas 1990: 93; Bell-Villada 1991: 53). The 
Western left was also unable to disentangle ‘democracy’ from its associa-
tion with the capitalist West and hence it could do nothing against, in E. P. 
Thompson’s words, the substitution of the European class struggle by the 
bloc struggle (cf. Wood 1994: 13). In the early 1990s, there seemed to be 
nothing they could do against claims of the ‘end of history’, against the 
argument that there were no alternatives and against the hegemonic confla-
tion of the “collapse of Communism”, the “failure of socialism”, and the 
“death of Marxism” (Wallis 1991: 7). 
 
Reasons for the Collapse 
Several authors discussed the question in how far the Gorbachev reforms 
had contributed to the final collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In an editorial 
entitled “Perestroika and the Future of Socialism”, the writers criticised the 
belief that the positive sides of capitalism could be introduced without the 
negative ones (cf. Monthly Review 1990: 15). This was utopian thinking in 
the most negative sense and was explained with the observation that intel-
lectuals acted as the moving forces behind the reform programme. Intellec-
tuals, according to the authors, were among those people who profited most 
from advanced capitalism. Eastern European intellectuals seemed to imag-
ine themselves in the roles their peer groups played in capitalist societies: 
 
Capitalism, whatever its faults and shortcomings, has created in a few of its most 
advanced units a standard of living and a degree of security for its most fortunate 
citizens far beyond anything available in any other form of society, whether earlier 
or contemporary. Among these fortunate citizens are many in the arts, sciences and 
professions whose status in their respective countries is below that of the ruling 
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establishments but who live well, are influential in their own communities, and 
enjoy a wide latitude to dissent and criticize. (ibid: 13) 
 
With regard to the reforms’ contents, from a human-rights and democratic 
perspective, there was much to applaud, in terms of its economic pro-
grammes, there was a lot that went wrong. For Löwy, the whole package of 
renewal formed a 
 
mixed blessing, combining a remarkable opening (glasnost) with a market-oriented 
economic restructuring (perestroika) which endangers some of the traditional rights 
of workers, and some very positive initiatives for nuclear disarmament with a sub-
stantial reduction of support for third world revolutions (particularly in Central 
America). (1991: 34-35) 
 
Also Amin took issue with the utopianism of the “school of Novosibirsk” 
which he identified as the think-tank behind the Gorbachev reforms and 
explained that their goals were not socialist – at least not in a Marxist sense: 
 
They [the school of Novosibirsk; SB] imagined a pure and perfect self-regulating 
market which required – Walras had understood this and Barone had expressed it by 
1908 – not widely dispersed private property but a totally centralized means of 
production and the bidding for access to it on the part of all people, who would be 
free to designate themselves as sellers of labor power or as entrepreneurs. This old 
Saint Simonian dream of scientifically managed society (Engels was the first to have 
seen it as nothing but capitalism without capitalists), when pushed to its furthest 
limits, expressed the economistic alienation of all bourgeois ideology, whose unreal 
and utopian character was demonstrated by historical materialism. (1992: 48) 
 
For Amin, it seemed clear that the unrealistic idea of capitalism without 
capitalists would eventually be transformed into a more ordinary capitalism 
with the emergence of a real bourgeoisie (which would replace the Soviet 
quasi-bourgeoisie) and a class system. While the Gorbachev reforms were 
guided by positive intentions, these would be thwarted by their inadequate 
theoretical foundations and thus contribute to a reintroduction of capitalism. 
Of course, these reforms were only the straw that broke the camel’s 
neck. The roots of the Eastern Bloc’s problems were inextricably linked to 
its emergence. In this respect, no fundamental difference existed between 
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the authors of Monthly Review and those of the other journals. The most 
baroque picture of the roots of the 1989 collapse was drawn by Singer: 
 
We were clearly watching the twilight of a reign, the end of an era, the collapse of 
regimes that were the result of revolutions not only carried out from above but 
imported from abroad. We were also attending the final funeral of Stalinism as a 
system. In February 1956, in his famous ‘secret’ indictment of Stalin, Nikita 
Khrushchev stunned the faithful by revealing that the corpse of their demigod was 
stinking. The shock was terrible. Yet it took a third of a century for the system based 
on this cult to be dismantled throughout the empire. (1990: 74) 
 
But the reasons did not start with Stalin either. Also Singer recurred to the 
old hope that the Soviet revolution should have spread to, in socio-
economic terms, more ‘advanced’ countries but failed to do so. For the 
author, the reason did not lie in the treacherous behaviour of the social 
democrats but at least partly in the “abortive search for a shortcut” (ibid). 
Thus he suggested to interpret the whole Soviet period as a historical paren-
thesis rather than a new era. Sweezy added that the lack of popular support 
necessitated the military presence of the Soviet Union in all Eastern Euro-
pean countries (cf. Sweezy 1990: 20). Under the surface, this could only 
strengthen the resistance of the population. Amin pointed out that this op-
position did not develop into an overtly political revolt but became a pro-
cess of depoliticisation which alienated the people from the political class 
(cf. 1992: 45). The author admitted that he had underestimated the extent of 
depoliticisation and wrongly believed in the chance for the systems to move 
to the left rather than, as they recently did, to the right (ibid: 47). Also 
Miliband conceded to have put a “naïve” faith in the transformability of 
Communist regimes into socialist democracies (1991: 18). With a depoliti-
cised population the setting-up of a coherent socialist system, independent 
from capitalism, became even harder to realise than it already was. Paul 
Sweezy tried to formulate a synoptic view on the multiplicity of problems: 
 
The [socialist] breakaways occurred in weak and relatively underdeveloped parts of 
the global capitalist system and were consequently never able to compete on equal 
terms with stronger and more developed parts of the system. From the very begin-
ning, therefore, they had to devote all their energies to the most elementary tasks of 
survival against the determined efforts of the capitalist leaders to bring them back 
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into the fold. Under such circumstances, these societies were unable to construct a 
coherent socialist system comparable to the global capitalist system from which they 
had broken away. Their industrial trajectories reflected not only their socialist ambi-
tions but also their varying histories and the special weaknesses with which they 
were burdened from the outset. (1990: 19) 
 
Like some of the voices in New Left Review, several authors claimed that 
the real turning point had been 1968 rather than 1989. After the Prague 
spring upheaval, no further attempts were made at reforming the Soviet 
system into democratic socialism but only to replace it by something else 
(cf. Singer 1990: 80). Still it was not merely the obvious difficulty of 
achieving such modifications that produced this change of direction among 
revolutionary movements. It was also an ideological offensive from the side 
of the capitalist West: 
 
To understand why a Tadeusz Masowiecki, once a progressive Catholic trying to 
reconcile Socialism with Christianity, becomes prime minister who presided over 
Thatcherite privatisation or why a Vaclav Havel, who a few years ago described 
himself vaguely as a socialist, no longer does so today, one must keep in mind the 
extraordinary change in the ideological climate. (ibid: 82) 
 
The author pointed to the failed moves to the left among various social 
democratic parties (and in the case of France, governments) which contrib-
uted to this climate of ‘there are no alternatives’ (ibid). Since these changes 
coincided with the culmination of economic difficulties in the Eastern Bloc, 
characterized by Istvan Mészáros as a stagnation in the accumulation pro-
cess, and with the desperate attempt at keeping pace in the arms race, the 
collapse was inevitable (cf. Monthly Review 1993: 14; Singer 1994: 88). 
1989 had to be explained by a combination of economic weakness, a crum-
bling political authoritarianism, a global ideological shift to the right, and a 
merciless arms race given priority by both parties in the Cold War. 
 
The Deficiencies of Really Existing Socialism 
It has become obvious in this chapter that in their evaluations of central 
aspects of the state-socialist systems, contributors reached very similar 
conclusions in the various journals. The overall critique of the Eastern 
Bloc’s lack of democracy remained the most important of these. All agreed 
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that the regimes did not do themselves any favours with the suppression of 
open discussion and democratic debate. Some authors were more willing 
than others, however, to seek out explanations for these mistakes – and so 
to a certain extent implicitly justify or excuse them. Despite their differing 
degrees of tolerance, authors unanimously argued that the absence of de-
mocracy had not only seriously harmed the political development of the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, in general, but had also greatly im-
paired their economic performance. The restrictive measures not only failed 
to convince the population to embrace socialist ethics (or as Socialist Regis-
ter would describe it, to cultivate a socialist consciousness); they also sti-
fled people’s creativity, which, if instead allowed to flourish, would have 
helped to put the Eastern Bloc’s economy on a far more solid foundation. 
Still, the Soviet Union could claim a number of economic successes: espe-
cially the industrialisation of the pre-industrial society which had been 
achieved after 1917 – even if only with terrible human sacrifices. For those 
who had survived and for later generations, economic modernisation had 
afforded citizens a modest level of wealth, material security and social 
equality. Finally, in several ways, the state-socialist system had helped 
capitalism to survive; the Soviet Union had played a central role in rescuing 
Europe from fascism and the Eastern Bloc had protected the West from a 
number of market-radical follies and indirectly supported the introduction 
of a domesticated capitalism that had felt forced to make concessions to its 
working classes. The countries of the Eastern Bloc had also contributed to 
the process of decolonisation that would have been even more cumbersome 
and protracted without their anti-colonial position. Although authors agreed 
nearly unanimously on these matters and provided similar interpretations of 
empirical evidence, this concurrence did not mean that specific issues were 
given the same weight in each of the different journals. Industrialisation 
provides an excellent example; while some mentioned it only in passing, 
for others, it constituted a central point.  
Overarching agreements aside, focal differences were marked amongst 
the journals. For example, although the gigantic task of Soviet industrialisa-
tion was acknowledged, their economic performance was judged different-
ly. For some authors (most in Dissent and a few in New Left Review), it 
amounted to a complete failure, while others held a more sympathetic or 
stratified view. Contributors also disagreed as to when and why these disas-
trous tendencies started or when they became irreversible. It is interesting 
130 | INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM AFTER 1989 
 
that these questions played an important role in the American journals – 
Dissent concentrated its discussion of authoritarianism and totalitarianism 
very much on the Stalin era. Monthly Review, on the other hand, contribut-
ed a counterfactual reflection on the role Trotsky would have played if the 
struggle between him and Stalin had ended differently. The negative evalu-
ation of Trotsky does not come as a surprise: the split between Trotskyists 
and Communists had played a prominent role in the American left for a 
long time. Context can also explain why certain issues were treated more or 
less prominently in certain journals; for example, the issue of a basic level 
of social security seemed more worthy of mention in the American journals 
(as Europeans were less easy to impress in this respect). The British jour-
nals, on the other hand, devoted more space to applauding the Soviet Un-
ion’s role in the Second World War; for the British left, the war still had 
tremendous importance and the journals represented strands of the left who 
had supported the popular front strategy. The coverage of the Cold War 
also differed, though these divisions did not run between the British and the 
American publications. New Left Review and Dissent had explicit and 
strong geo-political orientations, although the former also published opin-
ions at variance with its perspective. New Left Review identified the West 
as the main aggressor, whereas Dissent named the Eastern Bloc. For the 
other two journals, the political-economic perspective seemed more im-
portant than the geo-political one; which means they paid less attention to 
the Cold War. Monthly Review took the strongest interest in a detailed 
analysis of the Gorbachev reforms. This focus followed from their opinion 
that the Soviet Union had never been post-capitalist but rather non-
capitalist. Hence classes did still exist in Soviet society and the journal 
interpreted the Gorbachev era as a period of class struggle. The notion of 
non-capitalism was shared by Dissent, albeit in very different ways. In the 
British publications, the Deutscherite notion of post-capitalism had been 
more widely embraced – and the shock that the Gorbachev reforms could 
usher in the restoration of capitalism was consequently more serious. Alto-
gether, while the collapse of the Eastern Bloc did not provide a reason for 
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3. THE STATE OF THEORY 
 
The production of politically relevant theory had for long been the main 
occupation of socialist intellectuals – theory should point the ways towards 
more equal and just societies. For intellectuals as a group, theory had a 
double function: it formed a common base internally and served as a mark-
er of distinction – from other groups of intellectuals and political activists – 
externally. This chapter analyses the discussions on the most important 
inspiration for socialist intellectuals – the writings of Karl Marx. Addition-
ally it investigates what additions and alternatives to, or corrections of, 
Marxism writers tried to find in reflections by other theorists from or be-
yond the Marxist tradition. To call these ‘classics’ seems justified in so far 
as the individuals and groups chosen by intellectuals were either from earli-
er eras of emancipatory struggles, well-known, or presented in a mood of 





The discussion of Marxism, of the texts authored by Marx and of the texts 
interpreting them and developing them further, always a central part of the 
discussion of the intellectual left, was transformed in the aftermath of 1989: 
at least to a certain extent, it developed into a meta-discussion on the ques-
tion of whether further exchanges on Marxism remained theoretically 
sound and politically useful. Even before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, 
the journals had acted as forums of debate as to whether Marxism as a
 
nineteenth century social theory still bore relevance for the problems of, for 
example, the stratified welfare societies of the late twentieth century. Writ-
ers in the 1980s took issue with interventions from theorists who argued for 
moving beyond Marx or at least radically modifying his theories and ap-
proaches. However in the early 1990s, some critics additionally raised the 
question of whether there was some element inherent to Marxism that was 
responsible for Eastern Europe’s authoritarian regimes and perhaps also 
some intrinsic factor that had ushered in their demise. This question of 
responsibility – or even guilt – was one of the two major problems raised at 
the time. Dealing with it included asking whether Marxism had been affect-
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ed as a theory, or even scientifically falsified, by the events of 1989 or 
whether it would play a role in the future. 
The second major issue grew out of the first, but was more theoretical: 
it was about Marxism’s fundamental nature and status. Was it a complete 
system of thinking or just one social theory among many? Was it still a 
theory of history? Did it (still) have to say something useful about political 
strategy? Or had it been reduced to an approach to political economy or to a 
vague spirit of critique? These broad questions led to more concrete ones: 
should particular and problematic issues of Marxism be corrected by look-
ing to other systems of thought? Or was a thorough reading of Marx, and 
the many theoreticians in his tradition, (still) the best way to bring Marxism 
(and socialism) forward? Two issues seemed particularly important – they 
were, of course, older than Marxism itself: (a) was there a direction in 
history or was it an open, contingent process? (b) Were events shaped by 
structural determinants or by human agency? Authors dealt with these 
questions in numerous statements, critiques, self-critiques and defences.  
Attempts at finding answers to these questions went directly to the heart 
of socialist intellectuals’ views of the world. Consequently, none of the 
periodicals achieved unanimity over the issues discussed. In all, one finds 
continua of positions ranging from a more radical questioning of Marxism’s 
basic tenets to views maintaining that the whole edifice of Marxist theory 
was more or less unaffected by recent events. The question to be discussed 
in this chapter is whether these continua were of equal size in each of the 
journals and whether clusters of voices could be found around particular 
positions on them.  
 
New Left Review 
Only two contributions explicitly mentioned the question of Marx’s ‘re-
sponsibility’ for the negative aspects of the Eastern Bloc’s social and politi-
cal system: one by a central figure of the First New Left, E. P. Thompson, 
and the other by one of the main representatives of the Second New Left, 
Robin Blackburn. Interestingly, the former, who would only very hesitantly 
have called himself a Marxist at the time, defended the Marxist tradition 
against any such allegations: “[T]he current fashion of attributing a vaguely 
defined ‘generic Stalinism’ to the original bad faith of ‘Marxism’ is as 
disreputable as was last year’s fashionable celebration of the guillotine as 
the authentic outcome of the enlightenment” (1990: 143). Blackburn, then 
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editor of New Left Review, and at least in terms of theory a much more 
straightforward Marxist, dedicated one chapter of his extended article on 
“Socialism after the Crash” to “[t]he responsibility of Marxism”, and the 
argument embraces the thesis that what happened in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe could not be disentangled completely from Marxism (cf. 
1991: 177): political leaders in the state socialist countries had appealed to 
Marx and tried to implement institutions inspired by Marxism – for exam-
ple, public ownership and popular welfare. According to Blackburn, Marx-
ism’s major problem was its partial adherence to the ‘simplification as-
sumption’ which relied on the belief that with the creation of social justice, 
antagonisms in society would come to an end. Blackburn suggested that in 
the Eastern Bloc neither commodity and money relations had been abol-
ished nor had the need for the rule of law and checks and balances in politi-
cal decision making structures been transcended. Traditional Marxism 
provided insufficient guidelines for how to deal with such a situation (cf. 
ibid: 177-180). 
Even if they did not reflect on Marxism’s responsibility in such a direct 
way, most contributors were convinced that Marxism was strongly affected 
by recent changes. They differed in their perspectives about the nature of 
such transformations. Eric Olin Wright, when discussing the consequences 
for and the future of Marxist class analysis in consideration of the events in 
Eastern Europe, spoke of a combined theoretical and political challenge to 
Marxism (cf. 1993: 23). Having spent most of his intellectual life perform-
ing analyses of class, he regarded the former as more serious: “If the col-
lapse of these regimes undermines the theoretical arguments about the 
feasibility of transcending private property and capitalist class relations, 
then these elements of Marxism are seriously threatened” (ibid: 21). 
Though he was not sure about empirical proof to substantiate these argu-
ments, he had no doubt that a previous feeling of certainty had disappeared 
to a critical degree: 
 
Even if one believes that the empirical evidence remains highly ambiguous on these 
matters, and that democratic socialism remains a feasible and desirable alternative to 
capitalism, it is still difficult to sustain the concepts of socialism and communism 
with the certainty that once characterized Marxism. Without such concepts, howev-
er, the whole enterprise of Marxist class analysis falters. (ibid: 22) 
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Although he maintained that empirical evidence still needed to be analysed, 
he complained that many intellectuals did not have the nerve to wait until it 
had: “[T]he events of the late 1980s have nevertheless helped to accelerate 
a growing sense of self-doubt and confusion on the part of many radical 
intellectuals about the viability and future utility of Marxism” (ibid: 16). 
Similarly, Joseph McCarney emphasised the detrimental and disheartening 
influence of triumphant right-wing discourse (cf. 1991: 29). The decisive 
point was that Marxism could not be sealed off from such condemnation. 
The pervasiveness of claims of Marxism’s uselessness might transform 
them into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
However, others argued that this made up only one side of the coin. 
Jacques Derrida, in his article “Spectres of Marx” which appeared in New 
Left Review prior to his book with the same title in 1994, explained that 
Marxism was still very present and that all claims of its death just proved 
the point that it still existed and was still relevant (cf. 1994: 40): “We all 
live in a world, some would say in a culture, that still bears, at an incalcula-
ble depth, the mark of his inheritance, whether in a directly visible fashion 
or not” (ibid: 33). Derrida intended to offer a ‘deconstruction’ of the ‘end of 
Marxism’ and ‘end of history’ discourse but proposed, as several writers 
criticized, a future for Marxism only as a rather vague ‘spirit of critique’. 
Derrida regarded what was left as “a certain emancipatory and messianic 
affirmation, a certain experience of the promise that one can try to liberate 
from any dogmatics and even from metaphysico-religious determination, 
from any messianism” (ibid: 54; original emphasis). Others seemed to agree 
with Derrida and saw Marxism’s future role as rather modest but neverthe-
less as existing. Jürgen Habermas, for example, claimed that it was still 
useful as a critique of capitalism (cf. Habermas & Michnik 1994: 11). An 
ecumenical point of view was characteristic of those who did not believe 
(anymore) in the omniscience of Marxism and claimed, with Norman 
Geras, that as a comprehensive social theory plus leading ideology of popu-
lar struggle, it was irreversibly finished (cf. 1994: 106). On the other hand, 
Geras rhetorically asked whether Marxism was dead (cf. ibid: 105) and 
responded to his own question: “Judged as an intellectual tradition of the 
kind of breadth and wealth that this one has encompassed, the very question 
of its end is comical. No less. Of no other intellectual tradition of compara-
ble achievement would such a question ever be posed.” (ibid: 105-106) 
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What united all authors was that they agreed they had to react to the uncer-
tainties with which they felt confronted after the collapse. 
Wright declared: “I continue to believe that Marxism remains a vital 
tradition within which to produce emancipatory social science, but I also 
feel that in order for Marxism to be able to play this role it must be recon-
structed in various ways.” (1993:16) Through such refashioning, Marxism 
might become less holistic than it was once assumed to be, but remain 
helpful for understanding and dealing with causes of oppression. Wright 
identified three levels of Marxism: class analysis, theory of historical tra-
jectory, and emancipatory normative theory (cf. 1993: 17). He explained 
the strength of this combination: “Marxism attempts to theorize the inherent 
tendencies of historical change to follow a particular trajectory with a spe-
cific kind of directionality” (ibid: 18). Later he pointed to the task of Marx-
ist social science “to focus on the ways in which alternative futures are 
opened up or closed off by particular historical conditions” (ibid: 24). A 
more detailed definition, emphasising again the historical-philosophical 
dimension, was provided by Sayers: 
 
Marx’s critical method is an immanent and historical one. It is based on the premiss 
that the grounds for a critical perspective are to be found in existing social condi-
tions themselves. [...] Social reality is contradictory. Negative and critical tendencies 
exist within it, they do not need to be brought from outside in the form of transcend-
ent values: they are immanent within existing conditions themselves. Thus Marx’s 
social theory, so far from undermining his critical perspective, provides the basis on 
which it is developed and justified. (1994: 68) 
 
All these definitions hinted at Marxism’s specificity and strength – its par-
ticular combination of ontology, epistemology and strategy – but also at its 
problems: Marxism was, as Sayers put it, on the one hand ‘scientific’ and 
on the other not ‘value-free’ (ibid: 67). What would happen to the three 
levels once one of them was called into doubt for normative reasons? Could 
Marxism’s epistemology and strategy survive once its ontology had been 
proven wrong as it arguably had by recent events? Given its holistic charac-
ter, what characterised its relation with other social theories – could it learn 
from them or had innovations to come from a re-reading of Marxist texts? 
Among many contributors, one could observe a tendency to look for 
clues in Marx’s writings themselves about how to come to terms with the 
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changes of 1989/91 and the questions which followed from them. McCar-
ney, for example, explained that the collapse of the Eastern European gov-
ernments did not contradict the Marxist theory of history. Quite to the con-
trary, he insisted that Marx himself had never believed that communism 
could exist and survive as a local (rather than global) phenomenon (cf. 
1991: 28). In the same article, he pointed to a kind of dialectical humour as 
an important means for surviving at the historical conjuncture of post-1989: 
 
Yet students of dialectic, with the example of Hegel and Marx in mind, should be 
able to keep their humour. They will be aware that humour is itself a dialectical 
weapon, liable to the kind of reversal that strikes back at those who wish to exploit 
it. Hence, they will be alert to any signs of transforming irony in the present situa-
tion. (ibid: 29-30) 
 
Arrighi also emphasised that recent events could be read as a proof of 
Marxist perspectives: the Polish union Solidarnosc closely followed Marx-
ist ideals – they did not rely on vanguardism, did not represent selfish inter-
ests, and did not fall prey to separatist tendencies – and its success vindicat-
ed the theory’s assumptions, prognoses, and recommendations (cf. 1990: 
63). In a similar vein, McCarney reiterated the relevance of Marxist histori-
cal theory, which he considered proven by recent events in Eastern Europe: 
 
It need not be feared that the tradition of thought Marx founded when he set Hegeli-
an dialectic the right way up has been rendered obsolete or irrelevant by the working 
out of the historical process which has been its true object from the beginning. On 
the contrary, there is now everything to fight for so far as that tradition is concerned 
(1991: 38). 
 
Even those who believed that Marxism had to be criticised and corrected 
nevertheless felt obliged to excuse the theorist Marx by situating his writ-
ings in the context of nineteenth century industrial capitalism (cf. Habermas 
1990: 11). They pointed out that Marx and Engels had themselves been 
conscious of the historicity, the ‘ageing’ of their standpoint (cf. Derrida 
1994: 32). They also stressed that certain omissions in Marx’s corpus of 
work had to be explained via his wish to distance himself from the not only 
utopian but at the same time doctrinaire socialisms of the nineteenth centu-
ry which were likely to produce dictatorships in the name of some version 
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of vanguardism (cf. Blackburn 1991: 180). These statements reveal the 
wish to show solidarity with Marxism as a certain system of thought before 
criticising it. 
The first technique used by authors to display support was to list the 
many elements of Marxism that were still important. First of all, its political 
vision was still needed: for Robin Blackburn, at least some elements went 
beyond mere criticism and still acted as useful guidelines for the construc-
tion of a political project: 
 
If some of Marx’s rhetoric now seems overly simple, this emphatically does not 
apply to the previously cited aphorism which sums up his vision of the principle 
which should govern the future society: that the precondition for the free develop-
ment of each would be the free development of all. (ibid: 233) 
 
This meant arguing less the scientific but more the political and the moral 
case for Marxism. Together with socialism, Marxism simply remained 
indispensable as long as opposition to capitalism was needed. This formed 
the core of Derrida’s definition of Marxism as a ‘spirit of critique’. But the 
moral case was argued also by others such as Aijaz Ahmad, who regarded 
Derrida’s definition as too vague, his position as too performative, and his 
argument as not sufficiently analytical: 
 
One reason for being a socialist can be far simpler than ‘awaiting’ the ‘event-ness’ 
of the ‘messianic promise’. Theoretically, socialism arises from within the contra-
dictions of capitalism. Morally, opposition to capitalism is its own justification since 
capitalism is poisoning human survival itself, let alone human happiness. In the 
present circumstances, the resolve to overturn this globally dominant system does 
indeed involve what Ernst Bloch once called ‘utopian surplus’; but the utopian 
aspect of communist imagination need not translate itself into ‘the messianic’. (Ah-
mad 1994: 94-5) 
 
Secondly, Marxism’s theoretical and methodological achievements were 
also highlighted. Contributors considered a number of ideas in Marx’s 
writings and, more generally, in Marxist theory to be as indispensable as 
ever. Often these essentials were situated not too far from the respective 
authors’ academic backgrounds and specialisations. Most were still con-
vinced of the theory of labour and of the necessity of a nuanced class analy-
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sis. Wright emphasised the specificity of the Marxist class analysis, which 
interpreted the existence of class antagonisms as the result of property 
relations and the exploitation of workers (the decisive difference to We-
berian class theories), and tied it to the utopian vision of creating a classless 
society (1993). Additionally, no one would have denied the importance of 
the sphere of production for the organisation of societies, and no one would 
have totally abandoned historical materialism as a scientific method. For 
Sayers, the historical materialist method should be extended to the area of 
ethics, values and ideas: “For it questions the idea that the history of ideas 
of justice can be understood in terms of the logic of those ideas themselves; 
rather we must look to the development of the social forms which give rise 
to them” (1994: 82). Therborn listed three basic elements of what could be 
called a Marxist belief system: firstly, inequality and injustice had to be 
understood as the outcomes of capitalism and imperialism, class rule and 
exploitation. Secondly, the possibility of radical social change was inherent 
in the development of capitalism, and finally, the historical agents poten-
tially achieving such change would be the exploited and oppressed people 
(cf. Therborn 1992: 18). Another important aspect was suggested by G. A. 
Cohen who pointed to the Marxist theory of reification and used the rela-
tionship of money and freedom in capitalism as example – a lack of money 
meant a lack of freedom (cf. 1994: 15). He explained: “To have money is to 
have freedom, and the assimilation of money to mental and bodily re-
sources is a piece of unthinking fetishism, in the good old Marxist sense 
that it represents social relations of constraint as things that people lack. In 
a word: money is no object” (ibid: 16; emphasis in original). For McCar-
ney, more abstractly, it was only a question, the question of what was the 
nature of a human community that realised freedom, which formed the core 
of a philosophy influenced by Marxism (cf. 1991: 33).  
Several authors took up the question as to whether Marxism was teleo-
logical and working under the assumption of a clear direction in the move-
ment of history. Sayers suggested distinguishing teleology from directional-
ity. He defended directionality as a necessary part of Marxism as both a 
comprehensive social science and a political project by arguing for a strong 
version of a historical materialist theory of change: “Our present condition 
of disharmony and alienation is not ideal; but there is no question of going 
back. The true content of the idea of a harmonious life lies in the future; 
and it can be attained only by going through a necessary stage of division 
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and alienation” (1994: 78). He insisted that this perspective was non-
teleological because, unlike some conservatives and liberals in the early 
1990s (such as Francis Fukuyama), it did not set a particular turn in history 
as its end (ibid: 82-3). He also maintained the notion that socialism for 
Marxists needed to be understood not as a moral ideal, but instead “as a 
concrete historical stage which will supersede capitalism and which will be 
the outcome of forces which are at work within present capitalist society” 
(ibid: 69). As mentioned above, he was concerned in his article not only 
with the movements of history as such, but also with the genesis of ideas of 
justice which he saw not as developing in a closed and timeless space of 
ethics (as, he claimed, New Left Review contributors and analytical Marx-
ists like Geras and G. A. Cohen did) but within historical change and social 
struggles. Since human nature itself was produced and modified in history, 
and historical developments gradually led to a more rational control over 
material and social life, ideas of justice would, in this process, become 
increasingly rational (cf. ibid: 82). 
Even if in fact Marxism still had much to offer, this did not mean it was 
beyond criticism. Authors demanded two types of corrections: On the one 
hand, they identified areas that, from a nineteenth century perspective, 
could not have been foreseen or were missing for another reason. Arrighi, 
for example, argued that classes in the original Marxist sense had ceased to 
exist under conditions of managed and corporate capitalism which had 
emerged since the 1940s. In this context, anti-systemic forces were margin-
alized politically, thus destabilising Marxism theoretically even more in-
tensely in 1989/91 (cf. 1990: 34). On the other hand, New Left Review 
published individual voices, though far from the journal’s ‘mainstream’, 
which claimed the definite end of the theoretical usefulness of at least a 
certain version of Marxism; David Marquand explained in short critique of 
economic determinism that the idea “[t]hat politics can be a sort of cart, 
dragged along by the horse of economics, has no place outside the fairytale 
worlds of classical Marxism and classical economic liberalism” (1994: 25). 
For most writers, problem with the reliance on Marxism was that the phi-
losophy contained internal contradictions. Robin Blackburn hinted at the 
“simplification assumption”, the idea that once capitalism was superseded, 
all social conflicts would disappear and all required societal structures 
would automatically emerge; premises which collided with the “develop-
mental assumption”, the belief that new structures had to be created active-
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ly (1991: 180). According to Blackburn, both positions could be found in 
Marxism and thus he argued, in his tour-de-force through Marxism and 
other socialist theories and programmes, for a new open debate on socialist 
theory and strategy which would start from the developmental assumption 
which required creative, utopian and strategic thinking. 
Contributors went on to identify topics for reflection upon which tradi-
tional Marxism did not have much to offer. Among them was the problem 
of environmental destruction. Influenced by the pioneering spirit of indus-
trialisation and by its promise of material wealth, Marx considered the 
domination of nature as positive and denounced affection for natural beauty 
as sentimental. He did not anticipate ecological problems resulting from the 
human mastery of the natural environment. Both Ted Benton and Jürgen 
Habermas pointed to this problem and Benton not only stated that Marx’s 
aspiration to control all natural and social processes would result in an 
ecological disaster but, commenting on Marx’s derogatory remarks on 
people’s leisurely Sunday walks, complained that “[c]ontempt for such 
apparently trivial sources of ‘ordinary’ pleasure, wonder and engagement 
with the world has long been an Achilles heel of orthodox Marxism” (Ben-
ton 1992: 71, cf. Habermas 1990).
1
 While this criticism was widely shared 
among the contributors, another contradiction figured even more promi-
nently into discusions – the failure to sketch out the institutional arrange-
ments of a socialist democracy and the workings of a socialist economy. 
Especially Habermas noted Marx’s restricted and instrumental view of 
constitutional democracy, his insistence to limit the possibility of real de-
mocracy to communist post-political democracy, and his reluctance to 
                                                             
1  Ted Benton was engaged in a long debate with Reiner Grundmann over not only 
the philosophical and ethical justifications of an anthropocentric versus a bio-
centric environmentalism but at the same time also about the status of Marxism. 
To muster authority for his arguments, Grundmann simply referred to Marx, for 
whom humans lived in and against nature, and hence declared an anthropocen-
tric Marxist environmentalism to be justified (cf. 1991). Interestingly, Marxist 
concepts and theories were even used when Marxism was criticised. The follow-
ing quotation from Ted Benton, can serve as an example: “The notion of the ul-
timate vulnerability of all natural and social processes to the human will is pur-
est idealism. For a civilization to live as if it were true would be to court ecolog-
ical catastrophe” (1992: 63; my emphasis). 
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provide, beyond the dictatorship of the proletariat, any suggestions for 
institutions during a transitional period leading towards socialism (cf. 1990: 
12). Blackburn shared this view and presented a vast and heterogeneous list 
of socialists who had discussed democratic decision-making procedures and 
socialist goals within the sphere of production (1991). Some writers located 
a third omission in Marx’s work (though this remained controversial): his 
failure to contribute to a theory of justice. This became a particular concern 
of Geras, who diagnosed this deficiency as a negative side effect of Marx-
ism’s restricted focus on identifying material preconditions and social forc-
es of change rather than its ethical principles (1992: 66-67).  
A further criticism of Marx’s writings took issue with his understanding 
of society and political agency. Firstly, writers regarded his concept of 
society as too holistic because he had depicted it as composed exclusively 
of a number of antagonistic and rather monolithic “macro-subjects” acting 
in their rational interests which stood in conflict with each other (Habermas 
1990: 11). The resulting problem was that 
 
[t]heory in this way blinds itself to the resistance inherent in the system of a differ-
entiated market economy, whose regulative devices cannot be replaced by adminis-
trative planning without potentially jeopardizing the level of differentiation achieved 
in a modern society. (ibid) 
 
This neglect of differentiation went hand in hand with an incomplete under-
standing of, and exaggerated trust in, the working-class (ibid). Wright (who 
also called Marx’s class concept “too macro” [1993: 29]), Geras and Say-
ers, in different ways, suggested that the source for potential political 
change was not in the existence of wage labour, but instead in the experi-
ence of inequality from which people suffered (cf. Geras 1992: 68; Sayers 
1994: 77). This correction was not only more in line with the character of 
political struggles in the twentieth century, it also had the strategic ad-
vantage that all oppressed groups would, in principle, become potential 
agents of change. Their intention was not to dismiss class as the main de-
terminant of numerous aspects of social life, but to acknowledge that peo-
ple might have contradictory class positions and to account for non-
exploitative forms of oppression (such as those directed against an under-
class excluded from the production process and socially marginalised). Of 
course, this perception was not new, as Wright himself admitted when he 
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said that for most contemporary Marxists the class conflict was not the only 
social conflict, and he insisted that all emancipatory strategies would still 
need to deal with class inequality, namely with the distribution of material 
resources, the economic surplus, and with time (cf. 1993: 28). The rest of 
Wright’s article attempted to develop a revised form of Marxist class analy-
sis, foregrounding different forms of exploitation as the central issue rather 
than restricting exploitation to wage labour. In practice, a refined class 
analysis would be helpful for the forging of class alliances in political con-
flicts (cf. ibid: 35). 
Marx’s restrictive and “macro” approach to class was explained as the 
result of a belief in human rationality that was also traced back to philo-
sophical developments of his time. According to Habermas, Marx had 
believed not only in the possibility of rationally organising economic life 
but that its superiority – compared to market economies – would become 
clearly visible and thus automatically discredit capitalism as a system (cf. 
1990: 11). Several writers suggested that such rationality was less straight-
forward and much more constructed and ambiguous than Marx had 
thought. In response to this oversight, Blackburn contended that Marx’s 
developmental assumption, that contradictory and conflicting perspectives 
and priorities would continue, was clearly superior to his simplification 
assumption (cf. 1991: 180-181). These arguments also served as explana-
tions for the unexpected longevity of capitalism. Two contributors working 





The reason why Marx’s outline is problematic lies in the epistemological position 
that humans could understand the world they created much better than the world that 
is naturally given […]. [H]e does not reckon with the possibility that human objecti-
                                                             
2  Regulation theory analyses the role of the state in societies with capitalist econ-
omies. Having abandoned the perception of the state as merely serving capitalist 
interests, regulation theorists see the state as a coordinator of conflicting inter-
ests which contributes to capitalism’s stability even if acting against the interests 
of individual capitalists. Generally, regulation theorists distinguish different 
forms of capitalism characterised by specific accumulation regimes – main-
tained with the support of state institutions. 
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fications, such as modern social relations, may become so complex that they are no 
longer susceptible to everyone’s understanding. (1991: 117) 
 
Such difficulties in understanding the social world became a major obstacle 
to socialist agency and thus to political change. Without clear evidence that 
socialism was superior, it became harder to argue for socialist policies. 
These critical observations on the status of Marx’s writing set tasks for the 
future work of radical intellectuals. Of course, modernising Marxism had 
preoccupied them for a long time, but the fact that they reiterated this need 
at the historical moment of 1989/91 meant that they treated it with renewed 
urgency. Indeed, a great deal of the theoretical reflections in New Left Re-
view tried to fill these gaps. What Geras described as the need to combine a 
“scientific” approach of identifying agents of social change and a utopian 
approach of inventing futures became the guideline for these intellectual 
activities (1992: 69). A certain amount of creative imagination, obviously, 
had to be brought in order to progress beyond the rationalist determinism of 
what Geras called the “real tendency” theory of Marxism (ibid: 65). 
Two objections to these teleological, historically-directional and, to 
varying degrees, determinist perspectives were put forward in New Left 
Review: allegedly, they were analytically simplistic and politically danger-
ous. Regulation theorists pleaded for a more complex and historically-
specific understanding of capitalist regimes. Thus they stressed agency in 
the widest sense: it manifested itself in class and other political struggles 
which created socio-institutionally defined structural forms and hence 
shaped different phases within, and models of, capitalism. Their modes of 
production could not be sufficiently explained by Marx’s theory of history 
and development (cf. Brenner & Glick 1991: 46-47). Theorising and politi-
cal strategy had to be attuned to historically and spatially specific social 
conditions and power relations. Politically, the strong version of historical 
materialism could have, in the eyes of its critics, two negative consequenc-
es. It could either lead to the self-stylisation of revolutionary vanguards as 
being exempt from the moral regulations of their time. Habermas suspected 
teleological perspectives to encourage revolutionary elites’ wishes to accel-
erate history and hence to violate ethical standards (cf. 1990: 12). Or it 
could simply lead to apathy – the opposite of vanguardism – because so-
cialism would become possible only after the exhaustion of capitalism (cf. 
Wright 1993: 16). According to Wright, Marxists would be better served by 
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taking a ‘weak’ historical materialist position, one that would look for 
historical possibilities instead of trajectories and hence grant a central place 
to agency, but at the same time, warn against elitist vanguardism (cf. ibid: 
24).. Therborn supported these arguments by pointing out that the polarisa-
tion between the industrial working class and the capitalist class never took 
place on the anticipated scale (cf. 1992: 22-23). The possibility of change 
was inherent in capitalism. It could be achieved by the oppressed and ex-
ploited, but that was all. In other words: voluntarism, not of a Leninist 
version but one based on agreed-upon ethical standards, formed a necessary 
precondition for movements towards socialism. Voluntarism’s purpose was 
not to accelerate the movement of history but to influence the direction of 
history’s movement. Auerbach called in this context for a dialectical, an 
interrelated and reciprocal understanding of processes at the level of eco-
nomic base and societal superstructure and demanded that scholars take the 
institutions of the latter much more seriously as possible levers for political 
change: 
 
In its twentieth-century development, the dominant tradition emanating from this 
ideology [Marxism; SB] has concentrated on the importance of changes in the eco-
nomic base of society as the mechanism through which it would then be possible to 
deal with questions of human development. Superstructural issues such as education 
have been perceived as secondary. This tradition is dominant despite the fact that it 
was precisely failures in aspects of the ‘superstructure’ that motivated many individ-
uals’ radical political activity in the first place – individuals for whom superstructur-
al work such as education was often the dominant mode of human and professional 
activity. (1992: 9-10) 
 
Hence for ‘weak materialists’, the political and the analytical argument 
went together – agency was needed because a “real tendency” could not be 
relied on. Agency had to stick to ethical principles in order to avoid the 
dangers of vanguardist isolationism. Marxism was not dead, but Leninist 
vanguardism obviously was. However, on the continuum ranging from 
Marxism as a privileged system of thought to a much weaker and more 
open spirit of critique writers in New Left Review took extremely different 
positions and thus testified to the journal’s political and theoretical plural-
ism. 
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Socialist Register 
In Socialist Register, statements about the responsibility of Marxism for 
really existing socialism were rare. The voice coming closest to such a 
position was that of the editor Miliband who proclaimed that the events of 
1989/91 had cut Marxism to size and that socialists should welcome this 
development (cf. 1990: 360). This formulation can be read as an implicit 
acceptance of some responsibility of Marxism. No one contradicted 
Miliband, but other authors put the emphasis differently and expressed deep 
scepticism about the lessons which several other groups of Marxists seemed 
to draw at such times when they felt that non-Marxists considered them 
partially responsible for the atrocities of the Eastern Bloc’s regimes. 
Contributors to Socialist Register remained convinced that Marxism 
was not discredited by recent developments and they expressed deep unease 
about the fact that many (former) Marxists acted as if it was. Geras’s posi-
tion is already apparent from what he wrote in New Left Review. In Social-
ist Register, he added that Marxists should, of course, be self-critical but 
not make a “mess” of their Marxist past (1990: 32). Richard Levins insisted 
that Marxism’s tomb was empty, even if some former Marxists gave up 
Marxism altogether and others cut it down to a programme for a capitalism 
with a more human face and transformed themselves into post-Marxists or 
“petty-empiricists” (1990: 333-334). The annual edition printed further 
harsh criticisms of what its contributors regarded as the ‘retreat of the intel-
lectuals’. One of the most outspoken among these critics was Ellen 
Meiksins Wood who had received the Isaac Deutscher Memorial Price a 
couple of years earlier, awarded for her book The Retreat from Class – 
meaning, the intellectuals’ retreat – and thus claimed some authority on the 
matter: 
 
We live in curious times. Just when intellectuals of the left in the West have a rare 
opportunity to do something useful, if not actually world-historic, they – or large 
sections of them – are in full retreat. Just when reformers in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe are looking to Western capitalism for paradigms of economic and 
political success, many of us appear to be abdicating the traditional role of the West-
ern left as critic of capitalism. (1990: 60) 
 
This task of criticising capitalism was of continuing importance, even if 
Marxism was on the defensive, as MacEwan wrote with regard to the Unit-
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ed States (cf. 1990: 311). Nonetheless, this countering force was needed 
more than ever at a historical conjuncture characterised by triumphant 
capitalism: 
 
Just when more than ever we need a Karl Marx to reveal the inner workings of the 
capitalist system, or a Friedrich Engels to expose its ugly realities ‘on the ground’, 
what we are getting is an army of ‘post-Marxists’, one of whose principal functions 
is apparently to conceptualize away the problem of capitalism. (Wood 1990: 60) 
 
This reaction was judged to be untenable since Marxism was not only not 
discredited by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc but also continued to be the 
only system of thought capable of demystifying the realities of capitalism. 
No one in Socialist Register defended an absolute and dogmatic reading 
of Marxism. Nevertheless, it remained more than one theory among many: 
rather a world view that an identifiable group of people shared and devel-
oped collectively in ceaseless debate. This debate needed to become aware 
of and look to academic and political debates elsewhere for help – it could 
not survive in isolation. In how far such incorporations would and should 
transform Marxism itself was not entirely clear. For some, it seemed 
enough to fill Marxism’s gaps. Others, however, demanded a more open 
approach: Levins, for example, saw a need for inspiration – not just from 
sources from which Marxism had always learnt (English political economy, 
French socialism, German philosophy) but also from contemporary move-
ments such as feminism and environmentalism (cf. 1990: 342). 
Geras discussed Marxism’s scientific and epistemological status in de-
tail. He conceded that its central theoretical claims could not be proven (cf. 
1990: 5). This lack of veracity had repercussions for its reputation and 
relevance: in the eyes of many, even if they regarded socialism as an attrac-
tive model of social organisation, they had developed doubts about its 
plausibility after 1989, and asked questions about its practicability and, 
coming back to the old question of revolutionary agency, who could put it 
into practice and with what strategies (cf. ibid). On the theoretical level, 
Geras raised the question of whether retaining central tenets of Marxism 
despite their unproven status would amount to an epistemological absolut-
ism – especially since as a system of thought it employed a notion of truth. 
He denied the charge with the argument that a third position existed be-
tween the extremes of cognitive absolutism and cognitive relativism – and 
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that a third position of probabilistic knowledge should be occupied by 
Marxists. In other words, Marxism interpreted history along probable lines 
but was open to criticisms of these interpretations as suggested by others in 
rational discourse – among them Marxists themselves (cf. ibid: 18-19). 
Geras received support through similar reflections by MacEwan. The 
latter further elaborated on the notion of probabilistic knowledge through 
defining Marxism as a holistic and thus as different from a totalistic system. 
MacEwan repeated that Marxism did not provide explanations for all prob-
lems – nor every strategy for their solution – even if it was both a social 
theory and a political world view which aimed at ‘getting the whole pic-
ture’. In addition, he insisted that any such world view was heterogeneous, 
containing a plurality of views and controversial debates (cf. 1990: 317) or 
– as Amy Bartholomew put it – formed an “internally diverse and contested 
terrain” (1990: 244). The source from which to draw probabilistic 
knowledge, according to MacEwan, was history. History was theory and 
hence a guide to current issues (cf. 1990: 324). Socialist Register offered 
some reflection on what a theory of history could mean. Contributors to the 
journal generally agreed that a structurally determined directionality of 
history was an overly simplistic perspective. Marxism could not, as Geras 
repeated, explain all historical developments and social relations. However, 
he maintained that a ‘third way’ existed between determinism and plural-
ism: some factors might be more decisive and influential than others. In 
terms of history, the alternative to teleology was not necessarily circularity, 
and in terms of politics, the alternative to a hermetic functionalism was not 
necessarily contingency (cf. 1990: 5-9). 
Such a perception of Marxism could still be extremely valuable for so-
cial theory and political strategy. Paul Cammack, for example, discussed 
what Marxism could contribute to political scientists’ renewed interest in 
state theory and to the ‘new institutionalism’ and showed the limitations of 
those two approaches in terms of explaining the widespread long-term 
persistence and occasional rapid change of institutions. These phenomena, 
as Cammack argued, could only be accounted for by the central role of 
class conflicts within the formation processes of society. Marxism, as a 
theory of history, was needed in order to transcend what he called statism’s 
“theoretical emptiness” (1990: 156). He suggested that its “concern with 
the institutional requirements for state capacity supplements rather than 
replaces a broader theoretical analysis” (ibid: 159). He claimed that statists 
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and institutionalists failed to integrate the historical dimension into their 
reflections – to their own disadvantage. Concretely, he saw two errors: 
 
The first is the polarization of theory on the one hand and history on the other, as in 
the rejection of grand theory in favour of historically situated case studies, and the 
treatment of Marxism as functionalist and teleological, which rules out the possibil-
ity of a dialectical theory of history, and recognition of Marxism as one such theory. 
The second is a failure to approach Marxist commentaries on the state in the context 
of the wider corpus of Marxist theory, from which they cannot be detached. (ibid: 
168; original emphasis) 
 
Equally important as the intricacies of state theories, Cammack communi-
cated his perspective in an interesting way. Illustrating the merits of Marx-
ism as measured against the approaches of ‘conventional’ political scien-
tists
3
, he claimed the authority of non-orthodox sympathisers of Marx: 
 
We shall find [in statists’ and institutionalists’ writings; SB] strong confirmation of 
Sartre’s observation, recently recalled by Michael Löwy, ‘that Marxism is the ulti-
mate possible horizon of our age and that attempts to go beyond Marx frequently 
end up falling short of him’. (ibid: 152; original emphasis). 
 
It seemed to contributors to Socialist Register that Marxism’s most im-
portant achievement lay in its provision of a theory of history. Some of 
them criticised not only non-Marxist social scientists but also other Marx-
ists for not handling this merit carefully enough. In an article that analysed 
the situation of the left in France, George Ross accused Louis Althusser of 
having led Marxists into an intellectual cul-de-sac through replacing histor-
ical causality with a more abstract “deep structure” (1990: 203): 
 
[The] Althusserian turn undercut perhaps Marxism’s greatest political appeal, its 
purported capacity to lay bare the various motors of historical development and 
make them accessible to rational, progressive human action. The connection be-
tween the Althusserian reformulation of Marxism and real politics became ever 
more tenuous, leading eventually to a political and intellectual impasse. (ibid) 
                                                             
3  His list included theorists such as Stepan, Krasner, Skocpol, and Nordlinger (cf. 
Cammack 1990: 147-152). 
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With this statement, Ross revealed his conviction that Marxism ought to 
play a political role as well. It entailed more than an analytical approach to 
social developments: it served as guide to political action. 
The view of Marxism as more than just one among several theories was 
supported by a reiteration of its main contributions to the explanation of 
social relations, conflict, and change. Miliband pointed out that its central 
tenets, especially the class division of society which resulted in struggles, 
were still intact (cf. 1990: 361). Authors named essentials such as the idea 
of class contradictions as the primary divisions of society, the problematic 
of money and the out-of-fashion notion of ‘false consciousness’ as elements 
of such a theory – elements they considered to be as valid as ever (cf. ibid; 
Harvey 1993: 10; Norris 1993: 58-59). MacEwan listed three basics which 
he regarded as particularly important parts of Marxism: the labour theory of 
value, the theory of accumulation, and the theory of crisis (cf. 1990: 319). 
These essentials could not only explain why conflict between employers 
and workers was inevitable, why choices of technology in the production 
process were a product of struggle and thus had to be understood as social 
rather than as technical decisions, why the inclusion and exclusion of 
groups of the population comprised a tool for avoiding a falling rate of 
profit, or why economic crises were intrinsic to capitalism rather than acci-
dental (ibid: 319-323), it could also provide a source of energy for political 
activism: 
 
Socialists of all types have emphasized the way that workers are victims of capital-
ism, but Marxism stands out because it also emphasizes that workers are actors in 
creating their own history. This way of looking at things can provide an injection of 
power to workers struggles. (ibid: 321) 
 
The belief that workers were actors became even more important with the 
notion of “relative autonomy”. Geras accepted that the economy was not 
all-explanatory but nonetheless omni-present in political structures and 
pointed out that the debate of reductionism, though once important, was 
now a tired theme (cf. 1990: 10-11). While he admitted that economic 
determinism was reductionist indeed, he insisted that an anti-positivist 
explanation of one phenomenon through features of another, for example, 
through economic requirements, was not (ibid: 11). Wood added that, as a 
consequence, it was above all in this respect that Marxists differed from 
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other theorists. Commenting on the debate about civil society, she ex-
plained that Marxists interpreted states and civil societies as also dependent 
on the context of political economy and the power structures it produced. 
Others conceded, however, that certain traditional understandings such as 
the primacy of productive forces in social relations and conflicts had al-
ways been a deterministic distortion of Marxism (cf. Lebowitz 1991: 358). 
Michael A. Lebowitz discussed in this context one of Socialist Register’s 
most central beliefs  that the possibility of working-class political agency 
should be taken seriously: 
 
Those who fall prey to its [Marxism’s] determinist message can never explain why 
Marx believed that the political economy of the working class he elaborated in 
Capital was so important that it was worth sacrificing his ‘health, happiness and 
family’ or why he never ceased to stress that workers make themselves fit to found 
society anew only through the process of struggle. Rather than reflecting Marx’s 
position, the thesis in question is characteristic of a one-sided Marxism that has lost 
sight of the subjects of history. (ibid: 359) 
 
He added that a determinist understanding would mean that history was 
now on the side of capital – if relations of productions were changed once 
they had become fetters of the productive forces, then recent developments 
would mean that the re-introduction of capitalism was in the interest of the 
productive forces (ibid: 348-349). The alternative, Lebowitz emphasised, 
was to see capitalism’s triumph not as historical necessity but as conse-
quence of workers’ belief in its necessity (ibid: 358). Thus, conceptions of 
‘false consciousness’ and of the contentious relationship between interpre-
tation and reality could shed light on the questions of directionality, deter-
mination and agency. 
The notion of “false consciousness” proved more relevant than ever in a 
time of ‘there-is-no-alternative’ and ‘end-of-history’ discourse (Norris 
1993: 58-59). Closely related to the topic of consciousness was the insist-
ence on the continuing importance of critical theory – its analysis of in-
strumental reason and its claim “that social transformation can only come 
about through the intentional, self-conscious actions of human agents” 
(ibid: 86). Theorists had important insights for the post-communist world: 
changes in the social realm would lead to changes in human beings and an 
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intensified capitalism would, therefore, leave its scars within people them-
selves: 
 
At the same time, critical theory saw that the hope for ‘true individuality’, with its 
capacity for critique and resistance, was fast disappearing with the intensified en-
croachment of capitalism into all areas of human existence, or what Habermas 
would call ‘lifeworlds’. (ibid: 86) 
 
George Ross explained that even if one agreed that the collapse of the East-
ern Bloc had revealed certain deficiencies in Marxism, an alternative exist-
ed to abandoning it. He recommended a look into French intellectual histo-
ry and sketched out how Sartre and others in the post-1956 situation formu-
lated a revisionist defence of Marxism which developed into existential 
Marxism. It took issue with the Algerian War and, under its impression, 
formulated refined theories of state-society relationships (cf. 1990: 195-
204). Similar revisions would be possible now. More concretely, Geras 
accepted that Marxism had serious gaps and deficits and he named several 
of them. Its worst political deficiency was class reductionism. Marx him-
self, Geras claimed, had not suggested that a classless society would end 
individual antagonisms (cf. 1990: 13). A few pages later, he referred to 
Isaac Deutscher who also had pointed out that even socialism would not 
solve all predicaments of the human race (cf. ibid: 16). However, these 
statements reflect a certain ambivalence: it seems as though Geras, by using 
the term ‘individual antagonisms’ for non-class based conflicts, saw a dif-
ference between these and structural antagonisms (which seemed to be 
identical with class antagonisms). This differentiation implicitly comes 
close to a repetition of the primacy of class oppression – a position fre-
quently criticised by feminist and anti-racist theorists. For Geras, these gaps 
in Marxism posed no problem – they should be used as opportunities for 
thought. In his metaphorical language, occasionally difficult to decipher, he 
seemed to propose using Marxism as an overall framework and adding 
certain elements that had been dealt with inadequately or not at all by 
Marxists. Filling gaps meant adding new aspects to Marxism which was 
different from correcting its potential mistakes. Apart from a new under-
standing of class, such additions concerned, for example, the future role of 
politics. Whereas for a long time traditional Marxism had emphasised the 
‘withering away’ of politics and the state, Geras now insisted that politics 
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would only disappear as organised power of one class over another but not 
as a set of institutions regulating the public sphere of a society. However, 
this assertion entailed a different form of state and politics – one subordi-
nate to rather than superimposed upon society (cf. ibid: 27). 
Nevertheless, a number of modifications were needed. Geras dedicated 
a long section of his 1990 article to Marx’s failure to sketch out a classless 
society and – since the state would not wither away – its political institu-
tions and he encouraged Marxists to learn from other traditions in this 
respect, notably from liberalism which had invested much more effort in 
theorising institutional frameworks that offered protection by and against 
the state (cf. ibid: 26). Geras received support from Immanuel Wallerstein 
who stated that for too long the reflections on the shape of classless and 
socialist societies – something he called “utopistics” – were frowned upon 
as diversions from struggling for state power and national development 
(1992: 110). Another correction which had to be made was to engage in 
debates over welfare and social needs. As Linda Gordon suggested, like 
conservatives, Marxists had been sceptical about needs discourses because 
they regarded them as essentialised constructions which disguised the inter-
ests of hegemonic cultural and economic actors (cf. 1990: 191). Another 
reason for their lack of engagement was the assumption that under social-
ism needs would be satisfied automatically and welfare programmes would 
thus become superfluous – a perception which Gordon criticised as gender-
blind (ibid: 171). 
An example of a complete article dealing with corrections of Marxism – 
though one taking up discussions that had started already before 1989 – was 
Amy Bartholomew’s “Should a Marxist believe in Marx on Rights?”, pub-
lished in 1990. This article is interesting not just in the positions it took but 
also in the ways in which it referred to Marx in support of its arguments. 
Rather than offering an outright criticism, Bartholomew started with sug-
gesting the use of Marx’s own understanding of a “rich personality” as the 
basis for a Marxist discussion of rights (1990: 246). She admitted that Marx 
himself had treated rights ambiguously (cf. ibid: 247) because he saw them 
as results of particular configurations of social power and believed that 
workers’ interests should not masquerade as universal interests. Instead, 
Bartholomew argued that in twentieth century capitalism any attempt to 
take Marx’s position seriously would require supporting the notion of 
rights: 
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We can take support for the position that if Marx believed communism was a place 
lacking class conflict and lacking a state in the coercive sense of the word at least, 
then either he did or should have supported the rights in capitalism which protect 
people against the existing state and capital (e.g. the right to strike). (ibid: 250) 
 
Thus taking Marx seriously could also mean drawing conclusions from his 
work which he himself did not. In order to do so, one could turn to other 
topics in his work, for example, as Bartholomew suggested, to the issue of 
liberty. The author explained that Marx had a much more comprehensive 
idea of liberty than liberals because he complemented their negative defini-
tion of the concept with attributes like individuality, community, freedom, 
and choice. Hence negative liberty was a necessary but insufficient precon-
dition for the Marxist concept of liberation. This meant that rights – the 
right to assemble, to vote, or to strike – could facilitate the process through 
which the proletariat developed class consciousness and political awareness 
and, as a consequence, would start the proletariat fighting for the Marxist, 
comprehensive concept of liberty (cf. ibid: 252). On a more concrete level, 
on the question of the right to privacy, the author disagreed with Marx more 
fundamentally: she maintained that while Marx had wished to abolish the 
differentiation between the public and the private spheres, contemporary 
Marxists should argue for retaining this difference and call for ‘equal op-
portunities’ to choose their privacies: 
 
A socialist conception would not be the anxious privatism that dominates the current 
conception of privacy. Rather, a socialist privacy right would require a reconceptual-
ization of, and material commitment to, among other things, freely chosen private 
spaces; not only the ones where I just happen to be stuck by virtue of my class, 
gender and race or other source of a relative lack of power. (ibid: 256; original 
emphasis) 
 
Bartholomew’s contribution argued on two different levels. On the one 
hand it reflected on the importance of ‘bourgeois’ concepts (such as civil 
and political rights) for socialist struggles. Yet on the other it also proposed 
how to deal with Marxism as a historically specific body of social and 
political theory rather than as a trans-historical system of thought – the 
writing of ‘Marxism’ as ‘marxism’ attained symbolic importance here. The 
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theory should be used as a point of intellectual departure rather than taken 
for a holy script: 
 
I do not accept that even if Marx and the ‘marxist’ tradition had rejected rights, a 
contemporary marxist could not believe in rights. Clearly, we should care what 
Marx said, just as we care what any other major social theorist said. And as ‘marx-
ists’ there must obviously be some degree of agreement – what that degree is, of 
course, is properly a matter of lively debate. But it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween textual fundamentalism, which is to be rejected, and serious study and evalua-
tion. (ibid: 246) 
 
Finally, Bartholomew pointed out that she regarded one central problem of 
Marxism and socialism as not adequately solved at the time of writing: 
socialist strategy’s tensions over means and ends (cf. ibid: 256). In her 
view, the discussion of rights was a valuable way for sensitising oneself 
vis-à-vis this tension. 
In a similar vein, Arthur MacEwan warned against taking Marx’s 
productivist bias, his ideas of economic development, too seriously. He 
argued that productivism had for a long time hampered Marxist economic 
strategy and distorted it into support for Keynesianism. In more theoretical 
terms, this development had obliged the association of  productive advanc-
es with human progress. Marxists, he was convinced, should stop defining 
welfare (and progress) as ever more people obtaining and consuming ever 
more products. Instead, more efforts should be made to achieve non-
material goals such as equality, a humane work environment or the libera-
tion of women (cf. 1990: 316). Some authors were convinced that Marxists 
were well-equipped to theorise on and to find solutions also to environmen-
tal problems even though these topics had not been an issue in traditional 
Marxism. Levins thought about a new and more holistic understanding of 
historical materialism which perceived human history as the continuation of 
natural history. Historical change, thus, had consequences for the relation-
ship of (human) organisms and the natural environment. Along the lines of 
feminist demands for integrating reproduction into analyses of production, 
Levins saw a need to consider renewal, consumption and waste within 
analyses of production and reproduction. On the one hand, this led to an 
enlightened productionism which reflected the consequences of production 
on the environment. On the other, it constituted a critique of an ecologism 
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that was in the past based on the mythical idea of a balance between nature 
and human beings (cf. 1990: 343-344).
4
  
Eleanor Macdonald suggested a further correction concerning Marx-
ism’s conception of itself as a system of thought, a modification which she 
distilled out of a critical discussion of the work of Jacques Derrida: instead 
of clinging to the idea of non-ideological knowledge (scientific knowledge 
in the terminology of structural Marxism, or empirical knowledge, as ana-
lytical Marxists would say), Marxists should concede that there were no 
areas of knowledge untouched by ideology (cf. 1990: 232-233). They 
should put more effort into discovering the relationship between interpreta-
tion and reality – “different forms of ideological mystification” (ibid: 241). 
A scepticism of grand theory should not stop short of Marxism itself: 
“What this means for Marxists is that the foundational character of the 
‘economic’ realism, and the corollary privileging of the category of ‘class’ 
in political analyses, must be continually drawn into question as a sufficient 
programme for useful political interpretation” (ibid). Nevertheless, for 
contributors to Socialist Register, Marxism retained a very privileged role 
in their theoretical reflections. Especially its theory of history – understood 
flexibly – was of central importance. Most writers saw Marxism more as a 
system of thought than as a spirit of critique. 
 
Dissent 
Contributors to Dissent had long awarded Marxism a lower status than had 
their British colleagues and their (former) opponents working in conjunc-
tion with Monthly Review. Their move away from Marxism was less the 
consequence of theoretical considerations than of political ones. For the 
older generation, estrangement began with a Trotsky-inspired opposition to 
the Soviet Union and the popular front and later led to an Atlanticist oppo-
sition to the allegedly expansionist authoritarianism or, as some said, totali-
tarianism of the Eastern Bloc. For the younger generation in Dissent, politi-
cised around 1968, Marx had always been just one inspiration among 
many. Looking for alternatives to Marxist orthodoxy, the journal not only 
published materials from Eastern European dissidents but also retrieved 
                                                             
4  Levins quoted Ernesto Galeano who underlined the active nature of human 
ecology: “We are what we do, but above all what we do to change what we are.” 
(Quoted in Levins 1990: 343) 
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writers such as Carlo Rosselli, a member of the Italian partisans and a theo-
rist of liberal socialism. Hence for most contributors Marxism constituted 
just one possible point of theoretical departure and certainly not a holistic 
system of thought. Furthermore, Dissent had started questioning the useful-
ness of Marxism for the politics of the Western left long before 1989. Many 
of its contributors considered Marxism responsible for the changes of 
1989/91 which they – at least in the early days – unambiguously applauded 
as the liberation of the people of Eastern Europe. For many Dissenters, 
Marxism as it had been translated into practice in really existing socialism 
had revealed the shortcomings of Marxism as theory. 
Marxism’s central problem in Dissenters’ eyes was the ‘simplification 
assumption’ which caused not only a neglect of politics but even made 
them illegitimate. If ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ were given and obvious, institu-
tions of political debate and for procedures regulating political struggle 
would become obsolete (cf. Ryan 1990: 437). The post-Marxist Cornelius 
Castoriadis made exactly this observation and added that Marxism formed a 
special case within a more extended school of thought with an uncritical 
belief in rationalistic scientism which had all too often produced ideas of 
orthodoxy – once a position was legitimised by ‘science’, opposition to it 
became heterodoxy (cf. 1992: 221). Contributors to Dissent thus discussed 
the question of whether there was any relevance at all for Marxism in the 
future more extensively than the other journals. 
Most authors started out from the observation that Marxism was in de-
cline – but it was pointed out that this phenomenon did not start in the late 
1980s. Tying theoretical decline to the political realities in the Eastern 
European countries, most agreed with Castoriadis’s claim that Marxism’s 
collapse had been obvious for thirty years (cf. ibid: 221). The question 
remained, however, whether this collapse was total – also for Marxism as 
theory – or whether any aspects of Marxism should be salvaged. Occasion-
ally writers claimed its continuing relevance. Robert Dahl, for example, 
suggested that, all mistakes notwithstanding, “[m]any of the criticisms of 
capitalism advanced by socialists were essentially correct” (1990: 226). 
What remained, however, was a relatively vague idea of critique. Gus Ty-
ler, for instance, wanted to abandon the scientific approach: “Is Marx valid 
today? Yes, if we allow for the factor of uncertainty and if we admit that 
there are, in the real world, no pure forms” (1991: 109). He hinted at the 
demands formulated in the Communist Manifesto which called for an end to 
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the proletariat’s immiseration and, in Trotskyist terminology, constituted 
‘immediate demands’ which, by and large, had been fulfilled in the twenti-
eth century (at least – though Tyler did not make this specification – in the 
metropolitan regions of capitalism). Thus his argument might be under-
stood as suggesting that Marxism had succeeded in so far as its ‘sensible’ 
demands were concerned. Shlomo Avineri claimed that exactly this had 
happened over the last decades – both the demands of Marxism and the 
threat of a possible overthrow of capitalism had allowed social democracy 
to win concessions: 
 
It is likely that one day, when someone tries to immortalize the person who inspired 
the complex developments that led to the rise of this system, Karl Marx will, ironi-
cally, be seen as the harbinger of this developed neocapitalist world, in which moral 
suasion, economic interest, and fear of revolution combined in a potent mixture to 
yield a more humane transformation of a system whose predatory beginnings threat-
ened to destroy it from the outset. (1992: 11) 
 
This made, as he pointed out, the industrialised countries of the West the 
‘most socialist’ ones. This observation could be interpreted in a positive 
light – but Gitlin, for example, warned that serious problems continued to 
exist which Marxism was as unable to solve as liberalism. He considered 
not only recent global threats such as environmental destruction, but also 
worried about the aspirations which gave rise to identity politics. What they 
articulated, he suggested, was a demand for commonality politics, for a 
recognition of the value of community and of the interests of groups, op-
posed to the universalism (and its companion, individualism) of both tradi-
tions of thought, Marxism and liberalism. The ideas of 1968, obviously, 
had been attempts at bridging the gap between universalist and commonali-
ty politics (cf. 1993: 74-75). In short, Dissenters understood the events of 
1989 primarily as a further and maybe final blow to a Marxism in decline 
as a political theory. They varied in their opinions about what it had – unin-
tentionally – achieved and what should replace it – either a democratic 
socialism or a left communitarianism. 
However for some contributors, Marxism remained important enough 
to be worth the attempt of a radical overhaul – which would have far-
reaching consequences for socialist theory and strategy. As in the other 
journals, corrections were understood to have both a theoretical and a polit-
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ical dimension. First of all, the central perception remained the abandoning 
of an uncritical belief in a rationalism that could replace politics: 
 
What socialism involves, if not a measure of collective social control over decisions 
that under pure capitalism are left to actors in the market place, I do not know. But 
what has to be abandoned is any thought that we shall achieve Marx’s vision of a 
world in which ‘society’ rationally chooses what to consume, how to produce, and 
how to distribute it, as if ‘society’ was a single individual writ large. (Ryan 1990: 
437) 
 
Castoriadis pointed out that to make such alterations would amount to a 
liberation of Marxism (or socialism) from the capitalist imaginary that 
hampered it: from the centrality of production and economic growth, the 
mythology of progress, the mastery of humans over nature and themselves, 
the acceptance of work as a specific sphere of social organisation, and the 
existence of a bureaucracy (cf. 1992: 221). Gus Tyler summed up these 
suggestions by claiming that it was “timely to make two small adjustments 
in Marx: first, instead of economic determinism, substitute societal inde-
terminism; second, instead of ‘forms’ substitute norms to guide human 
behavior – individually and collectively” (cf. 1991: 110). The over-reliance 
on economic and scientific rationalism reflected an insufficient considera-
tion of the discursive, ideological and organisational dimensions of societal 
life. As again Castoriadis explained, Marx had failed to see that humans 
produced not only tools and history but also significations and institutions. 
This realization had repercussions for political struggle. Others added fur-
ther miscalculations: Daniel Bell, for example, portrayed classical Marxists 
as believing that socialism would overcome scarcity and thus it would only 
have to find ways of distributing products rather than organising production 
(cf. 1991: 50). Its idea of economic planning was closely linked to its trust 
in unlimited growth. Another mistake, according to Shlomo Avineri, was 
Marxism’s neglect, its negative or instrumental view of nationalism – he 
called nationalism Marxism’s “black hole” (1990: 447). This reduction of 
nationalism to a pre-modern phenomenon or, in Hobsbawm’s words, to a 
“building block of capitalism”, had resulted in a lack of support for “na-
tional liberation” as such (ibid: 448-449). Nationalism, however, was one 
of the issues on which Dissent differentiated between classical and neo-
Marxism. Avineri conceded that some theorists of the latter variety had 
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come to terms with the autonomous, emancipatory power of nationalism 
(ibid: 452). Finally, the French writer Michel Wieviorka suggested a shift 
of emphasis concerning the role of work in socialist theory. The concept of 
work should not be interpreted a euphemism for wage slavery and in the 
twentieth century oppression was at least as likely to stem from exclusion 
as from exploitation: 
 
What counts now is not social relationships, but the lack of them; not the relation-
ship of domination to exploitation, but the growing separation between the excluded 
and those who ‘belong’ – who continue to work, to earn a salary and to consume. 
[...] Today no one would seriously claim that by casting off its chains, the proletariat 
will liberate all humanity. The worst crises are no longer those of exploited workers, 
who now seem to occupy a privileged position – one they want to protect – but 
rather those of men and women deprived of work. (1994: 249) 
 
Castoriadis took up the issue of agency and determinism. He identified two 
dangers in traditional Marxism’s teleological-determinist approach: on the 
one hand, it simply ignored the possibility of agency and thus of choice and 
the existence of alternatives, on the other, it de-legitimised opposition and 
popular struggle because history was on the side of those who claimed to 
represent it. He insisted that the idea of a future better than the past would 
make politics meaningless, that historical change would be regarded as 
automatically positive and that altogether this amounted to a religious ra-
ther than a self-critical approach (cf. 1992: 223). He pleaded instead for the 
importance of politics: “The choice when brought to bear on the form of 
institutions, is politics properly understood. And for reasons mentioned 
above, it is this possibility of choice – thus, of politics – that Marx’s con-
ception makes impossible” (ibid).  
Nevertheless, he remained convinced that useful elements in Marxist 
theory could be picked for a project of social and individual autonomy and 
its “kernel”, free thinking, created through human actions: 
 
[W]hat remains is what I have called ‘the other element’ in Marx: the element that 
stresses human activity, affirms that humans make their own history under determi-
nate conditions generally without knowing it, and asserts that we have to find in 
actual historical reality the factors tending to transform this same reality. (ibid: 222) 
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For most Dissenters, Marxism had been reduced to one inspiration for 
reflections on socialism. They privileged Marxism’s humanist elements 
over its scientific claims. For them, the writings of Marx could only make 
limited contributions to a critical perspective of the left. 
 
Monthly Review 
Monthly Review was the journal which came closest to ‘traditional’ Marxist 
positions – though the spectrum of opinions it published was wider. Thus it 
was not surprising that it commented only rarely on the responsibilities of 
Marxism for the deficiencies and the eventual breakdown of the Eastern 
Bloc – which it acknowledged as final and irreversible later than the others. 
The only voice which drew a direct line between Marxism and the lack of 
democracy in the socialist states, once more, was Ralph Miliband – 
Miliband was held in high esteem by the editors of the journal. He hinted, 
in an article called “Socialism in Question”, at Marx’s and Lenin’s beliefs 
in forms of semi-direct democracy and explained: “I do not believe that this 
is a good recipe for the socialist exercise of power, not at any rate for a very 
long time to come, when a new breed of people will have been produced by 
a prolonged experience of socialist relations of life” (1991: 21). Others, 
among them Michael Löwy in his article “Twelve Theses on the Crisis of 
‘Really Existing Socialism’” (he chose this title as late as 1991), denied that 





Nobody would make Descartes responsible for the French colonial wars, nor Jesus 
for the Inquisition, even less Thomas Jefferson for the U.S. invasion of Vietnam. But 
it has been made to seem that Karl Marx built the Berlin Wall and nominated 
Ceaucescu the leader of the Romanian Communist Party. (1991: 36) 
 
This view was balanced by several contributors’ observation that most 
Marxists had long been too apologetic about the countries of the Eastern 
Bloc – countries that they had, as Alan Wald admitted, despite all scepti-
cism felt close to (cf. 1991: 61). Wald’s remark was meant as a warning 
against moving on too easily to a barely altered version of Marxism without 
                                                             
5  This line of argument was very similar to Thompson’s critique in New Left 
Review on blaming the French Revolution for the guillotine. 
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taking notice of what had happened. It was directed against Manning Mara-
ble, author of an article on “Remaking American Marxism” (1991), which 
Wald criticised for its strategic proposals. In Wald’s eyes, Marable propa-
gated a continuation of vanguardist and democratic-centralist decision-
making structures though now in alliance with social democrats from the 
left wing of the Democratic Party (cf. Wald 1991: 61-62). Similarly, Alber-
to Prago took issue with Carl Marzani’s view that the defeat of the Eastern 
Bloc was declared prematurely and that its societies had achieved much 
more than was commonly admitted (cf. Marzani 1990). Prago conceded 
that Marxists (like Marzani and himself) should have begun much earlier to 
critically examine the Soviet Union and the states of the Eastern Bloc: “He 
[Marzani; SB] – and I and other Marxists – should have employed it [Marx-
ism; SB] in examining the nature of Soviet society, before the Khrushchev 
revelations” (1990: 54; original emphasis). The exiled Hungarian Marxist 
István Mészáros took up the topic of critique and pointed out that 20
th
 cen-
tury Marxists had either failed to address moral and political questions or 
were prevented from doing so by Stalin’s ban on political theory and phi-
losophy. Under these circumstances, Lukács’s and Kautsky’s reflections 
remained isolated (cf. 1993). Western Marxists avoided the issue and pre-
ferred to move into new theoretical terrain: 
 
In this context, even Marx’s own position could be, and has been, grossly misrepre-
sented. The peculiar notion which labelled Marx ‘a theoretical anti-humanist’ – a 
notion born partly out of ignorance and partly out of a quite undeserved respect for 
Stalin’s position which condemned preoccupation with these matters as inadmissible 
‘moralizing’ – is a well-known example of such misrepresentation. (ibid: 33-34) 
 
Hence, contributors to Monthly Review seemed to be generally convinced 
that although Marxism was not responsible for the deficiencies of the so-
cialism of the Eastern Bloc and of the changes of 1989, Marxists to a cer-
tain extent were. Their abstention from critique and independent thought 
had diminished chances for a future radical political model because they 
had failed to rescue Marxism from being associated with Stalinist bureau-
cratic systems (cf. Löwy 1991: 35). This failure would have repercussions 
for the importance and status of Marxism after 1989: while Marxists be-
lieved that its strength was as important as ever in a historical situation 
dominated by a triumphant capitalism, this opinion was shared by few 
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contemporaries. Löwy contended that Marxists should blame themselves 
for this situation because many had exempted really existing socialism from 
Marxist critique. Nevertheless, he declared majority opinion to be wrong: 
 
What is being thrown away with the (extremely dirty) bathwater – the anti-
democratic, bureaucratic, often totalitarian nature of the non-capitalist societies and 
of their system of centralized planning is the baby – the idea of moving beyond 
capitalism toward a democratically planned economy. (ibid: 37-38) 
 
Löwy suggested an ensemble of features which Marxism still had to offer – 
a philosophy of praxis, the dialectical materialist method, the analysis of 
commodity fetishism, workers’ self-emancipation, the utopia of a classless 
and stateless society (ibid: 39). He quoted Marx in order to propose that 
after 1989 Marxism had to be more than ever a “ruthless criticism of all that 
is” (ibid). He also referred to other Marxists when pointing out that the 
‘principle of hope’ also belonged to its central tenets (ibid: 39-40). This 
hope, called by others the visionary or the utopian element, was central for 
many contributors (cf. Wallis 1991: 9; Kovel 1994) 
Since authors were aware that as a system of thought and as a political 
programme Marxism was seriously affected by recent events, they dis-
cussed how to handle this situation. The most promising way out of this 
impasse for Monthly Review was to return to Marxist basics – as evidenced 
by their extended debate on Cornel West’s book The Ethical Dimension of 
Marxist Thought which attempted an innovative reading of Marx, one 
based more on its moral than on its scientific claims. Although written in 
the 1970s, in 1993 West’s study was debated in the journal with the intent 
of introducing a discussion on an ‘ethical Marxism’. One of the journal’s 
contributors to the discussion defined the relationship between the events of 
1989/91 and the relevance of Marxism as dialectical rather than unidirec-
tional: Guillermo Bowie explained that “[i]t now seems that socialist 
thought has entered a new phase that forsakes Marxist thought and praxis. 
The loss of faith has both contributed to and resulted from the collapse of 
European socialist states.” (1993: 38) Confusion over the state of affairs 
was not limited to the fate of the Eastern Bloc, but characterised Marxist 
philosophy in the West too (cf. Monthly Review 1993: 22). Feasible or 
possible alternatives seemed few at the time; socialist thought had not en-
tered a new phase but stopped at a dead end (cf. Kovel 1994a: 54). Cornel 
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West himself described the Marxist left as facing a threefold challenge in 
this situation – one organisational, one intellectual, and one existential (cf. 
1993: 57). This echoed the position of Paul Buhle who saw Marxist theory 
in an odd predicament after its geographical dislocation from its base in the 
Eastern Bloc, faced with the shrinkage of its assumed political agents – the 
working classes – in the West and confronted with the epistemological 
pessimism cultivated in postmodern social theories (cf. 1990: 43). 
Contributors united around a shared belief in the theoretical superiority 
of Marxism even if some of them enhanced the philosophy with elements 
of postmodernism and new historicism – this was how Allison Jaggar char-
acterised West’s work mentioned above. Jaggar pointed to the holistic 
nature of Marxism that set it apart from “bourgeois social science” with its 
focus on ossified and isolated facts (1993: 20). She then defined Marxism 
as simultaneously  descriptive, explanatory, critical, and prescriptive and as 
necessarily calling for changing the world (ibid: 21). In other words, a 
thorough Marxist analysis would still have the capacity to generate an 
adequate political strategy. Such a perspective implies that even after 1989, 
Marxism remained a comprehensive system of thought and as such more 
than one mere social theory among many. Revealing statements include 
those by Kovel, written in an obituary for Miliband, which listed Marx-
ism’s many different dimensions: 
 
There are of course many facets to Marxism, from deep philosophical presupposi-
tions such as materialism or dialectics to a particular/economic analysis of current 
events. But class struggle is the conceptual linchpin inasmuch as it is here that Marx-
ists have to fight for the truth they believe in. (1994: 52; original emphasis) 
 
Important as the different dimensions are, the most central issue came 
towards the end of his passage: Marxism is something to believe in. The 
problem of belief – often more closely related with religion and politics 
than with theory and analysis – provokes the question of the base on which 
it is built. Is belief – and are the ethical guidelines following from it – com-
pletely arbitrary? Contributors hinted at the possibility of avoiding ethical 
foundationalism and absolutism as well as relativism. This became the 
central topic within the discussion on Cornel West’s work when he argued 
that Marx had developed a concept of justice that based social criticism on 
discursive rather than trans-historical values. Such a position allowed for 
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the combination of Christian values such as service, love, and humility with 
socialist ones like freedom, justice, and equality (cf. Jaggar 1993: 20). 
Jaggar, in her critical evaluation of West’s arguments, remained sceptical 
about his discursive approach to justification – which put West on a line 
with Kant, the pragmatists, Rawls and Habermas – and proposed instead a 
dialectical and procedural – in other words, a more traditionally Marxist – 
approach: 
 
If contemporary leftists were explicit in expressing an epistemic as well as political 
and moral commitment to creating the social conditions that would facilitate more 
open discussion and critical dialogue, this would dispel the spectres of relativism 
and even conservatism that otherwise haunt West’s conventionalist conception of 
justification, despite his declared aim of exorcising them. (ibid: 27) 
 
Foster pointed out that these debates revived an old tradition of reflections 
on how to find ‘moral objectivity’ and to convince critics, which included 
Marxists such as Norman Geras who according to Foster had accused 
Marxism of using moral judgment but rejecting morality, that a difference 
existed between ‘soft’ – historically specific, discursively constructed – 
objectivity and relativism (cf. 1993: 10-12).
6
 
With the discussion of Cornel West’s work, Monthly Review made clear 
that it considered the development of a socialist ethics to be important and 
that Marxism was indispensable for such an undertaking. West described 
Marx’s move from a search for philosophical certainty to a focus on social 
criticism and change, accompanied by a move from philosophical to theo-
retical language.
7
 While West accepted that there was no human essence 
                                                             
6  Foster distinguished three quests for moral objectivity: Engels’s teleological 
quest (which regarded proletarian morality as the root of a socialist morality to 
become fully developed through the transcendence of class divisions), 
Kautsky’s naturalistic quest (which located the base of morality in human needs 
and human nature), and Lukacs’s ontological quest (which combined historicism 
with a belief in an essence of human beings and came closest to West’s consid-
erations)(cf. Foster 1993: 11-12).. 
7  Others disagreed with West’s description of this move as a smooth and straight-
forward operation. Jaggar, for example, suggested that there were continuing 
tensions in Marx’s work between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theory’ (cf. 1993: 23) 
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and that human identities were the products of the ensemble of social rela-
tions they experienced, he believed in their capability of developing im-
proved forms of humane moralities in collective processes – through com-
munity-wide agreements which created more just and more equal societies 
(cf. Foster 1993: 12-15). Foster illustrated this point with an example: “It is 
not to nineteenth century moral philosophers, after all, that the world owes 
the conviction that slavery is evil; rather the world was forced to 
acknowledge the reality of this evil as the result of an historical struggle for 
human freedom” (ibid: 15). If this experience was generalised, Foster be-
lieved that one could argue in the following way: “In short morality was not 
a form of philosophical truth that could be abstractly advanced or defended, 
but something real, in the sense that it was the object of struggle for com-
munities of individuals actively engaged in the changing of the conditions 
of human community” (ibid: 13). It was this tying of morality to collective 
struggle and discursive action that distinguished moral historicism from 
both, moral relativism and moral essentialism. In this sense, Marxism pro-
vided a very useful toolkit for the development of a socialist ethics. 
Authors in Monthly Review argued for a weak form of historical direc-
tionality but did not explicitly defend economic determination. In an anon-
ymous “Review of the Month” with the title “Where are we going?” pub-
lished in 1991, the editors explained how they tried to draw lessons from 
history. They contended that the past had opened up certain routes and 
closed others: “If there is a science of history, it has to do not with predic-
tions but with identifying and studying these determinations of the past 
with a view to making meaningful choices for the future” (Monthly Review 
1991: 3). If there was any foundation for determinist ideas, these seemed to 
lie in the interrelationship of human beings and social conditions rather 
than in the social conditions themselves. This premise constituted the spir-
itual element in Monthly Review’s outlook which set it apart from the other 
journals. Amin explained that human beings were metaphysical beings 
because they questioned the meaning of their lives (cf. Amin 1993: 49). As 
a consequence, they possessed a desire for transcendence which manifested 
itself in revolutions (cf. Buhle 1990: 50). To combine such a desire with 
knowledge gained from analyses of the past remained, according to the 
journal, the task of Marxists – especially in a time when others declared the 
end of history. For West, Marxism combined a moderate historicism with 
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the search for a new foundationalist approach to ethics – for the purpose of 
finding philosophical justifications for moral choices.  
Monthly Review remained convinced that, objectively, Marxism re-
mained as relevant for the future as it had always been – as long as, to use 
Wood’s phrase, social relations were embedded in economic relations (cf. 
1994a: 20). As Victor Wallis explained in one of the articles which tried to 
reformulate tasks for the American left: “In short, capitalism is as damaging 
as ever, and the longer it hangs on, the more dangerous it gets. The objec-
tive basis for Marxism – the systematic search for an alternative to capital-
ism – has therefore never been stronger” (cf. 1991: 6). Capitalism inevita-
bly produced its ‘other’ and Marxism still provided the most appropriate 
theoretical model for this other. Hence its relevance rested on political 
conditions and on its theoretical achievements. The fact that capitalism had 
developed in unforeseen directions in the 20
th
 century did not make Marx’s 
work less valuable because this process had not challenged, as Harry Mag-
doff pointed out, the essentials of Marx’s laws of motion (cf. 1991: 1). 
Others argued that the importance of Marxism had been vindicated through 
recent changes in the U.S. class structure, as Richard A. Cloward and 
Frances Fox Piven made clear. The preceding two decades had seen a “new 
class war” that had produced, in Marxist terminology, a “reserve army of 
labor” and thus weakened the workers’ bargaining power (1991: 26-27). 
Nevertheless, capitalism had produced additional problems, environmental 
destruction perhaps being the gravest. Monthly Review took ecological 
problems even more seriously than the others. It argued for a politicisation 
of ecology (cf. Weston 1990) and listed Marxism as one among the radical 
ecological perspectives alongside deep ecology, social ecology, bioregion-
alism, and eco-feminism (cf. Yih 1990: 16). All of these positions shared a 
fundamental critique of the prevailing social, economic and political order 
(ibid). Yet contributors were convinced that Marxism was better equipped 
for the pursuit of a radical environmentalism than the other approaches 
because it entailed possibilities for combining issues of justice and equality 
with environmental concerns and could thus avoid the traps of quasi-
Malthusian misanthropy. The central contribution that Marxism could make 
to environmentalism consisted of the understanding of the politics of ecolo-
gy as the politics of production and exchange (ibid: 24). Using the tools of 
dialectical materialism and theories of accumulation, Marxism could also 
provide a theoretical framework for environmental political action that was 
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Victor Wallis in pointing out that Marxism was “bigger than Marx”, ar-
gued that the label should be attached to all people who worked in analys-
ing and for overcoming the systematic dimension of oppression (cf. 1991: 
10): “Marxism is important because instead of just dealing with oppression 
on a case-by-case basis, or even with all the forms of all the oppressions at 
once, it deals with the totality of oppression in all of its interrelationships” 
(ibid: 8). This notion of totality made Marxism indispensable. Even if 
groups suffering from particular types of oppression were not aware of this 
totality, the oppressive structure used it to their advantage. This structure 
consisted of the capitalist class and “the entire complex of economic, mili-
tary, and cultural instruments over which this class presides” (ibid). Only 
Marxism, Wallis believed, could prevent oppressed people from engaging 
in futile struggles against single oppressions and isolated phenomena, 
which would mean “to settle for a merely spasmodic response-mechanism 
to the framework imposed by capital” (ibid: 9). 
Another important insight of Marxism which, according to Wood, was 
in danger of getting lost in the aftermath of 1989 was the pervasiveness of 
compulsion as an organising principle of market relations. In an article 
which commemorated E. P. Thompson and his work, she argued against a 
reading of Marx that interpreted the change from feudalism to capitalism as 
progress and liberation, and instead explained it like Thompson had as a 
process in which social relations became embedded in market relations 
(1994: 15-20). The contemporary relevance of this interpretation lay in the 
tendency among Marxists to regard markets as parts of emancipatory pro-
jects rather than as instruments of class power which, in the late twentieth 
century, were used to control labour and to discipline Third World coun-
tries and the ‘new democracies’ of the former Eastern Bloc (cf. ibid: 39). 
                                                             
8  At the same time, the journal was very critical of Marixsm’s deficiencies in this 
field. They clustered around a quasi-liberal understanding of productionism and 
progress, based on scientific rationality. Yih criticized Marx’s theory of value in 
particular because it was restricted to labour time and ignored the ‘consumption’ 
of nature involved in the production process. Accordingly, the value of nature 
remained unclear and, consequently, easy to ‘externalise’ (cf. 1990: 21-23). 
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Finally, Marxism was able to explain the unavoidable link of capitalist 
success and failure. Such a perspective, based on Paul Sweezy’s theory of 
accumulation and overproduction, interpreted the expansion of the forces of 
production and the simultaneous growth of misery as mutually dependent 
(cf. Magdoff 1991: 1). This insurmountable problem of capitalism was 
ignored by those organising political change in Eastern Europe. Contribu-
tors to the journal claimed that in the early 1990s the collapse of the Eastern 
Bloc was interpreted as a quasi-natural incident which proved the inescapa-
bility of capitalism’s economic laws. Marxism was as needed as ever for a 
deconstruction of this myth. Amin emphasised in this context that Marx’s 
most important contribution to political economy consisted of the distinc-
tion between the laws of nature and the laws of economics. Only an under-
standing of the ‘laws’ of the economy as being internal to society – and 
imposed on parts of it – would open up space for political change (cf. 1991: 
48). 
Although Monthly Review awarded Marxism an important status, it rec-
ognised areas where Marxism needed modification. Three broad – and in 
many ways interrelated – weaknesses were identified. The first concerned 
the importance of human identity and subjectivity. As Jack Weston argued 
in his article “For an Ecological Politics of Hope”, Marxists should learn to 
accept that religion and spirituality could play a positive role in social 
change, a perception that was to go hand-in-hand with transcending the 
traditional ignorance about ‘primitive’ societies and their forms of 
knowledge (1990: 11). Joel Kovel, who in his work tried to synthesise 
Marxism and psychoanalysis and who reflected on the conditions of human 
subjectivity, reiterated the point when he explained, with a bow towards 
Marx, that the latter indeed had accepted a positive function of spirituality 
(cf. 1994: 33). Kovel suggested that it was “exactly what Marxism needs to 
reclaim itself in its present dark hour” (ibid: 34). Though he admitted that 
spirituality constituted an ambiguous concept that had also played its part in 
Nazism and Soviet gigantism, he maintained that it could have human and 
social significance and provide the base from which to develop ethical 
guidelines: “The issue is not to turn Marxists into meditators. It is rather to 
cultivate a certain needed humility and openness to the wonders of the 
world” (ibid: 40). According to Buhle, Kovel’s work was extremely im-
portant because it drew parallels between Marxist concepts of ‘conscious-
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ness’ and religious concepts of ‘faith’.
9
 Further, Kovel sketched out a 
Marxist understanding of personality formation that relied not only on 
Freud but also on Bachtin. Hence it succeeded in transcending the boundary 
between self and society. The integration of psychological theories was 
necessary, Buhle suggested, in order to come to terms with ‘irrational’ 
developments such as, for example, the recapturing of revolutionary socie-
ties through neo-colonialism (1990: 47).
10
  
The second important set of corrections concerned Marxism’s roots in 
nineteenth century reality and science. Of course no one doubted that im-
portant changes in capitalism had occurred since the early stage of industri-
alism which Marx and his contemporaries had witnessed. Nevertheless, a 
number of features were regarded as important enough to be mentioned in 
the pages of Monthly Review. Editor Sweezy excused Marx’s exaggerated 
optimism with regard to the capacity of the working class’s ability to act 
collectively as stemming from the comparatively low level of social strati-
fication and differentiation in the 19
th
 century (cf. Watanabe & Wakima 
1990: 1-2). The pervasiveness of class antagonisms at the time could also 
explain why other differentiations were neglected. Weston mentioned the 
importance of patriarchy, racism, and condescension in respect to ‘primi-
tive’ societies as expressions of such anachronistic views (cf. 1990: 11). 
Löwy traced such deficiencies back to a positivist scientific model which 
Marxism shared with the mainstream sciences of its time: 
 
As a social scientist Marx did not always transcend the bourgeois/positivist model, 
based on the arbitrary extension to the historical sphere of the epistemological para-
digm of the natural sciences, with its laws, its determinism, its purely objective 
predictions, and linear development – a tendency pushed to its logical conclusions 
by a certain kind of Marxism, from Plekhanov to Louis Althusser. (1991: 38-9) 
 
                                                             
9  Kovel interpreted ‘revolution’ as a desire for transcendence manifested in histo-
ry (cf. Buhle 1990: 50). 
10  Buhle did not make it clear as to which societies he was referring – he did not 
mention the Eastern Bloc (which to describe as neo-colonised would be ques-
tionable). In the America of the early 1990s, Nicaragua might have come to 
mind as a typical example.  
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Amin claimed that Marx managed at least to move beyond traditional eco-
nomics which he described in the following way: “Bourgeois thought is 
founded on the totalitarianism of the economic, expressed every day in 
naïve terms by those who say that ‘the economy forces us to do this’” 
(1993: 51). Still, Marxism was less successful in overcoming other defi-
ciencies of enlightenment thought which had revolted against religion but 
“did not, however, substitute for religion anything very convincing, only an 
insipid behavioralism based on existing social practice” (ibid: 46). As a 
consequence, bourgeois social science and Marxism shared a mechanistic 
view of society. Dialectical materialism, according to Amin a centrepiece 
of what he called “vulgar Marxism”, was a reiteration of bourgeois differ-
entiation of nature, society, and the individual. Hence all societies had 
functioned with some form of alienation –religious, market-oriented, or 
economic. This disaffection had harmed both human emancipation and 
theoretical reflection: “The theories of power and ideology were blocked 
[by ‘vulgar Marxism’; SB] in their development and reduced to the 
pseudotheory of ‘reflection’” (ibid: 52). Under this assumption, human 
emancipation became identical with an increase in production and wealth. 
Thirdly, several contributors demanded a number of concrete changes, 
for example, a transcending of Marxism’s latent Eurocentrism (cf. Boggs 
1990: 14). Guillermo Bowie welcomed West’s intervention as an “in-
digenization of Marxist thought, i.e. as an attempt at applying Marxism to 
North American culture and society where issues of racism, sexism and 
religious faith figure prominently” (1993: 37; see also Vilas 1990: 102; 
Cushman-Wood 1993: 27-30). As early as 1990, Prabhat Patnaik called for 
the revival of one particular strand of Marxist theory and analysis that while 
though earlier had constituted a central element, was at the time was almost 
forgotten: the issue of imperialism. For the author, its disappearance from 
debate was surprising because its importance had never been doubted (cf. 
1990: 1-2). Patnaik was convinced that a modernised theory of imperialism 
could provide insights not only into U.S. interventions in Central America, 
but also into recent changes in Eastern Europe (ibid). He suggested that the 
concept of imperialism could explain why socialism did not develop more 
successfully in the ‘peripheral states’ of capitalism and why Herbert Mar-
cuse and numerous U.S. Marxists had erred when they had put their hopes 
in peripheral challenges to the metropolises (ibid: 1-5). Patnaik was con-
vinced, and quoted Althusser to support his argument, that theoretical con-
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cepts could not be discarded “like old shoes” – they came back and haunted 
you (ibid: 6).
11
 To expect moves towards socialism from the peripheries 
rather than from the centres, posed, of course, a challenge per se to classical 
Marxism. Nevertheless, the analysis of the possibilities of such activities 
became a requirement according to Kovel. He explained once more that 
whereas Marx had anticipated the capitalist economy’s coming to power, 
thinkers now had to deal with the maturation of capitalist society – the 
penetration of capitalist principles and relations into all parts of the globe 
and all areas of life (cf. 1994: 53). To focus on such changes in detail, as 
Jaggar suggested, should become the core task of Marxism in the years to 
come and this embracing of a modest analytical Marxism did not make its 
work less important. It still could fulfil the 
 
urgent political task of developing historically specific accounts of structures such as 
modes of production, state apparatuses and bureaucracies, and socially detailed 
analyses of how such structures shape and are shaped by cultural agents. These 
theoretic analyses will make no pretensions to philosophic necessity; instead, their 
adequacy will be determined experimentally and empirically. They will be fallible 
but still rationally and empirically warranted. (1993: 23) 
 
However, Marxists had to move beyond their traditional concern with ana-
lytical work, as Miliband explained: “But the strength of Marxism has 
never been that it offers ready-made solutions to contradictions which are 
an intrinsic part of real life: it is rather that it highlights these contradictions 
and challenges us to find ways of resolving them, or at least of attenuating 
them” (1991: 25). In this sense, moving beyond analytical work meant 
moving beyond Marxism: although writers did not use the terms of utopia 
and utopistics, their emphasis on values and ethics pointed into exactly this 
direction. Many contributions must be read as appeals to bridge the gap 
between analysis and belief; as claims that linking politics to morality was 
inescapable and that all major works on political theory were at the same 
time works on ethics at the same time (cf. Mészáros 1993: 34). Generally, 
contributors to Monthly Review considered Marxism to be an important 
                                                             
11  Looking back from the early 21
st
 century, this indeed was a prescient statement 
although the debate on ‘new imperialism’ focused more on the post-Cold War 
era. 
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social and political-economic theory – but as one that needed complementa-
tion, especially by timely reflections on ethics. 
 
3.2. The Retrieval of Classics from the Radical and 
Socialist Traditions 
 
Although Marxism was not abandoned in the journals, it was widely ac-
cepted that it needed new inspiration to find meaningful responses to the 
questions posed by the changes of 1989/91. Therefore, many intellectuals 
began to reconsider the contributions of thinkers from a more broadly de-
fined socialist or radical tradition. Among those retrieved were some, such 
as Rosa Luxemburg, who had always been held in high esteem. Yet the list 
also included others who had been harshly criticised in the past, for exam-
ple, Karl Kautsky. One finds interesting differences between the journals in 
terms of the space devoted to these re-readings and in how far they trans-
cended their theoretical core positions. These differences are telling with 
regard to how seriously contributors felt challenged by recent changes but 
also concerning the question as to what they considered to be the most 
urgent renovation work. 
 
New Left Review 
A serious discussion of ‘classics’ took place in the pages of New Left Re-
view. The journal published two complete articles, one by Norman Geras 
and one by Peter Wollen, devoted to re-evaluating the works of Rosa Lux-
emburg and Karl Kautsky. A considerable number of additional names 
were listed and their ideas were more briefly discussed in two other arti-
cles.
12
 Luxemburg had long been treated with great sympathy, because, 
having been one of the most strongly committed Marxists, she had been 
heavily critical about vanguardism and the lack of democracy in the revolu-
tionary Soviet Union. Her perspective, however, included tensions and 
                                                             
12  New Left Review had always been more interested in discussing left social 
theory than Socialist Register. This might explain its more comprehensive cov-
erage in the early 1990s. This contradicted Anderson’s earlier thesis in his Con-
siderations on Western Marxism, that the Western Marxism of the interwar 
years had been formulated in a period of defeat and pessimism and was thus on-
ly of limited value for a renewal of socialist thought (Anderson 1976). 
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ambiguities that were well-known to left intellectuals. Norman Geras, 
probably the British political theorist most familiar with Luxemburg’s 
work, emphasised, just as Daniel Singer, several of these points including 
her conviction that change had to come from below (cf. 1994: 95), her 
“instrumentalist” view of parties, leaders, and parliaments (ibid); and her 
belief that since the shape of socialism was not pre-defined but an “open 
horizon” (ibid: 97) the revolution always had to stop and criticise itself 
(ibid: 96). In terms of the latter, she claimed that in order to do so, a strict 
adherence to formal democratic principles had to be guaranteed: “As in the 
manner so in the product of it, much remains to be determined through the 
experience of the process itself. And this requires that what would today 
generally be called liberal norms of political life must govern that process” 
(ibid). According to Luxemburg’s thinking, emancipation through oppres-
sion of liberties seemed to be a contradiction in terms: “[J]ust because what 
is envisaged is an emancipation, those carrying it through have to be free in 
their constructive enterprise.” (ibid: 100) She spoke of “sacred personal 
opinions”, freedom of the press, the right of assembly and the importance 
of public life – but as Geras pointed out, this was not a “revisionist” posi-
tion. Rather the goal of socialism and communism in the Marxist sense 
remained a “regulative idea”, committing the open and democratic process 
to concrete values and goals (ibid: 98-100). As the most important goals in 
Luxemburg’s work Geras listed working-class liberation, social equality, an 
end to exploitation, communal property, a planned economy and socialist 
democracy (ibid: 100). These were, according to him, “a set of very general 
principles, to be realized in institutional forms that have yet to be worked 
out.” (ibid) 
The most interesting part of Geras’s article on Luxemburg concerned 
the ambivalences in the latter’s work. He conceded that with her famous 
formulation of “socialism or barbarism”, Luxemburg broke with Marxist 
historical and economic determinism. However, Geras criticised the fact 
that she remained entrapped in what could be called a ‘moral determinism’. 
She left no doubt that there was but one outcome of democratic agency – 
socialism – and that Marxism was the system of thought to be employed in 
the emancipatory struggle of the proletariat (ibid: 105). This parochialism 
had consequences for those studying Luxemburg’s work: “While it may not 
strictly gainsay the freedom of the one who thinks differently, it does sug-
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gest there is not much point in thinking too differently” (ibid). Geras in-
stead proposed a more open struggle for emancipation: 
 
How can any outcome be that certain, so much of whose exact shape and content, 
empirical working out, practical trial, variation and negotiation, is still so open? 
Socialists have every reason to hope and strive for the kind of world they do. But to 
count on the certainty of its democratic achievement when there is so much to be 
settled in both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of it, this has been a mistake, not only of 
Marxist thought. Socialism may be a possibility, and that is all. (ibid: 102) 
 
He gave two reasons why he regarded the critical re-reading of Luxemburg 
to be important: firstly, the analysis of the ambivalences in her work sug-
gested that deficiencies existed in Marx’s writings themselves. They could 
not be explained away as distortions for which others, for example Lenin 
and Stalin, had to take responsibility (ibid: 94). Secondly, for reconciling 
socialism’s struggles with democratic procedures, the retrieval of socialist 
classics could provide help, but only up to a certain extent: “This may 
perhaps contribute something to a wider process of democratising socialist 
thought: in the sense here, be it noted, not of rendering democratic what 
was not; but of seeking to make more democratic what has always aspired 
to be so” (ibid: 94-95). For Geras, the lesson to be drawn seemed to be the 
prioritising of democratic principles over the achievement of socialism. 
While socialism was a possibility, democracy was a necessity. However, he 
did not make this point explicitly, perhaps because doing so would have 
made him, according to his own argument, a ‘revisionist’. 
More surprising than expressions of sympathy for Luxemburg was the 
rehabilitation of Kautsky, whom twentieth century leftists – including those 
from the 1968 generation, at least according to Peter Wollen – generally 
had little time for (cf. 1993: 92). Wollen argued that a return to Kautsky 
could be helpful in the climate of ‘post-communism’ since the latter was a 
thinker who had been not only criticised but treated as a traitor by all – 
Eastern Bloc Communists, Trotskyists and Western Marxists (ibid: 86-87). 
He explained that the importance of Kautsky lay in three aspects of his 
work: Kautsky had been convinced of the need to accept formal democratic 
principles, he had developed a theory of ultra-imperialism and he was op-
posed, at least in most of his statements, to any attempts at accelerating 
history. These assumptions amounted to a critique of vanguardism which 
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led Kautsky to condemn what he called the “barbaric road to socialism” in 
the Soviet Union, based on forced labour and super exploitation (ibid): 
According to Wollen, “for Kautsky, this policy flew in the face of reason, 
democratic values, and, most important of all, Marxism. [...] This was 
indeed, in Gramsci’s words, the ‘revolution against Das Kapital’” (ibid: 
87). In the early 1990s, the criticising of the undemocratic turn at the end of 
the Russian revolution was, of course, a position often taken. Interestingly 
however, Wollen linked this critique with a new emphasis on a differently 
understood scientific, deterministic approach: 
 
Now that the collapse of Soviet Communism has changed the situation once again, 
perhaps it is time to reconsider Kautsky and the ‘classical Marxist’ tradition he 
represented. Indeed, perhaps it is time for a more general reappraisal of scientism, 
historicism and economism, the principal evils his work was said to represent. (ibid: 
92) 
 
This scientific approach should not be revived in order to develop a new 
version of a hermetic, determinist teleology, but to identify features that 
were indispensable for a situation in which a transformation towards a 
socialist society would become possible and might actually start. Wollen 
pleaded that academics should take seriously the historical materialist in-
sight that socialism could only be attained once capitalism provided certain 
economic preconditions such as a sufficiently advanced development of 
productive forces, which would allow for the achievement of “full democ-
racy” and the political hegemony of the working class (ibid). With regard to 
internationalism, the author drew parallels between Kautsky’s “ultra-
imperialism” and Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. Both described a 
“long-range system alternation between rivalry and hegemony within capi-
talist world-systems” (ibid: 93). Ultra-imperialism could eventually create a 
situation in which change on a global scale emerged as a realistic option – 
then, and only then, would socialism become possible (ibid). Wollen ar-
gued with Kautsky that Lenin’s strategy had been wrong and that it had 
started a process which reduced Marxism to a self-serving orthodoxy. He 
observed a more recent tendency, represented by Ernest Mandel and 
Fredric Jameson, which again was too ‘optimistic’ in its observations of 
capitalist crisis and retreat (ibid). However, as in the case of Luxemburg, 
Wollen admitted that Kautsky’s approach was also not free of ambivalences 
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and that the clarification of such was an important task for left intellectuals 
in times of post-communism: 
 
At the same time we should also note how Luxemburg, Lenin and Kautsky all fell 
prey, in different ways, to the wish to accelerate history. Socialists should accept 
that it may be better to have a realistic hope, however historically distant, than a 
false hope based on a deformed foreshortening, however immediate and close at 
hand it may seem to be. We should once again give priority to the goal rather than to 
the movement. We must reverse the terms set so disastrously in the Soviet Union, 
where indeed the Communist movement became everything and the goal of social-
ism nothing. (ibid) 
 
Obviously Geras and Wollen (and Luxemburg and Kautsky) agreed on 
some points and disagreed on others. Whereas Geras emphasised agency 
(proceeding towards socialism on a democratic road), Wollen stressed 
structure (the preconditions for a transition to socialism must exist). Both of 
them, however, saw formal democracy as central and, moreover, both re-
frained from giving detailed accounts of the institutional set-up of a social-
ist society which other authors in New Left Review prioritised as the major 
task of the time. 
Additionally, Robin Blackburn who traced back the deficiencies of the 
Soviet Union to certain shades of Marxist theory presented a list of famous 
names and discussed their potential for offering corrections and alternatives 
to Marxism. The core of his article’s critique was directed against the Sovi-
et Union’s interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a bureau-
cratic party dictatorship. Blackburn emphasised that this substitution was 
criticised by Kautsky (who as Lenin’s teacher felt personal responsibility) 
as well as by numerous other individuals and groups from the Mensheviks 
to the Eurocommunists (cf. 1991: 179) as it gave rise to the two main pa-
thologies of the Soviet system: the neglect of political liberties (ibid: 191) 
and the inability to organise a differentiated economy (cf. ibid: 200). 
Blackburn explained that Kautsky had diagnosed the intricate linkage be-
tween these two defects and that the latter had hinted at the incompatibility 
of military-like command structures with a creative workforce (cf. ibid: 
198). Blackburn called for a reconsideration of all those writers and activ-
ists who saw themselves in the Marxist tradition, but who in turn had con-
tradicted the Soviet Union’s claim to represent the only valid version of the 
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Marxist programme, opposed press censorship and arbitrary state power, 
and gave priority to democratic practices – from Kautsky and Trotsky via 
the Austro-Marxists to C.L.R. James. However, Blackburn also went one 
step further. He pointed to alternative sources of socialism from nineteenth 
century utopian novels to anarchists like Bakunin (cf. ibid: 183; 187). Alt-
hough Blackburn suggested listening to such individuals, in many cases he 
remained unconvinced of the alternatives they suggested. For example, 
though he entertained Bakunin’s criticisms that the Bolshevists had too 
narrow a definition of the working class and that the ‘revolutionary state’ 
was in danger of being ruled by a ‘scientific intelligence’, Blackburn re-
mained sceptical both of the anarchist’s alternatives and, furthermore, of all 
suggestions which laboured under the simplification assumption and ex-
pected the withering away of the state and institutional politics (cf. ibid). 
He preferred those approaches which combined decentralised forms of 
democracy with versions of market socialism – a list ranging from Prou-
dhon via Bernstein to political economists like Oskar Lange and Karl Po-
lanyi (cf. ibid: 183; 185; 204-208). 
Giovanni Arrighi also featured Eduard Bernstein when he reflected on 
the making and remaking of the world labour movement since the nine-
teenth century. Arrighi’s article was not primarily concerned with the re-
trieval of certain intellectual traditions, but rather with establishing which 
theories of socialism were most adequate for fundamentally different phas-
es of capitalism. Arrighi suggested understanding Marx and early Marxism 
as children of their time, as belonging to a first phase of industrial capital-
ism, witnessing the apogee of market relations and the bourgeois society. In 
its second phase, beginning in the last decade of the nineteenth century, this 
form of capitalism ran into crisis and was transformed in ways unforeseen 
by Marx and the early Marxists. This stage and the accompanying attempts 
to come to grips with the difficulties of overproduction and social unrest 
changed the role of the state and of formal political democracy. Bernstein, 
according to Arrighi, was one of the first critics to recognise this altered 
structural context. Analysing developments in Britain in the 1890s, Bern-
stein wrote that political democracy had changed from a tool of subordina-
tion of, to a tool of emancipation for, the working class and had increased 
the British working class’s standard of living (cf. 1990: 40). Moving on to a 
third stage of managerial and corporate capitalism, Arrighi maintainted that 
Bernstein’s belief in the possibility of a peaceful move towards a more 
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humane capitalism was validated through the examples of Britain, the Unit-
ed States, Scandinavia and Australia (cf. ibid: 42). Arrighi identified a 
certain strategy of reformist labour struggles that on the one hand became 
possible in this stage and on the other contributed to its dynamic. Accord-
ing to the author, Bernstein was, in other words, among the first to identify 
 
the path […] of energetic and well-organized movements capable of exploiting 
whatever opportunity arose to transform the increasing social power of labour into 
greater economic welfare and better political representation. In this context, the goal 
of socialist revolution never became an issue, and revolutionary vanguards of the 
proletariat found few followers. (ibid) 
 
Arrighi thus underlined the importance of Bernstein’s approach for the 
second and third stages of capitalism and its superiority in comparison to 
those revolutionary Marxist strategies that would have been relevant for the 
first. However, the third stage of capitalism had, since the late 1970s, come 
under threat from the increasing importance of the global market and for-
eign direct investment. Arrighi pointed out that with these changes, and 
with a fourth stage of capitalism which in many respects resembled the 
first, the political strategies suggested by the early Marxists might gain a 
new relevance. The Communist Manifesto’s predictions about the emer-
gence of a world labour movement might become more realistic in the early 
twenty-first century than they had been in the twentieth. Though first and 
foremost an attempt to sketch out likely future developments in class rela-
tions and struggles, at the same time, Arrighi’s article appeared to be a 
warning that late Marxists should neither mistakenly abandon Marxist 
theory at a time when it was likely to become increasingly relevant, nor 
move on to thinkers who were as likely to look as outdated in the fourth 
stage of capitalism as Marx had done in the third. In other words: although 
Bernstein’s observations had been farsighted and remained relevant and 
although Marx’s theories had not anticipated the development of capitalism 
in the twentieth century, this did not make Bernstein necessarily more 
important. Arrighi argued for a synthesising rather than for a polarising 
interpretation of socialist ‘classics’. 
 
  
THE STATE OF THEORY | 179 
 
Socialist Register 
Socialist Register contributed only a few thoughts to the discussions about 
socialist ‘classics’. However, they published two articles from American 
writers, Daniel Singer and Manfred Bienefeld, who did mention Luxem-
burg and Trotsky, albeit only in passing. Singer repeated what he consid-
ered to be Rosa Luxemburg’s most important message: socialism could not 
be implemented from above. This position had consequences not only for 
socialist strategy but also for the contours and details of a future socialist 
society: 
 
Socialism, to echo Rosa Luxemburg, cannot be a Christmas present for those who 
voted well; it is by definition a conquest from below. Hence, it cannot be built 
thanks to a blueprint drawn at the top and imposed from above. The vision of a 
different society must be elaborated collectively and in the open. It must take into 
account the spectacular changes in the capitalist world and answer all the awkward 
questions (e.g. whether the greatly altered working class is still the main agency of 
historical change). (1993: 253) 
 
Singer’s passage must be read as a suggestion to look carefully at what 
political struggles were going on at grassroots level and to collectively 
design the institutional set-up of socialism in the process of building it. 
Singer thus compliments Luxemburg’s sentiments as an important proce-
dural approach to the development of socialism. 
Unlike Luxemburg, Trotsky was criticised in the pages of Socialist Reg-
ister. Bienefeld argued that Trotsky’s ideas of a global political strategy and 
the attempt of setting up a global socialist state were correct analytically 
and in principle. In practice, however, they were useless (1994: 122). This 
statement carries three messages: firstly, to return to Luxemburg, the strug-
gle from below had to be fought on a lower and more accessible level than 
the global. Secondly, the national state still constituted a major political 
frame of reference.
13
 Thirdly the Trotskyists in Britain and North America, 
who saw their analyses vindicated by recent events in the Eastern Bloc, 
could not suggest a realistic way forward. 
                                                             
13  This became one of Socialist Register’s central positions when it involved itself 
in the globalisation debate from 1992 onwards. 
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These two references were all that Socialist Register contributed to de-
bates on classics beyond Marx. This paucity remains surprising, given the 




In Dissent, most articles mentioning classics from the socialist tradition 
focused on issues such as market socialism or associative democracy rather 
than on detailed reconsiderations of individual contributions to socialist 
theory. The one exception, where a complete article honoured a particular 
thinker, was not a comment on, but a reprint of, a reflection written by the 
Italian activist Carlo Rosselli on “Liberal Socialism” in the 1930s. As Na-
dia Urbinati explained in her introduction, Rosselli regarded socialism as a 
moral ideal and free of (Marxist) orthodoxy. He wanted to develop an al-
ternative to determinism and open up space for human agency. He regarded 
liberalism and socialism as having the same roots in the old traditions of 
European political thought and even as being dependent on each other: 
“[A]s Rosselli stressed, socialism needs political and civil liberties; in turn, 
these liberties need a politics of social justice to remain alive” (1994: 115). 
Rosselli formulated a version of liberalism that required socialism for its 
completion: 
 
Liberalism in its most straightforward sense can be defined as the political theory 
that takes the inner freedom of the human spirit as a given and adopts liberty as the 
ultimate goal, but also the ultimate means, the ultimate rule of shared human life. 
The goal is to arrive at a condition of social life in which each individual is certain 
of being able to develop his own personality fully. (1994: 117) 
 
Rosselli considered a liberal socialist to be a believer in the possibility of 
such a society who was nevertheless opposed to dogmatism, and involved 
in grass-roots work rather than in a revolutionary struggle aiming at occu-
pying the commanding heights of the economy. This strategy bore the 
chance of gradually democratising the organisational structure of the state 
and the economy (ibid: 120-123). His reflections paralleled Luxemburg’s 
view that the exact content of socialism would become clear in the process 
of its creation and that therefore self-reflexive moments, and a spirit of self-
critique rather than of dogmatism were essential: 
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In this doubt, in this virile relativism that gives a powerful impulse to action and 
wishes to leave plenty of room for human will in history; in its critical demon that 
obliges one continually to review one’s position in the light of fresh experience; in 
this faith in the supreme values of the spirit and the marvellous animating force of 
liberty, end and means, climate and lever, lies the state of mind of a socialist who 
has sailed away from Marxist seas and touched land on the shores of liberalism. 
(ibid: 123) 
 
Whereas in New Left Review the bureaucratic command structure of the 
Soviet system was criticised for both its violation of human liberties and its 
economic inefficiency, in Dissent the issue of civil liberties was given 
priority. This was because the journal focused more closely on the ‘totali-
tarian’ regimes of the twentieth century. The sympathy for representatives 
of Italian socialism like Rosselli lay in the fact that they had developed 
distinctive features reacting to both Stalinist orthodoxy and fascist dictator-
ship. Or, as Nadia Urbinati put it, some of the Italian thinkers had under-
stood that the defeat of liberalism was also a defeat for socialism (ibid: 
115). As leftwing intellectuals frequently of Jewish backgrounds, contribu-
tors to Dissent took all totalitarian tendencies very seriously and usually 
situated their origin in an uncritical faith in human power. Consequently, as 
Jeffrey C. Isaac explained in his article on “Civil Society and the Spirit of 
Revolt”, Dissenters held those intellectuals who had become careful about 
change induced by human will in high esteem – he listed artists and intel-
lectuals such as Iganzio Silone, Victor Serge, Dwight Macdonald, Simone 
Weil, Albert Camus, George Orwell, and Nicola Chiaromonte (cf. 1993: 
357-359). The message of Isaac’s article echoed Rosselli in stating that 
socialists’ priority should be to involve themselves in grassroots associa-
tions and loose alliances rather than to fight for state power. This negative 
understanding of the state and the belief in the permanent danger of state 
tyranny led to brief statements of sympathy for anarchists and syndicalists 
(cf. ibid: 360), but also for American radicals, such as Tom Paine, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, Eugene V. Debs, and Norman Thomas (cf. Wilentz 1994: 
384-385).
14
 Other writers pleaded for a more positive understanding of the 
                                                             
14  Editor Irving Howe nevertheless explained that he did not see himself as an 
uncritical follower of theories of totalitarianism. He insisted, following David 
Riesman’s critique of Hannah Arendt, that ‘totalitarian’ regimes had very differ-
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state and quoted John Dewey, who in the 1930s had argued similarly to 
Bernstein in the late 19
th
 century, that civil liberties should be appreciated 
as protection by the state rather than against it (Brody 1994: 62). Without 
such a changed perception of the state, David Brody suggested, the civil 
rights revolution of the 1960s would have been impossible (ibid).  
The critique of vanguardism played a central role in Dissent, as did the 
perception – an orthodox historical-materialist one – that the preconditions 
for a transition to socialism had not been present in Russia. However, this 
absence did not mean that the country had never had a chance to develop 
into the direction of a socialist society. Although Howe agreed with Isaac 
Deutscher that Soviet totalitarianism could and would change (cf. 1991: 69-
70), this concurrence did not qualify Deutscher, in Howe’s eyes, as one of 
the classics to whom one should now return. Howe contended that 
Deutscher had been morally wrong in stating that Stalin fulfilled a cruel but 
necessary task and that he was analytically wrong when assuming that a 
well-functioning planned economy would lead to a self-organised liberali-
sation. In fact, Howe found evidence of the contrary: “It now seems quite 
the other way round: that it is the crisis of the economy and the failure to 
provide material well-being that have provoked glasnost and perestroika” 
(ibid: 69). The choice of classics that were worthy of reconsideration was 
similar to the selection in New Left Review. It included Luxemburg and 
Martov (1990a: 184-186) and still paid attention to the ideas of the Trotsky-
ists. Mitchell Cohen wrote an article, “Theories of Stalinism. Revisiting a 
Historical Problem”, where he sketched out how criticism of the Stalinist 
system had developed from Trotsky himself to Milovan Djilas and Max 
Shachtman in the 1950s and how different conceptions emerged as to how 
to best understand the Soviet Union (as a degenerated workers state, as 
neither capitalist nor socialist state, as a state ruled by a new class, as a 
bureaucratic collectivist state, as a state with or without a rationale to its 
policies for the improvement of the living conditions of the proletariat). 
Cohen’s relationship to these thinkers remained ambivalent. Like Howe, he 
seemed convinced of their reflections’ superiority compared to the histori-
cally unspecific accounts of Arendt and, more so, “cold warriors” like J. L. 
Talmon and F. Hayek. He drew no direct line from Lenin to Stalin (1992: 
                                                                                                                          
ent roots, structures and functions. The analytical use of the concept of totalitar-
ianism was thus very limited (cf. 1991: 70). 
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183, 190). However, he complained that even such Trotskyist and post-
Trotskyist thinkers had not been serious enough in considering the particu-
larities of Russian political culture (ibid: 190). 
If classics could to a certain extent be helpful in analysing the failures 
of the Soviet Union, they were less useful in developing ideas for alterna-
tives (beyond liberal socialists’ and existentialists’ commitment to democ-
racy). However, Shlomo Avineri named a number of theorists who had 
developed ideas of a leftwing nationalism – an issue he granted similar 
importance to as had Manfred Bienefeld in Socialist Register. Whereas 
Marxists like Luxemburg and Lenin had an instrumentalist perspective 
towards nationalism, others came forward with more positive views (cf. 
1990: 450). Avineri mentioned Moses Hess, who had described a national 
community as a Hegelian element of mediation and was convinced that 
while a revolution would abolish classes and national conflicts, it would not 
annihilate nations and their identity as the “individuality of a people” (ibid: 
454). The Austro-Marxists provided a further important example with their 
emphasis on the importance of cultural empowerment in a polyglot society 
with a large non-German proletariat (ibid: 455). They imagined internation-
alism not as the opposite of nationalism, but as peaceful coexistence of 
nations in a pluralist structure. Finally, Avineri hinted at a Zionist socialist, 
Chaim Arlosoroff, who had blamed the abstract internationalism of social-
ists as the root of the destructive working-class nationalism that exploded in 
the First World War (ibid: 456). Altogether, Dissent presented a large num-
ber of classical figures from the socialist tradition, with those proposing 
ideas for a liberal socialism seemingly deemed most important. 
 
Monthly Review 
Monthly Review invested more effort in finding alternative sources of so-
cialist imagination than any of the other journals. The value of such sources 
was measured less by the details of the models some of them had developed 
than in the spiritual guidance they could provide. The conviction that the 
spiritual dimension of socialism needed more consideration proved central 
to the journal’s reading of classical thinkers. Contributors looked into three 
different bodies of political thought: into the “left wing” of the English 
revolution of the seventeenth century, represented by Gerrard Winstanley 
and the Diggers and its repercussions in early America (Sweezy 1993: 1), 
into religious thought and into theories developed in the context of the anti-
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colonial struggle. Apart from these strands, contributors also mentioned 
(but more in passing) several of those classics from the Marxist tradition 
that were discussed in the other journals as well – above all, Rosa Luxem-
burg. Löwy echoed the democratic dimension of Luxemburg’s thought 
when explaining that the latter had criticised the abolition of free elections 
in the Soviet Union as early as 1918 (cf. 1991: 33). Singer emphasised 
another element in Luxemburg’s thought: she believed that the socialist 
revolution – better understood as a transformation – would be a protracted 
global process with periods of advance but also of retreat during which 
sticking to socialist principles and setting personal examples was all the 
more important (cf. 1990: 73). As in the other journals, a list of further 
illustrious names of early critics of the Soviet union was presented to the 
readers. It included Leon Trotsky, Christian Rakovsky, Isaac Deutscher, 
Abraham Leon, Heinrich Brandler, Willi Münzenberg, Victor Serge, and 
André Breton (cf. Löwy 1991: 34). Trotsky, unsurprisingly, played a rather 
ambivalent role and was severely criticised in the journal’s pages. Kovel 
explained that Trotsky shared with other Bolsheviks a Nietzschean super-
humanism which travestied Marxist humanism and overestimated humans’ 
capacity to change the shape of the world and of their own nature and char-
acter: “For Trotsky’s spiritual grandiosity contains within itself the failure 
of Bolshevism to achieve socialism. Its impulse towards gigantism and 
hardness is paired with an indifference to the individual.” (1994: 37) Hence 
Kovel expressed scepticism that those horrors associated with Stalin would 
have been avoided had Trotsky come to power in the U.S.S.R. Amin also 
included Trotsky in a genealogy of “vulgar Marxism” which, he insisted, 
had not begun with Stalinism but in late-19
th
 century Germany. Amin re-
ferred to a Marxism that had substituted historical necessities for ethical 
imperatives – a tendency he also diagnosed in Leninism and (though to a 
lesser degree) Maoism (cf. 1993: 52). 
More interesting than these considerations, which evidently mirrored 
Monthly Review’s customary anti-Trotskyite perspective, were those that 
moved farther beyond the Marxist tradition. Suggestions peddled in the 
journal ranged from the communality and spirituality located in the tradi-
tional life of Native Americans to the moral foundations of existentialism. 
In an interview, the British musician and protest singer Billy Bragg went 
furthest in depicting socialism as a collective moral spirit whose embodi-
ment could be found in the past rather than in the future. Though he did 
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certainly not represent Monthly Review’s mainstream opinion, his reflec-
tions were nevertheless published in its pages: 
 
[T]he ideals of what socialism is about, the call of socialist feelings and humanitari-
an hopes which existed long before Marx, as far as I am concerned, are still valid. 
We need to trace back before Prague ’68, before Hungary ’56, before Stalin, before 
the Russian Revolution, before Marx, before the whole industrial revolution, to look 
at the collective societies which existed then. Take the Native Americans. They 
know how to deal with the environment and the relationship of the individual to 
one’s surroundings. We’ve lost that because capitalism demands individualistic 
materialism. (Batstone 1991: 23-24) 
 
Whereas this statement stresses communality and collectiveness as central 
elements of socialism, Istvan Mészáros, quite to the contrary, emphasised 
its often neglected individual dimension. For him, socialism became possi-
ble only after a conscious personal decision against capitalism. Jean-Paul 
Sartre was the thinker who pointed this out most markedly: 
 
Sartre was a man who always preached the diametrical opposite [of the idea that 
“there is no alternative”; SB]: there is an alternative, there must be an alternative; 
you as an individual have to rebel against this power, this monstrous power of capi-
tal. Marxists on the whole failed to voice that side. (Monthly Review 1993: 10) 
 
These two poles became equally important for Monthly Review contribu-
tors’ quest for ideas – they tried to link personal responsibility for pursuing 
socialism with a common spirit in which to do so. The effort to establish 
such a link explains the selection of the further sources discussed in the 
journal’s pages. Early Anglo-American radicalism provided inspiration. 
Notably the Levellers and Diggers were applauded for their “advanced 
ideas of egalitarianism” but they were complemented by specifically Amer-
ican fighters, for example, the “Regulators”, who were recruited from the 
‘lower orders’ and struggled against the landed aristocracy in North Caroli-
na (cf. Magdoff 1991: 3). Even the ‘Great Awakening’ of the 1760s was 
interpreted as a radical political movement and the authors explained that 
the American revolution was not only an anti-colonial uprising, but also a 
struggle over more radical or more restricted versions of democracy. Unfor-
tunately, those forces who argued in the Federalist Papers against ‘exces-
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sive’ democracy and for a retreat from the egalitarianism that had charac-
terised some of the states in the years directly before the foundation of the 
United States proved stronger than the anti-property wing (ibid: 3-4). The 
U.S. constitution, thus, was a document of defeat as much as an achieve-
ment. Bragg also mentioned the Diggers of the seventeenth century and 
characterised them as the first liberation theologians. Further, he pointed 
out that the antagonism of religion and social liberation was a feature spe-
cific to European history. Religion itself, however, did clearly have social-
ist implications (cf. Batstone 1991: 26). This argument built a bridge to-
wards the second and the third strand of political thought – religion and 
national liberation.  
The treatment of religion was surprisingly prominent in the journal’s 
pages: it went back to the classical figures of Buddha and Jesus but also 
took notice of the social gospel theologian Rauschenbusch and his impact 
on Martin Luther King. In the case of Buddha, Kovel explained the human 
and social significance of mysticism: “Recall that Buddha’s meditative 
insights into the illusory nature of the self led him to call for the care of all 
suffering creatures” (Kovel 1994: 39). John Brentlinger constructed a sur-
prising alliance of Jesus and Che Guevara, interpreting them both as exam-
ples of revolutionary Christianity, which consisted of the feeling of love 
and responsibility for other people and nature, and presented the Nicaragu-
an case as an example where spirituality had been integrated into the revo-
lutionary struggle (cf. 1992: 28-34): 
 
The revolutionary Christian speaks of following Jesus, of putting love into practice 
by building community. It is because of the commitment to practice that the revolu-
tionary Christian is revolutionary, and confronts the necessity for ridding the world 
of capitalism and building socialism. (ibid: 35) 
 
Guillermo Bowie also mentioned the religious aspect of Guevara’s struggle 
and drew parallels to Martin Luther King: both men were concerned with 
the possibilities of making ethical decisions in the face of, and perhaps 
against, European modes of cultural and economic domination (cf. 1993: 
41): “This moral imperative, rather than the cold, detached, manipulative 
ethic of the European capitalist, was the guiding principle of Guevara’s 
praxis. In this respect he was at one with Martin Luther King” (ibid: 39). 
However, this spiritual commitment was not all; at least some writers 
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warned against blurring all boundaries between different anti-oppressive 
projects. Interestingly, it was a theologian, Darren Cushman-Wood, who 
insisted on bearing in mind these differences. In an article on the economic 
thinking of King and Malcolm X, he clearly hinted at points where they 
parted company with Marxist approaches. Although Malcolm X adopted 
some Marxist ideas, for example, when he regarded black people as the 
reserve army of labour needed in capitalist relations of production, he still 
considered the class conflict as subordinated to the “race” conflict (1993: 
30). And Martin Luther King remained within a reformist Keynesian 
framework in his suggestions on the redistribution of wealth (ibid: 33). 
It is a bit surprising that a journal as strongly committed to internation-
alism as Monthly Review did not come forward with more classical figures 
from the anti-colonial movements. Comments remained largely limited to 
the frequently mentioned examples of revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba 
and to Che Guevara. Yet one article introduced another thinker – Amilcar 
Cabral. Cabral insisted on the importance, under conditions of imperialism, 
of national liberation struggles and emphasised the need to form an alliance 
between workers and peasants on the one hand and petty bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals on the other. Only the awareness of a national interest would 
allow the “class suicide” of the more privileged sections – the subordina-
tion of their selfish material interests to the interests of the whole society 
and the integration in a “nation class” (Meisenhelder 1993: 41-46). Finally, 
Cabral, like many others, emphasised that after successful liberation an 
institutional set-up was needed that prevented people from achieving per-
manent positions of power (ibid: 47). 
 
3.3. Marxism and Radicalism 
 
The reflections on Marxism and on classics from the socialist and radical 
traditions show that Marxism was far from dead for most socialist intellec-
tuals. Most agreed, however, that it was seriously harmed even if only a 
small number of them were convinced that Marxism had to accept respon-
sibility for the realities as they had existed in the Eastern Bloc. Some au-
thors even suggested that the recent changes in the (former) state socialist 
countries vindicated core elements of Marxist theory, though they had their 
doubts that even these affirmations would help Marxism in the future. 
While all intellectuals accepted that Marxism had been ‘cut to size’, they 
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disagreed as to ‘what size’ this was. Dissenters, looking back over a long 
history of criticising at least certain strands of and elements in Marxism, 
wanted to retain only the ‘other Marx’: particularly the ‘early Marx’ who 
stressed human agency and fit into a category usually described as ‘socialist 
humanism’. In New Left Review, for many writers the main function of 
Marxism was reduced to its critical and analytical dimension – either as a 
‘spirit of critique’, resembling a vague and general perspective, or a system 
of critique, posing questions about the bases of a critical social theory and 
methodology. Socialist Register and Monthly Review as well as some con-
tributions to New Left Review pushed for a more prominent role for Marx-
ism. For them it came far closer to a holistic edifice of thought, even if one 
with overt gaps and covert mistakes. 
All journals agreed on a number of achievements which they considered 
to be Marxism’s most important: The concept of class, the historical-
materialist method (understood flexibly as an illuminator of influences and 
tendencies rather than as a tool to dogmatically identify historical laws) and 
the notion of reification (which linked the material with the psychological 
world) were highly esteemed. On the other hand, most writers were willing 
to at least partially excuse Marxism’s deficiencies on the basis of Marx’s 
and Engels’s historicity as nineteenth-century thinkers: historical context, 
authors conceded, explained the failings of Marxism’s utopian vision (with 
regard to the details of a socialist society), its ‘simplification assumption’, 
determinism and its neglect of questions of ethics and justice. Nevertheless, 
these were serious defects which had to be corrected. Further issues, such 
as ecological considerations, constituted gaps which could be filled by 
applying elements of the Marxist methodology itself. At the bottom line, 
what remained of Marxism as political project was the central role of class 
struggle, albeit in a radically re-conceptualised form.  
In their attempts to re-conceptualise problematic elements of Marxist 
and other theories, contributors looked to various ‘classics’ from the left 
tradition. It is here, in each group’s canonical preferences, that one first 
finds differences between the British and the American journals. Although 
all of the journals investigated the writings of several ‘classical’ figures in 
order to find inspiration for the conduct of grassroots bottom-up struggles, 
the Americans’ choices were dramatically more eclectic. Presenting figures 
ranging from Italian liberal socialists to Jewish socialist Zionists and from 
the Diggers to Jesus, the American writers claimed adherence to a radical 
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rather than a Marxist-socialist tradition. The British lists were much shorter, 
although they also included surprises such as writers of nineteenth-century 
utopian socialist novels or Kautsky. One could conclude here that these 
differences testify to Therborn’s thesis: the two groups could be character-
ised by their differing political routes in the twentieth century, where Euro-
pean movements were more ideologically-driven while those in North 
American were more socially motivated.
15
 In Monthly Review one finds 
another element often identified as central to American political culture: a 
commitment to ‘community’ which formed a constant compliment to the 
journal’s insistence on the necessity of fighting the class struggle. For Dis-
senters the question of whether Marxism and classics of socialism provided 
openings for totalitarianism played a prominent role, pointing to the im-
portance of the twentieth-century European Jewish experience for the New 
York intellectual scene in which the journal had its roots. Surprisingly little 
attention was paid to the experience of third-world classical theorists. 
While a few names were mentioned in passing – such as C. L. R. James and 
Ernesto Che Guevara – only Amilcar Cabral was addressed in a complete 
article. Neither the struggle against British imperialism nor the opposition 
to U.S. dominance in Latin America seems to have provided inspiration for 
intellectuals in Britain or the United States. Regardless of their judgement 
on the future status of Marxism, their search for alternative approaches 
remained predominantly restricted to heterodox European and North Amer-
ican political traditions. 
                                                             
15  For Therborn’s argument, see p. 32, footnote 9. 
 
 
4. OUT OF THE IMPASSE: THE SEARCH FOR MODELS 
 
With universal agreement that socialism would not fall into place overnight 
but had to be developed through well-designed institutions, radical intellec-
tuals saw a need to move beyond a mere critique of capitalism. They had to 
answer the question of how a socialist society and a socialist world would 
like. On the one hand, this task required an engagement with ‘utopistics’. 
On the other, it could analyse existing models and institutional arrange-
ments. All the journals took both of these routes. 
 
4.1. Dimensions of Democratic Socialism 
 
The previous chapter has shown that radical intellectuals criticised Marx-
ism for its lack of imagination of the shape of a socialist society and for its 
disregard of democratic procedures. Thus it became an important task to 
think about the structures of a socialist society and the institutions of a 
democratic socialist political system. This involved the discussion of four 
questions: (a.) what would be the most important principles on which to 
build the edifice of democratic socialism? (b.) What institutional forms 
were required to make it work – did models of such institutions exist? In 
how far would they differ from the institutions of liberal or – as most au-
thors would say – capitalist democracy? (c.) Which preconditions had to be 
met in order to make democratic socialism a realistic option – for example, 
with regard to the distribution of power in society? Would international 
power constellations allow societies to move towards democratic social-
ism? What were, overall, the chances for realising such a project? (d.) Fi-
nally, what dilemmas would people committed to the building of democrat-
ic socialism face? How, for example, should they deal with likely opposi-
tion to their project?  
 
New Left Review 
New Left Review dedicated a great deal of space and energy to new reflec-
tions on the basics and chances of democratic socialism. A number of well-
known writers as diverse as André Gorz, Jürgen Habermas, Ralph 
Miliband, and Kate Soper contributed to this discussion – which they obvi-
ously considered crucial at this historical moment. However, from the 
members of the journal’s editorial board there were, apart from Robin 
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Blackburn’s far-reaching article “Socialism after the Crash” (1991), only 
contributions by Fred Halliday (rather in passing) and Norman Geras. Most 
of these thoughts, formulated as either complete articles on the issue or as 
fragmentary sections and reflections within essays on other topics, were 
concerned with defining the basic values, principles, goals and priorities of 
democratic socialism or with institutional structures required to organise 
and sustain it. 
 
Principles and Core Elements of Democratic Socialism 
Authors introduced a number of definitions of socialism and democratic 
socialism. According to Therborn, the most important core values of a 
socialist culture were universal equality and solidarity (cf. 1992: 32): “In a 
nutshell, socialism is about the availability and the distribution of material 
resources; about understanding, explaining and changing them by way of a 
new mode of production and/or of distribution” (ibid: 25). This was a very 
general definition which left open whether this egalitarianism moderately 
meant a more egalitarian society or more radically one in which all inequal-
ities had been dissolved (ibid: 63). Some authors, such as G. A. Cohen, 
strongly argued for a radical egalitarianism where “the amount of amenity 
and burden in one person’s life should be roughly comparable to that in any 
other’s” (1994: 11). He made this point with reference to a non-Marxist 
authority: 
 
And whereas rewarding productivity which is due to greater inherent talent is indeed 
morally intelligible, from certain ethical standpoints, it is nevertheless a profoundly 
anti-socialist idea, correctly stigmatized by J. S. Mill as an instance of ‘giving to 
those who have’, since greater talent is itself a piece of fortune that calls for no 
further reward. (ibid: 13) 
 
Eric Olin Wright, disagreed and explained through the example of class 
differences, that classlessness served as a utopian vision but in practice the 
reduction of “classness” functioned as the “operative norm” (1993: 25). 
Democratic socialism would become a rolling process, a move towards a 
utopian, egalitarian vision. While no unanimity existed about the extent of 
material equality, it remained similarly open as to within which framework 
it should be achieved. For Wallerstein, there was no doubt that relative 
equality had to be achieved on a global level because “[w]e can contribute 
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nothing to a desirable resolution of this terminal crisis of our world-system 
unless we make it very clear that only a relatively egalitarian, fully demo-
cratic system is desirable” (1994: 16). This perspective, of course, called 
for reflections on the problem of a standard of living that could be repro-
duced on a global scale. Kate Soper tried to find solutions to this issue. She 
argued that if one took Wallerstein’s goal of relative global equality seri-
ously, one had to distinguish between basic human needs (she listed nutri-
tional food, clean water, protective housing, non-hazardous work and phys-
ical environments, appropriate health care, security in childhood, signifi-
cant primary relationships, physical security, economic security, appropri-
ate education, safe birth-control and child-bearing) which had to be made 
available for everyone and human wants which must be questioned (cf. 
1993: 121). Hence, she called for a new “erotics of consumption” and ex-
plained: “In this sense, being realist about needs may require us to be utopi-
an about wants, and the political force of any theory of basic needs prove 
dependant on the imagining of a new hedonist vision” (ibid: 127-8). She 
based a socialist environmentalism on these theses, which differed from 
some strands of deep ecologism in so far as it did not demand a radical 
reduction of consumption from everyone but tried to strike a balance be-
tween satisfying the basic needs of the poorest, worst-off sections of global 
society and a less destructive relationship to nature. 
Miliband agreed that material equality constituted a necessary precondi-
tion for democratic socialism. Nevertheless, he pointed out that liberation 
had to go beyond the redistribution of material resources (cf. 1994: 13). 
Like him, writers unanimously subscribed to the claim that socialism de-
pended on democracy. However, at the same time it stood that democracy 
needed a redistribution of power and at least relative equality in order to 
attain real meaning – if it was understood as “egalitarian” rather than as 
“hierarchical” democracy (Honderich 1994: 62). While some contributors 
were convinced that democracy understood along democratic socialist lines 
had been a central element in all ‘schools’ of socialism and that all attempts 
at accelerating movements towards socialism had constituted perversions of 
its theory (cf. Miliband 1992: 112), others urged socialists to become more 
precise in their own understanding of democracy – for example, on “rela-
tions between state and nation, man and citizen, the private and the public, 
and so forth” (cf. Derrida 1994: 50). Habermas, on the other hand, argued 
that a radical conception of democracy was all that was left of socialism (cf. 
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Habermas & Michnik 1994: 11). For most authors, the concept of democra-
cy was not restricted to the political sphere but extended to democratic 
decision making in other parts of societal life, especially in the economy. 
Authors disagreed on the more concrete forms that this extension could 
take; Honderich, for example, remained sceptical of Miliband’s and Robert 
Dahl’s propagation of workers control. In any case, Miliband argued, so-
cialism gave fullest meaning to democracy (cf. 1994: 3), while socialists’ 
relationships with existing forms of capitalist democracy remained complex 
and instrumental. Finally, the environmental dimension was especially 
mentioned in numerous contributions. Some authors seemed to feel (but 
only rarely addressed) a possible tension between socialist and environmen-
talist goals. However, André Gorz explicitly dealt with this problem when 
demanding the redistribution of labour not only to save time for socially 
purposeful activity beyond work but also to reduce the economic activity’s 
destructive consequences for the natural world. He described “eco-
compatible industrial civilization” as a social project that had to be 
achieved democratically through self-limitation (1993: 64).  
The commitment to public ownership remained, perhaps most strongly, 
from classical socialist thinking within a democratic-socialist perspective. 
This did not require the socialisation of every business and all economic 
activity (and not necessarily the complete abolition of market mechanisms), 
but certainly of a part large enough to become the dominant form of owner-
ship – a project that went beyond the mixed economies during the golden 
age of social democracy and models such as Sweden. Yet differences were 
not just about the degree of public ownership; the authors were at pains to 
point out that public ownership was about collective social ownership rather 
than about the state as the institution to monopolise economic decision 
making. They agreed that public ownership was no panacea but was, never-
theless, to be preferred over a private system and above all to be controlled 
by democratic decision making. Miliband pointed to its superiority: 
“[E]xploitation under public ownership is a deformation, for a system based 
on public ownership does not rest on and require exploitation; under condi-
tions of democratic control, it provides the basis for the free and coopera-
tive association of the producers” (1992: 110). For him, public ownership 
was an indispensable part of socialism because: 
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[C]apitalist democracy […] may not seriously challenge the power, property, privi-
leges and position of the people at the top of the social pyramid – more specifically, 
the holders of corporate power on the one hand and of state power on the other, 
linked as they are in a difficult but very real partnership. (ibid) 
 
In short, without the abandonment of privilege linked with large-scale 
private ownership, there was no chance of creating a democratic-socialist 
society.  
Since the writers in New Left Review expected a long and complicated 
process of transformation towards a socialist society, its exact shape and its 
most important values could not be determined in detail, but only generally 
from the present. Socialism, according to Habermas, was only available in 
the form of an “abstract idea” – but in connection with radical democracy it 
would be approximated in a rational, non-exclusive discourse which could 
find solutions to global problems in everyone’s interest (cf. 1990: 15-6). 
There was a parallel in the writings of Miliband who believed in the possi-
bility of a 
 
civic virtue, according to which men and women would freely accept the obligations 
of citizenship as well as claiming its rights; and they would find no great difficulty 
in the cultivation of a socialized individualism in which the expression of their 
individuality would be combined with a due regard for the constraints imposed upon 
it by life in a society. (1994: 4) 
 
Socialism remained as something like an ‘open horizon’ – a guiding moral 
principle acting as a compass in order to solve the problems of the present. 
The route taken (to follow the direction defined by the compass), however, 
had to be strictly governed by “liberal norms of political life” (Geras 1994: 
98). 
 
Reflections on Institutional Arrangements 
The institutional set-up of a democratic-socialist society was also a widely-
discussed topic. There seemed to be two basic assumptions: one rather in 
line with traditional Marxist thinking, the other at variance with it. As al-
ready mentioned, contributors were still convinced that planning was nec-
essary within a socialist economy. New, however, was their belief that 
some kind of state would remain indispensable for the foreseeable future 
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because the introduction of socialism was now defined as a never-ending 
process rather than a sudden qualitative leap to a new stage (cf. Miliband 
1992: 113). Rather than holding on to the ‘simplification assumption’, 
writers started thinking about the constitutional and institutional set-up of a 
democratic socialist state, or for a democratic state that would move to-
wards socialism – a state characterised by great complexity: 
 
Simple-minded socialism, or a socialism adapted to simple conditions, has imagined 
that the logic of social choice can be just as intelligible and definite as an individu-
al’s decision to slake their thirst by drinking a glass of water. But without at all 
abandoning socialism it is quite possible to recognize that social need and public 
good have to be arrived at by complex, tentative and negotiated ways – indeed this 
could be seen as the very essence of genuine socialism. (Blackburn 1991: 208) 
 
Without planning of economic activity, the principal goals of socialist 
change – reduced inequality and an environmentally less-damaging mode 
of production – had no chance of being achieved. This planning, however, 
should not take the form of centralised, bureaucratic state guidance but of 
democratic, grassroots, rational decision making. Blackburn described the 
task in the following words: 
 
The harsh contrast of wealth and poverty in the modern world – and the spectre of 
ecological catastrophe – demand global and regional planning but they also require a 
framework of economic cooperation which encourages responsible initiative and 
innovation in a myriad of citizens. (ibid: 233) 
 
His solution required the ability of people to communicate “rationally and 
effectively” and thus reasserted Habermas’s ideas of the ethics of commu-
nication (1990: 15). Whereas Habermas, in keeping with his model of 
communicative action, believed in the theoretical possibility of arriving at 
solutions in everyone’s interest (though he did not dare to predict whether 
economic and state apparatuses could be transformed to work on the base 
of rational discourse [ibid: 16]), Miliband was less optimistic and assumed 
that conflicts and tensions would persist (cf. 1992: 113; 1994: 12). With 
several authors, Wright suggested that the implementation of a basic in-
come would at least partly weaken the “coercive character of capitalism”, 
“deproletarianize” working-class people, (1993: 26). This would enable 
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them to take decisions on ethical rather than material considerations. Most 
forcefully, the link of social income, social citizenship and communication-
based democratic socialism was argued by David Purdy in his article, “Citi-
zenship, Basic Income and the State”: 
 
More generally, if the ethos of social citizenship takes hold, people may be less 
inclined to take a narrow, sectional view of their interests and more receptive to the 
claims of wider moral communities, including those of their fellow citizens, humani-
ty as a whole or, for that matter, of other sentient species and our common planetary 
home. (1994: 42) 
 
André Gorz also considered basic income as a chance to combine less work 
and consumption with more autonomy and existential security and thus as a 
chance to transcend the profit-based economic rationality of capitalism (cf. 
1993: 65). Ideas on the exact shape of decision-making institutions re-
mained limited to hints at workplace and community democracy. Writers 
obviously agreed with Habermas that the concrete set-up had to be estab-
lished in practice on a trial-and-error basis (cf. 1990: 16). 
Regardless of its final shape, none of the suggested measures would 
make the state in a democratic socialist society obsolete: “The power of the 
state in such a society would be variously constrained; but [...] the notion 
that state power, and therefore state coercion, would no longer have a sub-
stantial place in the conduct of affairs belongs to the realm of fantasy, at 
least for the relevant future” (Miliband 1994: 7-8). Miliband envisaged a 
structure in which a strong state, a vivid civil society, and democratic prac-
tices controlled and checked each other. Thus the rule of law, the separation 
of powers, civil liberties, and political pluralism would stay in place, but a 
democratic socialist civil society “would give them much more effective 
meaning” (1992: 113). Blackburn also pointed out that formal structures 
were needed since it was unrealistic to expect the emergence of a trans-
personal socialist mind. Socialist change would develop as result of meet-
ings of minds – and these had to be organised and formalised (cf. 1991: 
208). Just one of the writers thought – given that there was no automatic 
historical move towards socialism – about how to deal with potential deci-
sions to instead turn round and move away from the socialist course: Ted 
Honderich explained that a normative commitment to socialism (or to in-
creasing equality and environmental sustainability) had to be constitutional-
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ly codified in a manner similar to civil rights in what he called “hierarchic 
democracies” (1994: 63). In this sense, socialist democracy meant both the 
institutional extension and transcendence of capitalist democracy (cf. 
Miliband 1994: 13). 
Apart from these widely-shared beliefs, one could find reflections on 
particular institutional tasks. Prominent among these was Immanuel Wal-
lerstein’s insistence on devising mechanisms to organise the redistribution 
of wealth on a global scale. He suggested a process of “rational reconstruc-
tion” that reversed the global North’s appropriation of the surplus produced 
in the South. Rather than being regarded as “remedial charity”, such a 
mechanism was central to the whole project of global democratic socialism 
(1994: 17). Another author highlighted the educational aspect of democratic 
socialism. Hinting at the observation that the societies coming closest to its 
principles were the best educated ones, Paul Auerbach called for a radical 
reconstruction of elitist and class-selective education systems where the 
reproduction of hierarchies should be replaced by genuine equality and by 
spending more resources on poorer and weaker pupils (cf. 1992: 31). Final-
ly, one contribution argued for considerably less radical measures with 
regard to economic and social policy than suggested by other authors. 
Mouzelis, in strongly criticising Therborn’s reflections on “The Life and 
Times of Socialism” (1992), pleaded with intellectuals to refrain from 
anything more than an indirect control of the economy and targeted social 
benefits. Accompanied by the suggestion to expand democracy downward 
and gradually to the workplace, neighbourhood and local community, this 
view seemed to take on board some communitarian themes of the time (cf. 
Mouzelis 1993: 184). 
Auerbach’s reflections on education point to Scandinavia as an entity 
from which democratic socialists could draw lessons. However, whereas it 
could probably serve as a model for relative educational and material equal-
ity, it could hardly demonstrate democratically organised economic plan-
ning or a state checked by a strong civil society. For these elements, authors 
had to look elsewhere and did not find very much. Blackburn suggested 
reconsidering the merits and historical experiences of syndicalism as mod-
els for planning (cf. 1991: 207). Auerbach hinted not only to Scandinavia’s 
but also to Japan’s capitalism because he saw also the latter as based on 
cooperation and group-loyalty (cf. 1992: 13). David Marquand, in writing 
in his capacity as a specialist on the EC/EU, suggested that the left should 
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develop a new version of the early post-war European federalism based on 
the idea of subsidiarity (cf. 1994: 25). Generally, he seemed convinced that 
lessons could be drawn from stabilising economies and societies in difficult 
situations. Hence he also hinted at the example of the early developing 
United States and its forms of democratic decision-making (ibid: 26). 
 
Requirements 
With the abandoning of teleological determinism, the question of precondi-
tions for, and chances of, moves towards democratic socialism became 
urgent. The probably most fundamental precondition was expressed by 
Miliband: socialists needed to believe in the capacity of humans to act in 
unselfish ways (cf. 1994: 5-6). Without this belief, all ideas about the most 
important principles and the most suitable institutional set-up were moot. 
However, it was exactly this perception of humans’ sense of collective 
responsibility that seemed questionable – more than ever in the face of the 
capitalist restoration in the Eastern European states. Cohen thus pointed to 
studies which emphasised that even among the managerial classes in capi-
talism, there were many people who aimed at the maximisation of cash 
results, but who did so out of a desire to make positive contributions to the 
society to which they belonged, rather than for selfish reasons (cf. 1991: 
19). Auerbach took insights from management studies a step further: “The 
question naturally arises in the minds of socialists: if group loyalty and 
cooperation are important components of economic efficaciousness at the 
level of production, will this not be true a fortiori for society at large?” 
(1992: 13). Democratic socialism required attempts at changing society’s 
superstructure, for example, its political culture and political ideas, its ra-
tionalities. While Gorz argued that only a new rationality (able to recognise 
alienation and what was called ‘externalities’) could establish a new eco-
nomic order, Wallerstein urged a rationality that was capable of overcom-
ing the Eurocentrism on which it was based for the last 200 years (cf. Wal-
lerstein 1994: 16-17). Paul Auerbach added that only a highly educated 
population would be able to survive: “We also need an educated population 
because the world that population inherits will be an extremely dangerous 
one. The only hope for survival is that some sober, rational thinking will 
keep the race afloat a little while longer. It won’t happen by luck” (1992: 
33). 
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Apart from these reflections on general preconditions, there were other 
deliberations  that were more concrete: Halliday pointed out that the chanc-
es of socialism in the West depended to a high degree on the willingness of 
the parties of the Western left (in fact, he meant the former Communist 
Parties) to criticise capitalism again (cf. 1990: 20). This leads on to the 
question whether there was a realistic chance for a democratic socialism to 
be implemented. Two positions existed in the pages of New Left Review, 
which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first was expressed by 
Geras when he explained the openness of future developments in the fol-
lowing way: 
 
But socialism now, it must clearly also be acknowledged, is utopian socialism – in 
the way Marxists used to mean that. It is a moral ideal; a protest; the refusal to take 
for acceptable, much less for the best, what is today triumphantly commended as 
being that. And no one presently knows how, or even if, socialism will be achieved. 
(Geras 1992: 69) 
 
The second opinion was, for example, put forward by Hobsbawm who 
formulated, also in the footsteps of Rosa Luxemburg and implicitly echoing 
her socialism-or-barbarism dictum, that there was no alternative: 
 
[S]ocialists do not, and cannot, accept Adam Smith’s view that the pursuit of self-
interest by every person will produce socially optimal results, even when they accept 
that it may maximize the material wealth of nations – which it only does in specific 
circumstances. They cannot believe that social justice can be achieved simply by the 
operations of capital accumulation and the market, and they agree with Vilfredo 
Pareto that a society which had no specific place for social justice and morality 
cannot survive. (1992: 62) 
 
This reversal of the Thatcherite slogan ‘there is no alternative’ (because 
without moves towards socialism, destruction on a global scale would 
become inevitable) was often reiterated in the magazine’s pages and it was 
explained above all via the dire conditions in the global South and ever-
increasing environmental problems everywhere. The chances for survival 
depended to a high degree on the flexibility and creativity of people who in 
changing alliances worked for progressive change (cf. Wallerstein 1994: 
17). 
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Questions and Dilemmas 
In the end, a number of questions remained open in the pages of New Left 
Review. These were posed by single contributors, but most of the time not 
taken up by the others. Consequently, a real debate on these issues did not 
develop. However, they are still worth considering because they reveal 
dilemmas and a sense of helplessness. The first of these problems was 
formulated by Honderich. Agreeing with other contributors that vanguardist 
and dictatorial routes to democratic socialism were undesirable, he re-
mained at the same time convinced that a peaceful transformation from 
“hierarchic democracy” to “egalitarian democracy” was impossible (1994: 
65). Socialists faced a dilemma because such change would inevitably lead 
to civil war and thus worsen the life situation of those at the lower end of 
the social hierarchy, thereby harming the very people whose situation’s 
improvement was the socialists’ original political goal (cf. ibid: 66). Yet 
even if such a society could, in fact, be established, problems would con-
tinue: 
 
It remains a fact that for a society to persist in Egalitarian democracy is for it to be in 
a way of existing that requires defence against determined adversaries within and 
without. There is the possibility, then, that the Principle of Equality will not justify 
the continued defence of an Existing Egalitarian Democracy. (ibid) 
 
Perhaps this problem seemed less insurmountable for all those who be-
lieved in the possibility of human beings to decide rationally and beyond 
their narrow self-interests. However, not even Miliband, who certainly was 
convinced that they could, would completely rule out the necessity of vio-
lent and authoritarian self-defence (cf. 1994: 10-11). Finally, some contrib-
utors raised the question as to whether progressive and emancipatory strug-
gles should still be fought in the name of socialism. Blackburn, for in-
stance, seemed to have doubts: “The future belongs to a diversified social-
ism, a ‘socialism without guarantees’, or even to some new concept more 
adequately embodying the goals of the left and the creative impulses of 
anti-capitalist movements” (1991: 239). Blackburn was seconded by Co-
hen: “The socialist aspiration was to extend community to the whole of our 
economic life. We now know that we do not know how to do that, and 
many think that we now know that it is impossible to do that” (1994: 11). 
Obviously, contributors to New Left Review still had to come to terms with 
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the question whether the future belonged to a struggle for democratic so-




New considerations of the meaning and the shape of democratic socialism 
played an important role during the early 1990s in Socialist Register as 
well. According to the editors, the rethinking of these topics was made 
necessary by not so much the collapse of the Eastern European regimes, as 
by the perception, shared also among intellectuals, that Western socialists 
had backed and defended their practices. As Miliband and Panitch ex-
plained in their introductory article (“The New World Order and the Social-
ist Agenda”) to the 1992 Register, many on the left shied away from using 
concepts like “socialism” any more – they followed the “prophets of post-
modernism” (like Jean-Francois Lyotard) into a retreat from ‘mega-sagas’ 
(1992: 20). The editors were very critical of this defensive movement and 
regarded it as operating under false assumptions: 
 
It is impossible to say how long the ranks of the left will be plagued by this fashion, 
but it is clear that it is an intellectual mood that was very much based on a caricature 
of contemporary socialist aspirations as inherently totalitarian. This ignores the 
extent to which the aspirations of socialists in every era, and not least of the new left 
of the 1960s (taken together as encompassing a new generation of radicals and an 
older generation of socialists and communists), entailed not a future constructed on a 
model of disciplined proletarian homogeneity but rather of genuine pluralist democ-
racy in which the state would be subject to a freely associated society. (ibid) 
 
Generally, the mood in the publication oscillated between a confidence that 
spoke of the supposed end of socialism – as what Richard Levins called a 
“eulogy behind an empty grave” – and a sober admission that to claim that 
Western socialists were not affected at all would not lead very far (1990). 
Practically, this meant to restate what had been stated (but not necessarily 
heard) before – most importantly, thoughts on democratic socialism. Many 
of the reflections on democratic socialism in the annual of course came 
from its editor, Miliband, who had throughout his career worked on this 
question but intensified his efforts after his hopes that a reformed Soviet 
Union might provide a suitable model had been destroyed. Because 
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Miliband was so central to the Register and because also several other 
contributors simultaneously wrote for New Left Review (like Wallerstein 
and Geras), a number of similar ideas and proposals figured in both publi-
cations. Yet there were interesting differences too. Above all, the narrowing 
down of democratic socialism to only radical democracy (on the basis of 
Habermasian rational decision-making) was nowhere suggested in Socialist 
Register. This abstinence was linked to a second difference: the scope of 
each journal’s work. Discussions of the means and relations of production 
and especially the question of how to democratise their organisation had 
always found a more central place in Socialist Register. Finally, the second 
editor, Leo Panitch, also contributed a special angle based on his conviction 
of the central roles national states still played in a perceived era of globali-
sation. Indeed, for many writers in the Register the national state remained 
the most important arena of struggle for a democratic-socialist society.  
 
Principles and Core Elements of Democratic Socialism 
Socialist Register provided three basic definitions of socialism. Miliband 
emphasised its democratic dimension in his article “Counter-Hegemonic 
Struggles” and described it as the extension of democracy to all spheres of 
societal life (1990: 356). Democratic decision making would create a socie-
ty (this was his second definition) that consisted of what he called genuine 
communities (cf. ibid: 363). These definitions were accompanied by a more 
orthodox Marxist comment from Lebowitz who maintained – within the 
context of a contribution which warned of giving too much away of Marxist 
approaches – that socialism should still be seen as a transitional phase, a 
stage on the move from capitalism to communism (cf. 1991: 361). Obvi-
ously, several intellectuals regarded these definitions as important tools to 
make their idea of socialism distinguishable from the authoritarian, repres-
sive perversions (as Arthur MacEwan put it) with which the term was asso-
ciated (cf. 1990: 324). Additionally, like in New Left Review, the holistic 
claim of socialism was seriously contested, or at least seen as in need of 
specifications. This was, for example, Geras’s argument, who intended to 
save Marxism from simplistic critiques through stressing its self-conscious 
modesty. Thus he explained that (socialist) feminism and (socialist) anti-
racism had their own specific objectives (cf. 1990: 30): 
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Beyond continuing to register how different forms of domination can often feed off 
and mutually reinforce one another, socialists have to recognize that socialism, 
ambitious and difficult of attainment as it has proved to be, is one goal, relatively 
distinct from other emancipatory goals; which are of their own pressing urgency, the 
obstacles and resistances to them being the source of plenty human misery and 
stifled potentialities. [...] Any battle against one grave systemic injustice diminishes 
itself by ignoring other such equally grave injustices, or by making light of them. 
(ibid) 
 
Specific objectives could, of course, be conflicting or contradictory. Thus 
democratic decision-making had an important role to play. However, alt-
hough a great deal of thought was spent on explaining democratic social-
ism, such clarifications focused more on the differences between socialist 
and capitalist democracy than on terms of structural details. Levins, for 
example, stated that 
 
[t]he difference between socialist and bourgeois ideas of democracy remains valid: 
while the one aims at the mobilization of the creative and critical intelligence and 
knowledge of the whole people on behalf of a common enterprise, the other is orga-
nized around the management of dissent within a safe domain and the competition 
for office. (1990: 339) 
 
He explicitly welcomed the achievements of bourgeois democracy which 
succeeded in terminating particular abuses and thus helped the liberation 
struggles of the oppressed classes. Hence, it should not be dismissed but 
incorporated and invigorated (ibid). The core idea for Levins consisted of 
an activist democracy, in the attempt at using the intelligence of all people 
for problem solving and the corrections of errors in the organisation of 
economics, politics and social life (ibid: 345). Cox added that there were 
three meanings of democracy: a bourgeois version of liberal pluralism, a 
socialist meaning of producer self-management (under conditions of central 
planning), and a third meaning, also socialist – but unlike the second with-
out historical precedence and yet to be realised – of popular participation in 
central planning (1991: 184). This final version constituted the most attrac-
tive way forward for a new socialism (ibid). 
Such a project could only work under conditions of equality. The goal 
of equality appeared of course quite often in the pages of Socialist Register, 
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but again it was Wallerstein who gave it the most radical meaning by insist-
ing that it had to be understood globally (cf. 1992: 108). He reiterated a 
perspective formulated one year earlier by Miliband who claimed that “’[a] 
radical alternative’, as I understand it, simply means the creation of a com-
parative, egalitarian, democratic, and ultimately classless society, to be 
replicated in due course throughout the world” (1991: 349). Interesting in 
Wallerstein’s contribution was the suggestion to develop a collective, 
group-related understanding of equality which he saw, liberalism’s official 
high esteem for individualism notwithstanding, at work also in capitalism. 
He wanted to replace the group ideology of “survival of the fittest” with 
another: the recognition of equal rights of all groups in a reconstructed 
world system – while acknowledging that individuals should never be 
reduced to being nothing but members of groups, collectives or ‘masses’ 
(1992: 107-8). Apart from this perspective, which integrated associational-
ist and communitarianist elements, also more traditional interpretations of 
equality were published, which understood it as a matter of redistribution of 
resources, income, and working time. Redistribution was required to limit 
economic growth, and such reallocation should be accompanied by an 
economic strategy that prioritised national and local needs, along the lines 
of the programme of the Bennite left in the British Labour Party of the late 
1970s and early 1980s (cf. Panitch 1994: 89-91). Such a programme – this 
lesson could also be drawn from the Benn experience – would be impossi-
ble to realise without restricting the power of capital (cf. Albo 1994: 163). 
Finally, and the ultimate goals should not be neglected as Singer wrote in 
his “In Defence of Utopia”, for Marxists, the pursuit of equality entailed the 
replacement of exchange value by use value (1993: 255). This move would 
also contribute to a more cautious treatment of the natural environment (cf. 
Albo 1994: 166). At the same time, this strategy aimed at changing the 
dominant view of labour as a private commodity (cf. Lebowitz 1991: 363). 
Equality, democracy and environmental sustainability served as general 
points of orientation. More concretely, authors were convinced of the supe-
riority of, and, for both moral and strategic reasons, the necessity of public 
ownership. On the one hand, private ownership was declared to be morally 
inferior: Miliband admonished that private armies were universally seen as 
abominable, but other private enterprises not (cf. 1991: 387). On the other 
hand, only democratically controlled public ownership could muster the 
material preconditions for initiating and maintaining the move towards a 
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socialist society by ending the power imbalances inherently linked with 
systems of private ownership: 
 
There are, however, reasons other than ‘efficiency’ for wanting a mixed economy 
with a predominant public sector. One crucial such reason is that public ownership 
removes from private hands the control of assets and resources which [...] are of 
essential importance to society. (ibid) 
 
The pragmatic way forward thus required an alternative economic strategy 
and a change in the ownership of the means of production in order to move 
towards social justice and the extension of democracy (cf. Albo 1994:166-
7).  
Like the contributors to New Left Review, the authors in Socialist Regis-
ter could envisage the achievement of socialism only as a long-term pro-
cess (cf. Wallerstein 1992: 108). The goals and principles to be popularised 
in order to convince people were not new – but the central place for democ-
racy could not be mentioned often enough at the historical conjuncture of 
the early 1990s. The task of working for a socialist future was more than 
merely a political decision. It was based on a particular understanding of 
human beings and the human condition which distinguished socialists from 
conservatives and liberals. This understanding, at least according to John 
Griffith in his discussion on the status of rights maintained that: 
 
Socialists are different again [from conservatives and liberals; S.B.]. They believe 
humanity to be composed of social animals, a collection of individuals who are 
inseparable from the society in which they live. From conception until death they are 
integral part of society. Their problems arise from this. This is the human situation, 
perhaps the human tragedy. In this society there are no natural rights, only those 
which society has conferred. (1993: 123) 
 
Reflections on Institutional Arrangements 
Since the sphere of work played a central role for socialist principles, the 
shape of the production process and its control were at the core of the Reg-
ister’s reflections on the organisational features of a democratic socialist 
society. A great deal of thought was spent on issues such as more democrat-
ic workplace structures, the redistribution of work, democratic planning of 
employment as the major tasks a democratic socialist state had to organise 
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(cf. Albo 1994: 164-166). The authors understood a socialist democracy as 
an institutional arrangement that followed established democratic proce-
dures while at the same time actively pursuing the empowerment of work-
ing people (cf. MacEwan 1990: 324-5). Moves towards socialism required, 
as institutional foundation, the socialisation of the most important means of 
production and the creation of democratic, decentralised decision-making 
structures (cf. Lebowitz 1991: 367). The latter aspect, that of decentralisa-
tion, was crucial for autonomous work control (cf. MacEwan 1990: 325). It 
seems that the authors did not want to introduce this model too abruptly; 
instead they envisaged a gradual process, where the production process was 
carefully planned (in order to serve a number of functions defined on the 
basis of democratic socialist values) and this planning became more and 
more decentralised over time (cf. Levins 1990: 338). Their model constitut-
ed a mixture of subsidiarity, grassroots democracy, and workers control. 
Levins, for instance, suggested measures such as the participation of volun-
teers in working committees of legislative bodies, the extensive nation-wide 
discussion of suggested legislation, the compulsory reporting-back of elect-
ed representatives, and collective leadership (ibid). Albo intended to set up 
national and sectional planning structures (cf. 1994: 164). Bienefeld de-
manded a version of subsidiarity that would leave decision making decen-
tralised and as much as possible in the realm of the market (and to a certain 
extent allow private ownership) – as long as the framework of social and 
environmental sustainability was not violated (cf. 1994: 125). 
Institutional arrangements such as these relied – as already stated – on a 
number of preconditions: the private sector should be subordinate to the 
public sector (cf. Miliband 1991: 386). This suggestion not only echoed the 
critique of the British left that the private had always dominated the public 
sector in the UK, but it was also founded on the idea that the public sector 
was the ‘base’ from which to build new, non-competitive social relations 
(ibid: 388). Secondly, as Panitch expressed it, it was necessary to restruc-
ture the hierarchy of state apparatuses. Thirdly, since contributors to Social-
ist Register assumed these developments would take place on the nation-
state level, protectionist strategies were essential: these would include 
capital controls and some trade controls to allow inward industrialisation 
instead of export-oriented growth (cf. Panitch 1994: 90; Albo 1994: 163). 
Finally, such arrangements would require a world system that did not privi-
lege one mode of growth and sanction all others, but instead allowed for 
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different paths of economic development (cf. Albo 1994: 163) and addi-
tionally penalised the causing and export of environmental “externalities” 
(ibid). 
The last point was important: the institutional set-up needed not only to 
empower the weaker parts of society, it also had to fulfil a number of nor-
mative considerations, nationally and internationally, derived from the 
debate on democratic-socialist goals and priorities. For example, it had to 
serve environmental purposes, such as, through the acceptance of tariffs 
that allowed countries to implement or maintain high social and environ-
mental standards. It had to support the expansion of a democratically con-
trolled third sector of social and cultural services. Finally, it had to work 
towards overcoming the sexual division of labour and the creation of a non-
racist, non-militaristic, and generally non-competitive society which re-
warded caring as a socially helpful activity and transformed the welfare 
system from a stigmatising into an empowering institution. 
Obviously all this could not be achieved by a free association of indi-
viduals. Hence, a strong state was needed, at least for a “young” socialist 
society, as Miliband explained. However, this state had to be constitutional-
ly controlled as well as checked and complemented by popular power (cf. 
1990: 357). Miliband and Panitch insisted that “[t]he socialist project is not 
about more or less state but about a different kind of state” (1992: 23). 
Concretely, the constitutional arrangements would have to be radically 
revised. One important question, however, remained: how to deal with the 
resistance to such alterations? Again, the authors seemed to understand 
opposition primarily in terms of class antagonism. Thus Bienefeld suggest-
ed addressing the problem in the following way: 
 
It [the group of those who profit from the institutional arrangements in capitalist 
states; SB] must be persuaded by argument and by the threat of political opposition 
to accept a political compromise through which it can regain its social and political 
legitimacy, in return for agreeing to recreate sovereign political spaces within which 
capital, labour, and other constituencies can bargain and in which the resulting 
agreements can be forced, in which the process can establish social, political, ethical 
and environmental priorities and trade them off against efficiency; and in which full 
employment can be pursued as an overriding priority. (1994: 112) 
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When looking for models that could provide direction or inspiration, the 
contributors listed three very different types of experiments. Firstly, Foster 
hinted at the U.S. New Deal and especially its Works Progress Authority. 
The project’s importance lay in the fact that it did not follow a capitalist 
logic but instead, in its job creation programmes, considered where people 
lived, what their capabilities were and acted on these premises. Foster 
agreed with Monthly Review’s Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff who were 
involved in setting up New Deal policies, that lessons could be drawn from 
the programme: it showed the way for a concrete anti-capitalist strategy as 
the beginning of a long revolution (cf. Foster 1990: 278). Secondly, Levins 
detected forms of grassroots democracy in the states of the Eastern Bloc. 
He pointed, for instance, to neighbourhood courts which “demystified” the 
legal process and to the historical example of Makarenko’s pedagogical 
work with communities of orphans (1990: 338).
1
 According to Levins, the 
problem was that grassroots activities had lost most of their real content in 
socialist countries. Yet he saw parallels with grassroots experiments in 
other parts of the world – in both, advanced capitalist as well as in develop-
ing countries: feminist consciousness-raising groups, liberation theology’s 
base communities, participatory action research, and the educational theo-
ries of Paulo Freire (cf. ibid).
2
 Finally, there were lessons to be learned 
from France and Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Albo claimed 
that France was, in the early years of the Mitterand presidency, more suc-
cessful in its economic strategy than was normally admitted and had avoid-
ed the sharp downturn experienced by most other OECD countries (cf. 
1994: 160). Panitch highlighted the eventually abortive attempts by sections 
of the British Labour Party to implement democratic-socialist decision 
making both within the party and also in local politics (cf. 1994: 91). All 
these reflections suggested a combination of grassroots and state-led initia-
tives for a move towards a democratic socialist society. 
 
                                                             
1  Demystification in this context meant to free the judicial system of the percep-
tion that it followed universal or foundational values and needed sophisticated 
procedures and to anchor judicial decisions within the population and trust their 
sense of justice and fairness. 
2  He added the theories of Gramsci and the work of Che Guevara to his list of 
precedents and starting points of socialist democracy (cf. Levins 1990: 338). 
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Requirements 
Reflections on preconditions and chances of success for socialist democrat-
ic structures were seldom and short. For most writers it seemed clear that 
the adequate strategy for a democratic-socialist left was to transform the 
state rather than either to over-ambitiously transcend it (an allegation di-
rected against “ultra leftist” groups) or to be content with shaping it as a 
‘progressive’ competitive state in an era of global capitalism (as social 
democrats were accused of doing) (cf. Panitch 1994: 87). This transfor-
mation required, as already mentioned, a combination of parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary activity – especially for bold programmes of economic 
recovery which could receive their dynamics from building improved pub-
lic infrastructure. For Miliband and Panitch in particular, it seemed crucial 
to find a strategy for initiating change which would then, almost automati-
cally, continue to gather momentum (cf. 1992: 23). They described demo-
cratic socialists’ task as “giving people a sense that something can be done 
about the crisis, which is the key to further popular mobilization in even 
more radical directions” (ibid). This was as true for Western societies as it 
was for the transformed countries in Eastern Europe, where the removal of 
dictatorships had generated formally democratic regimes with highly ine-
galitarian social orders (ibid: 16-7). Linda Gordon raised another issue in 
emphasising the centrality of utopian thinking (in her case, especially, 
inventing concrete utopian models of welfare provision) for new dreams 
and ideas of democratic socialism and liberated societies (cf. 1990: 172). In 
terms of political geography, it seemed unclear where moves towards dem-
ocratic socialism were most likely to be started. Generally, writers seemed 
to expect them from the industrial North rather than from the South and 
Miliband invested his trust in the few “third way” activists who were still 
struggling in Eastern Europe; he felt they constituted the best “slender 
hope” for an emerging socialist society, they should be supported by West-
ern socialists (1991: 388-389).  
 
Questions and Dilemmas 
Socialist Register dealt in a more conclusive way with difficult questions 
than its British sister publication. The problems identified were similar; 
here contributors also asked themselves what to do in order to secure the 
gains achieved on the route to a democratic socialist society. In an article 
on the question whether Marxists should follow Marx’ legal relativism, 
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Amy Bartholomew hinted at possible dilemmas: how to deal with what she 
still called counter-revolutionaries and how to come to terms with people 
who demanded “too much” in a period of economic transition from capital-
ism to socialism? Her conclusion was different from that expressed by 
Honderich in the Review. She claimed that individual rights could be in-
fringed but “as little as possible congruent with the importance of realizing 
the objective to be secured by that encroachment” (Bartholomew 1990: 
259). Hence, she did not completely rule out such infringement – despite all 
the dangers connected with such restrictions, of which she claimed to be 
very aware: 
 
Thus, the commitment [to individual rights; SB] does not entail the conclusion that 
we never limit or even deny rights. Rather, it indicates that each limitation and 
denial must be justified and if not abhorred at least undertaken with the recognition 
that an accumulation of limits and denials chips slowly away at the culture which 
sustains respect for the protections and entitlements we call rights. (ibid) 
 
No explicit contradictions to this opinion can be found in the pages of So-
cialist Register – one could argue, however, that Miliband’s and Panitch’s 
insistence on the transformation of the state accompanied by an incremental 
radicalisation of the population was at variance with it (as were Bienefeld’s 
suggestions to “convince” the dominant strata of society by argument and 
the “threat of political opposition” (1994: 12).
3
 
As stated above, the transformation of socialism into radical democracy 
and the abolition and replacement of the term were not backed in the Regis-
ter’s pages. However, it did discuss whether the whole range of emancipa-
tory struggles could be subsumed under the heading of socialism. When 
Geras pointed out that Marxists had exaggerated the link between achieving 
socialism and, almost automatically, overcoming all kinds of oppression, he 
also raised the question whether a society organised on socialist principles 
was a “good society” or only part of a “good society” (1990: 29-30). He 
                                                             
3  Due to its character as an annual publication, there were hardly any debates 
within Socialist Register, unlike in the other journals discussed. Although the 
editors claimed each year that the Register did not have a general line, there 
were limitations of what counted as acceptable for publication and what not. 
Bartholomew’s article apparently was not beyond this line.  
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self-critically conceded that the traditional tendency to take the part for the 
whole had contributed to an over-reliance on the working class as historical 
agent (cf. ibid). This certainly was not meant as a farewell to the working 
class. However, the statement underlined a clear commitment to accept the 
multiplicity and many faces of oppression and the possible contradictions 
involved in tackling them. This stance made it perhaps easier to be more 
conclusive about another important issue – that of living standards. Gregory 
Albo left no doubt that with a reduction of working time – which he regard-
ed as necessary for political, social and environmental reasons – certain 
cuts in living standards were unavoidable (cf. 1994: 165). It seemed that 
writers in Socialist Register were convinced that there was no use in evad-
ing difficult questions and no alternative to coming to terms with the prob-
lems of the realisation of a ‘good life’ everywhere rather than just in the 
rich global North. 
 
Dissent 
More than any other publication, Dissent clearly and emphatically dealt 
with the questions of values, goals and principles in its reflections on the 
future shape of democratic socialism. Two problems seemed to be of cru-
cial importance: the relationships of democratic socialists with social (or 
liberal) democracy and of individualism and collectivism. Obviously, these 
issues were important enough to be covered not only in numerous articles 
by regular contributors to the magazine but also by a wide variety of ‘ex-
ternals’, ranging from proponents of associationalism via leading post-
Marxists, such as Chantal Mouffe, and representatives of the left wing of 
liberalism in the American sense of the term, to dissident socialists from an 
earlier era like the Italian liberal socialist and anti-fascist Carlo Rosselli 
whose work was discussed in the previous chapter. Additionally, the editors 
found it helpful to look to the other side of the Atlantic: not only to Italian 
socialism, but also to British political theorists, and to the role model of 
Swedish social democracy and its welfare state. That Dissent’s approach 
appeared to be even more concerned with ethical questions than that of the 
other journals could be partly explained with the strong current of political 
theorists among the magazine’s contributors but partly also because of its 
basic assumption that the problem of what had become of the Eastern Eu-
ropean states could not be explained without discussing the ethics and 
values of socialism. Based on their anti-Communist history, it seemed 
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insufficient for these intellectuals to restrict explanations to Cold War con-
frontations and the state socialism’s internal degenerations. With few ex-
ceptions (such as the contribution by H. Brand [1991]), questions of the 
global political economy (and thus global living standards) and of the con-
crete institutional set-up of a socialist society played a minor role. As a 
consequence, the related questions of necessary preconditions of and possi-
ble obstacles hindering the move towards socialist societies were dealt with 
less extensively. However, despite the narrower focus, the normative and 
ethical questions featured in the journal bore more than sufficient material 
for disagreement. It is quite obvious, however, that such disagreements 
were rarely expressed in the open. Contradictory statements appeared side 
by side in the pages of the journal and this coexistence could be read on the 
one hand as a commitment to the type of democratic pluralism Dissenters 
viewed as indispensable for any future moves towards socialism, but on the 
other as a symptom of what Michael Walzer called the “period of uncer-
tainty and confusion” (1992: 466).  
 
Principles and Core Elements of Democratic Socialism 
Dissent came forward with a number of new attempts at grasping the mean-
ing of democratic socialism by means of definition-like statements. These 
were more diverse than in the other journals and, arguably, often even 
contradictory. Firstly, authors suggested definitions foregrounding the 
economic dimension. Robert Dahl characterised democratic socialism as a 
third way between a planned economy and a free market (cf. 1990: 225). 
Others put forward a political-economic definition, regarding the essence of 
socialism as being the primacy of politics over the economy (Ryan 1990: 
442). Additionally, there was a class-based, social definition stating that 
democratic socialism stood for the “effective extension of the liberties of 
the bourgeoisie to all” (Rosselli 1993: 118). For Dennis Wong, the opposite 
of socialism was not capitalism but individualism and egoism, thus he 
transferred, more consequently than most others, the question of socialism 
from property relations and the organisation of the economy to ethics. 
Furthermore, there was a ‘reformist’ definition by Howe, claiming that 
democratic socialists – despite the necessity of values and utopias – should 
not try to create a “new man” (1992: 144-145). He was seconded by Michel 
Rocard, former French prime minister and thus a practitioner of reformism 
in a moderate, gradualist declaration: “I call socialism the collective wish 
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for social justice, for less arbitrariness, for a reduction of inequality to a 
level that corresponds to the distribution of talents, risks, and responsibili-
ties” (Rocard & Ricoeur 1991: 506). Finally, one could also find more 
traditional historical-teleological definitions like that by Branko Horvat: 
“Socialism is a phase in the process of the individuation of men and wom-
en, of their emancipation from various collectivities (tribe, estate, class, 
nation), of their progress in the direction of individual self-determination” 
(1991: 107). Perceptions of socialism thus ranged from innovative ideas of 
what constituted an individual’s ‘good life’ to a different organisation of 
the processes and relations of production. Yet no one defended the idea of 
revolutionary overthrow of the existing order. Socialism did not mean a 
comprehensive break with exiting forms of social organisation. This posi-
tion was representative of Dissent’s early break with vanguardism. Conse-
quently, the central concept for Dissenters was democracy. Its dominant 
status was repeated in numerous articles which left no doubt that there was 
no falling-back behind the standards set by capitalist (or liberal) democra-
cy. Not all contributors went as far as Dennis Wong, who suggested substi-
tuting “democratic socialism” with other terms such as “social democratic 
liberalism” or “liberal social democracy” to underline democracy’s superior 
status (Rule & Wong 1990: 485). Others looked at the ways in which the 
two could be linked.  
All Dissenters would agree, however, that the form of democratic socie-
tal organisation they envisaged was different from the democracy that 
existed in the United States and in other Western countries – even if several 
of them regarded the Scandinavian countries as coming rather close to their 
ideals. The responsibility of the left was to initiate an extension of democ-
racy – some would call it its radicalisation or expansion while others pre-
ferred to describe it as a move towards socialism. Among the first group 
was the post-Marxist theorist Chantal Mouffe: “There are still numerous 
social arenas and relationships where democratisation is critically needed. 
The task for the left today is to describe how this can be achieved in a way 
that is compatible with the existence of a liberal democratic regime” (1993: 
81). The centrality of democracy for the authors was related to the centrali-
ty of individual freedom, which, as Dennis Wong argued, needed to have 
precedence over all other values (cf. Rule & Wong 1990: 485). These shifts 
in focus implied that democratic socialists had to accept the fact that ulti-
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mately not everyone would be converted to socialism (cf. Ryan 1990: 437-
438). 
Judging solely from these reflections one might wonder whether any 
distinction remained between democratic socialism and social (or liberal) 
democracy or whether Dennis Wong’s recommendation to abandon the 
term was consistently accepted by the majority of contributors. However, 
not all writers agreed with him. Two differences were retained in several 
contributions: the first consisted of the presumed necessity to do more than 
to just correct the failures and excesses of capitalism. The Canadian Bob 
Rae expressed this position quite powerfully: “If the best democratic social-
ism can offer is ‘a little more of this and a little more of that’, we might as 
well pack our bags and call it a day” (1991: 45). The second, and related, 
difference lay in a long-term project which had to be borne in mind and 
required utopian thinking (cf. Denitch 1991: 103; Howe 1993: 145). The 
dream of eventually achieving a society that looked radically different from 
the present and had abolished, for example, wage labour was not ruled out 
entirely. The only aspect to be abandoned was the infringement of individ-
ual liberties in order to arrive there. This hope for change was based on the 
assumption that socialism did not constitute so much a break with the past 
as its logical continuation. Horvat, for example, argued that socialism con-
tributed to fulfilling three principles underlying bourgeois revolutions and 
societies: liberty, equality, and solidarity (cf. 1991: 107). This old triad also 
became the means by which Dissenters believed the contentious relation-
ship of individualism and equality could be overcome. When discussing 
post-Marxist Paul Hirst’s reflections on associationalism, Mouffe conceded 
that certain types of individualism might prove conflictual, but that such 
strife could be avoided by recourse to an idea of a republican common good 
(cf. 1993: 85). Insisting that universalism and individualism had to be seen 
as related, she explained: 
 
The problem is to understand the individual, not as a monad, an ‘unencumbered’ self 
existing previous to and independent of society, but as constituted by an ensemble of 
‘subject positions’, participating in a multiplicity of social relationships, member of 
many communities and participant in a plurality of collective identifications. (ibid) 
 
These ideas built a bridge on which Dissenters could discuss ideas not just 
of republicanism and republican virtues, but also communitarianism (as 
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suggested, in a left version, by Michael Walzer) and associationalism. They 
remained sceptical of libertarian versions of these theories and maintained 
that political institutions were necessary, even if certain critics, such as 
Horvat, hoped to replace party politics – he saw parties as agglomerations 
of power – with “citizens’ politics” (1991: 107). 
As in the other journals, the question of power relations was regarded as 
very important. For socialists, as Alan Ryan insisted, community could 
only mean a “community of equals” (1990: 440). This equality did not 
necessarily mean the levelling of all wealth differentials, but instead its 
precondition was a redistribution of economic and political power (cf. 
Horvat 1991: 108). Such reallocations could only be achieved through 
changes in the organisation of the economy. This view that successful 
political change required economic change was, of course, not new; it had 
been essential to many orthodox old-leftists, a line of reasoning which 
Dissenters now partially shared. However, Dissenter’s  arguments for some 
form of a socialised economy and for the crucial role of economic planning 
were not restricted to this traditional materialist view; like contributors to 
Socialist Register, they questioned the environmental sustainability of an 
unregulated capitalism and even its macro-economic sense. For Ryan, an 
unregulated private economy had intrinsic self-destructive tendencies 
which had to be controlled (cf. 1990: 439). He saw it as an essential task of 
socialism to overcome these deficiencies in the economic system (ibid: 
440). He denied that the collapse of the state socialist societies had proven 
that there was no sensible way in which economic planning could reduce 
the waste of human resources and talents and the irrationalities of unorgan-
ised production and distribution (ibid: 442). Neither, he went on, did Hitler 
or Mussolini discredit corporatist critiques of an unorganised capitalism (cf. 
ibid). As a result of his article, he pointed out that “[s]ocialism as such must 
[…] center on the public control of the consequences of an economic sys-
tem based on private property” (ibid). Others, like Rae, were more straight-
forward: he declared that in order to make the difference between a produc-
tive economy and a casino, democratic socialism had to do more than just 
control the excesses of the capitalist system (cf. 1991: 43-45). Denitch 
again went a step further when suggesting to expand workers control over 
their workplace and to abolish the present concentration of private owner-
ship (cf. 1991: 105). The problem remained how to organise this kind of 
economic decision making and interventionism, given the fact that, as 
216 | INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM AFTER 1989 
 
Edward Broadbent stated and the experience of the Eastern European states 
had made clear, state and private ownership were both alienating (cf. 1991: 
83). The suggestions published in the pages of Dissent included (apart from 
market socialism) a combination of Swedish corporatism, a socialised 
sector, and diverse forms of grassroots economic planning. These proposi-
tions came from what could be regarded as the left wing of Dissent. Joanne 
Barkan, for example, pleaded for extending the small sector of cooperatives 
that already existed. These could become a vanguard of self-reliant and 
responsible economic decision making (cf. 1991: 97-98). Brand wanted to 
put the lever elsewhere and turned to corporate structures: he saw them as 
necessary for reducing the influence of shareholders, and for creaming-off 
and reinvesting dividends (cf. 1991: 99). The structures he proposed were 
different from those found in ordinary corporatist capitalism: he fancied a 
tripartite structure of representatives of the public, of the labour force, and 
of consumer groups (cf. ibid). Only by reorganising the conditions of eco-
nomic production in such ways could economic liberty become a reality – 
in a specific sense as it was understood by Carol Rosselli in the first half of 
the twentieth century: not as a liberated economy but as people liberated 
from economic coercion and hardship (cf. 1993: 119). 
Such liberation would mean the – at least partial – decommodification 
of labour, of the allocation process of goods and services and, thus, of 
social life as a whole. Ernest Erber expressed his opinion that it was only 
once the polity as a whole decided over the allocation of resources, that 
there could be a chance at satisfying a society’s collective needs (and to 
tackle social and environmental problems)(cf. 1990: 360). Brand further 
explained that the decommodification of labour in practice meant the mas-
sive expansion of a social wage, which should be material as well as securi-
ty-providing; hinting at the writings of Gösta Esping-Anderson, he envis-
aged collective social services, unemployment and sickness compensation, 
employment security, and general income maintenance (cf. Brand 1991: 
99). Cohen emphasised that such measures indeed worked towards moves 
towards a democratic socialist society and put them into the same context 
as Branko Horvat – using a term from the U.S. Declaration of Independ-
ence, Cohen made them a completion of the promises of eighteenth-century 
bourgeois revolutions: “To go beyond the welfare state is to make its gains 
irreversible and to democratise the conditions of production. It is to make 
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employment, health care, housing – the basics of human welfare – together 
with democratic control of the workplace ‘inalienable rights’” (1991: 101). 
The emphasis on decommodification could be interpreted as an echo of 
the ‘post-materialist’ political visions of the new social movements. How-
ever, recourse to the agenda of the new social movements occurred only 
infrequently. Occasionally, environmental issues were mentioned, mostly 
as an argument supporting the necessity of economic planning (cf. Erber 
1990: 360). Rae hinted at the important task of combating the disad-
vantages of women, disabled people, and visible minorities (cf. 1991: 45) 
and Ryan, finally, insisted that struggles against disadvantages could not be 
successful as long as they were not accompanied by the struggle for social-
ism. He claimed this to be the lesson to be drawn from the experience of the 
1960s (cf. 1990: 442). Another parallel to feminist thinking could be found 
in Mouffe’s discussion of Norberto Bobbio which emphasised the need to 
democratise institutions in all areas of social life: “To democratise society 
requires, for Bobbio, tackling all the institutions – from family to school, 
from big business to public administration – that are not run democratical-
ly” (1993: 83). Despite the rare exceptions, generally the agendas and the 
political ideas of the new social movements did not qualify as very im-
portant sources of inspirations for Dissent’s contributors. 
Instead, more than in other journals, writers for Dissent stressed the in-
dispensability of a commitment to the primacy of the individual. Most of 
the time, they did not see this as a problem for moves towards democratic 
socialism. When they did, the primacy was not questioned – rather it was 
suggested to abandon the goal of democratic socialism instead. Dissent’s 
principles could be interpreted as being more self-confidently moderate 
than the other journals’: they seemed to be more at ease with reformist and 
gradualist approaches and did not even necessarily justify these principles 
as immediate steps towards a far more ambitious distant goal. However, 
differences of opinion existed between social democratic contributors and 
the more left wing faction. This pluralism of positions remained responsible 
for most of the contradictory statements on ideas and goals.  
 
Reflections on Institutional Arrangements 
Among Dissent’s institutional concepts, market socialism and the state 
played central roles. For most contributors, market socialism, in which 
neither private economic privilege nor an over-powerful state could gain a 
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dominant position in the decision-making process, formed a core element 
of a democratic socialism. These reflections on market socialism were part 
of a more general idea of economic democracy. Nevertheless, the state was 
indispensable – as H. Brand made clear: 
 
Furthermore, I believe that the state must ultimately guide all major investment in 
productive equipment and structures, human resources, and social infrastructure. 
This role for the state remains, notwithstanding all that has happened in Eastern 
Europe, a central problem, perhaps the central problem for social democracy and 
democratic socialism. (1991: 99) 
 
As already mentioned, such state guidance did not necessarily mean public 
ownership in all cases, but entailed instead a mixed economy of state and 
private ownership in combination with cooperative enterprises. Authors 
admitted that state (or public) ownership might be advantageous in some 
instances, but they did not see it as the dominant form of ownership in a 
socialist economy (cf. Rae: 44, Cohen 1991: 101, Urbinati 1993: 116). 
Dissenters obviously subscribed to two broad ideas on the institutional 
organisation of a democratic-socialist society: The first wanted to democra-
tise decision making in the economy, the second in all other aspects of 
social life. Concerning the economy, writers envisaged a corporatist set-up 
where workers should be members of the boards of directors of either pub-
licly or privately owned enterprises. Above all, they should be involved in 
deciding the future direction of production – this was seen as a massive 
extension of liberal democracy (cf. Broadbent 1991: 82). Bob Rae’s idea on 
this issue resembled the abortive Swedish attempts at implementing wage-
earners funds which would incrementally de-privatise ownership. He sug-
gested pension funds as a strategy for exerting control (cf. 1991: 44). It was 
also necessary, according to the writers, to control the banks and thus not 
only productive but even more financial capital. For democratising society 
comprehensively (or at least its public sphere – in how far writers agreed 
with Bobbio’s suggestion to democratise all institutions, including for 
instance families, that were not yet ‘run’ democratically, was not clear), a 
legal framework had to be designed that allowed for a democratically con-
trolled interventionist welfare state. Additionally, regulations were needed 
in such areas as protection of the environment, affirmative action, mandato-
ry paid vacation, universal health, education, and childcare (cf. Broadbent 
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1991: 82). In order to avoid the development of a concentration of power to 
such a degree that it might become dangerous for democracy, Horvat sug-
gested extending one of its core ideas: the separation of powers. In addition 
to the classical division of legislative, executive and judicative he added an 
administrative, a recruiting and a controlling power (cf. 1991: 108). For 
Urbinati, such a horizontal separation should be combined with  vertical 
and professional ones; parliamentary democracy should be accompanied by 
regional autonomy and workshop democracy (cf. 1993: 116). Civil society 
would thus, as a federation of federations, control the state and reproduce 
principles of resistance organisation in fascist Italy (ibid). Finally, writers in 
the magazine came forward with ideas for arrangements of political interest 
articulation and accountability. Horvat, in accordance with his ambition to 
replace party democracy by popular democracy, wished to see representa-
tives held responsible to their electors and the people they represented 
rather than to their parties (cf. 1991: 107). Cohen anticipated a democratic 
socialist culture built, like the United States, on a two-party system, but 
unlike the United States, consisting of two socialist rather than two capital-
ist parties, one of which would be a bit more radical than the other (cf. 
1991: 101). 
Dissenters’ attempts at identifying existing models were mainly histori-
cal, as has already become clear; besides resistance Italy and welfare-state 
Sweden during the golden age of social democracy, they also pointed to 
developments in the Anglo-American world. Dahl, for instance, repeated 
Karl Polanyi’s argument that British economic, social and political theory 
with thinkers such as Bentham, Ricardo, Burke, Malthus, Marx, Mill, Dar-
win, and Spencer had come forward from early on with institutional sug-
gestions for replacing the unregulated economic life of the late eigtheenth 
and early nineteenth century. As a consequence, Britain’s social relations 
had already in the later part of the nineteenth century been regulated by the 
state (cf. 1990: 225-226). The necessity of controlling banks had gained 
respect in the United States during the New Deal era (cf. Ryan 1990: 441). 
Finally, the United States’s experience was important in a further respect – 
it was based not on the idea of a social contract, but on the republican tradi-
tion. It was this perception of collective life not as an infringement to liber-
ty but as an enrichment of the self that, according Mouffe’s reflections, 
would allow the democratic creation of a society that had a common social-
ist purpose to which the people would subscribe (cf. 1993: 84). 
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Requirements 
Dissenters remained mostly silent on the preconditions and chances of a 
development towards democratic socialism. Most of them shied away from 
any teleological perceptions of history and thus from reflections on condi-
tions and factors influencing it. However, they remained confident that 
social change for the better was possible. Social change seemed linked to 
the belief in human perfectibility. Though Dissent did in fact reprint Ros-
selli’s conviction that the latter was unlimited (cf. 1993: 117), various au-
thorial disagreements as to how far this gradual social improvement would 
proceed seem to suggest that not all contributors subscribed to Rosselli’s 
position. Indeed, statements of modesty, such as Howe’s call for utopias for 
a better rather than a perfect society, or Ryan’s doubts that everyone would 
accept the merits of socialism, do not support a claim of unanimity among 
contributors. As they did not necessarily ascribe to an unqualified faith in 
humankind, many authors concentrated instead on the values and institu-
tions that might improve the living conditions of the less privileged and 
might reduce the destructiveness of capitalism. Improving society obvious-
ly had a great deal to do with creative political activity, or as Denitch put it: 
“I believe that only in societies with a high degree of autonomous self-
organisation and a thick set of overlapping movements and institutions, 
does it become possible to think of moving beyond the limits that capitalist 
civilization sets” (1991: 104). Despite Brand’s opinion that the realisation 
of certain ideas of socialism depended on the “historical setting of a given 
society”, statements such as Denitch’s must be read as a prioritisation of 
ethics and practical democratic experimentation over materialist analyses of 
the development of capitalism and the political economy, as well as the 
power structures of the contemporary world (1991: 99). 
 
Questions and Dilemmas 
The main difficulty for Dissenters was formulated by its editor, Mitchell 
Cohen: for them, socialism appeared to be more of a problem than a pana-
cea (cf. 1994: 377). Socialism seemed unduly problematic not only because 
of the realities of the Eastern Bloc, but also because, as a utopian idea, it 
expressed how society should look like without explaining how to arrive 
there, now that the most successful model had failed. The crucial question 
for socialists thus was how to translate socialist concepts into practice or at 
least how to move towards doing so and it was this limitation which trig-
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gered many of Dissent’s circumspect positions. Concrete issues were never-
theless raised and difficult questions asked. However, the answers were not 
often discussed and the problems hardly ever solved.  
The existence of a global economy constituted one of these problems. 
Brand explained that de-linking from global infrastructures would not be 
beneficial and had ended in disaster for the Eastern Bloc. He argued that 
one should instead support global struggles for economic regulation (cf. 
1991: 100). The question was not discussed any further and to support 
which struggles in what ways did not become clear.
4
 Ricoeur agreed to the 
idea of a mixed economy but missed any reflections on the question which 
parts of economic activity were best left in private hands and in the mar-
kets, and where public planning for production and distribution would 
make sense (cf. Rocard & Ricoeur 1991: 505). The final question con-
cerned the role of the state. While there was widespread agreement of its 
necessity (even among communitarianists such as Walzer), no one contra-
dicted Paul Hirst when he suggested that both democratic socialists and 
environmentalists should no longer rely on the state (and should instead 
work through associations) (cf. 1994: 243). Apart from this fundamental 
problem, the question remained what to do concretely to limit the power of 
the state (which was just as likely to be destructive as it was to be benefi-
cial) and how to liberate it from its close ties to economic power – a partic-
ularly important task in the U.S. context. Although writers were obviously 
aware of these problems, they were discussed nowhere in the pages of 
Dissent. Just like in New Left Review, this seemed to testify to certain help-
lessness among thinkers confronted with these problems. 
 
Monthly Review 
It was already mentioned that Monthly Review maintained its faith in the 
chance of reforming the U.S.S.R. well into the early 1990s, that they saw 
the Eastern Bloc’s disintegration as anything but the proof of the superiori-
ty of Western-style democracy, and that they focussed less exclusively on 
the not so hopeful situations in Europe and North America than the other 
three magazines. With such a background, re-thinking democratic socialism 
                                                             
4  It was only several years later that Dissent started regular coverage of “globali-
sation”, and analysed its consequences for the international economy and for the 
United States. 
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was perhaps less pressing a task than for the other journals and their con-
tributors. Nevertheless, Monthly Review also published articles dealing with 
questions of democratic socialism and the organisation of a future econom-
ic system which would be both just and sustainable. The specificity of their 
point of view came from close contact with, and frequent contributions by, 
dependency theorist Samir Amin as well as activists in Latin America. 
Obviously, it was the specific ethical socialism of the Latin American left 
which explained Monthly Review’s interest in the moral and spiritual di-
mension of progressive and socialist thought. Against these backgrounds, 
the journal’s mood seemed to be less subdued than the others’ though the 
questions they discussed were often identical ones. Given this focus, the 
Review may have felt less threatened by recent developments, which might 
also explain why the journal paid less attention to institutional questions 
than, for example, Socialist Register – the publication closest to it in terms 
of political outlook. The definition and explanation of socialist principles 
and goals, however, received considerable emphasis in Monthly Review’s 
pages. 
 
Principles and Core Elements of Democratic Socialism 
Like the other journals, Monthly Review offered several definitions of so-
cialism, which were, however, less contradictory than the ones in Dissent. 
Amin succinctly summarised socialism as the replacement of competition 
by cooperation (cf. 1990: 13). Thus, socialism became capitalism’s “signif-
icant other” on the world-historical stage, as Sweezy pointed out in 1993 
(1993: 1). In an interview with the British singer Billy Bragg, socialism was 
defined as being “about loving and caring for other people” (Batstone 1991: 
25). This definition is one example among several which used humanist 
rather than political or Marxist language and hinted at the spiritual dimen-
sion which a number of writers considered important. The following two 
definitions differed from those in the other journals in so far as they gave 
socialism a much broader meaning: for Magdoff, socialist struggle denoted 
the sum of all struggles for human emancipation whose purpose was to 
combat racism, nationalist and ethnic rivalries, and patriarchal hierarchies 
(cf. 1991: 5). Löwy defined a socialist society as “a form of society where 
the associated producers are the masters of the process of production, a 
society based on the largest economic, social and political democracy, a 
commonwealth liberated from all class, ethnic, and gender exploitation and 
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oppression” (1991: 33). These adaptations combined the classical Marxist 
version of socialism with the agendas of feminism and the new social 
movements. 
Contributors did not shy away from tall orders: Amin demanded an 
awareness of the cultural universalism of humanity’s project and thus hint-
ed at the global dimension which democratic socialism had to consider (cf. 
1990: 28). This was in line with his critique of the privileging of Western 
traditions and problems. The synthesis of human desires for unbroken 
community as well as a fully developed individuality (cf. Kovel 1994: 41), 
and a solidarity that was strong enough to transcend group interests, and 
sufficiently circumspect to combine environmental sustainability with 
preferential treatment for the poorest parts of the world’s population (cf. 
Hinkelammert 1993: 110). In the context of a sympathetic evaluation of 
Cuba, Alice Walker declared: “This empowerment of the poor: literacy, 
good health, adequate housing, freedom from ignorance, is the work of 
everyone of conscience in the coming century” (1994: 42). 
As in the other publications, Monthly Review featured perspectives 
which claimed that while socialism remained an ideal, a goal unlikely to be 
fully obtained, it was nevertheless needed as a reference point, or a horizon. 
Bearing this in mind, Amin stressed that reflections on socialism should 
only focus on systems of values and not on fully-fledged models of social 
organisation (cf. 1991: 10). This ethical anchoring was needed because, as 
Miliband repeated in his argument in the pages of Monthly Review, other-
wise one was in danger of getting lost in the social and political struggles of 
the day (cf. 1991: 23-24). Again, he declared the struggle for socialism to 
be a long-term project. This required the refutation of the assumption that a 
“true realm of freedom” would replace capitalism overnight. Instead, so-
cialism needed well thought through values and institutional structures and 
to leave the realm of freedom to future generations (ibid: 20).  
Within Monthly Review’s discussions of socialism, democracy also be-
came a central theme. Without democracy, there would be no chance to 
achieve a society that was free not only from economic exploitation but 
also from class antagonisms and alienation. The democracy envisaged was, 
however, different from the “formal” one familiar in capitalist states which 
was as far removed from socialism as was authoritarianism. The search for 
alternatives to both remained an important issue. Oliver S. Land explained 
in an article reflecting on the tasks and prospects of socialism in the 1990s: 
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[O]ne way to account for the parallel failures of the capitalist and self-styled social-
ist systems is to point out what has never yet been achieved anywhere: the integra-
tion of political with economic democracy, of centralized with de-centralized social-
economic planning, of representative with participatory democratic structures and 
processes. (1991: 47-48) 
 
Here also, the main strategy was to build on the foundations of liberal or 
formal democracy and to reform and radicalise it. No one believed in the 
viability of shortcuts to socialism via the infringement of democratic life, 
and concurrently, the reflexive, critical and creative potential of a society. 
Walker addressed this argument, quite poetically, as a friendly warning to 
the Cuban government: 
 
To Cuba I would say your poets are the heartbeat of the revolution: Because that is 
what, by definition, poets are. If you force them to eat their words it is the revolution 
that will suffer indigestion and massive heart attack. Bread is not everything, after 
all, as women have always stressed: there must be roses too. And the roses of any 
revolution are the uncertainties one dares to share. (1994: 43) 
 
Space for critical creativity was one thing; but there was also a need to 
dissolve the present structure of economic and political power. Democracy 
had to be made sufficiently powerful to prioritise social considerations over 
those of profit. For the veteran community activist Grace Lee Boggs, this 
meant “replacing it [the culture of capitalism; SB] with a culture in which 
the political superstructure, based on popular organisations, controls 
through conscious choices the development of the economy and of the 
productive forces. I believe that this is the global project of our time” 
(1990: 13). In addition, authors often mentioned that the democratic control 
of economic development was simply necessary for ending environmental 
destruction. Environmental concern had to become a priority for socialists 
as both Marzani and Sweezy emphasised (cf. Marzani 1990: 29). To this 
end, Magdoff more specifically demanded that socialists needed to define 
economic priorities which considered the limits of what the natural envi-
ronment could shoulder – unlimited growth and development were no 
longer regarded as realistic options (cf. 1991: 11). Amin took a similar 
position and described the concrete consequences which would follow from 
such a required reorientation: democratic socialists should consciously 
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develop new policies instead of trying to catch-up with capitalism. On the 
national level, this would mean delinking from the world economic system. 
On the planetary level, it would require the reconstruction of a polycentric 
world order (cf. 1992: 50). All this was impossible without some form of 
public ownership – one in which, unlike in social democratic states, the 
public sector would be dominant and the private controlled by democratic 
planning (cf. Miliband 1991: 22). 
The question of equality, so prominent in the other journals, was only 
rarely raised in the pages of Monthly Review. It appeared that contributors 
did not contest the idea that the highest possible level of equality should be 
strived for and instead only discussed the problem of whether hierarchies 
and classes, formed on the basis of particular expertise and responsibilities, 
would continue to exist or could be avoided in a socialist society (cf. Mag-
doff 1991). In contrast to the relatively light treatment of equality, Review 
seriously debated another aspect which hardly played a role in the other 
journals: the question of spirituality.
5
 In a long and tentative article, John 
Brentlinger based his call for a more positive evaluation of the sacred on 
his personal observations in post-revolutionary Nicaragua: 
 
I am a Marxist and an atheist. Yet seeing has become believing – I agree that Nica-
ragua is a more sacred land through the sacrifices of its revolutionary martyrs. But 
what can that mean? Is it possible? I ask this question seriously: can a revolutionary 
society that is refounding itself and its values re-create the sacred? (1992: 29) 
 
Brentlinger wanted to free socialism from a fallacy which he believed was a 
vestige of capitalism: the perception of religion and the sacred as outmoded 
and unscientific ways of thought (cf. ibid: 30). Instead he argued for recog-
nising feelings of love and responsibility for other people and for nature as 
a form of worldly spirituality – a spirituality that recognised human beings 
as creators of their own lives and societies and enabled them to notice and 
correct mistakes. Such a spirituality would transform the self-conception 
and the strategies of socialism: “It becomes modest and world-wise and 
speaks of infinite progress and alternative paradigms instead of a single 
                                                             
5  Norman Geras’s considerations on the ethical and moral implications of Marxist 
theory, which he published in New Left Review and Socialist Register, came 
closest to the question of spirituality and ‘the sacred’. 
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method and a final goal, but it need not abdicate its struggle for progress 
and faith in a higher society” (ibid: 40). With terms such as ‘community’ 
and ‘new society’, he saw conceptual links between socialist and religious 
goals and utopias. An appreciation of spirituality was just the logical con-
sequence of coming to terms with religion’s positive elements: 
 
I think we must respect and encourage the positive core that exists in religious 
spirituality for its concrete valuing of human community and humanity’s relation-
ship with nature (on a level that transcends the limits of class, race, and gender 
conflicts, without underestimating their importance). (ibid: 30) 
 
This “positive core”, according to Brentlinger, was deserving of scientific 
acceptance as it functioned to produce the sacred – which he defined as a 
valid expression of human life and as “necessary element of any communi-
ty worth dying for” (ibid: 40). For socialists, relying on such insights and 
feelings was necessary, in order to find what Raymond Williams had called 
“resources for a journey of hope” (qtd. in Foster 1993: 8). Finally, Paul 
Sweezy emphasised that the key ideas of socialism – equality and coopera-
tion – predated its emergence as a set of political ideas and were part of all 
great religious traditions (cf. 1993: 1). 
Another core principle turned up in the pages of Monthly Review on 
many occasions: a commitment to internationalism. This position proved 
much closer to orthodox socialism, but was nevertheless also shared with 
religious persuasions. Contributors envisaged not only a polycentric world 
order in which economic power had been dissolved, but also a termination 
of the arms race which was unjustifiable by all standards and had served to 
prevent the development of such a polycentric system through its comman-
deering of political power (cf. Amin 1990: 27-28; Amin 1992: 50). 
 
Reflections on Institutional Arrangements 
Compared to the other journals, Monthly Review’s deliberations on institu-
tional questions remained short. Some contributors subscribed to a tradi-
tional view on the stages of the revolutionary process and assumed post-
revolutionary societies would develop institutional arrangements fitting to 
their concrete conditions. Accordingly, the development of too detailed a 
general model would be a futile effort since people at different places had 
different problems, which in turn required specific solutions and hence also 
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particular institutional frameworks (cf. Amin 1990: 27). Nevertheless How-
ard J. Sherman provided a summary of institutional principles which again 
served to define democratic socialism: “economic democracy, the extension 
of political democracy to the economy. Socialism is public or collective 
ownership and control, where the public institutions (the government) and 
the collectives (or cooperatives) are democratically governed” (1990: 14). 
Sherman’s statement points again to the essential factors of democratic 
planning, public ownership, and the maintenance of certain market mecha-
nisms. Particularly important was democratic control of new investment in 
order to avoid its orientation on the principle of profit maximisation (ibid: 
21). Mechanisms of subsidiarity were needed to make these decision mak-
ing structures sensitive to people’s local needs but it was also necessary to 
strike a balance with overall demands such as a global redistribution of 
wealth or environmental protection (ibid). Thus Miliband emphasised that 
such grassroots elements were indeed important, but still formed “no sub-
stitute for democratic mechanisms in the internal organization of state 
power” (1991: 21). Magdoff explained which institutional changes would 
mark the difference between a capitalist democratic and a really democratic 
state. In his view, the most important institutional alteration to be achieved 
was the more even distribution of power in society: 
 
Clear-cut policies would be needed to underpin the move to a democracy that is 
really democratic: affirmative action to bring the people into the corridors of power; 
leaders who trust and listen to the people; and ways to make leaders accountable, 
which includes the right of the people to recall political leaders and administrators. 
(1991: 10) 
 
Such reforms, of course, would have to be applied right to the top level of 
government (cf. ibid: 6). To maintain such democratic structures, a form of 
‘permanent revolution’ was needed, otherwise functionaries and bureaucra-
cies would become too remote from public control: “To be sure, this di-
lemma can only be resolved by ongoing, uninterrupted revolutionary prac-
tice – a practice that opens the way for the empowerment of the unempow-
ered” (ibid: 10). Most of these suggestions focused on the level of the exist-
ing national states. Amin, in contrast, emphasised the importance of global 
governance. He intended to renew and extend the UN and demanded that 
socialists should work for the empowerment of the existing embryonic 
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structures of world government. He also called for a global tax that could 
be used for financing environmental policies (cf. 1990: 28). A certain ten-
sion arose with the general thrust of articles which recommended an in-
ward-focussed orientation in terms of community-based economic and 
social structures (the self-organisation of societal entities that were more or 
less identical with national states) as the only alternative to the rise of an 
imperial power – the United States. 
Apart from the controversial discussion of the Swedish welfare state in 
the pages of Monthly Review, the journal offered a number of further can-
didates as possible models. Marzani suggested combining the best of the 
United States and the U.S.S.R., of capitalism and socialism (supposedly he 
referred to democratic institutions and economic planning) and saw it as the 
only way forward (cf. 1990: 30). Additionally, he pointed to the possibility 
of a red-green project in Germany (based on the SPD’s comparatively 
radical 1980s’ programme) as a likely candidate for a future model (cf. 
ibid: 29). The third example mentioned was Cuba. When analysing the 
latter, Alice Walker noted a number of achievements that were admirable 
for poor and, perhaps in particular, African-American people: 
 
Having been born among the poorest, least powerful, most despised population of 
the United States, spoken to as if I were a dog for asking to use a library or eat in a 
restaurant, the revelation [during a visit to Cuba in 1979; SB] that black people, who 
make up between 40 and 60 percent of Cuba’s population, and women, who make 
up half, can share in all the fruits of their labours, was a major gift Cuba gave to me, 
a major encouragement to struggle for equality and justice, and one I shall never 
forget. (1994: 41) 
 
Cuba, was one of the last remaining non-capitalist systems and one for 
which contributors to the journal had much more sympathy than former 
Eastern European state socialist regimes. Given the United States’ 
longstanding conflict with the island, for a left U.S. journal its survival 
constituted a particularly serious challenge. 
 
Requirements 
There were only scattered and rather eclectic remarks on the preconditions 
and chances of moves towards democratic socialism. Strongest was the 
feeling that it required a change in public consciousness: 
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When more than a majority [sic] of the total population realizes its oppression, in 
both direct and indirect manifestations, and joins together to ‘fight the power’, the 
inherently unequal social structure will have to buckle, and a new, yet to be envi-
sioned egalitarian society will rise to take its place. (Kim 1993: 57) 
 
In such conceptions, educational work was obviously more important than 
the task of creating blueprints for the institutions of a democratic socialist 
society; without socialist education, there were few chances for the popula-
tion to come to terms with their oppression. Two strategies were essential 
for reaching people: old ideas had to be communicated in new ways or in 
new channels (cf. Marzani 1990: 29), and utopianism needed again to play 
a more important role in socialism (cf. Wallis 1992: 9). There were also 
scattered hints at replacing economic rationality and the concept of labour 
with less-alienating alternatives. Again in line with Monthly Review’s posi-
tive evaluation of spirituality as constituting an important dimension of 
consciousness which had been ignored by socialists, Peter Meiksins sug-
gested looking at the traditional mythologisation of craftwork for identify-
ing such alternatives – in which values such as freedom, community, varie-
ty, challenge and commitment replaced the fixation on wages (cf. 1994: 
53). Clearly, the issue of raising people’s consciousness, of sensitising 
them, played the most important role in preparations for democratic social-
ism. 
 
Questions and Dilemmas 
In Monthly Review a number of problems became visible that, like those 
encountered by Dissent, went directly to the heart of the democratic social-
ist project. Among these was the question of the maintenance of the term 
‘socialism’. Again, if one believed that giving up certain terms meant aban-
doning ideas and thus narrowed the number of alternatives available for 
political change, much more than just a name was at stake. However, when 
Bragg in his interview in Monthly Review claimed that the name ‘socialism’ 
was not important, nobody contradicted him (cf. Batstone 1991: 25). Most 
authors, however, continued to use the term self-confidently. The second 
problem that Monthly Review had to deal with was the question of the de-
gree of equality in socialism. This had two dimensions: firstly, critics asked 
how to avoid the development of a class of specialists in a democratic so-
cialist society, as similar structures had proved historically disastrous for 
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state socialist countries. Magdoff discussed this issue extensively and be-
lieved that a top layer of specialists remained necessary in a society highly 
differentiated in terms of economic life. In a similar vain, the question arose 
as to how to limit specialist influence to its immediate economic tasks 
without allowing it to become a source of privilege in the wider distribution 
of power. Sensing how critical the class issue was, Magdoff recommended 
tackling this problem as soon as possible during a process of transformation 
towards socialism: “The test of the inevitability of class structure will de-
pend on future attempts to create a socialist transition which consciously 
works not only to do away with the old class system but also to frustrate the 
formation of new classes and social strata” (1991: 8). The author, though, 
did not explain how this could be achieved. The second dimension con-
cerned the global applicability of the concept of equality. It would be diffi-
cult, and deserved further thought, as again Magdoff argued, to overcome 
differentials of wealth and power above all between third and first world, 
but also between peripheries and centres within the first (cf. ibid). Most 
contributors assumed that the strategy towards such equality lay in delink-
ing from the existing structures of the world economy. Delinking would 
work as a levelling force, which would strengthen domestic investment and 
thus in the long run reduce such differentials (cf. Amin 1992: 50). The 
imperfect and eventually failed attempts at delinking by the countries of the 
Eastern Bloc were not discussed in this context. 
A further problem for writers in Monthly Review was how to deal with 
anti-socialist forces. It was again Miliband who tried to deal with this diffi-
culty. In particular, he expressed unease about two questions: he saw an 
unavoidable tension between a strong state within a socialist democracy 
and one that was simultaneously controlled by and accountable to its citi-
zens. This tension, his argument went, could be reduced, but not completely 
eliminated by representative democracy. It became acute, above all, in the 
case of violent opposition from the political right. Under these circum-
stances he considered it to be justifiable to infringe civil liberties. However, 
it was absolutely essential not to forget that such a strategy was detrimental 
to socialist society itself and hollowed out its values – and thus had to be 
restricted to the absolute minimum and abandoned as soon as possible (cf. 
1991: 21-22). The only alternative to restrictive measures like these con-
sisted, as Tim Meisenhelder suggested, of the formation of class coalitions 
– to be achieved by political struggles based on concrete issues rather than 
OUT OF THE IMPASSE | 231 
 
theoretical ideals. He pointed to Third World national liberation struggles 
and although he discussed Cabral’s theories on the conditions under which 
sections of the middle classes might “commit class suicide” and take sides 
with the working class, he still was not convinced that this could prevent all 
forms of authoritarian structures. He recommended confining such authori-
tarian measures to a period of transition: “Militarist organization and ‘dem-
ocratic centralism’ may well be necessary for armed struggle and other 
periods prior to the taking of power but they must be rejected by the very 
design of ‘post revolutionary’ political institutions” (Meisenhelder 1993: 
47). Clearly, the contributors were not happy with their own answers to 
these problems and Magdoff asked himself (in words that could be under-
stood in many different ways): “Can socialism be built without major 
changes in the consciousness and standards of morality?” (1991: 5). It 
seemed that none of these problems could be solved as long as one had not 
decided whether socialist equality or democratic processes constituted the 
more important components of democratic socialism. 
 
4.2. Market Socialism – a Promising Project? 
 
In the United States and Britain, leftwing intellectuals and workers had for 
a long time thought about alternatives to Soviet-style state ownership of the 
means of production and its bureaucratic planning system. Figuring promi-
nently among the alternatives – especially in the 1970s – were syndicalism 
and workers control. In the early 1990s, after the debate had gained re-
newed urgency with the privatisation and deregulation experience of the 
Thatcher and Reagan years as well as the rapid disappearance of state own-
ership in Eastern Europe, thinkers began to intensively discuss the merits 
and problems of ‘market socialism’. The term, originally used for the Yu-
goslav form of economic organisation and going back to the writings of the 
Polish economist Oskar Lange, stood for a loose concept, developed into 
different directions by British and American theorists such as Alec Nove 
and John Roemer respectively.
6
 Among the journals, especially New Left 
Review and, to an even greater extent, Dissent took some effort in familiar-
                                                             
6  With Nove’s The Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983) and Roemer’s A 
Future for Socialism (1994), both have contributed studies which have become 
‘classics’ of market socialism. 
232 | INTELLECTUAL RADICALISM AFTER 1989 
 
ising their readers with the ideas of market socialism, evaluating their 
chances, and asking in how far they differed from welfare-state capitalism. 
A minority of intellectuals who took sides on these issues criticised it 
from a Marxist point of view, whereas the majority emphasised the ad-
vantages of the market-socialist concept, though to varying degrees. Con-
tributions by the latter analysed the merits of markets, the need to guide or 
control them, the ways in which markets and socialism could be linked (and 
why such an undertaking was worth the effort), market socialism’s organi-
sational and institutional requirements, and what the preconditions of im-
plementation and how its chances for working smoothly were. Like the 
opponents of the concept, its proponents took recourse to Marx, discussed 




In Dissent, market socialism served the purpose of making the democratic 
socialism analysed in the last chapter more concrete. Roemer, one of its 
leading proponents, characterised it as “a politico-economic system in 
which firms are publicly owned, the state has considerable control of the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy, and there is democratic control over 
society’s use of its economic surplus” (1991: 562). Thomas E. Weisskopf 
discussed those elements which distinguished market socialism from state 
socialism and to a certain degree situated it closer to capitalism: 
 
Market socialism seeks to promote the traditional socialist goals of equity, democra-
cy, and solidarity while maintaining economic efficiency; it proposes to do so by 
retaining one major feature of capitalism – the market – while replacing another 
major feature of capitalism – private ownership of the means of production. (1992: 
250) 
 
                                                             
7  This chapter changes the order in which the findings from the journals are pre-
sented because Dissent published the mist details reflections on the issue of 
market socialism. To analyse them first makes it easier for the readers to get fa-
miliar with the concepts of market socialism. 
OUT OF THE IMPASSE | 233 
 
Roemer accordingly declared that while markets were indispensible for an 
efficient economy, private ownership was not indispensible for well-
working markets (cf. 1991: 562). 
The market, according to the theories of market socialism, stood for a 
functional price mechanism which was lacking in centrally planned state 
economies. This price system was needed in order to guarantee efficiency 
and avoid bureaucracy and waste of resources. It functioned, however, in an 
economic system where public or state planning directed investment to 
purposes that were seen as socially useful. Proponents’ opinions differed as 
to the form and the extent of public ownership and on the question whether 
collective decisions should be taken at plant level or by society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, all agreed on the basic principles of economic democracy, on 
the need to redistribute profits as social dividends, and on the advantages of 
decommodifying public services. There were different suggestions as to the 
directive role of banks and managers, the availability of loans, or a basic 
income for all labourers, but all Dissenters maintained that a supervisory 
state would need to play a central role. In the words of Bob Rae, market 
socialism should be seen as an attempt to come to terms with the tension of 
“three realities”: planning, democracy, and markets (1991: 43). 
Rae went into greater detail when stressing the virtues of markets not 
just in terms of efficiency but also accountability. He listed realistic pricing, 
respect for the relationship of supply and demand, the positive effects of 
competition, the need to serve a public of consumers, an openness for 
change, dynamism, entrepreneurship and efficient management as the main 
advantages (cf. ibid: 45). States and governments were usually judged by 
their populations, as James Rule argued, in terms of their ability to organise 
economic growth – and an economic system based on markets could pro-
duce such growth (cf. 1990: 478-9). These successes were most convincing 
however, as several writers claimed, where states exercised a certain 
amount of control rather than followed the Anglo-American model of a 
laissez-faire economy (cf. Erber 1990: 353). Thus throughout the twentieth 
century one could observe a tendency towards state-guided and increasing-
ly state-managed capitalism – in other words: state-supervised markets (cf. 
ibid: 357). If Anglo-American capitalism was one unconvincing alternative, 
the other, as Daniel Bell emphasised in Dissent, could only consist of cen-
tral planning where people at the levers of economic power would inevita-
bly develop and pursue their own interests (cf. 1991: 52-3). This experience 
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stemmed not only from observing economic life in the Eastern Bloc but 
also in Western countries. 
Contributors believed in the possibility as well as in the necessity of 
controlling markets. David Miller, who wrote a piece on the detailed work-
ings of market socialism, countered criticism that its proponents were no 
proper socialists by arguing that the problem for socialism was not markets 
per se, but their effective control (cf. 1991: 413). These positions differed 
not only from the opinion of New Right economists such as Hayek and von 
Mises, but also from those of former Eastern European scholars, who had 
once tried to sketch out ways towards a more efficient and more democratic 
socialist economy but were now convinced of the futility of any such at-
tempts. Thus the proponents of market socialism heavily criticized, for 
example, James Kornai’s book The Road to a Free Economy (1990) with 
its thesis that there was no ‘third way’ due to the incompatibility of socialist 
ethics and market efficiency, which they described as an expression of East 
European intellectuals’ flight from their former ‘naïve’ belief in the possi-
bility of transforming Soviet-style socialism (cf. Nove 1990: 443). The 
contributors’ optimistic view that it was possible to create controlled but 
still efficient market relations originated from the perception that, in the 
West, the public sector with its alleged inefficiency was very often blamed 
for private sector failure and for budget constraints imposed by the state (cf. 
ibid: 445). Controlled markets worked better than neo-liberals wanted to 
admit. 
Market socialism was necessary for two reasons: Erber was convinced 
that the introduction of “market relations without capitalist relations” would 
be the existential question of ecological improvement and hence of human 
survival in the twenty-first century (1990: 356). Secondly, the perceived 
need for social curbing of market relations furthered the left’s fundamental 
goal of equality. Crucial goods and services should be unconditionally 
available to all regardless of their market position and purchasing power 
(cf. Broadbent 1991: 83). Authors argued that deregulation was no panacea. 
Even if it was true that planned economies had not worked it was obvious 
that neo-liberal models did not either. Nove pointed out, and urged Eastern 
European economists to consider, that Thatcherite laissez-faire policies had 
had no beneficial effect on the real-wealth creating parts of the British 
economy (cf. 1990: 446). Erber observed the same for the United States: 
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If global market share is the goal, the nation’s consumers had better not been permit-
ted to decide on the allocation of resources. Laissez-faire America illustrates why 
not. The consumers opt for second homes, third cars, snowmobiles, Jacuzzis, and 
Torneau watches, thereby shortchanging education at all levels, skill retraining of 
the labour force, housing, and health care – all essential ingredients in mobilizing 
resources to fight for market share. (1990: 359) 
 
The intellectuals agreed on the need for markets, but they explicitly contra-
dicted the neo-liberal idea that markets constituted a form of, or a model 
for, societal organisation in general. Quite to the contrary, without control, 
markets posed a danger for societies. In the words of Paul Hirst, 
 
[t]here is no such thing as a ‘market society’, for the simple reason that the market is 
not a society. It is a mechanism of exchange that is embedded in other social rela-
tionships. In ‘freeing’ the market, economic liberalism actually weakens those 
relationships. Societies will be unable to survive, and even to compete economically, 
if they just accept whatever results uncontrolled market and international competi-
tive pressures produce. (1994: 243) 
 
As a consequence, markets had to be accompanied by civil societies: 
 
So if we are to have a market economy, we also need a definition of citizenship 
(what I have called ‘the public household’) that permits individuals to participate 
fully, in the market as well as the polity, as members of a civil society. A market 
economy without a civil society is an individualistic monstrosity. (Bell 1991: 50) 
 
Writers disagreed on the ‘socialist’ content of market socialism. On the one 
hand, the question of the ownership of the means of production and the 
distribution of wealth had been thoroughly debated by the left and had 
acted as markers of difference between liberals (or, in the European ver-
sion, social democrats) and socialists (cf. ibid). On the other hand, propo-
nents of market socialism argued that state ownership meant neither auto-
matically higher wages nor better working conditions (cf. ibid. 480), nor 
were private and public ownership synonymous with private and public 
decision making respectively (cf. Erber 1990: 357). In other words, a fair 
distribution of wealth and public decision making had replaced public 
ownership as the guideline for socialist politics. Consequently, the privati-
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sation spree in Eastern Europe did not necessarily mean the abolition of a 
socialist politics. At least for some writers, market socialism could unprob-
lematically exist on the base of predominantly private ownership – a posi-
tion that certainly transcended the definitions by Roemer and Weisskopf 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter: 
 
I suggest that this may not be the most significant or fruitful point to focus on. Per-
haps the government-versus-private dichotomy should give way to a broad spectrum 
of different auspices for capital. Maybe we should be talking about how ‘ownership’ 
might take on meanings and new social content in an egalitarian market economy. 
(Rule 1990: 479) 
 
Rule argued that the worst form of inequality consisted of people who were 
better-off dominating public and political decision making (cf. 1990: 479-
80). He went on: “It seems to me that government ownership of productive 
wealth neither guarantees an attack on such inequalities nor is necessary for 
success in such an attack” (ibid: 480). Finally he insisted that rather than 
anxiously discussing whether the means used in such an attack could be 
defined as ‘socialist’ or not, leftwing intellectuals and activists should re-
draw the “map of political possibilities” (ibid). Yet, while the writers ac-
cepted markets, they did not love them. Apart from the already mentioned 
strengthening of civil society, this scepticism made them argue for an ex-
tension of the public sector, especially of the welfare systems (cf. Erber 
1990: 357). In this combination, socialism became, according to Alec 
Nove, almost identical with “welfare-capitalism-with-a-human-face” (1990: 
446). Weisskopf contradicted this perception. He saw a difference in the 
stronger inclusion of communities and a more fundamental power shift: 
 
Where market socialism seeks to promote the public interest, greater equity, democ-
racy, and solidarity primarily by transferring capitalist ownership rights to communi-
ties of citizens or workers, social democracy seeks to do so by government policy 
measures designed to constrain the behavior of capitalist owners and to empower 
other market participants. (Weisskopf 1992: 258) 
 
Dissent published three articles which dealt with the technical intricacies of 
market socialism (cf. Miller 1991; Roemer 1991; Weisskopf 1992). All of 
the contributions suggested some mixture of public ownership and man-
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agement, workers cooperatives with self-management and, finally, limited 
private ownership. Economic decision making would be supervised in three 
different ways: by the public as a whole, by a firm’s employees, and by the 
state. The role of the state was particularly complicated. Its task was seen as 
guiding economic development through an arms-length approach – without 
directing and thus disturbing its internal dynamics. The major instrument 
for such an involvement was the planning of investment rather than of the 
composition and prices of goods to be produced (cf. Roemer 1991: 564). 
Entrepreneurship would still have a function, as David Miller explained, 
because its essence, the capability of perceiving the difference between a 
product’s future selling price and the cost of the resources needed to pro-
duce it, would remain (cf. 1991: 411). 
Critics of market socialism often pointed to the case of Yugoslavia. Did 
it not prove that market socialism did not work? In the Yugoslavian case, 
the Soviet Union’s influence could not be blamed for the failure. However, 
according to Tadeusz Kowalik, the Yugoslav model had a number of defi-
ciencies: decentralization and the abolition of macro-economic planning 
went too far and made the national economy more free-market than in most 
Western European states. This absence of planning produced collisions 
between workers’ self-management, market mechanisms, and the Com-
munist Party’s role in un-systematically determining prices and investment 
priorities. Hence, Yugoslavia could not be used as an example that market 
socialism was bound to fail (cf. 1991: 94, see also Weiskopf 1992: 252).  
The question remained as to how such non-capitalist markets could be 
implemented. The authors agreed that the present political climate was not 
particularly promising. In the Western countries, such a transformation 
would be obviously difficult to achieve. Several authors hinted towards the 
Swedish wage earners’ funds as bold attempt at a change of power rela-
tions. However, this example had simply failed as had all other attempts to 
implement a radical programme on the nation-state level (as in France 
around 1980) or even to install grassroots democracy within organisations 
working in the nation-state political arena (as in Britain’s Labour Party a bit 
later). In Eastern Europe, much more than in the West, the objective condi-
tions were given because, after the crash of state socialism, the question in 
what direction a future economy would develop was open. Unfortunately, 
market socialism was not what most people in Eastern Europe wanted (cf. 
Kowalik 1991: 94). There was, however, a chance for the situation to 
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change once unemployment and economic problems began to affect them 
more seriously (cf. ibid. 95). 
Several open questions remained. It was still unclear whether the move 
to market socialism needed to be started by governments, labour move-
ments, a broad popular alliance, or at the ‘point of production’. Additional-
ly, the question of ‘market socialism in one country’ constituted an obvious 
problem that was only occasionally raised and in just one case answered 
with vague hopes on the European social chapter (cf. Miller 1991: 414). At 
least some proponents of market socialism seemed convinced that once a 
transformation process had been set in motion, it would become self-
sustaining and would gain intensity since it would, through political 
measures furthering equality and the decommodification of many areas of 
public life, move public opinion slowly but dynamically to the left (cf. 
Roemer 1991: 568). 
 
New Left Review 
New Left Review published both positive evaluations and also severe cri-
tiques of market socialism. Interestingly, it was G. A. Cohen (who had 
collaborated with Roemer among others in developing what became known 
as ‘analytical Marxism’) who criticised the concept for a variety of reasons 
but especially because it would not break with the bourgeois profit-centred 
elements of the market logic. He referred to Marx’s critiques of revisionism 
when elaborating his argument: 
 
But he [Marx; S.B.] did not doubt that reward for contribution is a bourgeois princi-
ple, one which treats a person’s talent ‘as a natural privilege’. Reward for contribu-
tion implies recognition of what I have elsewhere called the principle of self-
ownership. Nothing is more bourgeois than that, and the Gotha critique lesson for 
market socialism is that, while market socialism may remove the income injustice 
caused by differential ownership of capital, it preserves the income injustice caused 
by differential ownership of endowments of personal capacity. (1991: 16) 
 
For Cohen, market socialism was not only deficient because it best reward-
ed people who were talented but also because it identified and reproduced 
“mean motivations” as the basis for human economic activity: “The imme-
diate motive to productive activity in a market society is usually some 
mixture of greed and fear, in proportions that vary with the details of a 
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person’s market position. In greed, other people are seen as possible 
sources of enrichment, and in fear they are seen as threats” (ibid: 18). Co-
hen conceded, however, that market socialism could be embraced as an 
immediate political demand and play a part in what Marx called the first 
phase of communism (cf. ibid: 16). Yet he urged the left not to define mar-
ket socialism, in a voguish move, as the solution to all problems just be-
cause the chance to go beyond it seemed at the moment quite slim: “If you 
cannot bear to remember the goodness of the goal that you sought and 
which is not now attainable, you may fail to pursue it should it come within 
reach, and you will not try to bring it into reach” (ibid: 14). David Purdy 
also explained that even if market socialism was adopted as a progressive 
politics, the tension between the egalitarian logic of citizenship and the 
market tendency to (re-) produce disparate social conditions remained and, 
as a socialist task, had to be tackled head-on (cf. 1994: 43). 
For Jürgen Habermas, the separating out of certain spheres of social life 
was a necessary feature of complex societies. These areas then had devel-
oped their own modes and laws of working, be it in the sphere of political-
administrative life or in the economy, which was regulated by the market 
logic (cf. 1990: 17). Yet such an economy was not necessarily capitalist and 
thus there was no need for Eastern European societies to return to a fully-
fledged capitalist system (ibid). An important question for the left was 
whether efficiency – which markets supposedly furthered – was at all a 
socialist goal. This question was discussed by Robin Blackburn: 
 
Some may contest the notion that a socialist economics should seek to emulate the 
sort of efficiency that is promoted by market competition. In a socialist pattern of 
economy the overall distribution of demand would be very different from that in a 
capitalist society and so would be the context and capacity of public regulation. The 
automatism of the accumulation process – growth for growth’s sake – would not be 
there, nor would the encouragement to a greedy consumerism. Social costs and 
‘externalities’ would be rendered more visible. But both productive and transactional 
efficiency would still be vital. (1991: 217) 
 
The more efficient an enterprise was, he added, the more it could contribute 
to social and egalitarian goals (ibid.). Hence efficiency constituted an im-
portant element of a socialist economy. 
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However, authors were convinced that market control was a matter of 
necessity. They formulated the same arguments as Dissenters: As Jürgen 
Habermas and Robin Blackburn explained in different ways, market econ-
omies were indifferent to their ‘external’ costs – thus sensitising them to 
social and especially ecological requirements would become a matter of 
survival (cf. Habermas 1990: 17, Blackburn 1991: 232). Additionally, 
labour itself would not be treated as a commodity and as a consequence 
many of the conflicts over the distribution of profits and wage levels, and 
the threat of wage squeezes would vanish (cf. Blackburn 1991: 217). 
In practice, state involvement should be indirect, and limited to the set-
ting up of frameworks for industrial relations, procedures of decision mak-
ing within a socialist economy in general and firms in particular, and insti-
tutions of ‘social auditing’ (cf. Blackburn 1991: 223). It was not entirely 
clear whether the resulting form of organisation of the economy as a whole 
could be best described as syndicalism, corporatism, or economic democra-
cy. What was clear, however, was that a shift of power was needed because 
managers should no longer be responsible to shareholders but instead to the 
public and to the employees, that profits would be redistributed and hence 
an egalitarian drive would gather momentum, and that politics in a market 
socialist society would be at least as complicated and prone to social con-
flict as in a capitalist one. 
Looking for historical precedents, a number of authors seemed con-
vinced that without Soviet interferences, traditions of reform communism 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia would have produced moves towards mar-
ket socialism and in so doing might have been able to produce systems 




Monthly Review also published different positions on market socialism 
though the space dedicated to the issue was considerably smaller. István 
Mészáros expressed his view that market socialism would suffer from an 
insurmountable paradox: the combination of the market’s economic extrac-
tion of surplus labour with its political extraction in socialism (cf. Monthly 
Review 1993: 14). Ellen Meiksins Wood diagnosed a fundamental error in 
the market socialists’ perception of the market – she declared that the mar-
ket was not a sphere of opportunity and choice but rather an instrument of 
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class power to control the working classes and Third World as well as 
Eastern European countries. Although she conceded, like Cohen in New 
Left Review, that ‘socialist’ markets might be less harmful than ‘free mar-
kets’ and some institutions and practices associated with markets might be 
used in a socialist economy, she saw no reason why left intellectuals – 
following people in Eastern Europe, whose ‘illusions’ she understood – 
should embrace the idea of beneficial market systems because 
 
it’s no good refusing to confront the implications of the one irreducible condition 
without which the market cannot act as an economic discipline: the commodification 
of labor power – a condition which places the strictest limits on the ‘socialization’ of 
the market and its capacity to assume a human face. (1994a: 39) 
 
A different position was taken by Harold J. Sherman who stated that in a 
highly complex economy, decentralisation of decision-making was neces-
sary and without markets impossible (cf. 1990: 20). Similarly, even the 
veteran socialists Harry Magdoff and Ralph Miliband conceded in the 
pages of Monthly Review that the question was not whether markets should 
exist at all but rather what kind of markets (Magdoff 1991: 15) and what 
would be their adequate role (Miliband 1991: 23). At the same time, au-
thors warned against claiming a causal link between markets and democra-
cy. Clearly, in the case of Eastern Europe, marketisation was not enough to 
produce democratic societies (cf. Löwy 1991: 36). To avoid short-term 
consumerism and to allow for a production for the whole of society’s 
needs, markets, according to Harry Magdoff, definitely had to be subordi-
nated to central planning (cf. 1991: 16-7). 
Finally, Harry Magdoff presented a successful case – the United States. 
His experience as member of the New Deal administration more than fifty 
years ago made him strongly convinced that, in principle, a combination of 
planning, markets, a high level of state activism, and a variety of ownership 
types was possible and could have beneficial effects (ibid). 
 
Socialist Register 
Socialist Register obviously saw no sense in getting involved in the debates 
on market socialism. They contended that with the changes of 1989, discus-
sions about ownership had eventually lost their doctrinal significance – 
although this shift in political attitude had started long before. Contributors 
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presented a list of illustrious names to claim authority for their thesis that 
the ‘form of ownership’ debate had been abandoned: Gyorgy Lukács, 
James Kornai, Rudolf Bahro and Oskar Lange were put forward as exam-
ples of intellectuals who had in their different ways moved beyond the issue 
(cf. Cox 1991: 184-5; Lebowitz 1991: 349-50). Cox additionally formulat-
ed a position that could be read as an implicit acceptance of the relevance 
of market socialism for transformative politics. He claimed that models of 
socialism should no longer focus on producers’ self-management, but in-
stead on popular participation in central planning (cf. Cox 1991: 184). On 
the one hand this could be understood as an approach that privileged plan-
ning over market mechanisms, but the acceptance of different forms of 
ownership would also leave space for markets below the level of overall 
planning. For Socialist Register, market socialism had to be integrated into 
debates over the extension of democracy to the economic sphere. 
 
4.3. Sweden and other Dreamlands 
 
The hesitance and distance with which Western leftist and Marxist intellec-
tuals viewed the political practice of the countries of the former Eastern 
Bloc begs the question: which countries, societies, or polities in existence 
actually resembled the intellectuals’ respective ideals of ‘socialism’? For 
most thinkers, the Swedish system came closest to fulfilling such criteria.
8
 
Sweden, thus, became an often mentioned case study and a widely debated 
topic in the magazines – the coverage ranged from frequent passing re-
marks to a number of complete articles.
9
 Reflections generally addressed 
                                                             
8  The breakdown of the state socialist regimes reinvigorated the interest of left-
leaning social scientists in ‘models of capitalism’. In the first half of the 1990s, 
it became common to regard the Rhineland, the Nordic and the Japanese models 
as superior to the Anglo-American one, with their higher degrees of state inter-
vention and their institutionalised corporatism. This view became increasingly 
contentious as the 1990s progressed and Anglo-American economic liberalism 
and Ireland-style neo-corporatism seemed to overtake the others in term of eco-
nomic growth and the creation of new jobs. 
9  Interest was even stronger because in the early 1990s the ‘Swedish model’ 
seemed to crumble. In 1991, for just the second time (the first lasted from 1976 
to 1982) in almost 60 years, a non-social democratic government had come to 
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three questions: firstly, could the Swedish system legitimately be labelled 
as ‘socialist’? Secondly, why had it run into difficulties in the 1980s? And 
finally, what lessons could theorists draw from the Swedish model and 
from the difficulties which it had to deal with after the end of the golden 
age of social democracy? It becomes obvious that much more space was 
devoted to dealing with Swedish society than with any other – none was 
able to act as a serious rival in attracting the socialist imagination. Howev-
er, though inordinately popular, Sweden was not the only candidate for 
intellectual interest. Therefore, this chapter also serves the purpose of fur-
ther examining those countries which were viewed as having possible so-
cialist elements in their fabric.  
 
New Left Review 
New Left Review was the only of the four magazines which did not devote 
whole articles to the ‘Swedish question’. Nevertheless, positive evaluations 
can be found. For example, Kate Soper attested to Sweden’s great success 
when reflecting on the question how the satisfaction of basic human needs 
could be achieved on a global scale (cf. 1993: 115). With regard to the level 
of social security the Swedish state provided to its citizens, it clearly stood 
out as a role model. For Ted Honderich, the issue of social and material 
equality in Swedish society was the most central. He applauded the coun-
try’s comparatively successful move from a hierarchical to a more egalitar-
ian democracy – a move, however, that had stopped or even been reversed 
by the early 1990s (cf. 1994: 65). Honderich interpreted this setback as a 
consequence of the problem that any more-radical changes in the distribu-
tion of power – which were a necessary precondition for leaving the capi-
talist logic permanently behind – would always lead to civil war. He left the 
question open, however, as to whether such a war was desirable and could 
be won (cf. 1994: 66). 
New Left Review did not see the Swedish case as an example of a truly 
socialist society. Nevertheless, it highlighted its importance for socialists as 
an example of what Robin Blackburn called “impure capitalism” – a form 
of capitalism with massive state involvement which was superior to Anglo-
American ‘pure capitalism’ and worth more serious attention by left intel-
                                                                                                                          
power and started preparing Sweden for a membership in the European Com-
munity.  
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lectuals – now that capitalism had ‘won’ (cf. 1991: 228-9). Similarly, Paul 
Auerbach, in his article on the importance of education for socialist ad-
vance, listed Sweden, like the Netherlands, among a group of countries 
whose populations’ above-average levels of education coincided with the 
widest expansion and most powerful forms of industrial democracy (cf. 
1992: 10). For the author, a causal link existed between these two features. 
Several authors in New Left Review, however, hinted at the problem that the 
Swedish model relied on an exceptionally high level of material wealth. It 
allowed for a living standard which, for ecological reasons, was far too high 
to be replicated on a global scale. This anomaly, according to a number of 
sceptics, limited Sweden’s value as a globally applicable guide for thought 
on a more egalitarian society (cf. Soper 1993: 26; Mouzelis 1993: 184). 
For New Left Review with its global perspective, Sweden was the most 
interesting of a number of national economies which did not follow the 
doctrine of ‘pure capitalism’. This heterogeneous group also included coun-
tries such as Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Germany (cf. Blackburn 1991: 228-
9). Though writers suggested that intellectuals should draw lessons from 
these systems’ corporate structures, their highly regulated industrial rela-
tions or their state-led investment strategies, they did not discuss these 
cases in detail. 
 
Socialist Register 
Socialist Register nearly unanimously agreed that the Swedish ‘people’s 
home’ was very likely the most advanced example of social democratic 
achievement, but that it, nevertheless, fell short of socialism. Miliband 
defined the Swedish system as a form of tamed capitalism (cf. 1991: 380). 
The most important lesson to be learned from the country was that the high 
degree of domestication became possible through the influence of the par-
ticularly strong Swedish labour movement. Even though Sweden did not 
introduce socialism, Socialist Register regarded the standards set in its 
social-democratic experiments as obviously important enough to invite 
Rudolf Meidner, one of the Swedish welfare state’s main architects, to 
reflect on the model’s difficult state in the early 1990s. In his article, Meid-
ner conceded that Sweden’s ‘people’s home’ definitely did not constitute a 
Marxist project, but nonetheless remained one of “functional socialism”, in 
which capital had been driven from its monopoly position in economic 
decision making. However, it had not been expropriated: 
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The Swedish model [...] is reformist in the sense that private ownership and free 
markets are accepted to a large extent, but it is socialist in so far as fundamental 
values of the labour movement are built into it. The model is based on a firm social-
ist ideology but recommends at the same time practical methods to attain the goals. 
(1993: 219) 
 
In short, this quote could be read as the thesis that the Swedish model con-
formed to a transformative approach to democratic socialism. 
With regard to the question of why the Swedish model had run into dif-
ficulties or, as some argued, had to be considered a failure, the differences 
were more about nuance and emphasis than about fundamental points. 
Comments clarified, however, that the model failed to develop a transform-
ative strategy and instead remained within the limits of social democracy. 
Meidner himself was obviously ambivalent. Despite his remark quoted 
above, he saw the model’s shortcomings which, according to him, lay in the 
non-Marxist approach to socialism during the golden years or else in the 
Swedish labour movement’s “inability to encroach upon private ownership, 
the very core of the capitalist system” (ibid: 225). Gregory Albo also 
agreed that the Swedish model did not leave the capitalist logic behind; 
although he added that this had been tried when Meidner and others had – 
against massive opposition by the owners of large firms, by politicians even 
from the social democrats’ own ranks and by parts of the public – unsuc-
cessfully tried to introduce wage earners funds in the late 1970s (cf. 1994: 
161-2). Lessons should be learned from this abortive attempt: John Bellamy 
Foster criticised liberal left thinkers’ calls for “new social contracts” whose 
demands (which taken together often resembled the Swedish model) would 
require a class revolt in order to gain a chance of being implemented (cf. 
1990: 277-8). If even Sweden’s strong labour movement had proved unable 
to achieve this, the chances elsewhere were minimal. For Panitch, the crisis 
of the Swedish model had to be understood as the global crisis of Keynesi-
anism which had also harmed other welfare states (cf. 1994: 82). The fact 
that this crisis affected Sweden later and less seriously, testified to the 
greater strength of the labour movement, but not to a fundamentally differ-
ent economic organisation and political power structure (cf. ibid.). Meidner 
obviously agreed when he declared the model to have run its cause: “Social 
democracy has fulfilled its purpose well in a singular phase of Swedish 
history but must step down as a driving force as Sweden becomes just a 
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small part of a large block of capitalist states. There is no room in this 
scenario for a specific Swedish profile” (1993: 227). 
Though Sweden did not implement a socialist system and although it 
remained to be seen whether or not its model’s crisis would be terminal, the 
question arose as to whether or not it had created institutional arrangements 
socialists could learn from. For Socialist Register, this seemed to be the 
case. Again, it was Rudolf Meidner himself who argued that although Swe-
den had never developed fully-fledged socialism, it had at least in some 
respects progressed beyond capitalism: “The model combines visions and 
pragmatism of the traditional Swedish brand. It comes close to what Ernst 
Wigforss, a leading ideologist of the Swedish labour movement, called 
‘provisional utopias’” (1993: 219). Despite his remarkable level of self-
criticism, Meidner remained convinced of the model’s significance: “A de-
radicalized labour movement took the lead in developing into a welfare 
society which aroused admiration and envy all over the world” (ibid: 213). 
The demise of the Swedish model therefore posed a problem not only for 
Sweden, but for the left everywhere – how could welfare systems be de-
fended in periods of economic crises (cf. ibid: 220)? 
Although Sweden fell short of Socialist Register’s expectations in sev-
eral respects, this is certainly not to say that it was not significant. Sweden 
proved an incomparable object of study; not only did contributors produce 
multiple articles investigating the country’s social and economic organisa-
tion, but more than any other, Sweden proved unique in its ability to foster 
a tone of sympathetic critique among authors.  
 
Dissent 
In many respects, comments in Dissent resembled those in the Socialist 
Register. Bogdan Denitch, for example, wrote that the central feature set-
ting Sweden apart from other societies was the power and the self-
confidence of its labour movement rather than the extent of the country’s 
welfare provision (cf. 1991: 104). James Rule again stressed the society’s 
egalitarianism, the achievement of which, as he was convinced, the Swe-
dish Workers Party had pursued more wholeheartedly than any other social 
democratic party, making Sweden a more equal society than the U.S.S.R. 
(cf. 1990: 479). Dissent evaluated the Swedish case highly positively, sen-
timents which became obvious in a series of replies submitted in response 
to a question formulated by Robert Heilbroner: how far beyond a “real but 
OUT OF THE IMPASSE | 247 
 
slightly imaginary Sweden” would democratic socialists have to move in 
order to create a socialist society (1991: 96)? One respondent stated that 
Sweden might already be socialist – though still highly vulnerable and 
increasingly dependent on a “very imaginary Europe” (Barkan 1991: 98). 
Others agreed with this perception of vulnerability and shied away from 
calling a country socialist before the moves towards egalitarianism had 
become constitutionally codified and irreversible. For Mitchell Cohen, for 
example, it was a condition of socialism that the population’s social rights 
become “inalienable rights” on a par with the civil rights of the U.S. consti-
tution (1991: 101). Denitch remained convinced that Swedish economic 
organisation could still be transformed into a more socialist model by intro-
ducing workplace democracy and what he called the abolition of the con-
centration of private property (cf. 1991: 105). Finally, Gus Tyler regarded 
the question of the model’s socialist content as difficult to answer because 
the constellation of power in Sweden was one which was unimaginable 
within at least a Marxist perspective on socialism: the proletariat acted as 
the executive committee of a capitalist state and used it for its own ends (cf. 
1991: 110). While this configuration was incomprehensible on the base of 
Marxist theory, it could certainly qualify as a version of market socialism. 
Although Dissenters saw the Swedish model as seriously threatened, in 
their eyes its achievements had not disappeared yet. They critically ob-
served that Meidner’s plans for wage earners funds had not only been re-
jected by Swedish capitalists, but also by the voters. Thus it was argued that 
one of the reasons for recent problems consisted of the model’s internal 
shortcomings, for example, its paternalism which had increasingly antago-
nised the Swedish people (cf. Horvat 1991: 108). One of Dissent’s contrib-
utors, furthermore, hinted, just like Soper and Mouzelis in New Left Re-
view, at the problem that the Swedish model relied on a living standard 
which was too high to be reproduced all over the world. Hence, the Swe-
dish case offered important insights, but could not be used a blueprint for a 
socialist strategy (cf. Brand 1991: 100). 
Ernest Erber listed not only Sweden but also Japan as societies where 
social considerations rather than market forces guided the organisation of 
social relations. This linked the two welfare systems otherwise known for 
their differences: one had been achieved by a strong labour movement 
while the other had been created by paternalist but caring employers who 
cultivated a corporatist work ethics on firm level (cf. 1990: 359). Similarly, 
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Paul Berman claimed that not only Scandinavia but even the Canadian 
social system – which was quite modest for European standards – could 
serve as important sources of inspiration for the American left (cf. 1993: 
191). Like in Socialist Register, however, Sweden received more sympa-
thetic attention in Dissent than any other country did. 
 
Monthly Review 
In Monthly Review, contradictory opinions existed on the Swedish case. 
One of the authors noted that during the golden age of social democracy in 
the mid-1960s, Sweden had proved, at least impressive and ‘socialist’ 
enough to convince a famous American visitor, Martin Luther King, of the 
merits of ‘democratic socialism’ when he visited Scandinavia to receive the 
Nobel Prize (cf. Cushman-Wood 1993: 24). Other writers in Monthly Re-
view were less enthusiastic and debated whether there was any qualitative 
difference between the Swedish model and other countries’ social demo-
cratic policies. For Kenneth Hermele, its advantages were mostly restricted 
to the employees of large firms (cf. 1993: 16). He argued that Swedish 
capitalism did not differ from capitalism elsewhere (cf. 1993, 1993a), a 
view that was shared by Peter Cohen (1994: 41). Both of them accused the 
Social Democratic Workers Party of colluding with large Swedish (and 
increasingly also with international) corporations. If, however, Martin J. 
Morand declared that, like elsewhere, also in Sweden ‘socialism in one 
country’ had failed, this implied that at least clear efforts had been taken to 
move into socialist direction (cf. 1991: 26). 
One also finds two contradictory opinions on the meaning of Sweden’s 
example for socialists elsewhere. David Vail emphasised its importance for 
the American left (1993: 24): 
 
I confess a Jekyll and Hyde reaction to the recent policies and tactics of Sweden’s 
Social Democratic Party. When in Sweden, I tend to view the social democrats 
critically, from a socialist-environmentalist perspective. But on this side of the 
Atlantic, where even Bill Clinton seems fairly progressive, I find myself much more 
strongly aware of the social democrat’s [sic] past accomplishments and present 
virtues. (ibid: 30-1; Footnote 1) 
 
Peter Cohen, on the other hand, did not see any sense in speaking of a Swe-
dish model because it did not differ from other social democratic and wel-
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farist institutional arrangements. Furthermore, in international politics it 
behaved as badly and contradicted any notion of global working-class 
solidarity – just like any other capitalist country (1994: 43-4). 
Although all journals questioned the Swedish model’s global replicabil-
ity (and that of other welfare systems in the highly-industrialised countries), 
only Monthly Review looked for models beyond social democratic Western 
Europe, corporatist East Asia and liberal Canada (whose attractiveness 
seemed to depend to a large extent on its difference from the United States). 
Despite explicit critique, several writers in Monthly Review regarded Cuba 
as such a model. For Paul Sweezy, Cuba set standards in terms of its popu-
lation’s social equality, level of education, state of health, and the quality of 
the nutrition available to its population – if measured against other ‘devel-
oping’ countries (cf. 1990: 18). For Sweezy, the foundation of its success 
lay in the popular roots of the Cubans’ “own” revolution – distinguishing 
the island from the collapsed state-socialist societies in Eastern Europe 
where ‘socialism’ had been introduced by the Soviet Union (cf. ibid: 17). 
For the novelist Alice Walker, the model character stemmed from the level 
of equality Cuba had achieved among the different ethnic groups and from 
the confident politics of empowerment of the poor (cf. 1994: 41-2). Harry 
Magdoff pointed elsewhere – towards the Indian province of Kerala where 
a Communist-led regional government had managed to provide a level of 
social security for the most marginalised people unknown in other far bet-
ter-off parts of India (cf. 1991: 12). Magdoff conceded, however, that fur-
ther progress depended on a deliberate moving away from a capitalist 
framework of economic organisation (cf. ibid). Without such a shift, Kerala 
might share the fate of a dramatically richer society analysed by Jim De-
lahunty (1993) in an article for Monthly Review: while New Zealand had 
been regarded as a “Sweden of the South” until the 1970s, it had become 
the victim of a free-market renaissance and a signpost of an aggressive neo-
liberalism in the 1980s. As the only among the four journals, Monthly Re-
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4.4. Europe: Capitalist Club or Site of Struggle and Project 
for the Left? 
 
One of the major changes occurring simultaneously with the transfor-
mations in Eastern Europe was the start of a new stage in the ‘European 
unification’ process. On the one hand, the signing of the Maastricht treaty 
in 1992 signalled an intensification of economic and potentially political 
integration. On the other hand, the border between Western and Eastern 
Europe had disappeared. Hence the single market, ratified with the treaty, 
was likely to have consequences for Europe as a whole. The issue of Euro-
pean unification was deeply controversial for the British and the American 
intellectual left – representing hope for some and a serious danger for oth-
ers. The main questions raised in a number of articles, either focusing en-
tirely on these developments or discussing them within the context of ana-
lysing changes in global capitalism or the international political order, were 
whether the setting up of the European Union was a progressive step in the 
sense that it transcended exclusionist nation-state structures and constituted 
a political block powerful enough to prevent excesses by both a capitalism 
in the process of globalisation, and the only remaining super power. While 
few were without doubts about the European project, questions remained as 
to whether Europe could at least be transformed into a progressive force 
(and if it could, by what means) or whether it was, quite to the contrary, an 
administrative structure serving European capitalism and collaborating with 
the United States. Arguments concentrated on this question of the ‘nature’ 
of the European Union, but also on the meaning of its recent changes: 
would the single national states, as a consequence, become less powerful? 
Its present democratic deficit was only rarely ignored – was it possible to 
transform the EU into a more democratic entity? What would happen to the 
welfare systems of the individual national states? And finally, how should 
the left deal with the unification process? Should they welcome it and try to 
redirect it towards a more socialist project? Or should they keep their dis-
tance, criticise it and look for alternative resources, strategies and models 
for progressive social change? With the partial exception of the predomi-
nantly supportive Dissent, where only the European and British former 
structural Marxist and later theorist of ‘associative democracy’, Paul Hirst, 
expressed an ambivalent view on Europe, the journals were split on these 
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questions. The Americans, however, seemed slightly more optimistic than 
their British colleagues on this issue. 
 
New Left Review 
In the pages of New Left Review, one finds contradictory opinions concern-
ing the question of Europe.
10
 Interestingly, it was David Marquand, non-
Marxist and left-of-centre political scientist, who made the clearest case 
against the possibility of a social democratic Europe. Criticising sugges-
tions by Wolfgang Streeck and Paul Rogers for such a project, published in 
David Miliband’s 1994 compilation Reinventing the Left, Marquand ex-
pressed his opinion that it was highly utopian and that the European Union 
would remain in the grips of centrist and right-wing political forces even if 
social democrats were nominally in power (cf. 1994: 19). The problem, 
according to Marquand, lay in the economic orientation of the European 
Union. The original idea that political would follow economic integration 
had been unrealistic and only led to an erosion of nation-state power with-
out replacing it with appropriate supranational structures (cf. ibid: 24). The 
result was a lack of equality between different parts of the EU, an absence 
of what he called “territorial justice”. This was likely to have consequences 
in the future: 
 
So long as there is no authority to ensure territorial justice, to overcome the centripe-
tal tendencies inherent in a capitalist free-market economy, the periphery will not be 
able to sustain monetary union; and so long as the periphery cannot sustain monetary 
union, monetary union will be incomplete. (ibid: 25) 
 
Despite his pessimism, Marquand saw no solution but to reverse emphasis: 
instead of economic unification, political unification should become a 
priority and economic variation should not be used as an excuse for delay-
ing political integration, but as a reason for its urgency (ibid: 26). A second 
                                                             
10  New Left Review had taken a pro-European Community position during the 
heated debate over British membership in the mid-1970s. For the British left of 
the time this was an usual step which was widely criticised. See especially Tom 
Nairn’s article “The European Problem” (1972) which constituted the centre 
piece of New Left Review 75, a special issue number with the title The Left 
Against Europe? 
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voice was that of Aijaz Ahmad, who pragmatically argued the case for EU 
integration in New Left Review. In a side remark within a critical appraisal 
of Jacques Derrida’s “Spectres of Marx”, the Indian Marxist agreed with 
the French poststructuralist that there was the danger of a fundamentalist 
Christian EU (cf. 1994: 99). Unlike Derrida, however, he regarded the 
coming of the EU as unavoidable against the background of the ensemble 
of class forces and power distribution in Europe, and, for him, it was in 
several respects a progressive move (cf. ibid: 100). 
Only a few authors explicitly dealt with the question of whether dwin-
dling nation-state power had to be accepted as an unavoidable phenome-
non. David Marquand seemed convinced that the states themselves had 
initiated the transfer of power from the national to the supranational level. 
His main critique focused on the poor planning and execution of the transi-
tion, which made political interventions for a more egalitarian project ex-
tremely difficult or even utopian: “It will be utopian because the national 
states of the Union have already surrendered too much power to suprana-
tional institutions to implement it on the national level, while the institu-
tions of the Union will continue to be too weak to implement it on the su-
pranational level” (1994: 19). If it was true that the political room of ma-
noeuvre of individual national states declined, one of the most important 
issues for socialist intellectuals was the question of what would happen to 
the best-developed welfare states in a unifying Europe. The overwhelming 
majority of contributors were sceptical about the chances of their survival. 
Marquand expressed his fear of “competitive social dumping”, explicitly 
demanded and pursued by countries like Britain (ibid: 18). This was even 
more likely, as he pointed out, because political-institutional mechanisms 
for an adequate large-scale regional redistribution in the form of a transna-
tional electoral, welfare and tax system simply did not exist (ibid: 22). 
After these analyses, the question remained for the intellectual left how 
to relate to this process of European integration along capitalist lines. Both 
Marquand and Ahmad declared that, despite all scepticism, the left had to 
join the struggle over the European Union in order to make it an open, 
egalitarian, and internationalist rather than a closed, hierarchical, and fun-
damentalist polity (cf. Marquand 1994: 26; Ahmad 1994: 100). 
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Socialist Register 
John Palmer, European correspondent of the left-of-centre British newspa-
per Guardian emphasised in Socialist Register the progressive aspect of the 
European project and warned against the simplistic notion that the unifica-
tion would only serve capitalist interests. In his view, the major protago-
nists of capitalism were also divided over the question of free trade or pro-
tectionism (cf. 1992: 149). According to his perspective, the European right 
feared the entry of social democratic countries such as Sweden, Austria and 
possibly Norway which might move the whole EU project to the left – thus 
changing its current direction (cf. ibid: 152-5). Palmer was convinced that a 
socialist or at least progressive EU could contribute important stimuli to 
human emancipation on a global scale (cf. ibid). Stephen Gill, in the same 
issue of the Register, drew a bleaker picture. He strongly doubted that a 
unified Europe could challenge American and Japanese power in the global 
economy (cf. 1992: 157). He dismissed the idea that the twenty-first centu-
ry would be European rather than Pacific as a myth, though he conceded 
that European monetary union could to a certain degree act as a counter-
vailing force to U.S. power. The U.S. reaction, however, was likely to 
consist of a move from a Gramscian to a realist form of hegemony – replac-
ing cultural-ideological leadership by military-political dominance. This 
could not be challenged by the EU, but only by transnational alliances of 
progressive popular forces. These should work, according to Gill, for a 
differentiated world order on the base of a global civil society and an inter-
national political authority (cf. ibid: 193). Consequently, he criticised the 
“new constitutionalism” embraced by large sections of the intellectual and 
political left as an ersatz strategy after the end of the Eastern Bloc and as a 
way of avoiding the problems with organising working-class and grassroots 
agency for progressive international action. For him, new constitutionalism 
was just a 
 
political project of attempting to make liberal democratic capitalism the sole model 
for future development, with the military forces of the major, ‘core’ countries recon-
figured in ways which, in conjunction with the deepening and spread of commoditi-
zation and market forces, add a further disciplinary aspect to the emerging order. 
(ibid: 159) 
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This could only lead to a marginalisation of large parts of the population 
within the core countries and, as a likely consequence, to the formation of a 
mythical, racist Europeanness, or in other words, to the opposite of the 
internationalism he envisaged (ibid. 175-6). A similarly negative picture 
was drawn by Panitch. He described the EU project as one that freed capital 
from the constraints of nation-state control – a liberation organised by these 
states themselves who acted as “political authors of the Europe of traders 
and capitalists” (Panitch 1994: 86). For Panitch, the EU had no chance of 
becoming a counterforce to the U.S. because, as Nicos Poulantzas had 
already observed, American capital formed a strong presence within Europe 
and had fought bitterly, for example, against the European Social Chapter 
since the early 1980s (ibid). Hence the unification process could be nothing 
more than a mechanism organising the downward competition between 
states synonymous with a hollowing out of what had remained of the wel-
fare states (ibid: 85). 
The idea of decreasing state power seemed undisputed, although its ex-
tent was not precisely analysed and some, like John Palmer, emphasized 
that states had retained many functions and were likely to do so in the fu-
ture (cf. 1992: 156). The normative question of whether a transfer of power 
to supranational institutions was to be welcomed or criticised by the left 
remained a matter of dispute. Whereas Palmer warned against a quasi-
jingoistic defence of national parliamentary sovereignty, most others 
seemed to fear that sovereignty would be replaced by unaccountable institu-
tions colluding with transnational corporations rather than by a progressive 
internationalism. 
Such a view was directly linked to the problem of the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy. Almost all of those who discussed the issue agreed that a seri-
ous democratic deficit existed. Again John Palmer disagreed to a certain 
extent. He claimed that the intensified integration process in the 1990s 
would lead to an extended role for the European Parliament and a parallel 
downgrading of the Council of Ministers (cf. ibid: 150-151). Stephen Gill 
contradicted this prognosis and suspected that with the ‘new constitutional-
ism’, institutions all over the new EU framework would become even more 
removed from public control (cf. 1992: 165-166) 
What would happen to what was left of welfare capitalism? Gill, quot-
ing Ralph Dahrendorf, argued in that German unification would put an end 
to the German welfare state which in turn would jeopardize welfare in other 
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parts of Europe (cf. 1992: 182). The most likely scenario was, according to 
Panitch, a Europe-wide move towards the Anglo-American model of capi-
talism (cf. 1994: 86) and the setting-up of a programme to increase EU 
competitiveness (cf. Gill 1992: 164). In this context, Gill hinted at the ex-
ample of “liberalisation”, in other words, the privatisation of key industries, 
which traditionally had been under state control in Western Europe (ibid: 
176). For the future, Gill expected a phase of Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’ not only for the former state-socialist countries of the East, but 
also for the West-European welfare states (ibid: 177-8). More optimistical-
ly, Palmer argued extensively that the left’s new political project should aid 
the fight for a social or even a socialist Europe. He encouraged the left to 
use the current opening of a public backlash against the neo-liberal policies 
of the 1980s in order to develop a supranational economic strategy “which 
[could; SB] both inform specific transitional demands on social democratic 
and reformist governments and provide the foundations for a European 
socialist economic alternative” (1992: 155). He claimed the necessity of a 
common programme reaching far beyond the economic focus of the Euro-
pean Union of the present. He saw a 
 
need to develop prefigurative policies covering such questions as environmentally 
and socially sustainable forms of economic growth, transnational democratic plan-
ning, new forms of European public ownership, conversion from arms production, 
the encouragement of worker cooperatives, the development of the economy of 
social caring and innovative applications of human centred technologies. (ibid: 154-
5) 
 
With Aijaz Ahmad in New Left Review, Singer emphasised that the left had 
to resist an EU project that was “protectionist, white, ethnocentric and 
objectively intolerant, racist and repressive” (1992: 156). This entailed the 
defence of  the right of the Eastern European states to join the union (cf. 
ibid: 152). The left should not restrict itself to demanding the democratisa-
tion of EU institutions, but should contribute to the Europeanisation of the 
labour movement and of other social movements (cf. ibid: 153). For the 
left, according to Palmer, it was a matter of course that a single market 
needed transnational trade unions and frameworks for industrial relations 
on the European level. Singer also argued that opposition to a neo-liberal 
EU, if it wanted to avoid falling into the trap of jingoism, could only take 
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the form of fighting for a socialist United States of Europe capable of 
standing up to the United States of America (cf. 1993: 252-3). Other con-
tributors to the Register disagreed. Panitch, comparing the debate on Eu-
rope to the Quebec question in Canada, claimed that one Canada was not 
necessarily more democratic than two states and that hence one integrated 
Europe was not automatically to be preferred over several European states 
(cf. 1994: 89). Similarly, Meidner saw a potential for reinvigorating public 
pressure for welfare state projects and their individual commitments and 
priorities on the national level in opposition to a supranational centralised 
Europe (cf. 1993: 227). 
 
Dissent 
Dissenters reflected on the global consequences of recent developments in 
Europe. Daniel Bell argued that the EU integration process received further 
impetus with the unification of Germany, the inclusion of Eastern Europe in 
a European trade block, and the altered relationship between Europe and 
the U.S.S.R.. Optimistically, he assumed that close cooperation would 
bring not only economic advantages, but also the abolition of the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO (cf. 1990: 174). In a manner similar to Robin Blackburn’s 
arguments about the superiority of ‘impure capitalism’, Ernest Erber was 
convinced that, as a consequence of further steps of European unification, 
 
the twenty-first century is not likely to be an American Century. Clinging to the 
market, the negation of social guidance, we might not even come in second. More 
likely we will be third, after a united Europe and an Asian-rim dominant Japan 
operating with strategic planning. (Erber 1990: 360) 
 
Similarly, Donald Sassoon argued in Dissent that democratic deficiencies 
could best be cured by more rather than less integration (cf. 1994: 99). 
However, the British author Paul Hirst emphasised in the pages of the gen-
erally Europhile journal Dissent, that on the one hand only international 
organisations could cope with global problems but that on the other most of 
them – and he explicitly mentions the EU here – lacked democratic control 
(cf. 1994: 245). 
Despite such sentiments to the contrary, those who expected positive 
dynamics from the unification process were in the majority; they did not 
doubt that the age of nation-state social democracy had come to an end (cf. 
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Sassoon 1994: 94) and so regarded the set-up of the EU as a resource of 
hope. For David Miller, the Social Chapter constituted even a “distinct 
harbinger” of a market-socialist Europe (1991: 414). Other writers such as 
Bogdan Denitch and Donald Sassoon argued that further integration would 
put the welfare provisions on a new stable foundation and allow for a Swe-
dish model on a European scale (cf. Denitch 1991: 103-105; Sassoon 1994: 
97) The advantages of such a development would not remain limited to the 
members of the EU but would affect Europe as a whole: 
 
It would offer to Eastern and Central Europe and, indeed, to the rest of the world, the 
model of an advanced society radically different from the neoliberalism peddled by 
the IMF (International Monetary Fund). It would offer a society in which the values 
of solidarity prevail over the cacophony of cash registers. (Sassoon 1994: 97) 
 
Such a project needed the support of the left. The vision of Dissent’s con-
tributors during the early 1990s centred around what Joan Barkan called a 
“Very Imaginary Europe”, which was needed in order to maintain the 
“Slightly Imaginary Sweden” regarded by many Dissenters as the basis of a 
project for incrementally introducing democratic socialism (cf. 1991 98). 
According to Barkan, it was the duty of socialists to join the movement for 
building this imaginary Europe (cf. ibid). Her view was echoed in the arti-
cle by Sassoon. Speaking neither of ‘socialism’ nor of the ‘left’ but of 
‘social democracy’, Sassoon agreed that social democrats should try to 
influence the process of European integration as much as possible (cf. 
1994: 100). In particular, they should insist that the monetary convergence 
criteria should be accompanied by social ones (ibid: 99). These social 
measures were needed in order to also grant the underprivileged a stake in 
the emerging system of governance. Sassoon had no illusions that the reali-
sation of such a project would need support from political agents far be-
yond social democracy: 
 
Of course such consensus politics entails acceptance by all parties [...] of the basic 
features of a civilized society – yes, a society in which inflation is less than x per-
cent, but also one that eliminates the fear of ill health, poverty and want, the indigni-
ties of sexual and racial discrimination, and the dangers of environmental damage. 
(ibid: 100) 
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With regard to the ‘new constitutionalism’ criticised by other left intellec-
tuals, he insisted that a European constitution was needed, but that demo-
cratic institutions and pan-European labour organisations in both party and 
trade union form, were of equal importance. Finally, he suggested that a 
European social democratic programme would contribute to a strengthening 
of democratic structures in Eastern Europe and criticised social democratic 
parties for employing a Europhile rhetoric that was not matched by a com-
prehensive European strategy (ibid: 94-5). Altogether, for Dissent the Eu-
ropean Union had the potential to be transformed into a social democratic 
or democratic socialist transnational community. 
 
Monthly Review 
In Monthly Review, world system theorist Samir Amin declared his convic-
tion that Europe was at a crossroads in the early 1990s. It could become 
either a common capitalist market or, as Amin said in Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
words, ‘a common European home’ based on socialist principles. Which of 
the two scenarios would become reality depended on the future of intra-
European relations, both on the level of political movements and official 
policy (cf. 1990: 25). In a later contribution discussing the impact of the 
1991 Gulf War, Amin suggested that the war had demonstrated the weak-
ness of the ‘alternative European perspective’ on the world order and had 
intensified U.S. influence on Europe via the increased control of oil (cf. 
1991: 21). Other writers such as Daniel Singer and Peter Cohen were even 
more sceptical about the European project. Singer diagnosed the capitalist 
bias of the Maastricht regulations: 
 
The [Maastricht; S.B.] treaty itself was the logical completion of the whole process 
of integration, with the common currency and an independent central bank asserting 
the direct rule of money, while the meagre social chapter confirmed that the rules 
would not be equal for capital and labor. (1994: 93) 
 
Peter Cohen expressed a similar opinion in much stronger words: “The EU 
is the first step in the final rationalization of the European capitalist produc-
tion system, and represents the last act in the tragicomedy of European 
bourgeois political democracy” (1994: 58). Kenneth Hermele and Daniel 
Singer agreed that monetary union would only codify the EU’s monetarist, 
high-unemployment, anti-workers and anti-welfare biases (cf. Hermele 
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1993a: 36). In order to change course and to act as an effective counterforce 
to the United States, Europe would first have to develop different kinds of 
societies (cf. Singer 1994: 93). This, however, was unlikely to occur given 
that NATO and Western European Union (WEU), the European Communi-
ty’s ‘military wing’, would always suppress serious class unrest in Western 
Europe and prevent Communist Parties from regaining power in the eastern 
part of the continent (cf. Cohen 1994: 57).  
Like Marquand in New Left Review, Daniel Singer stressed the dimin-
ishing power of national state governments in Monthly Review, but he saw 
the reduction more as a consequence of economic developments than of 
political decisions. His conclusions, however, were similar to those of 
Marquand: “With the European Community moving towards a single mar-
ket, this trend was reinforced by the drastic reduction of the powers of the 
individual national states without a corresponding increase in the powers of 
a European state, as if capital decided to run without proxy” (1994: 92). 
The situation was worsened by the fact that the EU, in general, and the 
Council of Ministers, in particular, were only accountable to the highest 
levels of “corporate Europe” (Cohen 1994: 58; cf. also Hermele 1993a: 36). 
Others urged the readers not to give up hope for a more leftwing Europe – 
especially, as Robert Vail added in Monthly Review, if further progressive 
countries like Finland, Austria, Norway and Switzerland would join (cf. 
1993: 30). 
What position should the left take towards Europe? The critics of the 
Swedish model, Peter Cohen and Kenneth Hermele, argued that Scandina-
vian leftists, including sections of the Swedish social democrats, were 
correct to oppose EU membership (cf. Cohen 1994; Hermele 1993: 23-24). 
They remained unconvinced that visions for a socialist Europe could be 
provided by Scandinavian welfare state models, and did not believe that EU 
institutions could transform into agents of radical political change. The 
opposite position was taken by Daniel Singer, who held the left responsible 
for asking questions about what kind of economic growth the EU needed, 
about the purpose of such developments, about the nature of the society 
which would be built, and about the environmental consequences. If they 
failed to discuss and answer these questions, the left would disappear and 
Europe would become like the United States (cf. 1994: 98). He received 
support from Amin, who despite all his critiques of Europe’s role in a post-
colonial hierarchical world order, had already some years earlier main-
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tained that a unifying Europe should receive the support of progressive and 
democratic forces (cf. 1990: 21). Like Socialist Register and New Left 
Review, Monthly Review argued for supporting European unification – but 
without illusions. 
 
4.5. Locating Socialism 
 
The number of articles dealing with possibilities and forms of a new radical 
or socialist project was impressive. These reflections thematically centred 
on the discussion of democratic socialism. As their writings clearly indi-
cate, equality constituted the most important characteristic of democratic 
socialism for the authors in all four journals. This awarding of the central 
position to equality – instead of the abolition of private property or the free 
association of individuals, for example – testified to a certain modesty and 
allowed for a variety of conceptualisations of the socialist project. General-
ly, democratic socialism was not interpreted as following a radical break 
with liberal democracy but as its completion. Authors held that democracy 
should become more ambitious and be extended to the economic and the 
social sphere. In this context, the level of the national state with its institu-
tions and its separation of powers retained its privileged position, even if 
further levels – and further checks and balances on all levels – should be 
added. The overall vision was one in which the institutions of government, 
workplace decision-making and grassroots popular democracy would con-
trol each other. As a long-term perspective, many writers expected the role 
of government institutions to become more restricted and the structures at 
other levels more powerful. The whole process had to be understood as a 
large-scale learning-by-doing exercise. The rationale was the necessity of 
striking a balance of socialism and democracy in order to avoid a turn to-
wards authoritarianism. However, these considerations remained altogether 
vague. Several authors defended the abstract nature of their deliberations 
with the anticipation that more concrete models for institutional arrange-
ments could only be developed during the process of moving towards dem-
ocratic socialism. Similarly, despite the centrality of equality, the issue of 
the extent of such equality – should a society’s individuals become equal or 
only more equal – was only seldom convincingly addressed. The problem 
how to create equality on a global level was also raised but nowhere thor-
oughly discussed. 
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An alternative to designing democratic socialism from scratch would be 
to look into existing theoretical models or actual existing cases. Hence 
intellectuals investigated versions of market socialism. Overall, its evalua-
tion was positive. This model could be supported at least as an immediate 
demand within the framework of a transformative strategy, but others con-
ceived of it as a comprehensive variety of democratic socialism. Most 
authors accepted that market socialism retained positive aspects of markets, 
such as the price mechanism, but left behind negative ones, like the nexus 
of the amount of private property and the level of political influence. Mar-
ket socialism constituted a strategy to diversify forms of ownership and 
thus to further economic democracy. 
Among real-world cases, Sweden possessed a privileged position. Alt-
hough most authors agreed that the country could not be considered social-
ist, its ‘impure capitalism’, or ‘functional socialism’ had reached the high-
est level of equality imaginable within a capitalist framework. Contributors 
repeatedly pointed out that the Swedish model had not been granted to the 
Swedish population, but had been successfully fought for and achieved by 
an unusually strong and well-organised labour movement. This last point 
bore relevance for intellectuals’ evaluation of the European unification 
project. While a democratic-socialist Europe would not become a realistic 
option, opinion was split over the question of whether a social-democratic 
Europe was imaginable. Even if they had reservations, most authors rec-
ommended the left’s involvement in the debates over the unification pro-
cess in order to argue the case of working-class interests and strengthen 
European labour movements, to fight its drive towards a neo-liberal accu-
mulation regime, to correct the European Community’s democratic deficit 
and to prevent an uncritical alliance with the United States. 
While all these issues were broadly shared by the journals and consti-
tuted majority opinion within them, a number of important differences 
found expression too. Such variations concerned, for example, the question 
of whether a clear line of separation could be drawn between capitalist and 
socialist societies. While most authors agreed that the constellation of polit-
ical, social and economic arrangements made a given society either capital-
ist or socialist, some, especially among those writing for Dissent, argued 
societies should instead be placed on a continuum: more versus less social-
ist. These differing views were related to some extent to the question of 
how one chose to characterise socialism – by absolute equality or by a 
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comparatively high level of it. Implicitly, this problem provoked the ques-
tion of whether a country such as Sweden could be close to socialism alt-
hough its population would count as extremely wealthy and privileged on a 
global scale and it clearly profited from an unequal global division of la-
bour. As most Dissenters shared the more-versus-less-socialism perspec-
tive, they additionally raised the question as to ‘how much’ socialism was 
advisable. Once more they argued on the basis of their reflections on au-
thoritarianism and recommended balancing projects for socialism with 
realistic assessments of human behaviour. This question led to fundamental 
disagreements among the journals. While Dissenters privileged individual 
rights over collective interests, authors in the other journals occasionally 
and very hesitantly conceded that the infringement of human rights could 
be justifiable under certain conditions. More exactly, the latter position was 
only taken by contributors to the European journals. Whereas it could be 
argued that individual rights have an exceptionally high status in the Amer-
ican political tradition and the contributors to the U.S. journals responded 
to this history, this interpretation must be qualified: more than any other 
journal, Monthly Review defended the Cuban variety of socialism whose 
record on the protection of individual rights, to say the least, was mixed. 
Furthermore, the treatment of market socialism does not lead to a clear 
distinction between American and British perspectives. Among the journals 
most concerned with this topic, market socialism received the most com-
prehensive treatment in the American Dissent. Whereas New Left Review 
conceived of market socialism only as a step towards or a part of democrat-
ic socialism, Dissent even suggested interpreting the European Social 
Chapter as a document of market socialism. While the other two journals 
were less enthusiastic due to market relations’ supposed coercive character 
and consequently argued for a complete break with market principles, their 
position remained slightly at odds with their evaluations of Sweden, which 
were at least partly positive and called it an example of functional social-
ism. It was only in Monthly Review that Sweden found any competition: 
while Sweden was ‘functionally socialist’ internally, it collaborated with a 
capitalist and imperialist world system. Cuba was socialist not only in terms 
of its property relations, but also in terms of the positions it took in interna-
tional politics. However, it lacked democracy. Clearly, Monthly Review 
viewed Cuba through a critical U.S. lens – many of its deficiencies were 
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explained through the hostile postures to the island undertaken by the 
American government. 
The overall critical support of the European unification process came as 
a bit of a surprise. In the case of New Left Review, given its pro-European 
position, it appeared almost ironic that they solicited a commentator like 
Marquand, a member of the Liberal Democrats at the time, to present a 
negative evaluation of European future and then to advise the left to try and 
influence the workings of the European system of institutions as strongly as 
possible. It was only in Socialist Register that a number of authors argued 
explicitly for alternative left engagement – rather than immersing them-
selves in European constitutionalism, activists should join attempts at build-
ing European-wide and global labour organisations. Obviously, the Europe-
an Community and European welfare states were interpreted more positive-
ly from across the Atlantic than from within. The provision of welfare in 
Europe seemed several steps closer towards ‘functional socialism’ and 
writers hoped that a critical mass of countries with ‘impure capitalisms’ – 
for example, Sweden and Austria – would initiate a drive towards ‘func-
tional socialism’ on a European scale. 
Altogether, differences between the U.S. and the British journals were 
not very marked. However, another delineation became more evident: the 
positions taken by New Left Review and Dissent seemed more congruent 
than those of the other two journals. Their moderate positions on democrat-
ic and market socialism dovetailed with their evaluations of Sweden and 
Europe. In Monthly Review, and even more in Socialist Register, a discrep-
ancy existed between their more radical approaches to democratic socialism 
and their comments on Sweden and Europe which were quite similar to 
those expressed in the pages of their sister publications. 
 
 
5. RE-STARTING HISTORY: AGENCY AND STRATEGY 
 
The end of the Eastern bloc had put into question two basic principles fre-
quently reiterated in orthodox Marxism and theories of Bolshevik-type state 
socialism: the directionality of history and the power of vanguardist volun-
tarism as a strategy for ‘helping’ history’s movement. History could no 
longer be simply considered as the comrade and natural ally of socialists. 
As post-Marxists would have it: contingency had won over determinism. 
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Hence, possible agents of social change needed to be found and strategic 
options analysed. These were important tasks for radical intellectuals. 
Hence the debate on possible ways forward and the question of who would 
have to pursue them became an issue intensely discussed in the journals. 
For all it seemed clear that traditional notions of the working class as the 
revolutionary agent had been too simplistic. Thus academics invested a 
great deal of time and energy in working to identify either alternative fight-
ers for change or else find new ways of defining a revolutionary or trans-
formative working class, especially in a global perspective. Related to this 
search was the question of strategy. Though overlapping with the interpre-
tation of Marxism and the problem of democratic socialism, the focus here 
was put differently: did revolutions still count as a possibility – and a ne-
cessity – for achieving radical social change? If yes – were they part of a 
transformation process or did they constitute the whole? How to consoli-
date them? If they were not necessary – or not possible at the moment – 
what was to be done instead? If a reformist route was pursued, was there 
still anything that distinguished a socialist from a social-democratic strate-
gy? Did the concept of class struggle still have any political relevance? 
What was the task of those radical intellectuals who wrote for the journals 
and who, at least in most cases, wanted to act as organic intellectuals serv-
ing the oppressed of the world? 
 
New Left Review 
Agency 
The question of working-class agency was central for the journal. Writers 
agreed that on the one hand they could not rely on the traditional under-
standing of the industrial working class as the agent of revolutionary or any 
other kind of political change. On the other, the meaning of the term ‘revo-
lutionary struggle’ should be broadened. Giovanni Arrighi, like many oth-
ers, argued for a less economistic understanding of revolutionary political 
struggle and pointed to the examples of South Africa and Poland to show 
that issues such as religion and ‘race’, as well as age, sex, and nationality, 
were important sources of political resistance which were not considered in 
rigidly class-focused Marxist schemes (cf. 1990: 63). Arrighi went on to 
explain that in late twentieth century capitalism there was a growing group 
of marginalized and super-exploited people who were most likely to cause 
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the necessary political unrest once they had, through economic restructur-
ing, assembled enough political power in their hands: 
 
The social power which the cost-cutting race is putting in the hands of traditionally 
weak segments of the world proletariat is but a prelude to these struggles. To the 
extent that these struggles succeed, the stage will be set for the socialist transfor-
mation of the world. (ibid) 
 
In addition, Norman Geras argued that this change of emphasis in the un-
derstanding of the working class had to be accompanied by a modified 
perception of working-class ethics. Whereas the traditional ‘historical ne-
cessity’ argument had restricted agency to those sections of the working 
class which had a material interest to end exploitation, agency should be 
seen as belonging to those who formulated an ethical interest because they 
regarded distributive injustice as a moral scandal. As a consequence, the 
demand for distributive justice was extended beyond those who produced 
surplus value, namely the industrial workers. Geras was convinced that this 
broadening was extremely important because “[t]he least that can be said is 
that this [the emphasis on the proletariat as only historical agent; SB] was a 
particularism which did not always strengthen, in theory or in practice, the 
democratic and the humanist sensibilities of Marxists” (1994: 102-103). 
Elsewhere he further elaborated on this argument and explained that work-
ers had an interest in socialism not as producers, but as those suffering from 
inequality due to their position at the wrong end of economic relations. 
Hence they shared their plight with domestic labourers, the homeless, the ill 
or infirm, the long-term unemployed and all marginalized sections of socie-
ty (cf. Geras 1992: 68). A coalition of these groups of people should form 
the core of a new socialist project. Geras emphasised that he did not pro-
pose a voluntaristic association of divergent interests, but argued on the 
base of materialism: 
 
Note that this point is not urged in light of some counter-materialist logic, proposing 
the more or less free construction or alignment of identities. It remains on the ground 
of rooted social interests. By a development of the logic immanent to the Marxist 
case itself, the core constituency of socialism is seen to extend beyond the sites of 
production as such to all of the dispossessed. (ibid: 69) 
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Considering all the dispossessed members of society as potential agents of 
change necessitated changing the socialist agenda in two respects: it had to 
become global in perspective and it had to incorporate the demands of 
groups fighting oppressions beyond the economic sphere, especially those 
of the new social movements. André Gorz developed this argument further 
– perhaps to an even greater degree than Geras would have wanted. He 
suggested abandoning the idea that any particular class was the carrier of 
the socialist project, which in practice meant to leave behind the idea that 
particular economic situations served as its precondition (cf. 1993: 66). 
Apart from hints at the importance of super-exploited people for achiev-
ing political change, writers pointed to concrete examples that existed even 
in this non-revolutionary time. Mary Kaldor saw the revolutionary potential 
of Eastern European people as recently proven and was convinced that their 
commitment to political freedom was accompanied – through the experi-
ence of relatively egalitarian social systems – by distaste for social ine-
quality. She saw reason to hope that both aspects together would generate 
stronger demands for social justice on a global scale (cf. 1990: 36). Howev-
er, hope lay also elsewhere: Robin Blackburn pointed to new proletarian 
movements in the South – especially in Brazil and Mexico, in South Korea 
and, like Arrighi, in South Africa – and to a new type of socialist parties in 
several European countries: he listed Finland, Norway, Denmark, Spain, 
Turkey and the Netherlands (cf. 1990: 238). It seemed consensual that a 
revived left in Europe would take a different shape than what it had been 
before – but was at the same likely to be more similar to the left in the rest 
of the world. Göran Therborn explained that this European left would be-
come more like the North American – more heterogeneous in its concerns 
and identities, more sensitive towards cultural issues, more pragmatic and 
democratic, and looser in terms of organisation (cf. 1992: 32). The global 
dimension – the concerted agency of the oppressed of the world was re-
peatedly emphasised. Only one writer, Joseph McCarney, disagreed and 
suggested leaving the question of political agents to the future – he claimed 
that Western Marxists’ debates about supporters or replacements of the 
proletariat had been futile (cf. 1991: 31-32). 
 
Strategy 
Agency was one thing, strategy another. Most contributors accepted that 
revolution, however defined, was not on the immediate agenda and many 
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expressed doubts that a nineteenth century type of revolution was the ade-
quate strategy for political change in the future. Auerbach, for example, 
suggested that it had been a mistake to concentrate too exclusively on at-
tempts to take over the “commanding heights” of the economy (cf. 1992: 
34-5). The crucial issue was to find ways of combining the many different 
struggles that took place on a global, continental and regional level – fights 
of environmentalists, migrant workers, anti-racists, anti-militarists, as well 
as of those sceptical of privatisation in Eastern Europe (cf. Blackburn 1990: 
238). This strategy of following multiple progressive causes, the opposite 
of democratic centralism, certainly contained numerous problems. Among 
them was the danger of open-mindedness becoming unprincipled pluralism 
or even cowardice, something Auerbach diagnosed in leftwing reactions to 
the Rushdie affair (cf. 1992: 22): 
 
It is not given to us now to possess the belief of early twentieth-century radical 
Marxists in the power of historical materialism as a solution to all problems. But 
does this mean a surrender to fanatics and True Believers of various kinds? [...] 
[T]he self-confidence of the fanatic can easily overwhelm the Hamlet-like diffidence 
of the rational person, unless the latter makes an aggressive defence of at least the 
method of rational thinking as the only relevant device for decision-making on 
public issues. (ibid) 
 
In practice, this position would require squaring the circle of reconciling 
pluralism with a clear political position and a plurality of voices with or-
ganisational cohesion. Another problem was the assembling of a critical 
mass of supporters in order to make political demands heard. Thus Lynne 
Segal, discussing what could be learned from the New Left’s identity poli-
tics in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s, saw no alternative but to collab-
orate with the reformist labour movements: 
 
Without access to the resources of strengthened social-democratic reformist struc-
tures, as decentralized and accountable as possible, and without strong trade unions, 
the social movements (particularly as conceived by the theorists of difference) can 
offer little more than the enjoyment of an endless game of self-exploration played 
out on the great board of identity. (1991: 91) 
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Lucio Magri was also convinced that new social movements and Marxists 
would have to move towards each other. He claimed that the former were 
not able “to produce a new culture and organisation that will unite with 
broad masses of workers and marginal layers” (1991: 8). On the other hand, 
the latter had to embrace new concepts of struggle which lay beyond their 
traditional ideas of social and political change. He was sure that “cultures 
and experiences outside Marxism and the workers’ movement will make an 
indispensable contribution. There is certainly nothing fortuitous in the role 
of advanced Catholic currents in Latin America, or of ecologism, feminism 
and the peace movement in Europe” (ibid: 12). Magri imagined a combina-
tion of forces uniting those still fighting the class struggle and the new 
movements, which required an agreed-upon political theory and practice in 
order to be sustainable and successful. The only alternative to unity would 
be defeat, which would only serve to strengthen the objectionable system 
that one wanted to transform (cf. ibid: 13). In his view, it was wrong to 
interpret the collapse of Eastern Europe as a proof that formal organisation 
was no longer needed: “Precisely because socialism can no longer be sepa-
rated from democracy, it has all the more need of awareness, programmes, 
organization and education” (ibid).  
Magri suggested developing strategies that were compatible with the 
present situation in which the left was on the defensive. In this context, 
struggles had to protect democracy not only against explicit authoritarian-
ism but also – and this view distinguished the left from the triumphant right 
– against the ever-increasing influence of unaccountable power centres 
such as international institutions, company regimes, and information and 
education apparatuses (ibid: 16). Some contributors thought that links with 
social movements and labour organisations were insufficient as a coalition-
building strategy. Allies had to be found beyond the constituency of the 
left. David Purdy called for an alliance of socialism and liberalism. It could 
be forged around concrete political demands – he proposed citizen’s in-
come because liberals and socialists shared the idea of a justice-seeking 
state: 
 
Socialists who are critical of classical liberalism but care about personal liberty, 
have begun to overlap with liberals who are critical of classical socialism, but care 
about social justice. From this standpoint, it can be argued that universal grants offer 
the best way to renovate the social rights of citizenship and bring consideration of 
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social justice and questions of economic policy into a common frame of reference. 
(1994: 37) 
 
Further practical proposals concerned the issue of education. Auerbach 
urged a comprehensive paradigm shift in Marxist political strategy. Instead 
of focusing on the economic base, radical change should be achieved 
through altering the superstructure – he demanded a socialist education 
programme as important contribution to such a shift. In general, people felt 
very much affected by ‘superstructural’ arrangements, and the malfunction-
ing of institutions at the superstructure level had drawn many into political 
activism. More concretely, a better-educated public would have more 
chances of changing the existing system – one of the reasons being that an 
informed society would prove less easily manipulated by mass-cultural 
products. Education, hence, could become a lever of emancipation and 
feared as such by those interested in keeping the status quo: 
 
Right-wing philistinism has roots in seventeenth-century non-conformist religion 
(the superiority of faith over good works and of feeling over thought goes back to St 
Paul), but a capitalist utilitarianism (‘what is education good for?’) is reinforced by 
the long-term suspicion of conservatives (at least since the time of Plato) that teach-
ing the masses to think has its dangers. A persistent nightmare of the conservative is 
that an informed and literate population will wrest power from the natural rulers of 
society and deal directly with the issues that affect their lives. (Auerbach 1992: 18) 
 
Auerbach linked this educational programme to the issue of global survival. 
Pointing out that the system of the United States, as the embodiment of 
pure liberal capitalism, was likely to be incompatible with environmental 
concerns, there were just two alternatives – either democratic socialism or 
an authoritarian system. A well-educated and well-informed population was 
more likely to embrace the former (cf. ibid: 20). 
But how did writers deal with the question of a violent rupture? Was it 
stricken from the agenda just for the moment or should it be abandoned as 
strategy of change altogether? It seemed that most writers shied away from 
facing this problem. Ted Hondrich’s position has already been mentioned: 
he formulated doubts that a peaceful transformation from ‘hierarchical 
democracy’ to an ‘egalitarian democracy’ was possible. The attempt at 
changing power structures would be violently resisted and lead to a civil 
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war (cf. 1994: 65-66). He pointed out that a democratic socialist morality 
might then reject the introduction of egalitarian democracy since this would 
require actions contradicting its very ethos. In other words, he identified a 
moral dilemma. Unfortunately, this issue was not replied to by any other 
writer. Miliband expressed his conviction that revolutions in the sense of a 
violent overthrow of an existing system were necessary where people had 
to free themselves from dictatorships, but their consequences were highly 
ambivalent: 
 
As Lenin once said, ‘revolution is the festival of the oppressed’. But festivals do not 
last very long, and revolution is often accompanied by bitter resistance. The disloca-
tion and suffering this causes greatly affects revolution’s redemptive quality, and has 
a profoundly adverse effect on it. (1994: 11) 
 
Miliband disagreed with Marx and Engels, whom he claimed had regarded 
revolutions as the mechanism for freeing the working classes from the 
muck of ages. Revolutions would liberate people from dictators, but muck 
in the form of entrenched social structures and internalised patterns of 
behaviour would remain. Hence, the introduction of socialism was an ex-
tended process, whether it started with a revolution, as with authoritarian-
ism, or with gradual transformation, as with capitalist democracies (cf. ibid: 
10-11). 
Generally, contributors saw the need to wait for ‘better’ times. Many of 
them clung to a paradoxical hope: things had to get worse in order to get 
better. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, explained that capitalism would 
produce contradictions on a global scale which would threaten the legitima-
cy of state structures and, as a consequence, produce a situation similar to a 
civil war (cf. 1994: 15-16). It was likely to be a time of reinvigorated de-
mands of equality – but viewed from a global scale, these would be contra-
dictory: “In short, everyone will be acting somewhat blindly even if they 
will not think they are so acting:” (ibid: 16). In this situation the left would 
be needed as a force able to formulate long-term goals and to build an 
alternative social order. In other words, socialists should prepare for times 
to come. That they would come was a sentiment shared by many in the 
pages of New Left Review (cf. Kaldor 1990: 36; Auerbach 1992: 34). Gorz 
expressed this hope most clearly when he wrote about the necessary turn 
towards a more environmentalist regime: “A few limited disasters, portend-
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ing the approach of major catastrophes, may be sufficient to speed up the 
socio-cultural mutation now taking place and make societies lean in the 
direction of political ecology” (1993: 67). Miliband perhaps best summed 
up the general feeling when he claimed that socialists had to find a path 
between reckless voluntarism, which had proved to be terribly disastrous in 
the early Soviet Union, and an exaggerated caution (cf. 1994: 13). The 
waiting, thus, was an active waiting, accompanied by the participation in 
small-scale struggles and by the continuous formulation of critique. 
 
Intellectuals 
What were the responsibilities of intellectuals with regard to the agents 
suggested and the strategies outlined? Writers identified three broad catego-
ries of intellectual activity: critique, utopian thinking, and activism. Nu-
merous appeals not to abandon the basics of socialist critique littered the 
pages of New Left Review. G. A. Cohen, taking issue with a document 
published by the centre-left Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
which argued for leaving behind central tenets of classical socialist thinking 
and terminology, pointed out that without well-founded socialist principles, 
leftwing policy would be impossible: “Fundamental socialist values which 
point to a form of society a hundred miles from the horizon of present 
possibility are needed to defend every half-mile of territory gained and to 
mount an attempt to regain each bit that has been lost” (1994: 5). Hence 
critique and utopianism played as important a role as ever and were under-
stood as the opposite of accommodation. Halliday even seemed to feel a 
degree of relief that in the new situation a return to critique was possible: 
“The critique of capitalism was the starting point of Marxism and socialism 
and is the point to which, quite properly, that tradition can now return” 
(1990: 21). Nevertheless, this was not a return to a status quo ante, but 
required “a reassessment and a realignment not only of Marxism and the 
socialist movements but of the radical and revolutionary traditions of West-
ern society as a whole” (ibid: 23). This was a task of self-criticism, but also 
an intellectual challenge to analyse the potential for radical social change, 
in short, to combine criticism with utopianism and activism in order to 
prepare moves towards democratic socialism. Halliday, in his exchange 
with Thompson, urged intellectuals to be realistic about the openings that 
could be found. Observing that during the Cold War no ‘third way’ had 
been possible for non-aligned countries, he did not believe that alternatives 
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to capitalism had become easier to pursue after its victory. Intellectuals 
should make sober judgments in order to avoid voluntarism and unrealistic 
options (cf. 1990a: 150). 
What remained to be done then? Several authors suggested continuing 
work on the analytical tasks that they had pursued throughout their intellec-
tual and often also professional careers. Eric Olin Wright reiterated the 
importance of class analysis even if he saw it in crisis: the link that original-
ly existed between the nodes of class analysis, class emancipation and 
historical trajectory had become looser not so much because of historical 
events, but because empirical knowledge of each of the nodes had increased 
(cf. 1993: 20-21). The solution could only consist of constructing a new but 
more flexible model of reconciling these aspects (cf. ibid). Whether this 
proved possible or not did not seem entirely clear. Whereas the author was 
convinced that class analysis remained an important investigative tool, he 
was less sure about “the extent to which such class analysis will be embed-
ded in a broader theoretical configuration that contains the normative com-
mitments of class emancipation and the explanatory aspirations of a theory 
of historical possibilities” (ibid: 35). Derrida described another task of 
political-economic analysis when he claimed that critique should be di-
rected towards the link between state and international law on the one side 
and the market on the other (cf. 1994: 58). By analysing this link, intellec-
tuals could contribute towards a new loose and informal international (ibid: 
53). For this purpose, intellectuals would have to work in a non-dogmatic, 
‘hyper-critical’ fashion which, for Derrida, was a deconstructive fashion. In 
this way, intellectuals could renew and radicalise the Marxist spirit of cri-
tique “in the name of a new Enlightenment for the century to come” (ibid: 
55). McCarney developed a similar idea about the potential achievements 
of theoretical work. Rather than seeing it as an internal corrective to the 
existing economic and social order, he wanted it to clarify the fundamental 
contradictions within this order: 
 
What is needed above all is an inquiry that will achieve for contemporary capitalism 
what Marx achieved for that of the nineteenth century. […] The indispensable con-
tribution is the general conception of capitalism as a system structured by contradic-
tions which are insoluble in its own terms. (1991: 30) 
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Less ambitiously, Jürgen Habermas saw the relevance of socialist critique 
not in a transformative capacity, but in its function as important point of 
orientation within his model of communicative politics. Understood in this 
way, socialism became a “radically reformist self-criticism of a capitalist 
society, which, in the form of constitutional democracy with universal 
suffrage and a welfare state, has developed not only weaknesses but also 
strengths” (1990: 21). Structurally disadvantaged people no longer had the 
power to change politics through their industrial muscle, and marginal 
political causes (environmental concerns, the interests of developing states 
and refugees) never had. Their only chance lay in convincing society as a 
whole, in processes which Habermas called discursive problematisation 
(ibid: 20). This was a process in which intellectuals were needed both as 
spokespersons and as researchers. The latter role was related to “an attempt 
to find out how much strain the economic system [could] be made to take in 
directions that might benefit social needs, to which the logic of corporate 
investment decisions is indifferent” (ibid: 18). He further explained that the 
former role of spokesperson was indispensable for his concept of public 
sovereignty, “made fluid by being made communicative, that makes itself 
heard in the topics, arguments and proposed solutions of free-floating, 
public communication” (ibid). In this guise, the socialist project was no 
longer about a break with existing power relations but instead about making 
people aware of the numerous ways in which one’s own interests were 
bound up with the interests of others. 
One of the main differences from nineteenth century capitalism lay in 
its global expansion in the twentieth. Theorists should analyse what the 
relationship of first and Third World meant for moves towards an alterna-
tive social and economic order on a global scale, now that the second world 
had disappeared. Blackburn, however, added that such critiques of contem-
porary capitalism were not enough; a critical balance sheet of the socialism 
of the Eastern Bloc was needed too. This was simply a question of credibil-
ity (cf. 1990: 174).  
Utopian thinking did not have to start from nowhere. Halliday, and oth-
ers, such as Magri, proposed looking at the most likely sources for inspira-
tion: pre-Marxist and non-Marxist anti-capitalism, as well as social democ-
racy, feminism, ecology, and anti-racism (cf. Halliday 1990: 23; Magri 
1991: 12). The utopianism some writers envisaged was a utopianism of 
details, one that acknowledged the need to design complex societies and 
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elaborated decision-making structures. The question in how far one could 
go when describing details of societal organisation was answered different-
ly by different contributors. Some remained sceptical; G. A. Cohen, for 
example, was convinced of the futility of describing intricacies of political 
institutions and practice. He saw utopianism more as an embrace of certain 
moral principles, such as community and equality, since these remained 
central even if they had fallen out of fashion. Hence he argued: “A different 
response to the present predicament is to think the values afresh in a spirit 
of loyalty to them in an inhospitable time, and what new modes of advoca-
cy of them are possible” (1994: 8). It was not socialist rhetoric which was 
important according to Cohen, but instead the maintenance of socialist 
principles (ibid: 4). 
Obviously, contributors remained convinced of the centrality of theoret-
ical practice – this was perhaps the only form of political activism that 
made sense in times of uncertainty. Such a view seemed to engender the 
following comment by Geras: 
 
More than a century of history gives grounds for caution as to where, if anywhere, 
the capacity to bring about socialism might be located. All we can do, then, those of 
us unwilling to embrace the present economic order as the best historical terminus 
imaginable, is to continue to explore where an interest in socialism might be located 
and why. (1992: 68) 
 
The only project of ‘practical practice’ beyond work of research, analysis, 
and interpretation was suggested by E. P. Thompson; he called for a critical 
dialogue with former dissidents in the countries of the collapsed Eastern 
Bloc. They often had become neo-liberals and hence there was not much 
left of an intellectual left and of socialist imagination in these societies. 
Finding a common language would be difficult. Thompson nevertheless 
hoped that such a debate would become a first step towards the global 
revival of the socialist project (cf. 1990: 145). For him, this dialogue was a 
matter of necessity. Without it, not even the status quo would last because 
he interpreted the present conditions in Eastern Europe as a vacuum that, in 
the absence of a credible left, would be filled by anti-Semitism, nationalism 
and fundamentalism. Even if one was convinced that things had to get 
worse before they could get better, the danger was real that they would get 
too bad. Intellectuals should play their role in preventing this to happen. 




Not surprisingly, Socialist Register also asked about the role of the working 
class – and much more unanimously and unambiguously than contributors 
to New Left Review, it maintained that there was no alternative to working-
class agency. Nevertheless, like New Left Review, the journal argued for a 
broader understanding of the concept and against restricting it to the indus-
trial working class. The frequent hints towards the necessity of building 
rainbow coalitions and to come to agreements with the new social move-
ments or what some called the new middle class, did not mean, however, 
bidding farewell to the centrality of class struggle. Rainbow coalitions did 
not have the purpose of aggregating a plurality of struggles, but of relating 
them to the centrality of class contradictions. Ellen Meiksins Wood ex-
plained this perspective in the following way: 
 
There is another possibility: to differentiate not less but much more radically than 
even the new pluralism allows. We can acknowledge that, while all oppressions may 
have equal moral claims, class exploitation has a different historical status, a more 
strategic location at the heart of capitalism; and class struggle may have a more 
universal reach, a greater potential for not only class emancipation but other eman-
cipatory struggles too. (1990: 78) 
 
Yet even if the class contradiction was primary, formations of rainbow 
coalitions or collaboration of labour organisations and new social move-
ments should be welcomed. For some of the contributors, they embodied a 
combination of working class solidarity and the specific new middle-class 
moralistic individualism (cf. Ross 1990: 214). For the American John Bel-
lamy Foster, the formation of the U.S. rainbow coalition in the late 1980s 
constituted the first sign of a mass political movement for half a century (cf. 
1990: 267). In his words what was needed was a “rainbow coalition of the 
working class” (ibid: 285). He believed that the emergence of such move-
ments constituted an encouraging sign that mass agency was still possible – 
despite apathy and conformism in formal political procedures: 
 
Beneath the calm surface suggested by these recent voting patterns, however, is a 
society torn by contradictions born of class struggle, in which there exists a potential 
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for mass political rebellion that would threaten conservative political elites and tear 
the mask off the US ideological system for all to see. (ibid) 
 
Foster hoped, obviously, that a movement like this could be transformed 
into something more solid: he suggested that a social democratic party 
might develop out of it and would have the potential to attract the votes of 
those fifty-one percent of the American electorate who did not bother to 
vote in the 1988 presidential elections (cf. ibid). He concluded on an opti-
mistic note, assuming that the end of the Cold War might even have benefi-
cial effects. For him the Jackson campaign had signalled “the beginnings of 
a crucial unravelling of the internal Cold War political order; an order that 
requires for its coherence the imposition of an ideological straightjacket 
that leaves a majority of the population not only invisible but effectively 
voiceless and optionless as well” (ibid: 286). Such a dynamic could only be 
strengthened by the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc. Examples like this 
seemed to serve the purpose of reassuring intellectuals that the ‘common 
people’ could still become agents of change – this point was reiterated 
several times in the pages of Socialist Register.  
John Saville, retaining the spirit of the first British New Left, urged 
readers not to forget the role of human agency in developing political ideas 
different from those of the dominant classes, and not to ignore the fact that 
slightly improved living standards could just as well lead to radicalisation 
as to depoliticisation – hence it would be wrong to write off the metropoli-
tan working classes as potential political actors (cf. 1990: 50-56). Contribu-
tors wondered if this conception could also be applied to the working clas-
ses of the Eastern Bloc. Some suggested that working-class people could – 
under certain circumstances – become reactionaries (cf. Levins 1990: 341). 
The danger that this happened at the time in Eastern Europe could not be 
neglected. However, it might still be the case that these workers carried 
some remnants of a ‘socialist consciousness’ with them and reacted nega-
tively only to socialist sloganeering, but not to socialist values (cf. ibid; 
Lebowitz1991: 368). 
Despite such uncertainties, Socialist Register stood for a tradition of so-
cialist humanism which was strongly convinced that the ‘common people’ 
were able to govern themselves in principle. Miliband personified this 
premise perhaps more clearly than anyone else. He stated that while many 
lessons should be drawn from the experiment of state socialism, it was not 
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the case that socialism was impossible and had to end in disaster (1990: 
350). Miliband freely admitted that human beings were not intrinsically 
good, but neither were they necessarily bad. Neither Auschwitz nor the 
system of Gulags were, according to him, instigated by the ‘masses’ but by 
their rulers. Miliband conceded that while Marxists had often overestimated 
the commitment to radical change of the industrial working class, they were 
now rather in danger of underestimating it (cf. ibid: 362-363). 
What did writers think about agency at the international level? Its im-
portance did not lie in the chance to create a global revolutionary move-
ment, but in the possibility of building parallel movements – under similar 
conditions in comparable conjunctures – in a number of national states. 
This position constituted an early contribution to the globalisation debate 
that began at the time. Panitch in this context expressed his scepticism 
concerning the emergence of a global democracy or a global civil society 
(1994: 91). He claimed that globalisation was organised by national states 
and therefore had to be dealt with at the level of the national state (ibid: 63). 
Another article thematised the contribution to radical change that could be 
expected from ‘maverick states’. They might become reservoirs of re-
sistance because, after the end of the cold war, they might come under 
increased pressure to conform. Avishai Ehrlich urged critics to look beyond 
the main protagonists of the Cold War and believed that these pressures 
“will be viewed by many states as the further concentration of force, along 
with wealth, in the hands of a few rich states, increasing inequality and 
diminishing the chances of others to improve their standing in this hierar-
chy of states” (1992: 238). Inherent in these statements was the assumption 
that agents within future struggles for radical political change might threat-
en the leading capitalist states (and thereby the system as a whole) from 
two sides – from within through the emergence and consolidation of radi-
calised rainbow movements with a working-class core, and from outside 




To move on to the question of strategy, Socialist Register’s socialist hu-
manism was anti-vanguardist. Instead, contributors suggested a transforma-
tive approach that transcended the old demarcation line of reform vs. revo-
lution. This approach was not only needed because the times seemed un-
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promising for revolutions, but also because such revolts were no longer 
regarded as panaceas. Richard Levins explained in this context that revolu-
tions so far had combined both a conservative and a radical dimension: 
people wanted to consume in the same way as capitalists and at the same 
time to destroy capitalism and consumerism (cf. 1990: 336). Hence revolu-
tionary strategy had to take into consideration both of these aspects. Fur-
thermore, progressive policies could become regressive (as they did in the 
state-socialist countries) and continuous reforms were needed even in a 
post-revolutionary situation. The transformative approach required the 
combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity. With the 
conviction that the victims of certain oppressions were the main actors in 
their liquidation, Geras reiterated the strategy of self-emancipation (made 
more complicated by the rainbow alliances that had replaced the mass-
based socialist movements of earlier periods) (1990: 31-32). The tall order 
of self-emancipation had to be understood as a long-term perspective and 
should be brought about via two routes: on the one hand through the calling 
for and support of reformist measures within the existing state structures, 
on the other through the building of a socialist civil society capable of 
demanding radical change from the existing state system. In the current 
climate, this strategy could even turn defensive and entail the protection of 
the patchy welfare-state reforms undertaken during the ‘golden age’ of 
domesticated capitalism from neo-liberal attacks and attempts at disman-
tling them. For Werner Bienefeld, what was left of the secular welfare state 
was worthy of safeguarding not because it was perfect, but because present-
ly it was in danger of being succeeded by something worse: “And our 
struggle must begin by rescuing the secular, territorial national state from 
those who would abandon it, and from those who would replace it with the 
disastrous notion of ethnic or religious states” (1994: 97). Linda Gordon, 
who agreed with this argument and underlined the importance of welfare 
capitalism’s programmes especially for women, explained that a transform-
ative approach should nevertheless go beyond such defence and design new 
forms of welfare that avoided the stigmatisations and oppressions that 
usually accompanied welfare provision (cf. 1990: 171). She characterised 
the welfare states as entities of relative autonomy. Accordingly, a socialist 
ethics of welfare was needed, since discriminations and disadvantages 
suffered by women, minority ethnic people, and especially minority ethnic 
women would not disappear automatically in a socialist society (and wel-
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fare programmes would still be needed to organise reproductive responsi-
bilities). Gordon called for an ethics that considered these discriminations 
and tried to position those suffering from them as those who replaced these 
structures by something new of their own creation (cf. ibid. 192). It would 
be wrong, as historical examples showed, to write off welfare programmes 
as palliatives; they could just as well strengthen militant activism (cf. ibid. 
193). Arthur MacEwan explained the transformative approach in more 
general terms, explicitly claiming in doing so that “[r]evolution is not on 
the immediate agenda” (1990: 318). He suggested distinguishing between 
reformist measures that simply worked and thus stabilised the status quo 
and revolutionary reforms which challenged the existing order and were 
likely to initiate further reforms. He proposed that, for instance, the necessi-
ty of environmental protection measures could be addressed through the 
demand for public control of companies. This would call into question the 
traditional prerogatives of capital and hence the core of the capitalist sys-
tem (cf. ibid.). MacEwan admitted that an explicit commitment to this 
transformative strategy might alienate Marxists from oppositional popular 
forces, especially in the former state socialist countries – for him a risk to 
be borne in mind but nevertheless to be taken (cf. ibid. 319). He shared this 
position with Foster who was deeply critical of a social critique whose logic 
was anti-corporate but fell short of anti-capitalism. To attack corporations 
and to avoid ‘naming the system’, according to him, damaged the argument 
since it blamed individuals for systemic failures (cf. 1990: 279-80). Like 
MacEwan, he proposed the combination of concrete reforms with a long-
term perspective: 
 
What is at issue here is a strategy that points beyond simple reform or accomodation 
[sic], and toward the concrete formulation of a radical reform strategy with a poten-
tial mass base in the here and now consistent with the goal of long-term societal 
transformation, or what Raymond Williams and others have called the ‘long revolu-
tion’. (ibid: 278) 
 
Gregory Albo explained that the transformative approach was necessarily 
anti-capitalist: “There is no intellectually honest response from the left to 
the economic crisis, particularly with respect to unemployment, that does 
not involve political restraint on the power of capital and a redistribution of 
work and resources” (1994: 163). 
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Still, even if one embraced this idea of a long transformation, it could 
appear contradictory to support reforms within capitalism when one con-
ceived of its inherent failures and contradictions as insurmountable and 
believed in the inevitability of anti-capitalist struggle. Yet rather than mere-
ly pointing to its shortcomings in a cynical manner, Marxists should sup-
port also piecemeal reforms (cf. Miliband 1990: 349). However, this strate-
gy bore its dangers: it could generate an over-reliance on state-centred 
reforms and the neglect of what was going on at the level of (civil) society: 
“The self-help of popular forces should be seen as quite distinct from nego-
tiating reforms in the structure. This has been precisely the trap into which 
all anti-systemic forces, even the most militant ones, were led during the 
liberal ideological era.” (Wallerstein 1992: 109). However, as long as so-
cialists remained sensitive to the difference between working in the system 
of the existing state and working for it, they could avoid this trap. In order 
to remain clear about this distinction, “utopistics”, to use Wallerstein’s 
term, were required: the imagination of new institutional structures – espe-
cially in civil society – to replace older ones situated at the state level (ibid. 
109-110). 
Panitch emphasised the need to analyse the actual existing power struc-
tures with which transformers had to cope. He insisted that the national 
states still played a central role within ‘transnational’ political processes 
(like organising EU integration) and it was these national states that helped 
organise ‘transnational’ economic processes (such as globalisation). Apply-
ing this to strategy, Panitch referred to the work of Sol Picciotto who called 
for an analysis of the internal contradictions of the state, exploitation of 
which would give social movements the chance to intervene. At the same 
time, states were just a part of the structure of the global capitalist system. 
Any optimism that could be detected in the pages of Socialist Register 
had to do with the belief that once detrimental effects of the capitalist order 
became more visible, they would lead to a gradual radicalisation of the 
population. Again, this perspective was a variation of the argument that 
things had to get worse in order to get better. In this context, Bienefeld 
referred to the historical example of the New Deal which would have been 
regarded as completely unrealistic as late as early 1929 (cf. 1994: 100). The 
sketching out of detailed programmes was not so much what was needed in 
crisis situations of this kind, but rather the support of and solidarity with the 
movements that already existed. The existence of such movements and the 
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threats they posed was proven by “national fractions of a global elite 
seek[ing] multilateral protection from domestic political forces, be they 




The task of intellectuals included steering these domestic political forces 
into the right direction. Consequently, like in New Left Review, Socialist 
Register’s writers also identified the three tasks of intellectuals as the for-
mulation of criticism, utopianism, and activism. Criticism was understood 
not just as interpretation of the world as it was, but as critical intervention 
in discursive struggles. Eleanor MacDonald, elaborating on the work of 
Jacques Derrida, argued that it was Marxists’ and feminists’ task to demon-
strate that a relationship existed between power and what counted as truths 
and ethical guidelines. Intellectuals, nevertheless, remained capable of 
speaking the truth about power. Such a frank interpretation of reality was 
both epistemologically possible and part of an empowering politics (cf. 
1990: 241). It required a concept that was could not be fully grasped with 
academic or analytical methods – hope: “The challenge to rearticulate an 
optimism for politics and a trust in interpretation is an immense one, and 
must start with the ability to interpret in the hope of changing the very 
experiences that Derrida and the other postmodernists describe.” (ibid: 231) 
Criticism in the spirit of hope – for political change – allowed intellectuals 
to tell materialist ‘truths’ about capitalism as a system of power instead of 
echoing postmodernist and liberal perspectives on the exclusively discur-
sive or rational structures of society. In this context, Wood also criticised 
associational and communitarian perspectives: “It is perhaps time for us in 
the West to tell a few home truths about capitalism, instead of hiding them 
discreetly behind the screen of ‘civil society’”. (1990: 82) However, de-
manding the truth was one thing, how exactly to go about speaking it was 
another. Some contributors went a step backwards and suggested that intel-
lectuals had to look at the concepts they used: 
 
The prospects of a ‘brave new world’ (some would call it a dystopia) of global 
capitalism and the imperatives of a range of other global forces require a re-
examination of theory and a search for either a reformulation or generation of new 
concepts and approaches which can begin to capture, at least theoretically, the 
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changes which are actually taking place and the logic of their future trajectory. (Gill 
1990: 307-308) 
 
The changing prospects of global capitalism followed from the collapse of 
the state-socialist regimes. The analysis of which factors caused this col-
lapse also constituted an important aspect of critical activity and a precon-
dition for developing adequate concepts and approaches. Generally, writers 
demanded a re-politicisation of critical theory. They hoped that such a 
reorientation would spark off critique in the political sphere and deconstruct 
the myths which disguised and legitimised politics in capitalist democra-
cies. In the words of Foster, the task was 
 
to advance a politics of truth; to avoid easy compromises; to address the immediate 
and the long-term needs of the masses of the population and of those who suffer the 
most severe forms of oppression; to search for the common ground of that oppres-
sion; to resist ideological claims that ‘we are all in the same boat’ in this society; to 
reject what Mills called the ‘crackpot realism’ that makes the status quo into a kind 
of inescapable second nature and closes off the future; to fight market fetishism. In 
short, to avoid what Raymond Williams called ‘long-term adjustments to short-term 
problems’. (1990: 286) 
 
Foster’s article was a plea not to fall prey to but to rather resist what he 
called “liberal practicality” – a first step towards advancing “socialist prac-
ticality” (ibid). Further work on Marxism was essential in order to make 
sense of the world as a “complex, contradictory and evolving whole” (Lev-
ins 1990: 335). Yet, this analytical effort was not enough. One of the most 
interesting and most difficult tasks for Marxists was educational: to work 
towards the creation of what traditionally was called a ‘revolutionary con-
sciousness’. Such a consciousness could no longer be trusted to develop 
automatically in times of crisis and change; rather, specialists needed to 
investigate how it could be tended, while remaining wary lest they them-
selves succumb to over-ambitious vanguardist aspirations: “The recognition 
that social changes do not drag consciousness along passively has made the 
analysis of consciousness formation both under capitalism and in revolu-
tionary societies a major priority for all movements concerned with funda-
mental change” (ibid: 342). 
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While criticism had traditionally been one strategy for active ‘con-
sciousness formation’, utopian thinking now became another. In the post-
1989 climate, utopianism had to start with absolute basics in order to sug-
gest, to use a slogan which became popular only later, that another world 
was possible. Even MacDonald’s arguments about hope in the possibility of 
truthful interpretations of reality could be seen as epistemological utopian-
ism in an intellectual era in which even academic thinking was in danger of 
sliding into complete relativism. More concretely, writers called for reflec-
tions on a socialist ethics, including an ethics of rights. Again, they took the 
recognition seriously that socialism would never automatically solve all 
problems and conceded that boundaries needed definition which people 
should not cross when dealing with each other. Socialist rights were utopian 
in so far as their base did not lie in capitalist rationality, but instead in the 
ideal of equality. Utopianism of course also included designing new models 
of socialism (cf. Panitch & Miliband 1994: 4). The final aspect of utopian-
ism again addresses the question of agency. Gill suggested analysing the 
possibility of an international and internationalist counter-hegemonic pro-
ject around which all national and transnational progressive forces could 
unite (cf. 1990: 308). 
Contributors to Socialist Register claimed to believe in the unity of the-
oretical work and participation in political struggles. Leftwing intellectuals 
should not only think about, but also live for political change: 
 
[U]nderstanding the world, breaking out of the Great Brainwash, is an exhilarating 
first step in reaching toward our own liberation. Immersing ourselves as a whole 
way of life in the struggle for what might be against what is provides the greatest 
degree of freedom possible for us in today’s world. (Levins 1990: 345; original 
emphasis) 
 
Concretely, intellectuals should try to help in setting up a renewed progres-
sive movement in the shape of a socialist rainbow coalition as it was de-
scribed by Foster above (cf. ibid; Foster 1990: 267). Such an endeavour 
required a clear personal decision not to seek refuge and solace in liberal-
ism and work only for the amelioration of capitalism, but to act as a link 
between smaller, more radical movements and the centre-left – in the hope 
of radicalising the latter. Only such a position would allow intellectuals to 
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do that task for which they were needed – to open up new political spaces 




The reflections among Dissent contributors on the question of agency were 
similar to those in New Left Review and Socialist Register. The working 
class was important, but it was neither sufficient as an actor for achieving 
radical change nor was it necessarily progressive. Alan Ryan encouraged 
the readers of Dissent to say farewell to a number of leftist myths, among 
them not only the beneficial potential of a vanguard party but also, with 
regard to the working class, to the solidarity of the proletarians (cf. 1990: 
437). Several authors called for a ‘realistic’ picture of the working class and 
regarded such a portrayal as a precondition for designing a progressive 
politics. What did realistic mean in this context? Edward Broadbent made 
the following proposition: “It seems to me time for socialist intellectuals 
finally to accept the desire for personal economic benefit as a given element 
in all human nature but dominant in some only. Linked economically with 
profit, it can be harnessed to achieve socialist goals” (1991: 84). On the 
other hand, the ruptures of 1989 proved that people were acting according 
to their political convictions and not only to pursue their economic inter-
ests. As Irving Howe explained: “The events in the Soviet Union show that, 
as in Germany and Italy a few decades ago, all the socio-political forces, 
good and bad, suppressed by the total state have a way of reappearing once 
a bit of freedom is allowed.” (1991: 73) Not all of these forces were what 
Dissenters would regard as progressive, but still they felt that it should be 
possible to intensify cooperation among progressives in Europe – between 
social democrats, greens and those Eastern-European reform groups which 
had not embraced neo-liberalism (cf. Joseph 1990: 146). Hence, Dissent 
also conceived of broad alliances and rainbow-like coalitions, and like the 
other journals, it emphasized that the labour movement still had a role to 
play in such alliances. Paul Berman reminded readers that Mike Harrington 
had stressed the importance of the labour movement for the New Deal and 
the Civil Rights Movement. According to Berman, an alliance between 
labour movement and new social movements implied the attempt to unite 
two basic political principles – solidarity and the idea of rights. This com-
bination was essential for achieving further political change (cf. 1993: 98). 
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Related to the importance of the labour movement was the responsibility of 
a certain type of intellectual, identified by Richard Rorty in a controversy 
with Andrew Ross as the archetypical old-left intellectual. According to 
Rorty, old-left intellectuals had been much more politically useful than 
new-left ones. He explained: “The utility of the [old] left is illustrated by its 
role in drafting and passing Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society bills. The 
inutility of Ross’s left is suggested by its disdainful refusal to think in terms 
of drafting and passing bills” (Rorty 1992: 265). The core of Rorty’s cri-
tique, however, was that the new left did have an overly simplistic view of 
mainstream American political culture. For Rorty, this culture should not be 
reduced to a tool of American capitalism, but used as a vehicle for circulat-
ing radical ideas (cf. ibid: 266). Altogether, he argued that an alliance of 
intellectuals, politicians and progressives was possible and needed in order 
to achieve political change. 
Although many lessons could be learnt from the old left, political agen-
cy could not take the shape it had taken in the 1930s and 1940s. In the late 
twentieth century, the international dimension had become more important. 
In an article called “The Future of the Labor Movement in Historical Per-
spective”, David Brody argued that a new labour movement needed not 
only strong national structures (he formulated his disagreement here with 
Staughton Lynd, a new left labour historian, calling for a grassroots union-
ism) but, in addition, also transnational cooperation. In particular, the set-
ting up of NAFTA in 1992 required a response from the labour organisa-
tions – in this respect the existence of integrated Canadian-U.S.-American 
unions should be seen as an encouraging example (cf. Brody 1994: 60-61). 
The mental connection with the American labour movement was very 
strong among the contributors to Dissent. However, they also reflected on 
new avenues for political change beyond labour politics, though, as already 
mentioned, in close contact with it. Parallel to labour struggles on a national 
and international level, authors suggested relying on civil societal organisa-
tions as agents for political change. Some of the more detailed thoughts 
came from Jeffrey Isaac, who believed in the importance of a “rebellious” 
civil society which he explained in the following way: “A rebellious poli-
tics is a politics of voluntary associations, independent of the state, that 
seeks to create spaces of opposition to remote, disempowering bureaucratic 
and corporate structures.” (1993: 357) They experimented with a new type 
of political organisation characterised by self-constitution and spontaneity, 
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focused on present problems, which did not follow a grand master plan, and 
made a virtue of self-limitation, awareness of one’s own partiality, and self-
reflexivity (ibid: 359-60). Isaac pointed to the weaknesses of this type of 
political organisations too – they tended to underestimate the role of the 
state and of established organisations and institutions, and their member-
ship was often elitist (cf. ibid: 360). Nevertheless, he hoped that such 
groups would make an important contribution to the development of a 
democracy, one which offered more than just political engineering by state 
institutions. The idea of democracy as self-empowerment relied, to a large 
degree, on civil societal associations (ibid: 361). However, as Paul Wapner 
added, the politics of civil society had also to move beyond the framework 
of the national state. He called for what he called a “world civic politics” in 
which organisations like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and others 
worked with traditional pressure and lobby techniques to influence gov-
ernments but also contributed to global political life (cf. 1994: 389). His 
article clearly indicated how change could be induced through the work of 
such groups – even if they were elitist: 
 
Greenpeace’s direct actions are based on the notion of ‘bearing witness’. This type 
of political action, originating with the Quakers, links moral sensitivities with politi-
cal responsibility. Having observed a morally objectionable act, one cannot turn 
away in avoidance. One must either take action to prevent further injustice or stand 
by and attest its occurrence. [...] The idea is to invite the public to bear witness as 
well, to enable people throughout the world to become informed about ecological 
dangers, pique their sense of outrage, and spur them to action. (ibid: 391) 
 
Strategy 
The last quotation leads to the question of strategy. Having abandoned 
vanguardism a long time ago, for Dissenters there was a choice between 
reformism from above and self-emancipation. Some voices in the journal 
stated their optimism that such self-emancipation was possible. Cornelius 
Castoriadis, for example, despite his complaints about an apathetic and 
saturated population in the rich countries, remained convinced of the possi-
bility of what he called the project of social and individual autonomy. For 
him, the core of socialism was likely to be backed by ninety per cent of the 
people. He seemed to believe that “islands of resistance”, another term for 
Isaac’s organisations of rebellious civil society, could be found everywhere 
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and could become larger (cf. 1992: 224-5). The answer to the question of 
whether the rebellion envisaged was to be violent or peaceful remained 
vague. However, Carlo Rosselli, who strongly believed in the possibility of 
peaceful, gradual and self-organised transformation towards “liberty” – 
obviously the same as Castoriadis’s “autonomy”. In his words, “Liberty can 
never be won through tyranny or dictatorship, or even through being grant-
ed from above. Liberty is a conquest, a self-conquest, which is preserved 
only through the continual exercise of one’s faculties and individual auton-
omies” (Rosselli 1994: 120-1). In the same article, Rosselli suggested that 
violence might be legitimate as a defence – but only when a proletarian 
election victory was jeopardized by reactionaries (ibid: 121). That political 
opposition was necessary and that power had to be won in elections – about 
these facts there was no doubt in the mind of a liberal socialist. Once the 
strategy of violent change was ruled out, the question had to be answered as 
to how to create a block powerful enough to initiate a peaceful transition to 
a more socialist or more democratic system. Here, Rorty suggested forging 
an alliance between the poor and the middle classes which, especially in the 
United States, tended at the time to side with the rich (cf. 1991: 484). Mi-
chael Walzer supported this line of argument and, like Rorty, hinted at the 
relevance of appeals to traditional American values and to the common 
good for creating such an alliance. Such a coalition would not come about 
by itself, but required political leadership. Many contributors to the journal 
shared the conviction that principled leadership was capable of modifying 
human behaviour, though they shared the belief to differing degrees. 
Broadbent was quite optimistic: 
 
I remain convinced that sustained social democratic leadership can persuade majori-
ties to modify their behavior. Majoritarian support for tough measures to protect the 
environment, redress the concerns of indigenous people, yes, even favor trains over 
cars – all in degrees of emphasis, not as an absolute, is evidence of this. The majori-
tarian ‘followers’ often run ahead of their government in demonstrating the continu-
ing relevance of non-consumption-oriented values even in market-driven societies. 
(1991: 85) 
 
However, political leaders and intellectuals would have to change their 
attitudes towards the people with whom they wanted to liaise – they should 
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take their personal interests seriously instead of trying to educate them 
away: 
 
Although it is true that in the nineteenth century most intellectuals ranging from 
socialists to liberals like John Stuart Mill condemned the consuming culture of 
capitalism […], this has not been true of the working class, including those who 
constitute the main body of the socialist movement, either in the past or today. 
Workers, historic and modern, have welcomed the opportunity for access to goods 
that once were not available or were available only to those with much greater 
wealth. (ibid: 84) 
 
This needed acceptance and could be integrated into political strategy. 
Nevertheless, Walzer argued that the ‘engaged citizen’ had to be supported 
in order to balance the ‘economic man’. It seemed clear that such rein-
forcement was necessary in order to come closer to achieving Walzer’s idea 
of a powerful civil society – but it seemed also clear that “economic man” 
would not – and probably should not – go away (cf. 1992: 469).  
For Dissenters, the emergence of a civil society consisting of associa-
tions, movements and organisations of ‘engaged citizens’ was the most 
important precondition for political change. Nevertheless, even if such a 
civil arrangement existed and was in a healthy state, it should not over-
stretch itself by trying to replace institutional politics, but instead work to 
influence them from the margins (cf. Isaac 1993: 360; Hirst 1994: 246). On 
the other hand, it could also take over some of the administrative tasks so 
far reserved for the state and try to design institutions with the basis of 
democratic self-government in mind – authors like Paul Hirst thought of 
tasks such as health provision and education which nevertheless should be 
financed by the state (cf. 1994: 243). Some contributors more specifically 
demanded democratic control of economic life along similar lines (cf. 
Walzer 1992: 469). Others saw a need for further reflection on the regula-
tion of conflicts and struggles between governments and civil societal asso-
ciations – for example, those surrounding the question of military expendi-
ture (cf. Joseph 1990: 147). All in all, Dissenters imagined a political situa-
tion where an alliance of different classes, of old and new left, of egalitari-
ans and civil rights proponents could develop sufficient political muscle to 
change the mould of politics – in the United States but also elsewhere, 
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perhaps even in those Eastern European countries that at the moment 
seemed to embrace capitalism wholeheartedly. 
 
Intellectuals 
It has already become obvious that intellectuals played a decisive role in 
setting up these democratic structures. Whereas in the previous two jour-
nals intellectuals were primarily seen as critics of politicians and institu-
tional politics, in Dissent they had to fulfil a double function of criticism 
and support (as with Rorty’s insistence that they had to involve themselves 
in the intricacies of drafting plans and bills), or of a criticism from within. 
In line with this, the critique of capitalism also seemed to be slightly differ-
ent in character: at least for some contributors it was more about improving 
than about transcending capitalism – reformist rather than transformative: 
“It seems obvious, then, that the search for solutions to the problems gener-
ated by a predominantly privately owned, market-oriented society has been 
and will continue to be a major element in the political agenda of every 
democratic society” (Dahl 1990: 227). As the discussion clearly shows, 
intellectuals should not try to make decisions on behalf of those groups of 
the population whom they sympathised with. Admitting that they had done 
so too often, their approach to critique contained a large measure of self-
critique. Howe suggested that socialist intellectuals had to accept Eastern 
Europe’s choice to return to capitalism, but nevertheless they should try to 
engage with them in discussions (cf. 1990: 89). A critical investigation of 
what went so disastrously wrong in Eastern Europe was of equal im-
portance. It was necessary not only because without such an analysis mis-
takes were likely to be repeated, but additionally as Lewis Coser pointed 
out, the most serious threat to socialism at the moment of writing came 
from Eastern European intellectuals who had suffered under state socialism 
and hence voiced a strong antipathy against all versions of socialism. How-
ever, Dissent also allowed for the expression of such opinions, giving voice 
even to those who thought that criticism of socialism should go much fur-
ther and should be linked, in fact, to intellectual self-critique and the re-
thinking of core assumptions. Eugene Genovese who fought for this posi-
tion in the journal argued that issues such as a belief in human goodness or 
malleability, the condemnation of hierarchy and authority, the secularisa-
tion of society as an emancipatory goal and anti-American self-hate as a 
disposition of intellectual minds had to be reassessed (cf. 1994: 375). In 
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response to to the many sceptical voices his intervention provoked, he 
added that concepts such as democracy, equality, and social justice also had 
to be fundamentally rethought. More generally, he urged intellectuals to 
spend some time considering what might follow from philosophical ideals 
once they had been accepted as guidelines for political practice. Though he 
did not become explicit, he seemed to imply that the uncompromising 
pursuit of such principles might provoke drives towards authoritarianism 
and despotism (cf. 1994a: 388). Despite such strong revisionist criticisms, 
such as Genovese’s, most other authors chose to focus on reforming tasks 
and measures more commonly associated with the left. 
Re-examinations had to be carried out not only on the national, but also 
on the global level. Paul Hirst demanded a “new theory of the distribution 
of power” for sites of governance which were to be found increasingly on 
the regional and the supra-national levels (1994: 242). Additionally, Mi-
chael Rustin maintained that such a theory of power distribution was im-
portant when he reviewed Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society. Rustin accused him 
of idealism because Beck criticised ways of thinking, in this case “techno-
logical-scientific rationality”, rather than the structures such thinking 
served – the powerful institutions of capital (1994: 398-9): “[s]ociety is 
seen as evolving toward a variety of networks, linked laterally as well as 
vertically, rather than as hierarchical chains of command” (ibid: 398). Rus-
tin, an untypical contributor to Dissent, drew attention to the problem that it 
was certainly a helpful and necessary task to develop new theories of power 
distribution (ibid: 400). 
While Dissent oscillated between idealism and materialism as bases on 
which to build theoretical work, explicit emphasis on the importance of 
utopian thinking was relatively scarce in its contributions. Even if Howe 
and Coser underlined the need to think about fresh versions of socialism 
and defined this as one of the future tasks of the journal, its focus seemed to 
lie more on discussing concrete political questions to be struggled with in 
the present situation than in the setting up of a new socialist project (cf. 
Howe 1990: 89-90; Howe 1990a: 301; Coser 1991: 102). However in a 
later article, Howe repeated the need of a certain type of utopianism and 
defined it as “utopian thinking qualified by democratic norms” (1992: 143). 
He considered this to be important because “if we don’t bring up the basic 
economic issues and possible radical solutions, almost no one else will” 
(ibid: 143-4). This utopianism had to be different from traditional Marxist 
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approaches not just in regards to its acceptance of democratic norms, but 
also in its avoidance of deterministic and mechanistic assumptions. It 
should “depict the features of democratic socialist society in workable 
detail – its structural arrangements, not just its envisioned qualities – with-
out succumbing to excessively mechanical specifications” (ibid: 143). 
More important than abstract considerations on utopianism was indubi-
tably the participation in and organisation of concrete struggles. Many 
Dissenters regarded themselves as servants of a social democratic move-
ment-to-form and subscribed to views such as that of Broadbent; social 
democratic leadership could convince people to modify their behaviour – 
without succumbing to the arrogance and condescension of vanguardism. It 
remained the task of intellectuals to defend people in trouble and Dissenters 
hoped that once they did, they would convince other middle-class people to 
do so too and thus facilitate the emergence of the middle class and poor 
people’s alliance they intended to create. Walzer pointed out that the reason 
for siding with the weak and the poor lay more in ethical than in strategic 
reasons: 
 
We can’t cut our ties to people in trouble or to social groups in decline, for these are 
not merely the ‘base’ of the old left but the raison d’etre of any possible left. They 
can no longer be conceived, however, as a class apart, waiting for their historical 
moment. We must defend them, and help them defend themselves, as citizens of this 
society, not as the generative force of some ideal future. (1992: 468-9) 
 
Left intellectuals, according to Walzer, were central for the coordination of 
the different special interests of marginalised groups – their professional 
training and independence enabled them to do this better than anyone else 
(cf. ibid: 468). Unlike the traditional ideals of universal intellectuals of the 
past, Dissenters knew that specialisation was required and that intellectuals 
should not shy away from becoming absorbed in intricate and detailed 
problems: “Because intelligent choices of public policies require both tech-
nical understanding and sensitivity to the values involved, in modern dem-
ocratic countries a form of specialized intellectual activity has evolved that 
tends to combine both aspects of policy” (Dahl 1990: 227). In order to carry 
out these tasks, intellectuals had to direct a part of their activities towards 
themselves and develop a new culture of debate: “We must put an end to 
intellectual oscillation between unanimity and civil war. It’s necessary to 
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live with a democratic culture that at once entails compromise, concert, and 




Among the contributors to Monthly Review, one found nearly-unanimous 
views on the continuing centrality of working-class agency. Beneath this 
overall consensus, however, there were differences in how exactly to define 
the working class and to consolidate its agency. A large group of authors 
stressed the importance of the metropolitan working classes even if they 
could hardly be described as revolutionary. Martin J. Morand, for example, 
argued that without a viable labour movement, no progressive legislation 
was possible and not even a meaningful democracy. He saw this thesis 
proven by the differences between the United States with its weak and 
Canada with its stronger labour movement (cf. 1990: 44). Similarly, Joel 
Kovel, in his obituary for Miliband, expressed the view that the labour 
movement remained central because it was the main antagonist of the rul-
ing class – a perspective that he saw as one of Miliband’s most important 
political legacies (cf. 1994: 57). However, despite their continuing faithful-
ness to the working classes, writers were realistic enough to identify work-
ing class political agency as to a great degree lying dormant. Consequently, 
they discussed the question of how to make it more active and more effec-
tive. One possible route consisted of the founding of new organisations. 
Istvan Mészáros criticised the defensive character of all working class 
organisations and envisaged a new type of unionism that should develop 
into an extra-parliamentary force – for him an alternative to their traditional 
reliance on reformist parties. Only extra-parliamentary pressure could make 
parliaments meaningful agents of change: 
 
There will be no advance whatsoever until the working class movement, the socialist 
movement is re-articulated in the form of becoming capable of offensive action, 
through its appropriate institutions and through its extra-parliamentary force. The 
parliament, if it is to become meaningful at all in the future, has to be revitalized, 
and can only be if it acquires an extra-parliamentary force in conjunction with the 
radical political movement that can also be active through parliament. (Monthly 
Review 1993: 22) 
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The question of whether the transformation of labour unions into such a 
force was a realistic option or else wishful thinking caused controversy. 
Most writers seemed to have few illusions about the leaderships of U.S. 
unions which, according to Morand, simply consisted of cynics (cf. 1991: 
27-28). Kim Scipes similarly expressed reservations about unions’ tradi-
tional forms of organisation and ideology and, reviewing an optimistic 
study by Brecher and Costello on the possibility of building bridges be-
tween labour unions and community groups, went as far as claiming: “[W]e 
cannot assume that what they [workers; S.B.] want today is something 
which all progressives are willing to fight for” (Scipes 1991: 42). Others, 
however, urged academics to regard unions neither as too monolithic nor as 
static. Mészáros founded his hopes on workers’ likely disappointments with 
a toothless political and industrial leadership that could lead to radicalisa-
tion – as an example he pointed to direct action against the introduction of 
the Thatcher government’s poll tax in Scotland (cf. Monthly Review 1993: 
23). More generally, he observed the emergence of a surplus population 
marginalised by structural unemployment which might also become politi-
cised and connect with third-world workers (cf. ibid: 23-24). Such scenari-
os required a view of the (American) working class that was more positive 
than the one presented by Scipes above. Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello 
replied to such a negative characterisation by urging for a historicising, as 
opposed to an essentialist, perspective: 
 
We suspect they [Scipe’s criticisms; SB] result from a way of thinking in which 
unions, labor leaders, and workers are fixed entities with characteristics that can be 
known once and for all. [...] Scipes repeatedly presents social phenomena as if they 
possessed an essence that transcends time, place and specific historical context. 
(1991: 49-50) 
 
Authors widely discussed this issue of linking or of building bridges in 
Monthly Review and suggested several types of coalitions and alliances. As 
in the other journals, a great deal was written about the possible linking of 
the labour movement and the social movements of the time. Most contribu-
tors believed that a focus on class struggle was an essential element within 
a radical rainbow coalition. Victor Wallis argued that the most stable forms 
of self-organisation developed along class lines, because they developed 
their political identities and goals from an analysis of the totality of the 
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oppressive system – at least as long as they used a Marxist framework (and 
this was one of the tasks for which Marxism was still needed). In order to 
defend victories achieved in an endless cycle of anti-oppressive struggles, 
social movements had to unite a critical mass of the population behind them 
– otherwise each gain could easily be reversed. Only when the causal link 
between the different oppressive structures could be identified, it would 
allow the assemblage of such a critical mass and the emergence of an oppo-
sitional political culture (cf. Wallis 1991: 9-14). 
While social movements thus needed a class-conscious labour move-
ment, such dependence should be seen as a mutual. In order to be relevant, 
a labour movement had to open up itself and to coalesce with other groups. 
A long list of such groups was assembled in the journal’s pages – among 
them youth associations. Michael Löwy argued that many youngsters, often 
with a working-class background themselves, aspired for a free and equal 
society, social and economic democracy, and self-administration (cf. 1991: 
37). Apart from a general call for a trans-generational alliance, a number of 
more specific groups were proposed: the unemployed (existing just at the 
margins of traditional labour movements but in numbers that exceeded a 
mere ‘reserve army of labour’ and thus could become a threat to the exist-
ing order [cf. Monthly Review 1994: 2]), socialist ecologists (who were 
treated with suspicion by the discontented poor)(cf. Wallis 1992: 20-21), all 
those subscribing to the diverse utopian, anarchist, green traditions – who 
shared with Marxists the long-term goal of a stateless society (ibid: 21). 
Finally, the new social movements were also urged to open themselves up 
to people with disabilities and to sexual minorities (cf. Charlton 1994: 83). 
Such a broad network could develop into a radical U.S. civil society – and 
the belief that such a civil society could materialise under certain historical 
circumstances was not an illusion, but could be proven by historical prece-
dence: Paul Sweezy claimed that American civil society would have 
blocked any brutal colonisation of Vietnam (which would have been possi-
ble in military terms) and, more recently – through keeping alive the 
memory of Vietnam – had forced U.S. governments to moderate their poli-
cy towards Nicaragua. This influence contributed to the ten-year survival of 
the country’s revolution (cf. Watanabe & Wakima 1990: 7-8). 
Up to this point, the selected reflections have mainly addressed political 
agency at the level of the United States. However, other writers focused on 
political agency at other levels. One of these was that of local grassroots 
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activity. While lessons were often drawn from Third World countries, 
authors also presented insights into community activism in the United 
States. Since writers in Monthly Review were less likely to be university 
academics than those in the other journals, the journal published more 
hands-on coverage of such activity. It provided interesting examples of the 
problems of coalition building under conditions of diversity, but also its 
chances of setting up ‘de-linked’, democratically organised economies in, 
for example, old industrial communities such as rustbelt Detroit (cf. Boggs 
1990: 12-13). Contributors disagreed in how far initiatives like these, re-
ported from all parts of the world, were important for transformations on a 
global scale. Some, such as Samir Amin, boldly claimed that challenges to 
capitalism were more likely to come from the peripheries of the third and 
fourth worlds than from the capitalist West, or, for that matter, from the 
collapsing Eastern Bloc. He contended, however, that such agency – aimed 
at de-linking from the global economy – was necessarily anti-capitalist, but 
not automatically socialist (cf. 1990: 17-23). Elsewhere he justified his 
expectations in terms of the nature of capitalism: “In my view world expan-
sion of capitalism is necessarily polarizing and by that fact it is inevitable 
that the people who are its principal victims – those who live at the periph-
ery of the system – will revolt against it.” (1993: 45) Sweezy also expressed 
the belief that, from a long-term perspective, revolutionary situations would 
develop in Third World countries which would weaken the capitalist cen-
tres and might eventually bring revolutions also to them. This was particu-
larly likely to happen once revolutionary agency changed large countries 
such as Brazil (cf. Watanabe & Wakima 1990: 8-9). Others like Mészáros 
disagreed with the above opinions and took the more traditionally Marxist 
counter position against an over-reliance on Third World radicalism (and 
on all outcast radicalisms – as he emphasised in a late critique of Marcuse): 
while accepting that a great deal could be learned from political debates in 
Latin America, the future of socialism would be decided in the United 
States and the advanced capitalist countries in general (cf. Monthly Review 
1993: 20-22). Finally, some authors expressed the view that only interna-
tional solidarity by workers and cooperation among social movements 
could create a socialism that considered global justice and environmental 
sustainability (cf. Hermele 1993: 23-24). Arthur MacEwan emphasised that 
global – or at least transnational – solidarity was not an unreachable ideal 
but already political practice, despite the fact that workers were becoming 
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competitors on a global scale: he hinted at the opposition to the establish-
ment of NAFTA and suggested that the increasing feminisation of the 
workforce would strengthen the international dimension. At the same time 
it would also link labour and community struggles (cf. 1994: 3; 10-13).  
The bulk of Monthly Review’s writing on agency was in a wide sense 
empirical but it also included some more theoretical considerations. A case 
in point was Ellen Meiksins Wood’s article on E. P. Thompson. Referring 
to his best known quotation, on the principal intention of researching and 
writing The Making of the English Working Class – he wanted to save 
ordinary people from the ‘condescension of posterity’ – she explained that 
this passage “held a clear and immediate message about the agency of the 
working class in making its own history, a message that goes to the heart of 
the socialist project as the self-emancipation of the working class” (1994: 
8). She summarised the essence of Thompson’s work as showing the speci-
ficity, historicity and, thus, contestability of capitalism. He had illuminated 
the rationalities that had existed in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century England beyond market rationality and had chronicled examples 
which revealed that the people holding such alternative rationalities could 
win social and political struggles (cf. ibid: 10-12). These perceptions were 
in danger of being lost in newer trends in Marxist theorising. However, 
Wood remained convinced of their relevance for times to come: “[A]s the 
contradictions of capitalism become more and more evident in all parts of 
Europe and everywhere else, those hopes are likely to be justified again; 
and people will learn again not to think but to act, live, and struggle against 
capitalism” (ibid: 14). 
 
Strategy 
With the question of how to pursue this acting, living and struggling, the 
question of strategy became relevant. The most important recommendation 
to the readers was not to give up on socialism. The way forward was, in 
accordance with the Solidarnosc leader Lech Walesa, to keep and further 
develop what was good in socialism (cf. Marzani 1990: 25). Wood ex-
pressed this conviction most forcefully and directed it against a social de-
mocratisation of socialism: 
 
At this moment in the ‘long decline’, capitalists themselves – in their increasingly 
desperate demands for ‘flexibility’ – seem closer than ever before to admitting that 
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the imperatives of the capitalist market will not allow them to prosper without de-
pressing the condition of workers and degrading the environment. In these circum-
stances, socialism may turn out to be less unrealistically utopian than is a ‘social’ 
capitalism. (1994a: 39-40) 
 
The demand for socialism could only be expressed in class struggle – it 
remained, as Kovel put it, the conceptual linchpin of Marxism (cf. 1994: 
52). Although they remained faithful to socialism, it seemed that authors 
also saw the socialist project in a phase between the struggles of the past 
and those – qualitatively different – of the future and hence in a process of 
self-reflection, renewal and reformulation: 
 
This renewal will take time. The institutional forms of the old opposition – mass 
organizations, political parties, sovereign states – will mostly disappear and be 
replaced by new ones. The same will hold for ideas and ideologies, particularly the 
falsified and distorted versions of Marxism that acquired the status of orthodoxies in 
the Social Democratic and Communist movements of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. (Sweezy 1994: 7) 
 
Sweezy remained optimistic that this interim phase would eventually end. 
He based this belief on arguments similar to those presented by Wood – 
that capitalism was incapable of delivering what most people in the world 
needed and were lacking: decent jobs, security, and livelihood. To this end 
he claimed that “The human species is long suffering but it is not likely that 
it will tolerate forever what looks like a slide into ungovernability and 
chaos.” (Sweezy 1994a: 11) As a first example of revolutionary activity of 
this new type, Sweezy identified the uprisings of the Zapatistas in Chiapas 
which were closely observed in the journal (ibid). 
A large section of the space given to reflections on socialist strategy 
was dedicated to economic issues. Here, one perspective underlined the 
importance of small-scale socialist, or communitarian, economic experi-
ments within capitalism. Grace Lee Boggs, herself involved in neighbour-
hood projects, saw such manoeuvres as a way of becoming independent of 
the world market. Independence constituted the only way forward for Third 
World countries as well as for the bitterly poor U.S. peripheries. Whereas 
her ideas stem from observations in Detroit, Amin claimed the attempt to 
delink from the world economy to be the most realistic strategy for social-
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ists in the Third World. Once such delinking was in progress and guided by 
popular alliances rather than bourgeoisies, it could take a socialist direction. 
Amin explained the failure of third-world socialism of the past to take off 
with the cooptation of the bourgeois parts of popular alliances to the world 
system. Further, he proposed that the process of delinking had to take place 
not only in the economic sphere, but also in people’s heads. This entailed 
“discovering the criteria of rationality in economic life different from those 
that govern world capitalism, freeing oneself from the constraints of world-
capitalist value, and substituting a law of value of national popular refer-
ence.” (1990: 23). Amin remained silent about the time frame of his de-
linking strategy. Did he see it as a revolutionary break or as a long process? 
His reference to post-independence third-world countries makes it probable 
that he preferred a rapid scenario. This would contradict the suggestions by 
Harry Magdoff who agreed that to work for socialism meant to “work 
toward opting out of the international network of capitalist trade and fi-
nance” (1991: 18). Unlike Amin, he considered this to be an incremental 
process. 
Sticking to the goal of socialism meant continuing the fight against cap-
italism – something not to be confused with the fight against capitalists (cf. 
Marzani 1990: 10). Contributors considered this distinction indispensable 
for any attempts at finding suitable strategies. A redistributive and ecologi-
cal politics could only really become effective once it addressed the prob-
lem of profit maximisation as the determining principle of capitalism. 
While this sounded ‘fundamentalist’, most agreed that social and environ-
mental reforms within capitalism should be welcomed and supported at the 
same time. To do so was justified not just by the practical benefits of such 
policies, but also because in so doing they could cause incremental changes 
in the power structures of society – and thus pave the way for more radical 
change. Concretely, Marzani called for a Keynesian socialisation of in-
vestment and guaranteed employment, which he believed would not bring 
about the end of but would still radically alter capitalism (cf. 1990: 25). 
Another suggestion voiced in the journal was a conversion programme for 
U.S. industry which should support workers whose jobs were endangered 
by the end of the Cold War (cf. Plotkin et al. 1994).
1
 The authors were 
                                                             
1  The editors of the journal declared a serious jobs programme in the political 
climate and of the time as illusory (cf. Editors of Monthly Review 1994: 57). 
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aware of the fact that raising taxes for such programmes would cause seri-
ous difficulties because of opposition from the wealthier sections of socie-
ty. Therefore they pointed out that a concerted onslaught was needed 
against the basics and practices of American politics which granted the 
wealthier sections of the population privileged access to decision making 
processes: “financing short political campaigns from public funds, publiciz-
ing the issues and candidates’ positions through the media and forbidding 
private contributions to political campaigns could contribute enormously to 
breaking the stranglehold of the super-rich” (ibid: 56). 
Finding solutions to ecological problems was of paramount importance. 
In an interview, Sweezy voiced the opinion that capitalism had to disappear 
over the next one hundred years, otherwise the human species would not 
survive (cf. Watanabe & Wakima 1990: 10). As a role model, he pointed to 
the German Greens who – unlike U.S. environmentalists – had understood 
the close link between economic change and an end to rapidly progressing 
ecological destruction. For him, ecological sustainability was a non-
negotiable goal and he called for 
 
an attempt to achieve a movement which can educate people not only to the danger 
of the environment but also to the necessity for long-range planning and the ability 
to change the power-relations of human society in such a way as to make the preser-
vation of the environment the first goal, the number one goal. (ibid: 10-11) 
 
Activists should learn not only from environmentalists, but also from other 
sources beyond a narrowly defined socialism. In the same interview, 
Sweezy drew a surprising parallel between strands of Marxism, including 
even Maoism and liberation theology. He pointed out that liberation theo-
logians strove for the establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth. He 
conceded that while it was impossible to create an earthly paradise, libera-
tion theology, just like Maoism, suggested a permanent revolutionary pro-
cess for which the stage reached with the ‘withering away of the state’ 
(Marx’s equivalent to paradise) should be seen as a sense of direction into 
which to move rather than a realistic final destination (ibid: 4). Closely 
linked to such appreciative evaluations of religiosity was a more general 
call for more sensitivity towards the spiritual aspects of human life. Kovel 
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claimed the authority of Herbert Aptheker who defined Marxism as spiritu-
ality in action; in contrast to a religious spirituality it had nothing to do with 
mysticism, prayer and meditation but with struggle (cf. 1994: 40). This 
would give struggles a sense of purpose they otherwise lacked – to fight for 
something was only sensible as long as it was considered to be sacred, as 
Brentlinger explained. He diagnosed a permanent process through which 
people identified objects or values as sacred: 
 
This is a profoundly self-creative aspiration which in its historical development 
leads to clarity and definition in the idea of the good society. The sacred lies within 
this aspiration to be which people in the past have tried to validate through a higher 
being. In this sense, the sacred has been illusory. But it records an important reality. 
The sacred is a monument to our highest moments of strength and purpose and self-
affirmation. The higher being is our best self. (1992: 37) 
 
For the sacred, humans would be willing to make sacrifices, to struggle and 
even to risk their lives: It would be a “necessary element of any community 
worth dying for” (ibid: 40). 
Contributors tended to understand agency less as the result of objective 
conditions than of political will and political projects based on a socialist 
consciousness. Strengthening such consciousness constituted an important 
part of a socialist strategy. One of the relevant principles often mentioned 
was solidarity. Solidarity could become a tool for transcending the interests 
of specific groups, but any solidarity worth its name had to include the 
poorest and the weakest (cf. Hinkelammert 1993: 110). Such a form of 
unity was impossible to realise within capitalism and could become a driv-
ing force for overcoming it: “We must now help to regenerate the human 
dignity whose roots have been destroyed. We must stand up and cry out 
that capitalism without the possibility of solidarity is the negation of human 
dignity and we will not stand for that” (ibid: 112). Yet, the creation of such 
cohesion required Herculean efforts. As one contributor observed, the nor-
mal situation was rather the lack of solidarity among oppressed groups – for 
example, between Koreans and African Americans in the United States (cf. 
Kim 1993: 54). The most promising way out of such an impasse was to 
unite behind a demand shared by as many oppressed groups as possible. 
The same author suggested that such groups assemble in order to fight for 
universal access to health care. Once this common goal had been achieved, 
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it would be easier to pursue more specific demands (ibid: 56-7). Alterna-
tively, groups of activists could be encouraged to swap their projects and 
goals: women’s groups could work towards AIDS awareness, African 
Americans towards reproductive choice, lesbian and gay groups against 
inner city gang violence. Learning from each other in this way could facili-
tate coalition building on a local and, in the long run, on a global scale. 
Though such aims could sound unrealistic, the author was able to point to 
certain historical precedents – for example, when African Americans on the 
West Coast of the United States protested against the imprisonment of 
Japanese during World War II, or when Japanese Americans demonstrated 
against the demonization of Arab Americans in the Gulf War (ibid: 54-5). 
What could socialists do in the core countries of capitalism? In this con-
text, authors debated the strategic functions of parties of the left. Some held 
the opinion that the third-party route to political influence – as it had been 
taken in Canada with the New Democratic Party – was less than promising 
in the United States (cf. Morand 1991: 27-28). Others, however, insisted on 
the need for the formation of a third party, especially as Oliver S. Land 
formulated it, since there were no single issues any longer – the human 
future in general was at a crossroads and survival needed coordinated so-
cialist guidance (cf. 1991: 51-53). Alan Wald also proposed a clear and 
definite break with the Democratic Party and the formation of a new party 
based on “truly independent electoral formations that can become an arm of 
mass struggle, and democratically controlled from the bottom up” (1991: 
60). He sympathised with an organisation that was in formation process 
during the time of writing – the Labour Party Advocates (ibid). 
This seemed to be a reformist approach. Was revolution off the agenda 
in the core countries of capitalism? In these societies, it seemed likely that 
revolutions would occur only after a long preceding period of reforms. 
Hence the juxtaposition of reformism and revolution was misleading – 
reforms were revolution’s precondition: 
 
First, the initial region of socialist hegemony will already have had to free itself – as 
a precondition to its existence – from all externally based counterrevolutionary 
threat. Second, it will appear at a time when no capitalist country can any longer 
serve as a model to emulate, even in economic terms. Third, a greater number of 
appropriate changes in human attitudes and conduct will already have gained cur-
rency before the structural changes are introduced. This means, among other things, 
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that both the taking and the exercise of power will be marked by a higher level of 
egalitarianism and democracy. Finally, the whole process of building up to any 
transition will have generated far more in the way of specific proposals for revolu-
tionary change. (Wallis 1992: 9) 
 
On the one hand, this was a clear farewell to vanguardism. On the other, it 
again echoed the widely-shared catastrophism – in the capitalist countries, 
things had to get worse in order to get better. Despite this perspective, the 
appropriate measure was not to criticise incremental changes for their insuf-
ficiency, but to initiate and support them. This course of action should 
include coalition building with all radical groups, even if they were non-
Marxist (cf. ibid: 21). Critics looked again to Europe for hope; this time, 
however, not in the European Community but, quite to the contrary, in 
progressive resistance against a neo-liberal European Union. Singer point-
ed to the negative referenda results in France and Denmark on the Maas-
tricht treaty and characterised them as signs of nationalist and social re-
sistance (cf. 1994: 93). He anticipated further confrontations because of 
high unemployment figures, especially since joblessness now began to 
threaten the middle classes as well. For him, the struggles lying ahead in 
Europe were decisive: 
 
This is why the coming confrontation in Europe is so vital. What is at stake is 
whether the working people of Europe will be more than ever appendices to the 
machine in a society based on profit or whether the associated producers, imposing a 
different logic, will start gaining mastery over their work and the organization of 
their society. (1994: 95) 
 
It seemed that an effective political strategy had to be attuned to local con-
ditions. There was no universal or global way forward, but situations 
changed fundamentally in the peripheries, in Europe and in North America. 
Contributors optimistically turned to parts of the world outside North 
America whose struggles and progressive moves would strengthen move-
ments for change in North America. 
 
Intellectuals 
In Monthly Review, the tasks ascribed to the intellectuals were, broadly 
speaking, the same as in the other journals: they should formulate critiques, 
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conceptualize possible utopias, and educate the public. If socialists were 
supposed to lead history somewhere, they needed to know where to go. 
This sentiment implied a revaluation the status of moral discourse. Accord-
ing to this thinking, moral values were needed as guidance while scenarios 
of automatism and the development of revolutionary consciousness in the 
revolutionary process should be criticised as overly simplistic. This did not 
mean, as Cornel West clarified, that socialists should become moralist (cf. 
1993: 59). The people associated with the journal were convinced that 
West’s suggestions of a tactical and strategic essentialism appeared promis-
ing. They avoided two intellectual traps – moralist dogmatism as well as 
radical relativism. Both had to be criticised and Reviewers contended that 
intellectual work should not shy away from explaining why some moral 
positions were preferable over others. Leftwing thinkers had to take sides in 
the intellectual battle over the question of whether socialism as capitalism’s 
other was dead or not. Calls for a socialist society had to be reiterated (cf. 
Sweezy 1993: 6-8). However, as mentioned above, it was not only capital-
ism that should be criticised according to Review contributors, but also 
Marxism (cf. Löwy 1991: 37-38). Nevertheless, central elements of the 
Marxist method of critique were still useful, as Sweezy explained – hence 
the tasks of Monthly Review and the thinkers around it would remain the 
same: 
 
One of Monthly Review’s tasks in these years of counterrevolution has been to use 
Marxian methods to track and understand major developments on both sides of a 
polarized world. Another task was to chronicle, encourage, and where possible 
celebrate the successes of numerous Third World efforts to escape the confines of 
capitalism and start on a new road for all the tragically exploited and oppressed 
peoples of those unhappy lands. Whatever else happens, these tasks will remain. 
(1994: 5) 
 
Nevertheless the contributors agreed that such chronicling and criticising 
functioned insufficiently to bring an end to capitalism. Just like writers in 
the other journals, they emphasised the need to start a creative process of 
utopian imagination – as an important step to move beyond the there-is-no-
alternative discourse of the time (cf. Mészáros 1993: 35). Singer claimed 
that this discourse bore the danger of producing irrational, jingoistic, and 
reactionary solutions, especially in Eastern Europe, but also in the West (cf. 
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1994: 98). He called for pragmatism, the will to defend the bad against the 
worse, but also for the formulation of what he called a “realistic utopia” 
(ibid: 99). It required, among other things, to ask important questions: 
“growth? but which growth? for whose sake? for whose profit? for what 
purpose? for what kind of society and within which environment?” (ibid: 
98) In other words, according to contributors these questions should be-
come starting points for philosophies capable of overcoming what Grace 
Lee Boggs termed “scientific rationalism” – philosophies formulating 
changed relationships among human beings and between humans and na-
ture (1990: 14-15). Such rethinking also required attempts at dealing with 
difference and diversity in order to create pluralistic and multicultural soci-
eties. Boggs expressed hope that impetus for such utopias would come from 
the margins of the world system. While Third World revolutionaries of the 
decolonisation period had mostly been trained in the West and internalised 
some aspects of Eurocentric perspectives, the next generation of Third 
World intellectuals and activists would not – they would stay free from 
both Eastern and Western Eurocentrism (cf. ibid: 17-18). Similarly, Buhle 
called for a “decolonisation” of the heads of Western people: they should 
investigate what could be learnt from Third World societies about the ba-
sics of a decent and humane society (1993: 56). 
Finally, the educating role of intellectuals was mentioned in the pages 
of Monthly Review as well. Authors suggested that Marxism had still a 
great deal to impart and hence should be taught: 
 
We have a theory, as old as Marx, which, without rejecting a concept of our species 
as producers capable of freedom, allows us to choose collectively to emancipate and 
realize ourselves in creative and free activity, to create ourselves in human history, 
and to change our natures through social transformation to become cooperative and 
supporting the biosphere and ourselves. (Weston 1990: 4) 
 
According to Jack Weston, mass movements still needed to be informed 
about Marxist theories of social change, since only then could they identify 
the suitable time for revolutionary intervention – and without such interven-
tion the power of industrial capital could not be weakened (ibid: 5-6). Sing-
er saw another educational task with regard to the people in Eastern Eu-
rope. It was the duty of Western intellectuals to inform them about the less 
attractive sides of Western capitalism. They should explain, for example, 
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the link between higher productivity and higher unemployment, social and 
gender inequalities, environmental degradation, the exploitation of the 
global South and the worldwide monopolisation processes within the media 
(cf. 1990: 90-91). Generally speaking, as academics, intellectuals should 
use their privileged positions (which they only relatively recently captured) 
in order to act as advisors to the public rather than as specialists working 
exclusively within the walls of higher education institutions (cf. 
McChesney 1994: 34). Their task was to decode hegemonic messages and 
ideologies (ibid: 32). The important educational responsibility of intellectu-
als at the historical conjuncture of the early 1990s was perhaps most aptly 
summarised by the journal’s editor, Paul Sweezy, himself: “We can only do 
our best to explain what has happened up to now and help the new upcom-
ing generations to understand what changes are needed if the human spe-
cies is to survive into a decent future.” (1994: 7) 
 
Re-Starting History 
A large majority of contributors still regarded the working class as an in-
dispensable actor in any scenario of progressive political change. However, 
two modifications corrected traditionalist conceptions of working-class 
agency. Firstly, working class people did not constitute a monolithic whole 
with a collective political will, especially because social structures and 
people’s identities were complex and contradictory. Some authors empha-
sised that working-class people legitimately pursued their personal interests 
in attempts at improving their individual material position. Others under-
lined that working people, when they became politically active, were guid-
ed by ethical considerations rather than simply their ‘objective’ class inter-
ests. Secondly, as indispensable as working-class agency for moves to-
wards socialism was, this did not mean that the working class constituted 
the only or even the dominant actor. Instead, alliances with other groups of 
the population were required as well as with political movements. Especial-
ly the collaboration of working-class organisations and the new social 
movements was of crucial importance. 
All writers were convinced that a trans-national cooperation of progres-
sive political groups was essential in the late twentieth century. However, 
intellectuals largely understood such collaborations as consisting of simul-
taneous – and ideally, coordinated – struggles in different countries and 
regions of the world. The level of the national state remained the main site 
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of struggle over political demands. Within all journals different opinions 
coexisted when it came to the questions as to whether third-world or metro-
politan agents were the group more likely to initiate upheavals and which 
could contribute more to struggles for socialist change. 
In any case, the cooperation of labour organisations and new social 
movements had to be organised. An effective strategy needed a reconcilia-
tion of pluralism and cohesion. Many intellectuals believed that Marxist 
theory could play an important role in this context – by revealing the inter-
relations and common roots of different forms of oppression. All journals 
bade farewell to traditional notions of revolution and – with the partial 
exception of Dissent – were at pains to explain the difference between a 
merely reformative and a transformative political strategy, and most agreed 
that they preferred the latter. At the same time, writers accepted to experi-
ence a historical conjuncture when socialists’ struggles were often defen-
sive. It was the left’s task to defend welfare systems against neo-liberal 
cost-cutting policies and liberal democracy against hijacking by powerful, 
unaccountable ‘interests’. Generally, the mood seemed to be one of quali-
fied pessimism. All journals presented their version of the thesis that things 
had to go worse in order to wake people up. Then things might get better 
thanks to people’s support for a revived left politics. Such strategies consti-
tuted the only realistic hope; with the demise of vanguardism, the notion 
that emancipation could only be understood as self-emancipation was taken 
more seriously than ever. 
Contributors generally agreed as to the tasks of intellectuals in recon-
ceptualised socialist movements. They should provide analytical critiques 
of social problems and political deficiencies, engage in what Wallerstein 
called ‘utopistics’ and act as spokespersons and educators of marginalised 
groups. This function, however, should not be interpreted as the task of 
speaking for other people. The only thing intellectuals could do was to 
speak on behalf of groups who could not otherwise make themselves heard 
in the public sphere . Finally, the function of critic entailed a sober – and 
self-reflexive – elaboration of the socialist struggles of the past and of the 
varieties of state socialism which had recently disintegrated. 
New Left Review moved farthest from traditional ideas of working-class 
agency and tolerated opinions like Gorz’s, who did not rule out the possi-
bility that the working class could still play a political role but doubted its 
centrality in a post-industrial setting. All the other journals remained scep-
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tical of the sustainability of political change without considerable working-
class support. The American journals raised the topic in much more detail 
as to how important the role of organisations of civil society was to allianc-
es for political change; the journals considered these players to be central in 
complementing the more volatile groups and informal collectives of the 
new social movements. Together with Monthly Review’s strong interest in 
grassroots activism, this emphasis seems to reflect the associational charac-
ter of public life, including political life, in the United States and stands in 
marked contrast to the more centralist and party-centred organisation of 
political life in Britain. 
Nevertheless Dissenters repeatedly pointed out that civil society should 
not become a substitute for an institutionalised political system. As a strate-
gy, the left should try to contribute to debates on both levels – that of civil 
society and that of formal politics. Implicit in this call to action, was a 
command not to shy away from reaching out to organisations beyond the 
left, and indeed both Dissent and New Left Review called for broad centre-
left alliances. The strategies suggested seemed to take note of the specific 
problems of marginalised people in Britain and the United States. While the 
British journals urged for a defence of the threatened welfare system of the 
United Kingdom, Monthly Review took into consideration the more drastic 
exclusion of poor people in North America. The proposed strategy of de-
linking, recommended to communities in the U.S. rustbelt seemed adequate 
since inclusion into the slim welfare system would solve not even all of the 
most urgent problems. 
Obviously, contributors measured the centrality of modified rationali-
ties and well-founded ethics slightly differently. Although one should not 
overstate this point, the American journals published more deliberations on 
ethics, spirituality and the possibility – as well as the danger – of principled 
leadership successfully modifying people’s opinions and behaviour. Per-
haps the ethical dimension of American political discourse played a role in 
this context. Much more evidently, one of the specific features of U.S. 
politics provoked various statements: writers in the American journals 
reflected on how to deal strategically with the absence of a workers party in 
the country. Dissent treated Canada’s New Democratic Party as an example 
for emulation while Monthly Review discussed the experiment of Labour 
Party Advocates and urged the left to cut their ties with the Democratic 
Party. 
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Despite the widespread agreement on the role of intellectuals, opinions 
differed as to the main task of intellectuals: whether theoretical practice, or 
the function of educator of the public or the capacity to act as specialist, 
serving either radical groups or state institutions. Apart from Dissenters’ 
less hesitant approach to mainstream politics, these differences were mi-
nute, as were those on the level of modesty and self-restraint related to the 
functions of spokespersons. One obvious difference concerned the position 
of the ‘individual’. The U.S. journals dedicated more space to reflections on 
human nature – from Genovese’s critical statements on the negative conse-
quences of good intentions to Monthly Review’s thoughts on the sacred. 
Echoing, as already stated, strands of American normative political dis-
course, these considerations might also reveal a higher level of confidence 
– and of fear – of what intellectuals could achieve in the political sphere. 
Still, intellectuals were needed among agents for socialist change, especial-
ly in their capacity as producers of strategically relevant analyses – this 
perception was universally agreed upon and served as a legitimisation for 
the existence of the journals themselves. 
 
 




This study has shown how the radical, Marxist-inspired intellectual left in 
Britain and the United States made sense of the collapse of the state-
socialist systems of the Eastern Bloc. In a comprehensive contrastive com-
parison, the analogies, similarities and differences found in the journals as 
well as the specificities of the British and the U.S. reactions have been 
identified. The task of this final part of the study is to move one step further 
analytically. The first chapter deals with the question of whether the re-
orientations with which socialist intellectuals concerned themselves after 
1989/91 must be understood as self-adaptations to social democratic and 
post-Marxist positions, even if as perhaps reluctant ones. 
The second chapter of this part offers a short tentative discussion of the 
problem as to whether the reactions analysed are divisively British or 
American, or whether they reveal the existence of a discursive community 
of the Anglo-American intellectual left. To a certain extent, reflections on 
this question must remain tentative as a definite answer would require 
cross-checking with further analyses based on different corpora of sources 
and using a variety of methodological designs. Finally, the last chapter 
completes this study with a short outlook on developments in the journals 
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1. BETWEEN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND POST-
MARXISM? 
 
1.1. Democratic Socialism and Social Democracy 
 
It is obvious that socialist intellectuals under the impact of the events of 
1989/91 discussed varieties and developed models of democratic socialism 
which brought them close to central tenets of social democracy. A case in 
point was their acceptance of gradualism and reformism as the only possi-
ble roads towards ‘more socialist’ social and economic relations. This reor-
ientation was accompanied by an acceptance of the norms and institutions 
of parliamentary democracy. They left behind the idea of revolution as a 
violent rupture or as abrupt comprehensive change affecting all dimensions 
of public life, but also the role of intellectuals as a revolutionary group; one 
which would follow a vanguardist strategy and lead society towards social-
ism. Ellen Meiksins Wood identified this idea of intellectual vanguardism 
or substitutionism as an important characteristic of the ‘Second New Left’, 
which became the core group in New Left Review from 1963 onwards. 
However, the same strategy was adopted by large sections of the 1968 and 
post-1968 New Left as well (cf. 1995: 33). In particular, it is the ‘emotion-
al’ reactions in all the journals – in which writers deplore the loss of a gen-
erational project – which illustrate that this vanguardist self-image had run 
its cause. After accepting the inevitability of gradualism, socialist intellec-
tuals tried to retain some distinction from social democracy by insisting on 
the transformative dimensions of their reformism. However, the distinction 
remained unconvincing because the boundary between merely reformist 
reforms of capitalism and transformative reform strategies was difficult to 
discern. Obviously the intellectuals assumed that transformative reforms, 
such as wage earners funds, would incrementally destabilise capitalism 
through changes in property relations, but no strategies existed for how to 
safeguard transformative reforms as long as they were in their early stages 
and hence could be easily overturned.  
Socialist strategy, according to socialist intellectuals, still included the 
class struggle. However, this struggle was reduced to a working-class poli-
tics – to policies that considered and pursued the interests of working-class 
people via parliamentary work and were supported, backed-up, reinforced 
and radicalised by the extra-parliamentary activity of labour organisations. 
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It is true that socialist intellectuals demanded the extension of the principles 
of liberal-parliamentary democracy to all areas of public life. The problem 
was less that this constituted a gradualist, reformist approach than that they 
did not provide clear answers to the question of how to achieve this within 
the entrenched and self-protective power structures of capitalist democra-
cies which they so lucidly analysed. 
Several times intellectuals called for the preservation of the achieve-
ments of social democracy and reformist labour movements. The welfare 
states in particular were declared to be worth of protection. Practically, this 
amounted to a defence of Keynesian corporatism and of the link between 
economic growth – or increased efficiency – and ‘functional socialism’. In 
this context, most intellectuals agreed on the importance of centre-left 
working-class parties. This sympathy for material working-class interests 
along the lines of the old labourist slogan ‘a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work’, the declarations of empathy for social democratic parties and the 
emphasis on democratic rights and liberal principles again constitute exam-
ples of increasingly blurred boundaries between democratic socialism and 
social democracy: like the latter, the former had become a hybrid of liberal-
ism and socialism. Fittingly, many intellectuals were now prepared to grant 
markets and even the profit principle a positive status and to accept relative 
equality or – to use Eric Olin Wright’s phrase once more – ‘less classness’ 
as the goal of socialist policies. The retrieval and rehabilitation of thinkers 
such as Kautsky and Bernstein also testify to this reorientation. Similarly, 
the continuing insistence on the centrality of the national state as an arena 
of political struggle revealed an acceptance of existing institutions – even if 
it was slightly ironic that internationalists embraced the national state at a 
time when liberals and conservatives started speaking of the inevitability of 
globalisation and the consequences of declining state power. For the intel-
lectuals, however, a strong state – all previous qualifications on the roles 
states play in the reproduction of capitalism formulated by Marxist-inspired 
state theory notwithstanding – remained an indispensable tool for redistri-
bution. While this had been a position of left intellectuals long before 1989, 
many now followed the majorities in most social democratic parties of the 
time which changed their position on economic protectionism and backed 
the European unification project. 
For most socialist intellectuals, a rhetorical and analytical commitment 
to socialism and Marxism remained. However, the study has presented 
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numerous statements in which the intellectuals defined their socialist orien-
tation as a point of reference or as a horizon rather than as a guide to politi-
cal action. This abstract commitment often found expression in a critical 
perspective on the very welfare societies which should be defended and in a 
critique of the West’s – and especially the United States’ – geo-political 
strategies directed against the former Eastern Bloc as well as the global 
South. Furthermore, intellectuals claimed to have no illusions about the 
limits of parliamentarism. Despite these qualifications, they remained large-
ly silent on those burning questions which social democracy had never been 
able to solve: how to organise redistribution – how to create opportunities 
for a ‘good life’ for everyone – without ecologically disastrous levels of 
economic growth; how to initiate redistribution on a global scale; and how 
to prepare and safeguard redistribution not just of wealth but also of politi-
cal influence given the actual existing distribution of power in liberal or 
capitalist democracies. Altogether, socialist intellectuals became a func-
tional ‘keep left’ tendency on the fringes of social democracy and liberal-
ism at a time when Social Democracy and Liberalism moved rightward and 
– as ‘New Realists’ or ‘New Democrats’ – embraced many elements of 
Britain’s and the United States’ neo-liberal settlements of the 1980s. 
 
1.2. Neo-Marxism and Post-Marxism 
 
Despite controversial debates between those who called themselves Marx-
ists or neo-Marxists on the one hand and post-Marxists on the other – de-
bates which had started before 1989 – again a high level of conceptual 
overlap between both groups can be observed. While several post-Marxists 
such as Cornelius Castoriadis, André Gorz, Paul Hirst and Chantal Mouffe 
wrote for some of the journals, many others accepted post-Marxism’s claim 
that the struggle for democracy should be the first order, even if the strug-
gle for socialism played an important role within it. Socialist and post-
Marxist intellectuals agreed on the irrelevance of traditional ideas of ‘revo-
lution’ and emphasised the centrality of struggles over ‘hegemony’ in so-
ciety, even if the latter subscribed to a discursive understanding of society 
and defined hegemony more restrictedly as a discursive concept. Still, both 
groups underlined that such struggles required the formation of coalitions 
and remained convinced that considerable degrees of variety and unpredict-
ability would forbid prognoses on future progressive causes. They backed 
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constitutionalism and emphasised the importance of constitutional change, 
they agreed on the necessity of accepting democratic principles, and propa-
gated the idea of formal and informal governance at all levels of society 
and in all areas of public life. This notion of democratic struggles over 
hegemony tied in with an understanding of historical developments as 
contingent. Even if some intellectuals upheld the notion of history as the 
history of class struggles, these interpretations were pluralist and context-
specific – as regulation theorists had already demonstrated the specificity of 
different types of capitalism and of the class struggles taking place within 
them. As a result, the shape and the outcome of future class struggles was 
unpredictable and depended on the formation of coalitions for potentially 
hegemonic projects. 
Strategically, the acceptance of contingency required a focus on politics 
and on the forging of alliances at grassroots level and between existing 
organisations. The cooperation with and among the new social movements 
and non-governmental organisations was of central importance. In addition, 
neo- and post-Marxists called for a designing of concrete utopias with a 
modest character, taking on board ideas from concepts such as associative 
democracy, governance through institutions of civil society, and communi-
tarianism. Just like social democracy, these models stressed the extension 
of democracy to the social and the economic spheres; unlike social democ-
racy, they recommended various forms of de-linking from the capitalist 
economy. 
Additionally and on a more theoretical level, socialist intellectuals ap-
propriated many post-Marxist positions. Marxism had been ‘cut to size’ – 
and they applauded the diminution and welcomed the new climate of open-
ness which fostered the search for new visions and sources of inspiration. 
In this context, normative debates moved centre-stage. Ethical reflections 
became even more necessary; the adoption of a weak form of historical 
materialism not only reinforced the principle of contingency but abandoned 
– or at least qualified – the dialectical principle. Historical openness called 
for the intention to ‘make history’ and thus lent legitimacy to vision, fanta-
sy, creative thinking and open debate. 
Again, a difference between the socialist intellectuals and post-Marxists 
lay in the former group’s bleaker interpretation of international politics. In 
the late 1990s and after, this pessimism resulted in discussions on a ‘new 
imperialism’. In terms of other problems, socialist intellectuals were no 
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more inventive than post-Marxists: when it came to the question of how to 
realise grassroots self-emancipation within existing power relations, the 
former group’s critiques of post-Marxists’ belief that grassroots struggles 
could be replicated on the global level via existing institutions – from non-
governmental organisations to the United Nations – was certainly justified. 
The same goes for vague ideas of global democratic governance. However, 
whereas socialist intellectuals criticised these ideas on the one hand, on the 
other they embraced them through their trust in transnational (for example, 
European) constitutionalism and the possibility of grassroots-level de-
linking. Hence, just as in the case of social democracy, the disagreement 
between socialist and post-Marxist intellectuals concerned the field of 
interpretation, of how to perceive the political, social and economic world. 
These disagreements were concerned much less with which concrete strate-
gies and policies followed from these interpretations. 
 
 
2. BRITISH AND AMERICAN OR ANGLO-AMERICAN 
RE-ORIENTATIONS? 
 
The summaries which form the final sections of each of the analytical chap-
ters (Part III) have tried to explain the differences between the British and 
the U.S. re-orientations and debates with specificities of the political cul-
tures in Britain and the United States and of the respective political ‘subcul-
tures’ to which left intellectuals in both societies belong. All of the politi-
cal-academic journals analysed here published work from the opposite side 
(respectively) of the Atlantic, as well as from elsewhere. Furthermore, as 
many of the contributors had transnational professional careers, their publi-
cations necessarily reflect a blend of national and transnational influences. 
A comparison of sources within such a corpus can only yield tentative 
results and the following reflections are necessarily and correspondingly 
cautious. That being said, differences between British and U.S. reactions 
can, however, be deduced from the detailed analyses. 
The re-orientations of the British intellectual left mirror a specific so-
cialist tradition ranging from the socialist humanism of the ‘first New Left’ 
to the structural Marxism of the editorial core of New Left Review. For all 
of them, wherever they would position themselves in this field, the Cold-
War experience was central. It proved extremely difficult to unsubscribe 
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from a dichotomous East-West logic even if those intellectuals who had 
founded the journals deliberately engaged in attempts at finding a ‘third’ 
position. In political discourse among the British left, both the Soviet Union 
and the United States were closely associated with their international roles. 
The U.S.S.R. was evaluated positively for its contributions to the defeat of 
Fascism and to anti-colonial independence struggles. The United States was 
blamed for its imperialist postures and frequent acts of aggression against 
socialist or progressive states and movements beyond the Eastern Bloc. The 
fact that the society of the United States itself also constituted an arena of 
social struggles was certainly not ignored, but these struggles were seen as 
chanceless and regarded as playing only a minor role for socialist advance 
or retreat elsewhere. In other words, experiencing the omnipresence of the 
Cold War from a certain perspective and seeing it through British rather 
than U.S. eyes, encouraged the adoption of a quasi-Deutscherite position 
and forwarded the observation of the two ‘superpowers’ as relatively mono-
lithic entities subjugating the world to their Manichaean logic – although 
one of the two, the United States, bore more responsibility than the other. 
Whereas this view was arguably less complex than the perspective present-
ed by writers from within the United States, the British journals seemed to 
have a more familiar understanding of developments on the European con-
tinent. Their publications were more aware of the weaknesses of European 
Social Democracy as well as of the European unification project and they 
expressed a more profound pessimism about the social changes and recon-
figurations of political power following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. 
On the one hand, reactions and re-orientations in the American journals 
seemed to reflect a radical U.S. tradition rather than just a more narrowly 
defined socialist one. Radicals in the United States had always had a more 
pluralist perception of popular struggles and put their emphasis less exclu-
sively on the class conflict. On the other hand, the antagonism between 
former Trotskyist critics and former anti-Trotskyist supporters of the Soviet 
Union was still visible in the reactions to 1989/91, even if these positions 
had lost some of the immense relevance they had once had as a line of 
demarcation in the U.S. left. Considerations in the journals testified to the 
U.S. left’s traditional weakness which made several European features – 
such as the existence of working-class parties – look very attractive. Addi-
tionally, reflections revealed a self-conscious perception among intellectu-
als that they lived ‘at the heart of the beast’; a ‘beast’ which constituted one 
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of the most powerful actors in world politics – if not the single most power-
ful one – but at the same time continued to be one of the most unequal 
societies in the rich and technologically advanced economies of the West. 
Hence authors were keenly interested in both social struggles in the United 
States but also in the country’s role in international politics. In regard to the 
latter, the focus on the European arena of the Cold War was always com-
plemented by observations on developments in other parts of the world, for 
example, in Latin America and in the Middle East.
1
 It seems that writers in 
the United States also worked under the assumption that they lived in a 
post-revolutionary society which had developed valuable traditions and 
practices of participatory democracy, grassroots organisation and communi-
tarianism. Obviously these characteristics had contributed to the dominance 
of identity politics in discussions of the U.S. left and to the importance of 
‘constitutional activism’ in debates within the left.
2
 At the same time, U.S. 
left intellectuals viewed the centrally-organised and comparatively effective 
Western European welfare systems with a mixture of admiration and envy 
and appreciated the strength of their labour movements and progressive 
parties. 
The British and American journals did differ in terms of focus and re-
flection. However, these tendencies are in turn counterbalanced by a great 
degree of concurrence between British and U.S. intellectuals. Apart from 
many shared elements of British and U.S. political cultures and the close 
personal ties among contributors recruited from a global but even more 
from an English-speaking community of the intellectual left, some specific 
unifying elements need to be mentioned. Contributions to the British So-
cialist Register occasionally revealed the publication’s proximity to the 
United States – many of the writers were Americans and wrote from a U.S 
                                                             
1  The point is not that the British journals did not cover these issues – they cer-
tainly did. However, coverage of these conflicts and developments had less of 
an impact on writings about the United States, the Cold War, or the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc.  
2  Constitutional activism, a term originally designed to define a certain approach 
used by some Supreme Courts when interpreting the U.S. constitution, stands 
for a perception that it is a continuing task of liberals and radicals in the United 
States to guarantee that the constitution’s basic principles – freedom, equality, 
the pursuit of happiness – are not denied to any member or group of society. 
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perspective. Dissent evidenced a strong European influence, especially due 
to its roots in the originally Eastern European Jewish diaspora community 
in the United States, complemented by refugees from all over Europe in the 
mid-twentieth century. Finally, the English-speaking community of the 
intellectual left had its prestigious specialists who wrote on certain issues 
for more than one journal: the British Ralph Miliband’s reflections on dem-
ocratic socialism and the American Daniel Singer’s articles on ‘utopistics’ 
could serve as examples. All this makes generalising comparative state-
ments extremely difficult. Clearly, national political cultures and the nar-
rower intellectual-political environments in which the contributors acted 
played a decisive role for their reactions to the events of 1989/91, but so did 
the Anglo-American dimension of intellectual-political discourse. Never-
theless, the findings in the analytical chapters suggest that, during the peri-
od investigated, the British intellectual left expressed a deeper sense of loss 





                                                             
3  To say this with more authority would require another study which, on the basis 
of this one, would ask a representative sample of intellectuals about issues such 
as their relationships to British and U.S. political cultures, their understanding of 
Marxism, their interpretation of the Cold War, or their opinions on social de-
mocracy and post-Marxism. The study would be especially hindered by the 
problems that many representatives, particularly of the older generation – such 
as Howe, Magdoff, Miliband, Saville, Sweezy, or Thompson – have passed 
away since 1989; apart from a few exceptions, it is too late to ask the older gen-
eration. Still, tentatively one can observe generational differences: paradoxical-
ly, the younger generation of 1968 libertarian socialists seemed to feel more 
negatively affected than the older generation, many of whom had become mem-
bers or sympathisers of Communist Parties in the 1930s and 1940s. An addi-
tional problem arises once one tries to draw a line between the two generations. 
To use the example of New Left Review, the first editor, Stuart Hall, is generally 
counted as a representative of the first New Left, whereas Tom Nairn, one of the 
central figures of the re-organised New Left Review as it existed from 1962 on-
wards as a representative of the second New Left – a New Left that was still pre-
1968, but widely interpreted as the immediate forerunner of the 1968 movement. 
Both, however, were born in 1932. 
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3. OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION 
 
Almost immediately after 1989/91, radical and socialist intellectuals began 
to fear the consequences of a liberated and radicalised capitalism. This 
capitalism would not only increase the material and social polarisation in 
the relatively wealthy societies of Europe and North America; they also 
expected such a liberated capitalism to be incapable of dealing with exis-
tential tasks such as a global redistribution of wealth and the introduction of 
a mode of production that would end the destruction of the natural envi-
ronment. These fears turned out to be well justified. The version of capital-
ism which political economists define as ‘neo-liberal regime of accumula-
tion’ continued and intensified in Britain and the United States for most of 
the 1990s and 2000s, and the problems mentioned above were largely ig-
nored. It was only towards the end of the decade of the 2000s that this 
accumulation regime ran into serious self-created difficulties. Thus the 
suspicion among left intellectuals that 1989 constituted a turning point in 
the history of capitalism has been vindicated. 
The assumption that 1989/91 marked an ending for socialist intellectu-
als’ self-image as a distinguishable group seems also correct. Intellectuals 
had to borrow concepts and ideas designed by others and in their self-
perceptions this seemed to amount to a loss of distinction. To a certain 
extent, a two-generational project which united Western Marxism with 
1968 libertarianism had come to an end. From now on, the socialist intel-
lectuals in question could only formulate a certain political blend: a social 
democracy sensible to grassroots activities and struggles, and a post-
Marxism aware of power structures, hierarchies and material inequalities in 
society. Additionally, such a blend could point to unresolved global prob-
lems. Still, one could argue, that giving a voice to such a perspective was 
politically of critical importance. Why for many doing this seemed to be 
not enough, especially since the re-thinking and modifying of traditional 
Marxism had started a long time before 1989, is a difficult question. Part of 
the answer is that the complicated character of Marxism as a system of 
thought – a hybrid of theory and eschatology – had exploded. Further, 
following discourse theoretical considerations, one could argue that the 
legitimacy of Marxist or Marxian-inspired systems of thought or social 
theories and their abilities to contribute a specific discursive perspective to 
interpretations of the political world had been put into question. Socialist 
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intellectuals’ materialist version of critical theory became increasingly 
incompatible with hegemonic discursive frames, which claimed that the 
events of 1989/91 had deconstructed the whole edifice of socialist theory. 
Socialist intellectuals were forced to note that the expressive modalities 
through which they interpreted the collapse – for example, their analyses of 
the Cold War – were declared illegitimate. The formation of discursive 
concepts changed: what hitherto seemed logical – for example, that realistic 
alternatives to capitalism existed – now appeared illogical. Of course, intel-
lectuals could continue to express their perspectives. However, the chance 
to feed their specialist discourse into a politically relevant ‘interdiscourse’ 
had, as they had worried, declined. Radical intellectuals feared that ‘capital-
ism’s victory’ constituted an epochal break not only in geo-political and 
political-economic terms, but further, that this break entailed dimensions of 
a paradigmatic shift in intellectual, political and popular thinking as well – 
which delegitimised the most important elements of socialist intellectuals’ 
analytical approach. This rupture had dramatic biographical consequences 
for a generation of intellectuals who by 1989/91 looked back on at least two 
decades of political and intellectual activity. As a group, they suspected 
future isolation and anticipated that they would need to reinvent or re-orient 
themselves. Some did, over a considerable period of time. 
All journals continued their work. They commented on, reacted to, and 
criticised the political developments and problems of the 1990s and 2000s. 
Some new phenomena promised hope – for example, the emergence of the 
anti-globalisation movement which the journals arguably had helped to 
found with their interventions in the globalisation debate and which seemed 
to re-start radical protest in the West from the mid-1990s onwards. Other 
phenomena were far from promising, such as the militarisation of interna-
tional conflicts, heavily criticised by many contributors to the journals. 
However, this latter phenomenon opened up a new split among the socialist 
intellectuals because a minority began to defend interventions such as the 
U.N.-sanctioned war against Iraq in 1991. In this case, it was, surprisingly, 
Cold-War theorist Fred Halliday who lent his support (cf. Thompson 2007: 
152). In later years, especially after 2001, many close to the journal Dissent 
but also some contributors to the other publications, such as Norman Geras, 
exchanged many of their former convictions and became ‘left hawks’ or – 
in analogy to the once leftist ‘Cold-War intellectuals’ – “War-on-Terror 




 They extended the notion of forming an intellectual ‘rear-
guard’ to a supporting role for the defence of Western democracy and secu-
lar enlightenment values against terrorist attacks and ‘religious fundamen-
talism’. The majority, however, continued their critique of geo-politics and 
for some time engaged in analyses of a ‘new imperialism’. 
Organisationally, the British journals became increasingly ‘American-
ised’. Both New Left Review and Socialist Register often published more 
contributions from U.S. writers than from British or Canadians. To a certain 
extent, this shift has served to strengthen the trend towards ‘aloofness’, 
namely, the distance from political struggles in Britain, for which particu-
larly New Left Review is frequently criticised. The American journals 
seemed to remain closer to developments in U.S. politics. While the British 
journals had once fulfilled important functions for the movements which 
emerged as a consequence of the moment and spirit of 1968, they have now 
become, to use the phrase of Socialist Register’s co-editor Colin Leys, 
“journals in search of a movement”.
2
 
Soon, another generational change will take place. It remains to be seen 
whether the journals will retain their characteristics. Currently, many writ-
ers – again with the partial exception of Dissenters – oscillate between 
analytical radicalism, accompanied by pessimism, and an embrace of cen-
tre-left positions in ‘real politics’ – a combination which occasionally 
seems contradictory. Obviously, socialist intellectuals have adopted a 
homeless left existentialism: they continue to produce analytically sound 
critiques, but doubt their immediate political effectiveness. This mood of 
subdued and isolated perseverance has probably been best summarised by 
Göran Therborn as early as 1993: “Reality is not necessarily as we think. 
That’s why there is a need for empirical research. Society is not what it 
should be. That’s why some of us continue to be on the left.” (1993: 191) 
                                                             
1  I owe the term “War-on-Terror intellectuals” to Inderjeet Parmar. 
2  This phrase was proposed by Leys in personal conversation. 
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